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“…Whatever community, caste or creed you belong to you are now the [civil] servants of 
Pakistan. Servants can only do their duties and discharge their responsibilities by serving. 
Those days have gone when the country was ruled by the [civil] bureaucracy. It is people‟s 
Government, responsible to the people…do your duty as servants; you are not concerned 
with this political or that political party; that is not your business…you are not rulers. You do 
not belong to the ruling class; you belong to the servants.” [italics mine] 
 
                                                                                                     
                                                                                                       M.A. Jinnah‟s address to the  
                                                                                                        Gazetted officers, 
                                                                                                        25 March 1948 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
“…I would like to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the prescribed 
oath to you. “ I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to 
the Constitution and Dominion of Pakistan (mark the words Constitution and the Government 
of the Dominion of Pakistan) and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully serve in 
the Dominion of Pakistan [Armed] Forces and go within the terms of my enrolment wherever 
I my be ordered by air, land or sea and that I will observe and obey all command of any 
officer set over me…..”…if you have time enough you should study the Government of India 
Act, as adapted for use in Pakistan, which is our present Constitution, that the executive 
authority flows from the head of the Government of Pakistan, who is the Governor-General 
and, therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the 
sanction of the Executive Head. This is the legal position.” [italics mine] 
 
 
                                                                                       M.A. Jinnah‟s address to the  
                                                                                                        Officers of the Staff College, 
                                                                                                        Quetta, 14 June 1948 
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 1 
Introduction 
Historically and even in recent times it is society which, as a result of the  „social contract‟, 
gave birth  not only to the state but also its institutions.  Along with parliament, judiciary, 
police, and civil bureaucracy, the military is one of the most fundamental state institutions. 
The state, on explicit behalf of the society, delegated(s) its prerogatives or rather powers to 
the military to protect the former against any kind of external as well as internal threat or use 
of force. The very practice of delegating from the (society)-state to military enabled the 
former to assume the principal and the latter, to take the position of agent logically, 
democratically and even morally. Arguably then, this state-military equation must not be 
reversed into becoming  military-state combination until the former wills to do so 
consensually or on the basis of a majority principle.  
 
Ironically however, the military has attempted to intervene
1
 in politics throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. It often staged military coup d‟état. Therefore, most of 
Latin American, Asian and African states witnessed direct or indirect military interventions. 
Obviously, the military intervened in these counties for a number of reasons or „motives‟ i.e. 
national interests, sectional interests, corporate interests etc. (see Finer 1962:32-57). 
Nevertheless, over a period of time a majority of Latin America and Asian states, one way or 
other, preferred to practice the basic norms of democratic processes. The nature of civil-
military relations and the „transition‟ to democracy in these countries nevertheless remains a 
constant topic of interest for experts of this field (Linz 1990; Welsh 1994; Huntington 1991 
and 1995; Diamond 1992; O‟ Donnell 1973, 1978; Collier 1979; Croissant 2004). 
 
In the specific context of South Asia, the military preferred to intervene in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh‟s politics directly i.e. in the form of coups. In Nepal and Sri Lank, the military 
remains an important actor with certain institutional interests. Nevertheless, it abstained from 
taking over the reins of power overtly (Chadda 2000:221-235). Interestingly and 
paradoxically, the case of India within the South Asian context is quite unique in terms of its 
adherence to the norm and practice of democratic processes and parliamentary institutions. 
                                               
1
 The terms „military intervention‟ is frequently used in the literate on civil-military relations. See for instance, 
Finer. 1962. The Man on Horse Back; Huntington. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies; Nordlinger. 
1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments; Decalo. 1976. Coup and Army Rule in Africa: 
Studies in Military Style; Henry Bienen (ed.). 1968. The Military Intervenes: Case Studies ion Political 
Development; and Gavin Kennedy. 1976. The Military in the Third World.  
 
 
 2 
Furthermore, the consolidation of democracy in India and its opposite in Pakistan despite 
being part of British India- the two states inherited more or less similar state intuitions from 
the state of British India such as a civil bureaucracy, military, constituent assembly 
(parliament), and constitutional-legal norms and practices etc. – presents a contrasting 
situation to figure out the causes for its success in the former case and its failure in the case of 
the latter. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing it becomes imperative to generally 
understand and explain the dynamics of politics and state in Pakistan and specifically the 
role, if any, of the military in the country‟s politics.  
 
Objectives of the Research 
Military intervention in Pakistan has not been systematically and rigorously the focus of a 
great number of studies, to that we shall return in Chapter 2. A few studies- see Kukreja 
(1991:37-66; 2003:1-8), Siddiqa (2007:2-23) and Aziz (2008:23-37) - have attempted to 
theoretically explain military intervention in Pakistan‟s politics. These studies have marked 
the explanatory importance of models i.e. Kukreja and typologies of civil-military relations 
i.e. Siddiqa, in South Asia especially Pakistan. Nevertheless, as we shall explain later, even 
these accounts suffer from many lapses. For example, they have not considered the 
importance of „context and rationality‟ in their model and typology building (Mitra 2006; see 
also 1999). Moreover, they have tended to de-emphasize the issues related to comparability 
of two or more different cases. 
 
Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to build a model of civil-military relations 
applicable to the case of Pakistan. This model would help us explain the cause(s), and mode 
of military intervention as well as the nature of military rule. Moreover, the model would 
incorporate the necessary assumptions of agency theory and rational choice-neo 
institutionalism thus marking a departure from structural, path-dependent, 
irrational/conspiratorial and often acontextual descriptions- this shall be explained in detail in 
Chapter 2.  
 
Historical Overview 
South Asia as a geographical entity has always been a historical reality. Indeed, the tradition 
of the state in South Asia dates back to 2500 BC- a period when the local ruled the land 
according to their own indigenous rules of the game. Over centuries, the region of South Asia 
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witnessed the intrusion of Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Afghans, Kushnas, Huns, Parthians, Turks 
and European especially the British. The external actors‟ interventions in the local, however, 
could not innovate a separate state system; rather they, due to the particular nature of the state 
and its rules, preferred to assimilate with the local. Thus, the indigenous statecraft remained 
intact. Nevertheless, the exogenous actors introduced various institutions which were 
previously non-existent (Kulke and Rothermund 1986:89; Rothermund 2006:53; Habib 2001: 
9-12; 2002: 50-56; see also Hegewald and Mitra 2008). 
 
As a point of departure, the Moghul state started to decline due to a multiplicity of variables 
The forces of colonialism started replacing the Moghul state structure gradually. On the other 
hand, in the wake of the Moghul decline, the Punjab was conquered and governed by 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He raised his own army mainly comprising Punjabi Sikhs. However, 
the East India Company regime was able to annex the Punjab in 1849. Therefore, the next 
decade saw de-militarization of the defeated Ranjit‟s army. The 1857 mutiny, however, 
forced the British to re-evaluate the strategic importance of the Punjab as well as the Punjabis 
who had earlier supported the „military-fiscal state‟ of the company rule. Thus, in 1880s soon 
after the Second Afghan War, the colonial masters began to think in terms of the so called 
„great game‟- the Russian threat. In this context, the „martial races‟ concept was developed by 
the British authorities to „divide and rule‟ not only the armed forces but also India. 
Subsequently, the punjabicization of the colonial military initiated the recruitment of Punjabi 
Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Pathans of north India- the so called military districts- into the 
restructured Bengal Army (Yong 2005:19-51). 
 
This process of punjabicization, on the one hand, produced a „culture of militarism‟ in the 
colonial Punjab. On the other hand, it also gave birth to the concept and practice of “canal 
colonies” in terms of a process of “land allocation” by the colonial masters to win the 
“loyalty” of the soldiering classes during the 1890s. In 1900 the Land Alienation Act was 
passed by the state to stop land slipping out of landed-feudals‟2 hands. Coincidentally, this 
landed-feudal class consisted of ex-soldiers, pensioners and relatives of in-service army 
                                               
2 The phenomenon and practice of „feudalism‟ is historically (and ontologically) a European export to the 
society (and state) of South Asia with the colonization of the region by especially the British. To locate this 
locally would be historically fallacious as is often upheld by many. Besides, the present study does not 
subscribe, as shall be explained later, to a feudalistic view of Pakistan state and politics. 
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personnel. Moreover, from 1914-1919, the Punjab provided a majority of recruits to 
safeguard the colonial interests in Asia, Africa and Europe (Yong 2005: 90-108).  
 
Nevertheless, the noticeable fact is that all these developments happened under the civilian 
supervision of the British authority structure comprising a Governor General (G-G), the 
viceroy and the civil bureaucracy. This power system was answerable, via the Secretary of  
State to the British parliament in London. The civil bureaucracy was an integral part of this 
authority structure. Also, the state acted as an interventionist force to pursue its capitalist 
interests. In this respect, it was the bureaucracy which enjoyed an „arbitrary‟ position in terms 
of bureaucratic paternalism. The landed-feudal‟s role was effectively reduced by the state-led 
economic mechanism affected and regulated, in turn, by the market.  In addition, the state 
penetrated and influenced civil society through the civil bureaucracy (Rothermund 1983: xvi-
xxi; Waseem 1994:27-28). 
 
Nonetheless, the war years (1914-1918) brought a close collaboration between the civil and 
military authorities, giving birth to the concept of “militarized bureaucracy”. The post-war 
chaotic economic situation along with the political uprising i.e. the Khilafat movement etc, 
threatened the socio-economic balance in the rural-military districts. As a result, the civil-
military cooperation in terms of the Punjab Soldiers‟ Boards was further consolidated (Yong 
2005: 141-182). However, the nationalist movement gained momentum during the inter-war 
period. At the same time, the Raj was political too. In revising the 1909 Morley-Mitno 
reforms, it rewarded the Indians with limited representation by introducing Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms in 1919. However, in post-reforms India, both the Congress and the 
League failed to make political inroads into the Punjab which provided sixty percent of the 
Indian army by 1927. Instead, the Punjab based Unionist Party, an alliance of Hindus, 
Muslims and Sikhs landed-feudals, held on to power till the last days of the Raj. The Unionist 
party clearly represented the so called „praetorian oligarchy‟ especially in the „military 
districts‟ of northern Punjab (Yong 2005: 241-280). Importantly then, the consequent 
Partition in August 1947 of the British Indian state into independent countries of India and 
Pakistan brought new variables, politico-economic, strategic, ideological etc., into the 
limelight.  
 
After Partition in August 1947, Pakistan opted for a strong centre to counter regionalism 
(Jalal 1995:85). Islam was cited as well to bind the Bengalis together (Alavi 1988). The 
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bureaucracy was assigned the task of state and nation building. Mohammad Ali Jinnah 
became the Governor General and Liaquat Ali Khan acted as Prime Minister. The pre-
Partition Constituent Assembly was to make the constitution (Alavi 1990). The Secretary 
General of Pakistan, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, was a bureaucrat who invented a „planning 
committee‟ which was supposed to build the nation-state. During the process of nation-state 
construction, the secretary general bypassed the prime minister and his cabinet, thus paving 
the way for bureaucratic authoritarianism.
3
 The military, a well disciplined and coherent 
organization, was still commanded by colonial officers i.e. Masservey, Gracey. 
 
Jinnah being sick was dependent on his secretary general whereby the Prime Minister Liaquat 
Ali Khan did not normally attend the cabinet meetings due to weak eye sight. Thus, the 
secretary general as a head of the bureaucracy managed the military affairs as well (see Alavi 
1990). As India went for princely states integration into the Indian Union, so did Pakistan. In 
a geo-strategically critical princely state of Jammu & Kashmir, it was the tribesmen from the 
Frontier province of Pakistan who invaded the valley supposedly to liberate the oppressed 
Kashmiris from the Dogra rule, in October 1947. Later, there was a well planned military 
operation by the Pakistan army to supposedly liberate Kashmir from the India occupation. 
The subsequent events led to Indo-Pak war (Ali 2002:235; Chadda 2000: 196). The religious 
parties especially Jamat-i-Islami (JI) supported the military action against „socialist India‟ 
(Cohen 1984:37). 
 
From 1951-58 the bureaucrats and the military ruled the roost in a joint venture. The 
„alliance‟ politics further added to the military‟s power (Chadda 2000:29). By 1954 the 
military had assumed a powerful position within the military-bureaucracy equation to the 
extent that the military was invited by the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, a 
bureaucrat, to intervene in country‟s politics (Sayeed 1967:76-86). On the other hand, the 
religious elements raised the issue of „Ahmadiyya‟ which led to massive riots especially in 
Lahore in 1953 (Chaudhri 1973:181-216). Resultantly, the country observed its first martial 
law in three major cities. Later on, the country was able to have its first constitution in 1956.  
However, it was abrogated by martial law two years later. 
 
                                               
3 The present research does not conceptually/theoretically agree to a majority of existing interpretations of 
politics, especially the nature, pattern and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Instead, the study 
shall explain such and many other similar episodes and events with the help of its model. 
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The „Ayub Khan era‟ only brought Yahya Khan in power in March 1969 (Ziring 1970:109-
113). He along with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is held responsible for the break-up of Pakistan in 
December 1971. Bhutto though attempted to curtail the power of both military and the civil 
bureaucracy yet he resorted to the military to crush the nationalist Baloch (Chadda 2000:31-
32). Moreover, he appeased the religious forces, which were deeply influenced and 
indoctrinated by the events in the Middle East (Roy 2004:73; Kepel 2002:63-73). In addition, 
it is widely believed that Pakistan‟s nuclear program was initiated by Bhutto to reduce 
military‟s influence in politics (Cohen 2004:140). Nevertheless, Bhutto‟s regime ended with 
another overt military intervention by another army chief in July 1977. 
 
The Afghan Jihad served Zia till his death in August 1988. The religious parties gained much 
politically and economically during this period. Politically, Zia‟s real target was the Pakistan 
People‟s Party of late Bhutto (Chadda 2000:36). In short, the Eighth Amendment to 1973 
Constitution, militarization, state-led Islamization and drug trafficking are among Zia‟s 
legacy. Last but not least, the „decade of democracy‟- the 1990s- witnessed dismissal of five 
ministries. Overall, the nuclear tests in May 1998, the Lahore Declaration and Kargil War 
(1999) are a few major events of this decade. As regards the transition to democracy, in 
October 1999, General  Pervez Musharraf‟s „armored democracy‟ replaced Sharif‟s „Muslim 
democracy‟(Shah 2003; Nasr 2005). Besides, the religious political parties along with 
Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) reaped political benefits under the 
tutelage of General Pervez Musharraf. 
 
To summarize, the historical overview presents an amalgam of different schools of thought 
on the nature and „structure‟ of the British state, its civil-military bureaucracy, the Partition 
and the „post-colonial‟ state of Pakistan. Importantly, this section attempted to highlight the 
nature, patterns and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan as presented by the 
existing accounts- see Table 1 on the next page. However, the present study tends to 
theoretically and empirically differ from such structuralist-essentialist accounts as shall be 
presented and analyzed in Chapter 2. 
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Table 1 Chronology of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan 
 
  
15 Aug 1947- 11 Sep 1948   Jinnah ruled as the country‟s first Governor-General 
15 Aug 1947- 16 Oct 1951   Liaquat Ali Khan served as the first Prime Minister    
14 Sep 1948- 17 Oct 1951    Khawaja Nazimuddin served as Governor-General 
19 Oct 1951- 6 Oct 1955    Ghulam Mohammad, a bureaucrat, assumed   
                                                                         Pakistan‟s Governor-Generalship (resigned in 1955) 
19 Oct 1951- 17 April 1953   Nazimuddin served as country‟s Prime Minister 
17 April 1953- 11 Aug 1955   Mohammad Ali Bogra got appointed as PM 
6 Oct 1955- 23 March 1956   Maj-Gen Iskander Mirza ruled as Governor-General 
23 Mar 1956- 27 Oct 1958    Iskander Mirza ruled as Pakistan‟s first President 
11 Aug 1955- 12 Sep 1956   Chaudhri Mohammad Ali served as Prime Minister 
12 Sep 1956- 11 Oct 1957    H.S. Suharwardy got appointed as PM 
18 Oct 1957- 11 Dec 1957    I.I. Chundriger was appointed as Prime Minister 
16 Dec 1957- 7 Oct 1958    Malik Feroz Khan Noon served as Prime Minister 
7 Oct 1958- 8 June 1962    General Ayub Khan ruled as Pakistan‟s first Chief-  
       Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)   
27 Oct 1958*- 25 March 1969   General Ayub Khan ruled as President 
25 Mar 1969- 20 Dec 1971   Gen Yahya Khan  ruled as CMLA, and President** 
20 Dec 1971- 21 Apr 1972   Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ruled as (the only) civilian CMLA. 
                                                                        Bhutto became President on 20 Dec. 1971 and remained     
                                                                                       in that office under an Interim Constitution.  
14 Aug 1973- 5 July 1977    Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto remained Pakistan‟s Prime Minister 
       under the framework of the 1973 Constitution.  The  
 country returned to a parliamentary system. 
                                              
14 August 1973- 16 Sep 1978   Fazal Illahi Chaudhry served as President  
5 July 1977- 30 December 1985   General Zia-ul-Haq ruled as CMLA 
16 Sep 1978- 17 Aug 1988   General Zia ruled as President of the country 
23 Mar 1985- 29 May 1988   Mohammad Khan Junejo (PML) served in the office  
      of Prime Minister. The PM was dismissed by President- 
                                                                                       General Zia-ul-Haq under 58(2)(b). The National  
      Assembly along with Provincial Assemblies were  
      dissolved by the President. No caretaker Prime Minister   
      was appointed.                                                 
17Aug 1988- 19 July 1993   Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a bureaucrat, served as  
      President (both Acting and Regular) 
2 Dec 1988- 6 Aug 1990    Benazir Bhutto served as Prime Minister. President 
      Ishaq enacted 58(2(b) to dismiss the Bhutto Government 
      The National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were  
                                                                        dissolved by the President. 
6 Aug 1990- 6 Nov 1990    Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, an anti-PPP politician, was  
      appointed as Caretaker Prime Minster by the  President 
Nov 1990- 18 Apr 1993    Nawaz Sharif served as Prime Minister. On 18 April he 
      was dismissed and the National and Provincial Assemblies 
      were dissolved by President Ishaq under 58(2)(b). 
18 Apr 1993- 26 May 1993   A caretaking Cabinet was headed by Prime Minister 
      Balkh Sher Mazari. However, Pakistan‟s Supreme Court  
      judged the Presidential Order (of dismissal) un-  
      constitutional and restored the Sharif Government on 26 
      May 1993. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister and the  
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      President resigned on 18 July 1993. New elections were  
      called by (the Acting) President.***   
18 July 1993- 19 Oct 1993    Moinuddin Qureshi, a banker, was appointed Caretaking      
       Prime Minister. He tried to reform the economy. 
19 Oct 1993- 5 Nov 1996    Benazir Bhutto remained as Prime Minister. The Bhutto  
      Government was dismissed by President Farooq Leghari   
       (13 Nov 1993- 2 Dec 1997) through 58(2)(b). The  
      President dissolved the National Assembly. Later, the 
      Provincial Assemblies were dissolved also.     
5 Nov 1996- 17 Feb 1997    Malik Mairaj Khalid served as Caretaker Prime Minister 
17 Feb 1997- 12 Oct 1999    Nawaz Sharif acted as Prime Minister. Sharif restored the  
       parliamentary form of government through the Thirteen  
Amendment (1997).  Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, a retired 
judge, served as President (1Jan 1998- 20 June 2001).  
12 Oct 1999- 21 Nov 2002   General Pervez Musharraf ruled as the Chief Executive of  
Pakistan. Form 20 June 2001 to 18 August General 
Musharraf remained President of the country. 
21 Nov 2002- 26 June 2004 Zafrullah Khan Jamali, a politician from Balochistan, 
served as Prime Minister.      
30 Jun 2004- 20 Aug 2004    Chaudhri Shujaat Hussain, head of PML-Q, served as 
 Prime Minister, though for a brief period of time. 
20 Aug 2004- 15 Nov 2007   Shaukat Aziz, a banker, served as Prime Minister 
 
 
Source:  Data gathered from the existing accounts on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. 
* General Ayub Khan was appointed Prime Minister by President Iskander Mirza. However, the General and 
CMLA ousted the latter the same day, and became President. 
** General Yahya Khan assumed Presidentship on 31 March 1969. The former handed over power(s) to 
Zulfiqar Bhutto on 20 December 1971. 
*** Wasim Sajjad, Chairman of the Senate, served as Acting President from 19 July to 13 November 1993.     
     Also, he served in this capacity from 2 December to 1 January 1998.  
 
  
The Case of Pakistan 
The phenomenon and practice of military intervention in Pakistan has, over the decades, 
drawn considerable scholarly attention (Alavi 1988, 1990; Jalal 1988; Rizvi 2000; Waseem 
1994; Shafqat 1997; Cheema 2002; Siddiqa 2007; Kukreja 1991; Cohen 1984; Moore 1969; 
LaPorte 1969). Each of these scholars, undoubtedly, made an effort to understand and explain 
the problem from his/her respective theoretical perspective. However, none has, as shall be 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, managed to rigorously address why the military intervenes in 
Pakistan‟s politics in the first place. Moreover, the matrixes and models, which some of these 
accounts rely on, are limited in nature and scope.  
 
In addition, the case of Pakistan with respect to military intervention and its possible 
causes(s) has been overlooked by this literature with a possible exception of Kukreja. 
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However, the nature, character and scope of her „composite model‟ urges one to raise 
questions about its applicability to the Pakistan‟s case since the latter is contextually different 
from India and Bangladesh. 
 
Therefore, the present study has endeavored to build its own model of civil-military relations 
grounded in the assumptions of agency theory and rational choice-neo institutionalism. In this 
respect, it assumes that the actors i.e. military, civil bureaucracy, politicians and judiciary, are 
inherently capable of making things happen (agency). Moreover, it is assumed that the actors 
are inherently rational with a clear conception of costs and benefits, and that they given the 
choice(s) tend to maximize their interests i.e. politico-economic (rational choice).  
 
In addition, the thesis assumes actors to be institutions with their own institutional values and 
interests, and with the ability of playing a bridge role between the society and state in terms 
of articulating the former‟s interests and initiation of policies. Nevertheless, the contextuality 
of Pakistan‟s case is kept central to the model since Kukreja‟s model and Siddiqa‟s matrix 
have over-looked it. Besides, it is argued that the primary function of theoretical model, 
which the thesis attempts to design, is to enable us explain military intervention in Pakistan‟s 
politics- itself a good case of developing state/ transitional society. Moreover, the 
comparative potential of the present case, at least at the level of analysis, may also be relevant 
to other developing states. 
 
What is new? 
As is explained in the preceding section there is a dearth of a proper theory- guided research 
of civil-military relations of Pakistan as well as the phenomenon and practice of military 
intervention in politics. This study attempts to fill this gap. In this respect, it builds its own 
model of Pakistan‟s CMR which attempts to theorize the empirical data comprehensively- 
sans compromising agency and rationality of the actors and the contextuality of the case. 
Moreover, within the case of Pakistan, the present research, unprecedently, assumes the five 
events of military coups d‟état as contextually different cases whereby each case is 
methodologically accorded an analytical narrative treatment. In this respect, the study 
assumes coup as a dependent variable which is to be causally explained by the model with the 
help of two independent/explanatory variables, namely, agency A- shirk or work- and agency 
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B- (preferring) own versus larger interest(s).
4
 This, in itself, it is argued, contributes to the 
existing body of knowledge. 
 
Furthermore, the present research tends to ontologically distance itself from the existing 
literature on Pakistan‟s CMR, its general politics, the state of democracy etc. Because the 
overwhelming thrust of the existing work is on the „structure‟ one way or the other, whereby 
the reality is over-essentalized, the actors‟ agency is depreciated; context compromised; and 
importantly de-rationalized (this shall be explained in detail in Chapter 3).  
 
Last but not least, in stark contrast to  exiting accounts, which  rely heavily and often without 
reason, on sociological, historical and economic perspectives, the present research primarily 
centers upon the political; it logically believes in the precedence and centrality of politics 
over other variables. However, this is not meant to demote or devalue the significance of 
other perspectives. Where possible and plausible, the study takes the non-political into 
account, though not at the cost of the former. 
 
Data and its sources 
This research has primarily employed qualitative data, obtained from both primary as well as 
secondary sources (see bibliography). Nevertheless, it has a quantitative dimension also in 
terms of the qualitative-interpretative analysis of the various governmental sources e.g. 
Economic Survey of Pakistan, and semi/non-governmental reports and documents which 
contain quantitative data. Secondary sources used during the course of this research, consist 
of a large number of books, journal articles (including those of various think-tanks such as 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute etc.), newspaper articles and internet sources. Primary 
quantitative data was selected from various reports and documents of the Ministry of Finance, 
the Election Commission of Pakistan, National Accountability Bureau of Pakistan, Ministry 
of Population and Welfare, Federal Bureau of Statistics. As regards data from non-
governmental organizations, the reports of Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and 
Transparency (PILDAT) are treated as primary source.   
 
                                               
4 According to this research, only Mazhar Aziz (2008: 59-68) took different variables, though least explicitly, to 
explain the military coups in Pakistan. The present study strongly disagrees with his selection of the cases and 
the manner i.e. sans any model, they are made sense of. See Chapter 3 in this respect. Besides, with respect to 
the assumption of agencies A and B, see the footnotes of page 13 and 14. 
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Methodology 
The qualitative interpretative methodology of explanation is deemed useful to identify 
variables that signify relationships between explanatory variables, and to investigate causal 
patters which are difficult to be found through quantitative analysis. Also, the identification 
of causal mechanisms does not preclude the investigation of causal effects, at least where the 
data and the existing theoretical framework allow. The main challenge to the present research 
problem is the large numbers of possible causal forces, or statistically, independent variables. 
These are identified in Chapter 2. The rigorous- in other words logical and empirical- reliance 
of this study on non-structure, non-identity and non-conspiracy aspects of civil-military 
relations has significantly helped to determine the numbers of the independent variables. 
However, in this respect it is argued that the estimation of the explanatory value of one 
particular variable among others is, by default, an intricate subject methodologically. 
Importantly, socially complex realities- in our case the interaction between the civilian and 
military or among various civilian actors- further intrigues a researcher in terms of how to 
limit and specify the variables- both dependent and independent (Feaver 1999). Moreover, 
from a foundationalist ontological perspective, complex social realities continue taking place 
despite and irrespective of a researcher‟s specific model or theory to understand and/or 
explain them. Nevertheless, logically and realistically, the presence of a model and/or a 
theory equips instrumentally not only a researcher but also the beneficiaries of his/her 
research to understand, if not explain, the reality scientifically with the added advantage of 
generalizibility.  
 
Case studies, in this respect, are usually considered a way out of such perplexing situations 
and questions. The origin of the case study method is generally associated with the principles 
of „agreement‟ and „difference‟ as expounded by J.S. Mill (Anckar 2008; Clark et al 2009:28-
31; Ragin 1987:39). These methods, however, may not be taken for granted as they are 
certainly liable to intrinsic liabilities which Mill himself had indicated. Moreover, of the two 
the method of agreement is, arguably, the more problematic in terms of its assuming a 
similarity of outcome of multiple independent variables on a certain dependent variable, thus 
adjudicating the cause to the former. However, in some socio-cultural contexts, mono-
causality could be considered as a satisfactory explanation and that too in recognition of the 
fact that it is seldom a single variable causes an effect. Also, when it comes to 
multiple/conjectural causality, the method of agreement seems incapable of handling it.  
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On the other hand, the method of difference focuses on different outcomes of the dependent 
variable in multiple cases and tends to find corresponding variance in an independent 
variable. If the two cases, as per the logic, have different outcomes in terms of the dependent 
variable, but demonstrate identical values for a specific independent variable, then the 
independent variable in question cannot be a sufficient cause of the outcome. However, this 
method requires non-concrete assumptions to provide non-spurious inferences as Mill himself 
has indicated. In addition, Andrew Bennet has noted that the causal relations under 
investigation, under the method of difference, „must be deterministic regularities, involving 
conditions that are either necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome.‟ (Bennett 1999).  In 
the case of civil-military relations and particularly the occurrence of a military coup d‟état 
such conditions are not necessarily present which raises the issue of multiple/conjectural 
causality. Coups rarely rest upon the singularity of a variable. Often the coup makers point to 
a multiplicity of factors, as certainly has been the case in Pakistan. 
 
Interestingly, the current body of literature on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations is silent with 
respect to nominating specific cause(s) of any coup. Importantly, the majority of studies have 
tended to view the 1969 coup as a „continuation‟ of military rule initiated by General Ayub 
Khan (Siddiqa 2007; Aziz 2008). Moreover, the staging of 2007 coup by General Pervez 
Musharraf is viewed from similar lenses- see the Table below regarding the events of coup in 
Pakistan.  
 
Table 2 Coup Occurrences in Pakistan 
Source: Data gathered from the existing literature on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. 
                                               
5
 The March 1969 coup was technically against the military‟s own civilianized regime led by General Ayub 
Khan. The November coup was staged at a time when the civilianized regime led by PM Shaukat Aziz had 
almost completed its tenure. However, neither the Prime Minister nor the assemblies was dismissed. 
 
Coup  Date and Year Coup Maker(s) Dismissal
5
 
1 7 October 1958          President Iskander Mirza and 
         General Ayub Khan 
PM Feroz Khan Noon 
2 23 March 1969          General Yahya Khan - 
3 5 July 1977          General Zia-ul-Haq PM Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto 
4 12 October 1999          General Pervez Musharraf PM Nawaz Sharif 
5 3 November 
2007 
         General Pervez Musharraf - 
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This fact, it is argued, further complicates our case as one of the primary objectives of the 
present research is to possibly determine the common cause(s) to all cases of coup d‟état  
which are spatially, temporally or better contextually different from each other. This 
difference of contextuality further raises not only questions about variability and causality but 
importantly of comparability: which are the independent variables which may have caused, 
for example, the 1958 coup and how may this case be compared with 1969 or 1977 coup 
cases over a specific period of time and that too with a considerable difference of context and 
actors? As a possible solution to this problem, the individual case study (i.e. 1958 coup) 
involving process-tracing, facilitates a detailed explanation of the causal mechanisms at play 
in each case. In this respect, Mill‟s method of agreement is generally assumed to make a 
variable-driven study; also, his method of difference identifies an independent variable 
thought to have caused the dependent variable (Anckar 2008).  
 
As the foregoing suggests Mill‟s methods are instrumental to assume explanatory and 
dependent variables, it seems not inappropriate then to make a methodological point of 
departure based on Mills‟s analogy. Therefore, the thesis, in order to casually explain the 
phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan‟s politics, selects five units of observation of 
military coups d‟état- 1958, 1969, 1977, 1999 and 2007 (Pennings, Keman and 
Kleinnijenhuis 2006:9). Moreover, in order to qualitatively explain each case, the study 
identifies its dependent and independent variables as below:  
 
Dependent Variable: 
• Military coup d‟état 
 
Independent Variables:
6
 
▪ Working or shirking (agency A) 
▪ Own versus larger interests (agency B)7 
                                               
6 Independent variables are deduced from two different theories of agency, and have been applied in two   
different forms in the study.  For a deeper insight into the concepts of „working/shirking‟ (agency A) and „own 
versus larger interests‟ (agency B), and the manner they are incorporated into the model, see page 61. Besides, 
since the present study ontologically distances itself from normative and structural perspectives- as shall be 
explained in Chapters 2 and 3 in details- therefore factors such as religion, identity, ideology, (military) class, 
external threat etc., are excluded as independent variables. In addition, the study would attempt to establish that 
even on empirical grounds it is instructive not to take such variables into account to explain the occurrence of 
coup(s) - and for that matter military intervention- in Pakistan. See Chapter 3, in this respect.  
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Nevertheless, keeping in mind not only the historical nature of the selected cases e.g. 1958 or 
1969 coup,- which also serves as dependent variable- and concerns of contextuality, the 
present study tends to abstain from applying Mill‟s methods in terms of a „most similar 
systems design‟ and „most different systems design‟. Instead, the method of analytic 
narrative (AN) is accorded a preference due to reasons, beside historicity and contextuality, 
which are described in the following.  
 
An explicit discussion of AN‟s advantages and disadvantages starts with Analytic Narratives 
(1998) edited by Robert Bates, Avner Grief, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and 
Barry Weingast. It contains five chapters in which each contributor proposes an analytic 
narrative of some puzzling historical phenomenon- i.e. the stability of peace between clans of 
12th century Genoa, the institutional foundation of US federalism, the rise and fall of the 
International Coffee organization, etc.-, and an introduction in which the authors together 
explore broad methodological rules for building an analytic narrative (Alexandrova 2009).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
The analytic narratives‟ proposal involves choosing a puzzle, then building a model- to 
explicate the logic of the explanation and to elucidate the key decision points and 
possibilities- and finally evaluating the model through comparative studies and testable 
generalization that the model generates (Levi 2004:105). The method of analytic narrative 
favors parsimonious models. All narratives got to have an anchor(s) that are explicit in order 
to make it easier for critique and challenges to be made than in more configurative accounts. 
In comparative terms, this is a different strategy than the establishment of a general model 
from which is derived testable hypotheses, explored with appropriate cases (Croissant 2004). 
Another point of difference between AN and other methods relates to the former‟s reliance on 
the assumptions of rational choice and the logic of game theory that generate hypotheses, but 
the models are refined in interplay with the detailed elements of the narrative. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
7 Own versus larger interests are assumed as an agency due to the following: a) an actor(s) is capable of 
preferring own to a larger interest or vice versa, thus denoting its agency; b) having worked or shirked (which is 
an interest in itself) an actor(s) tends to maximize its (politico-economic) interests. Especially having shirked in 
terms of staging a coup, the military, while marking its agency (B), maximizes its political and economic 
interests. This process of interest maximization even empirically points to the fact that the military- among other 
actors- is inherently capable of preferring its own to larger interest. See Chapters 4, 5 and 7 for conceptual as 
well as empirical details.  
Besides, it is not inappropriate to mention here that A and B shall not represent Principal and Agents in the 
thesis. Rather, they differentiate between two agencies: working or shirking (agency A) and preferring own to 
larger interests (agency B). 
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Moreover, whereas the claim to generalizibility of findings is clearer when hypotheses are 
deduced from general theory, the explanations of specific instances may be less compelling 
and realistic. This is a common critique of the rational choice application in comparative 
political science and one that the analytic narrative approach attempts to address (Levi 
2004:213-214). In addition, both rational choice and analytic narrative approaches has been 
criticized for conducting „curve-fitting‟ exercises whereby the model is modified to “fit the 
facts”. Nevertheless, the exponents of AN have, in its defense, highlighted its significance in 
terms of its emphasis on iterative process- which resembles process tracing mentioned earlier 
in this section- and novel facts that the old model did not recognize or capture. This, in turn, 
help refine the model (Alexandrova 2009; Bates 2000). Importantly, this method differs from 
other meta-narrative and qualitative analyses such as modernization theorists etc., when it 
comes to locating and exploring mechanisms that shape the strategic interaction between 
and/or among actors, their preferences and subsequent actions (Alexandrova 2009; Bates et al 
1998:12). 
 
As the foregoing has marked the analytical capabilities of the AN, both as a method and 
approach, this study therefore chooses to utilize it. In this respect, with the help of primary 
i.e. interviews, coup text(s), reports etc., and secondary sources i.e. books, journal articles 
etc., the aim is to understand and explain the central actors‟ interests, preferences, their 
evaluation of alternatives, the information they possessed, the expectations they formed, the  
strategies adopted. The pieces are put together, using the technique of process tracing in order 
to construct an analytic narrative that accounts for the particular outcome of interest: shirking 
or working (agency A), and preferring own interest to larger i.e. national, interest (agency B). 
Extracting the processes that produce the outcomes of interest, it is posited, will capture the 
essence of the narrative (Mitra 2006:9-12).  
 
In addition, as is mentioned above the interviews are used as primary source of information in 
order to qualitatively explain the variables in a given unit of observation, it seems appropriate 
then to describe the method for their conduct, transcription and interpretation. To begin with, 
35 semi-structured interviews with the elite i.e. military personnel, civil bureaucrats, 
politicians, and other stakeholders i.e., industrialists, lawyers etc., were conducted. The 
method adopted for interviews was that of the „snowball system‟ (Goldstein 2002; Rivera et 
al 2002) given a relatively small sample-size, political complexities (the lawyers‟ movement 
was going on when I started approaching the interviewees during February-April 2008), 
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status and time constraints on the key respondents
8
. In this respect, it seems necessary to 
mention that all contacts with interviewees were established personally. They were called 
before hand to check their availability. On the appointed day, before the start of the interview 
the respondent was briefed about the general assumptions and aim of the study. Furthermore, 
care was taken to conduct interviews in a suitable environment. A majority of interviewees 
were found to be self-confident and expressive. At times and where relevant, awareness was 
shown about their past writings, actions or decisions in order to communicate a level of 
professionalism.  
 
The interviews were partly standardized and mostly open-ended. The advantages of an open 
approach, it is argued, outweighed the disadvantages due to the fact that the Pakistani elite 
tends to fluctuate, stretch, and exaggerate during conversation (Aberbach et al 1975; 
Schuman and Presser 1981:79-110). Moreover, an ideal and rigid questionnaire was deemed 
to be helpful in trying to understand the level and degree of the elite and stakeholders‟ 
opinion/explanation of civil-military relations especially regarding cause(s) of the coups. All 
interviews but one, were conducted in person with the help of a guideline; the guideline fixed 
the subject matter and proposed specific questions for each.  Each interview lasted between 
45 minutes to 2 hours. 30 out of the 35 were mostly conducted in English; the remaining 5 
were conducted in Urdu in which the author of this study is fluent. One interview was 
completely tape-recorded with the permission of the respondent; two were partially tape-
recorded since the recorder broke down due to technical faults. Nevertheless, handwritten 
notes in each case were carefully taken and were elaborated upon from memory right after 
the interviews. In addition, all of the interviews were properly transcribed. 
 
The interview results were analyzed at an aggregate level, in the form of a number of clusters 
which were related to the issue areas formulated in the questionnaire (see Appendix A). 
However, since during the course of the interviews, certain topics gained preference over 
others, and because the clusters are related to the analysis rather than the questions, they were 
                                               
8  A few key respondents especially from the military excused to be interviewed on the appointed day. In the 
author‟s perception the reason for not giving an interview had little to do with the sample of questions used to 
conduct an interview (see Appendix A). Rather, the major factor indicating such an attitude is perceived to be 
political in nature. Since the lawyers‟ movement was going at its peak- and the former had openly criticized the 
military‟s political and economic role in Pakistan- the respective respondents felt uncomfortable to sharing their 
views on military‟s political economy. For instance, in two cases, an arrangement was made with retired 
generals, one of them a former chief of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), through a journalist friend of the author. 
On the appointed day however, the respondents politely apologized lest their views should be leaked to the 
electronic media which the author‟ friend belonged to.  
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to be the same. The clusters are: 1) political system of Pakistan; 2) dynamics of civil-military 
relations; 3) role of religion in politics; 4) contemporary politics and the state. Furthermore, 
three types of codes as distinguished by Aberbach and Rockman (2002) were used for the 
purpose of this study. In this respect, Manifest coding items involve direct responses to 
particular questions such as: is there any difference between civilian and military domestic or 
security/foreign policy? Similarly, Latent coding items deal with the characteristics of replies 
which were not explicitly called for by the questions themselves; an example of this is the 
insights about the justification of use of force to topple a civilian government. “Global coding 
items” are responses in which the coder makes judgments from the interview(s) transcripts 
about the general traits and styles. Examples are: inferences with respect to the political 
framework of the interviewee, or about preferences concerning a given issue. Quite naturally, 
a move from “manifest” to “latent” involves a reduction in certainty. On the other hand, an 
interpretative approach becomes essential for an understanding of mindsets. Therefore in this 
case, latent and global coding items were used. Finally, given the type of coding, it makes 
little sense to present the findings in terms of quantitative precision. Rather, they are ordered 
plausibly by tendency.  
 
However, besides the primary reliance on qualitative analysis, the study also uses quantitative 
material, to construct a narrative, which is handled in two different but practical ways. On the 
one hand, to possibly determine the cause of a given coup, the law and order variable is 
specifically accorded a statistical treatment. For this purpose, the relevant data was converted 
into a sheet in the Microsoft Excel and then was statistically analyzed in terms of murders 
and riots‟ trend.  
 
The Scheme of the Thesis 
In terms of chapterization, preceded by an introduction Chapter 1 deals with the theoretical 
aspects of the study, and discusses in detail, the core question, dependent and independent 
variables, and hypotheses of the study. The chapter further discusses not only the 
assumptions of agency, rational choice neo-institutionalism but also the level and degree of 
their operational capabilities. Moreover, the chapter builds the study‟s agency model of 
Pakistan‟s civil-military relations.  
 
Chapter 2 attempts to critically analyze existing body of knowledge on the issue of civil-
military relations, both theory and practice, and general politics and the state in Pakistan. In 
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this respect, the chapter divides the existing literature into six sections and categorize it as the 
legitimist point of view, conspiracy theorists, the generalist accounts, the instrumentalist 
work, the structuralist literature and the path-dependent perspective respectively. Having 
highlighted the inherent theoretical and empirical weaknesses in the existing accounts, the 
chapter re-emphasizes the need and scope for an actor-oriented rationalist interpretation of 
Pakistan‟s CMR. 
 
Chapter 3 aims at highlighting the theoretical as well as empirical shortcomings in the 
existing works on the construction of Pakistan‟s state. The chapter, while applying the 
assumptions of its causal model, identifies the actors, specifies context and explains the 
actor‟s interests, their preferences in terms of working/shirking and the outcome in terms of 
their own/larger interests. The last part of the chapter connects the preceding section in terms 
of marking the agency and rationality of the civil bureaucracy whose preference of shirking 
prevailed in the post-October 1951 period. The chapter ends by mentioning the dissolution of 
Prime Minister Noon‟s ministry as a result of martial law declared, paradoxically, by the 
leader of the civil bureaucracy. 
 
Chapter 4 seeks to explain the 1958 and 1969 coups in particular and the civil-military 
relations during this period in general. In this respect, the chapter relies on the method of an 
analytic narrative. The chapter ends with a conclusion which maintains that a coup was an 
outcome of military agency- to get things done. In other words, a coup is rational rather than 
structural. Moreover, it is always political in nature for the primary aim of staging a coup is 
to capture political power which then is used as an instrument for political and economic 
purposes. In addition, the chapter concludes that the rational judiciary and politicians looked 
to their own rather than larger interests. 
 
Chapter 5 begins by explaining the change in principal with the help of the study‟s causal 
model. It argues that the politicians were able to assume principalship for the military could 
not bear the cost of confrontation with the political forces. The chapter further explains that 
Bhutto rationally opted to sideline the socialist-inspired section within his party. Moreover, 
the chapter emphasizes the agency and rationality of the military in its subsequent analysis. In 
addition, the chapter applies the model to explain the occurrences of the July coup. The 
chapter concludes that it is military agency which causes the coup. The latter is rational rather 
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than structural and/or conspiratorial in nature and political in character. The political power is 
instrumental to facilitate the military‟s economic interests.  
 
Chapter 6 chapter analyzes the civilian circularity in the 1990s. The chapter explains, with the 
help of the model, that the military was able to maintain its overall principalship of Pakistan‟s 
state since its preference had prevailed, especially in the realm of foreign/defense policy. 
Moreover, it is maintained on emerpical grounds that a section of politicians and the 
country‟s president rationally allied with the principal military. Though Nawaz Sharif was 
able to repeal 58(2)(b), his government could not establish civilian control over the military‟s 
economic activities as well as the foreign/defense policy. The chapter views the Kargil war as 
rational move by the principal military to politically weaken the prime minster. In the post-
Kargil period, the latter was sacked in a military coup d‟état.   
 
Chapter 7 seeks to explain the fourth and fifth military coup d‟état. In this regard, the chapter 
conducts an analytic narrative of each. The findings point to negative correspondence 
between each of the coup/martial law and the conceptual variables identified in each of the 
coup-text. The chapter then applies the study‟s causal model to explain the occurrence of 
each coup. The chapter maintains that though contextually the two coups are different, they 
are caused by the military agency.  Moreover, the coups are rational in nature and political in 
character, for each was staged to politically sustain the military‟s principalship. The chapter 
concludes that Pakistan‟s military is able to maintain its overall principalship of the state, 
because it is able to maximize its economic interests and make and implement the 
foreign/defense policy as a dominant actor.   
 
A detailed conclusion encompasses the whole debate in terms of pinpointing the answer to 
the study‟s core question and the central puzzle. It is maintained, with a degree of certainty, 
that the military intervenes in Pakistan‟s politics due to its inherent agency- its ability to 
make things happen- and rationality i.e. cost-benefits analysis. In addition to this, the overall 
theoretical, empirical and methodological contribution of the research also forms part of the 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 1  
Conceptual Framework  
This chapter begins by stating the main puzzle along with core and supporting research 
questions. In this regard, the main focus of the first two sections is to stress the need to 
address the problem of military intervention in politics. The following three sections cover 
the parameters of case-selection, explanatory and dependent variables of the study. In order 
to understand and explain the phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan‟s politics, this 
thesis has selected five cases of coup d‟état; these cases are methodologically regarded as 
analytic narratives of five coups. Moreover, to analytically analyze each case, coup is taken 
as dependent variable whereas “working” or “shirking” (agency A) and “own” versus 
“larger” interest (agency B) are assumed as independent variables of the thesis. Section four 
briefly highlights the importance of theoretical paradigms to build a conceptual framework 
for the study. The theoretical paradigms are schematically categorized, over a span of about 
dozen sub-sections of section four, into sociological, comparativist, structural and agency 
perspectives respectively.  
 
The sociological perspectives take a critical view of Huntington and Janowitz‟s pioneer work 
on civil-military relations. These works have introduced the concepts of „praetorianism‟ and 
„professional soldier‟ in order to understand not only military‟s politics but also to achieve 
civilian control of the military.  Since the thrust of these accounts in on the societal, it has 
been criticized for a lack of appreciation of the political/institutional. Moreover, it is also 
criticized on empirical grounds. The comparativist literature beings with a critical review of 
Finer‟s pioneering work on military intervention. It is followed by equally important works of 
Nordlinger and Amos Perlmutter. Since this literature is comparative in nature it is criticized 
for compromising contextuality. The next in the line is Michael Desch‟s structural theory of 
civilian control of the military in particular and civil-military relations in general. Despite the 
significance of this account, the section argues that structural theory is not applicable to the 
case of Pakistan on empirical grounds. Hence, the following section looks at the agency 
theory of civil-military relations as postulated by Peter Feaver. Since the agency theory 
distances itself from its predecessors on account of its rationalist framework, it is accorded 
due attention for the case of Pakistan requires, on empirical basis, an analysis which takes 
different actors, their choices, and outcomes into account.   
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Nevertheless, since the agency theory is primarily specific to the US case, its assumptions-
those that are empirical in nature- are modified and applied to Pakistan „case in the fifth 
section. With the help of the agency theory‟s assumptions, the next section aims at building 
an agency model of Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. The proposed model takes the 
variables into its fold and tends to operationalize itself on the empirical data in order to 
explain the phenomenon under investigation. The final section of this chapter introduces the 
hypothesis of the thesis. They are grounded in the model for testability. A conclusion, at the 
end of the chapter, summarizes the entire arguments of the chapter. 
 
1.1 Puzzle 
Military intervention in terms of a coup d‟état in politics is an established historical fact. The 
reasons/factors/causes/ supposedly responsible for intervention has been discussed and 
ascribed to many reasons (see Huntington 1957; Finer 1962; Janowitz 1960; Nordlinger 
1975; Stepan 1975). Little wonder then, the case of Pakistan has been accorded more or less 
the same treatment by many political scientists as well as non-political scientists- the detailed 
critical review of their work comes in the next chapter.  
 
Nonetheless, the multiplicity of such variables is, from the perspective of comparative 
politics, contextual and hence hardly related to another case. Moreover, such accounts have, 
arguably, compounded the problem or better transformed the problem into a puzzle instead of 
pinpointing any variable(s) in terms of a solution. Thus, the puzzle the present study poses is: 
is it structure or agency which brings the military in- through a coup d‟état which is the 
dependent variable of the study- and out of politics? 
9
  
 
1.2 The Core Question 
In order to possibly solve the puzzle the core question of the research is posed as under: 
▪ Why does the military intervene in Pakistan‟s politics?  
                                               
9 Structure here is used in its broader concept that pertains to socio-economic, political, and religio-cultural 
conditions prevailing in a society (and state). Agency is used conventionally- the ability of the actors to make 
things happen (see Steans and Pettiforrd. 2005. Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and 
Themes, 2nd edn. Harlow, England: Person Education Limited). Besides, our usage of agency should not be 
confused with „agency problem‟ which is generally associated with the principal-agent relationship. For the 
latter, we maintain „delegation‟ (problem).  Moreover, though the CMR‟s agency theory contains the element of 
rationality yet, for clarity and emphasis, the term is often separately applied in the study. 
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Here the „why question‟ refers to both cause/reason -or broadly „interests‟- and process which 
is based on strategic interaction, that signifies divergence of preferences- or broadly the 
delegation problem. 
Hence, the core question is supported by the following questions: 
▪     How does the military intervene in the country‟s politics? (agency) 
▪     Is it possible to single out any dominant cause for its intervention? (rationality) 
 
1.3 Analytic Narratives and Variables Selection 
Political realities are always complex. Doing research in political science almost always 
implies a reduction of the complexity of real life. The issue is, therefore, how to select the 
appropriate combination of units of observation- cases- and units of variation- variables- to 
validate model/theory without disregarding relevant contextual features. In this respect, the 
following seems suggestive: 
Whatever way on argues, however, we feel that cases should always be defined as 
empirical entities in relation to the research question asked. We shall therefore define 
cases as those units of observation that are: 
• Identically defined by time and place; and 
• Logically connected to the research question under review.  
                                                                                                                                  (Pennings et al 2006: 4-9) 
 
In other words, cases are the carrier of information which can be collected by means of 
translating concepts into empirical indicators. Similarly, variables represent conceptual 
information over time i.e. years, and the number of cases remain still the number of variables 
times the number of units of observation. In this respect, the general guiding principle is the 
posed problem/puzzle or rather the core research question. For example, if the research 
question is elaborated in terms of an „international‟ comparison, then the number of cases is 
identical to the number of nations included. Similarly, when the research question is proposed 
to be „cross-national‟, the units of observation defines the number of cases such as parties or 
governments, regardless the number of nations or systems. Finally, if the research question 
focuses on change over time i.e. inter-temporal, then the time units included indicate the 
number of cases (ibid  2006:9) 
 
As the foregoing informs, cases can be selected on the basis of inter-nationality, cross- 
nationality and inter-temporality. Therefore, in order to possibly solve the puzzle and answer 
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the core question, five cases of military coups d‟état are selected on the basis of inter-
temporality i.e. 1958, 1969, 1977, 1999 and 2007- see Table 2 also. However, as per this 
study‟s methodological position, the selected five coup cases are assumed as analytic 
narratives whereby each narrative is identified with a dependent variable which, in turn, is 
causally explained by two explanatory variables- these are explained in the subsequent 
sections. Moreover, the selection of the ANs in terms of specific events taken place at a 
specific point of time helps avoid the issues related to a narrative‟s point of departure and 
end. The following makes it more explicit: 
 
First Coup: it was staged on 7
 
October 1958. The subsequent military rule continued one way 
or the other, till 24 March 1969. The analytic narrative of the coup would, with the help of 
the model, explain why the coup was staged. However, the AN takes the pre-coup years 
(1948-1958) into account since the coup maker(s) in the „coup proclamation‟ has pointed to 
problems of law and order and economy as a justification to take otherwise that undesirable 
and unnecessary action
10
. In his address to the nation on 8 October 1958 President Iskander 
Mirza said: 
I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, [and] 
corruption [by politicians]…no serious attempt has been made to tackle the food 
crisis…In East Pakistan…there is a well organized smuggling of food, medicines and 
other necessities of life…You do not raise the prestige of your country by beating the 
Speaker, [and] killing the Deputy Speaker…I am convinced…that elections will be 
neither free nor fair…we have undertaken to safeguard the security of Pakistan…The 
Constitution…is unworkable…it is my intention to…devise a Constitution…[which] it 
will be submitted to the referendum of the people. [italics mine] 
                                                                                                           (Mirza 2000:367-370) 
 
Second Coup: it was attempted successfully on 25 March 1969. It placed the country under 
martial law. On 16 December 1971 the state of Pakistan broke up and General Yahya left the 
corridor of power by handing over the power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who became the civilian 
Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Since the study is concerned with military 
                                               
10 The 1958 coup is a puzzle in Pakistan‟s CMR since empirically it was announced by President Iskander 
Mirza. Interestingly however, in the coup proclamation/address to the nation he appointed General Ayub Khan 
as CMLA. Moreover, the general, the very next day, also addressed the nation and pointed to the same 
reasons/factors for the coup as stressed by Mirza. The study shall explain this puzzle in Chapter 4.  
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intervention and especially the phenomenon of coups, therefore the period under civilian 
CMLA is excluded from the coup narrative. However, the politics in new Pakistan‟s initial 
years would be specifically explained with the help of the model and narrative. This is the 
subject matter of chapter 4. Nevertheless, the preceding years (1958-1968) of this coup are 
included in the narrative since General Yahya Khan attempted to legitimize the action on the 
basis of problems of law and order too. In his address to the nation on 25 March 1969
11
, he 
said: 
As we all know, his [Ayub Khan] effort did not meet with success. He, therefore, 
called upon me to carry out my prime duty of protecting this country from utter 
destruction…I have imposed Martial Law throughout Pakistan…the situation has 
deteriorated to such an extent that normal law enforcing methods have become totally 
ineffective…Serious damage of life and property has occurred…Production has gone 
down to a dangerously low level and the economy generally has suffered an 
unprecedented set-back…My sole aim in imposing Martial Law is to protect life, 
liberty and property. [italics mine] 
                                                                                                       (Rizvi 2000:302-303) 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Third Coup: the military staged its third coup on 5 July 1977. The country was placed under 
martial law.  The imposed martial law was only lifted in 1985 after having secured indemnity 
and presidential form of government in terms of Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. 
However, the subsequent civilianized military rule- as is shown in Table 2- ended with the 
death of General-President Zia-ul-Haq on 17 August 1988. Thus, a narrative of this coup 
shall be constructed for primarily the period specified. However, like his predecessors 
General Zia-ul-Haq, in his 5 July address to the nation, also highlighted the problems of law 
and order and economy. He said: 
It must be quite clear to you now that when the political leaders failed to steer the 
country out of [politico-economic] crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed 
Forces to sit as silent spectators…The Army [military] had, therefore, to act as a result 
of which the Government of Mr. Bhutto has ceased to exist…My [the military‟s] sole 
aim is to organize free and fair elections which would be held in October this year…I 
                                               
11  General Yahya Khan, in his coup proclamation/address to the nation, cited the state of democracy and 
security also as factors/reasons for the coup. He, as CMLA, vowed not only to democratize the country but also 
provide security to the people. Importantly, both President Mirza and (CMLA)-President Ayub also claimed, as 
is shown in the quote on the previous page, the same. The present research shall explain in Chapter 4 whether 
the stated objectives were achieved; if so, could the coups be empirically legitimized? 
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[the military] sincerely desire…The life, honor and property of every citizen to be 
safe…the frontiers of Pakistan ( are) fully guarded…[italics mine] 
                                                                                                                   (Rizvi 2000:307-310) 
                                                                                                                                
Thus, the foregoing suggests that the Bhutto government failed not only to maintain law and 
order but also provide economic relief to the people. In order to empirically explore whether 
that was the case, it seems then realistic to assume the pre-coup period (December 1971- June 
1977) as part of the analytic narrative.   
 
Fourth Coup: the fourth military coup d‟état was staged by General Pervez Musharraf on 12 
October 1999. As is shown in Table 2 on page 11, the regime was able to civilianize it after a 
few years of overt military rule. The civilianized phase continued till 2
 
November 2007. In 
other words, the narrative would be constructed for the period between 12 October 1999 and 
2 November 2007. The objective shall be to empirically explore and explain, in light of the 
model and narrative, the reasons/factors for the October coup as stated by General Pervez 
Musharraf in his address to the nation. On 17 October 1999
12
, he said: 
Today, we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled…state institutions lie 
demolished...the few at the helm of affairs in the last government were intriguing to 
destroy the last institution of stability left in Pakistan by creating dissention in the ranks 
of the armed forces of Pakistan…I [the military] shall not allow the people to be taken 
back to the era of sham democracy, but to a true one…our armed forces are fully 
equipped and ready to defend our national sovereignty and territorial integrity…our aims 
and objectives shall be:… 
3. Revive the economy and restore investor confidence. 
4. Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice. (emphasis added) 
                                                                                                        (Dawn 2007: Oct.18)                                                                 
                                               
12
 General Pervez Musharraf had addressed the nation briefly on 13 October 1999. In this address/coup 
proclamation he explicitly pointed to the problems of law and order, economy and security, if not democracy. 
Since he, as vowed, was able to readdress the nation at length on 17 October, therefore, we preferred to rely on 
this address. Besides, a more detailed description of the text shall come later in Chapter 7. 
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What the quote suggests is that like his predecessors General Musharraf explicitly held the 
Sharif government for its failure to maintain law and order and bring economic prosperity. 
Therefore, in order to explain whether the Sharif government was responsible for creat ing 
conditions for the stage of the October coup, it is deemed necessary to include the Sharif 
years (1997- October 1999) as  part of the analytic narrative. 
Fifth Coup: it was (also) staged by General Pervez Musharraf in the capacity of army chief on 
3 November 2007. The narrative period of this coup ended on 18 August 2008 when the 
General-President left the presidency. This coup, like the 1969 coup, is puzzling since the 
military under Musharraf was already in power, though civilianized. Interestingly, the coup 
maker institution‟s leader, General Musharraf, addressed the nation the same day and pointed 
to the problems of law and order and economy which the previous government failed to 
solve.  In this regard, on 3 November 2007 he said
13
: 
There is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist 
attacks…posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens…the law and 
order situation in the country as well as the economy have been adversely 
affected…the Constitution provides no solution for this situation…the situation has 
been reviewed in meetings with the prime minister, governors of all four provinces, 
and with Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, 
Vice-Chief of Army Staff and Corps Commanders of the Pakistan Army…I, General 
Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff [the military], proclaim 
Emergency
14
[martial law] throughout Pakistan…[italics mine] 
                                                                                                            
What can be deduced from the afore-mentioned is that the coup was staged by the military to 
improve country‟s law and order and economic situation. However, herein lays the puzzle, 
namely, why the coup was staged, because the military was already in power. Moreover, 
there are other questions such as whether the stated objectives were achieved or otherwise, 
which demand a thorough investigation and a theory-oriented explanation of the 
                                               
13
 General Pervez Musharraf addressed the nation at night after having issued the proclamation.  The address- 
which lasted around 45 minutes - was primarily delivered in Urdu. The address highlighted the problems of law 
and order, security and economy at length. This section was delivered in English. The address‟ video is 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGQjuHOLKWQ. The study, for the sake of comprehension, has 
relied on both the texts which are cited in more detail in Chapter 7.  
14 In author‟s view the term „emergency‟ was used by the Musharraf-led military to either confuse or mislead the 
masses, if not the intelligentsia. Moreover, on empirical grounds this is untenable since the emergency was 
declared by General Musharraf in the capacity of army chief- as the quote shows. In addition, the country‟s 
press rightly put it as „martial law‟ (see http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?date=11%2F4%2F2007). 
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phenomenon. Therefore, this coup event is also regarded as a case of analytic narrative, 
which under the framework of the model is proposed to explain the occurrence of the coup.   
 
To summarize, the study, in order to explain military intervention in the politics of Pakistan, 
has selected five cases of military coups d‟état. Since the coups are empirical realities in 
terms of occurring at specific points of time, they are kept within the domain of comparative 
politics as regards the concept and criterion of inter-temporality. However, since the coups 
are historically-informed events, and that too with unique contexts, underlying puzzles and  
questions- as the brief description of five cases show-, the method of analytic narrative, as 
opposed to Mill‟s methods of agreement and difference, is accorded preference due to its 
potential to solve within-case puzzles, emergent questions etc. Nevertheless, the AN is 
applied within the overall and overwhelming framework of the model.  
 
1.3.1 Dependent Variable  
Peter Feaver has, in his Civil-Military Relations (1999), done a great service to not only 
political science but its subfield- CMR- by critically documenting and categorizing a wide 
range of „normative‟, „descriptive/empirical‟ and „theoretical‟ literature on civil-military 
relations. Since the present study is theory-driven, it seems, therefore, relevant to seek insight 
and inference from Feaver‟s. To begin with, as regards the definition of a dependent and 
independent variable he wrote: 
It is impossible to recommend a certain course of action without making an implicit 
predictive claim of cause and effect: A state should do X because then Y will happen, 
and otherwise Z will happen (where Y is “better” than Z). The theoretical approach 
distinguishes between the things to be explained/predicted, called dependent variables 
(DVs) - for example, coups or robustness of civilian control- and the things doing the 
explaining/ predicting, called independent or explanatory variables (IVs), such as the 
degree of military professionalism or the type of civilian governmental structure. The 
theoretical approach specifies ways in which changes in the IVs are reflected in 
changes in the DVs.                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                   (Feaver 1999) 
 
In the proceeding sections of the article, he has evaluated „coups‟, „military influence‟, „civil-
military friction‟, „military compliance‟, „delegation and monitoring‟ as the DVs. As is 
obvious from his analysis, each dependent variable has certain merits and disadvantages in 
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terms of measurability, contextuality and theoretical limitedness. For example, military 
influence, on the one hand, marks „continuous‟ rather than „dichotomous‟ in civil-military 
relations; however, on the other hand, it is hard to measure it. 
 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing especially problems related to measurement of non-coups 
DVs and contextual differences between different (cross-national) cases, this study- as is 
briefly mentioned in methodology section- prefers military coup d‟état as its dependent 
variable. After all, coups have been the traditional focus of civil-military relations since they 
symbolize the central problem of the military, namely, exploiting its coercive strength to 
dismiss and replace civilian rulers. Besides, the phenomenon of coups has constantly 
captured the imagination of political scientists who have glanced at two related but distinct 
questions. On the one hand, the emphasis has been made to the instance or frequency of 
coups- also attempted coups-; on the other hand, the probability, that a coup will be 
successful, is paid due attention
15
.                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                       
1.3.2 Independent Variables (IVs) 
As mentioned in the preceding section, independent/explanatory variables are those which 
help explain the change/variance in the dependent variable.  
Explanatory factors [variables] can be differentiated according to whether they are 
external or internal to the country. External factors that require a large army (such as 
the presence of a security threat), or pressure in the form of targeted aid and “advice” 
from particularly influential great powers, can influence the shape of a country‟s civil-
military relations. Internal factors include such determinants as the nature of dominant 
cleavages in society, whether the society faces an internal threat or civil war, the 
nature of the domestic political system, and the distribution of wealth.
16
  
                                                                                                                        (ibid 1999)  
                                               
15
 Huntington (1957),  Finer (1962),  Bienen (1968), Nordlinger (1977), Horowitz (1980), Thompson (1975, 
1976), Jackman (1978), Perlmutter (1977), O.Kane (1981), Zimmermann (1983), Johnson et al (1984), Bienen 
& Van de Walle (1990), Londregan & Poole (1990) and Frazer (1994) addressed the first question whereas 
Luttwak (1979 (1983), Bienen & Van de Walle (1990) and Frazer (1994) attempted the  second question (for 
details, see Finer 1999). 
16
 Generally, political scientists have tended to seek more explanatory leverage from internal factors (Aguero, 
Colton 1979, Colton & Gustafson 1990, Finer 1962, Horowitz 1980 and 1985, Janowitz 1960, Nordlinger 1977, 
Perlmutter 1977, Rouquie 1982, Stepan 1971 and 1988, Vagts 1937, Welch 1976). On the other hand, 
Huntington (1957), Lasswell (1941, 1950), and Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson (1995) have emphasized the 
significance of external systemic factors in shaping CMR. Recently but quite differently, the work of Michael 
Desch (1999) has integrated both internal and external variables. 
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What the quote informs is that both external and internal factors are assumed as independent 
variables by a variety of scholars. However, a deeper view of such factors makes it explicitly 
clear that these factors/variables are either structural or (socio-) cultural in nature and 
character. Moreover, another set of factors which may qualify as IVs are those related to 
„transitional‟ phase from authoritarianism to democracy. In addition, „civil-military relations‟ 
may also serve as an independent variable vis-à-vis a specific political phenomenon of 
interest (Finer 1999; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; also O‟Kane 1981).  
 
In light of the foregoing, if one critically analyze the existing works on Pakistan‟s civil-
military relations- of Jalal (1990) and Aziz (2008) especially- one finds that the external 
factors i.e. military aid, security alliances, diplomatic, politico-moral support to the military 
especially from the US etc., are given a preference. To emphasize and make this point more 
clear, the factors assumed as explanatory variables by Aziz- his is a most recent work on 
Pakistan‟s CMR- are critically examined as follows. 
 
Mazhar Aziz‟s (2008:59-60,63-67,70-76) work is generally least concerned about 
comparability and causality related issues. Nevertheless he has, implicitly and briefly, taken 
„political disorder‟, „saving democracy‟ and „problems of governance‟ as independent 
variables to determine historically-institutionally whether 1958, 1977 and 1999 coups were 
caused by them respectively. The present study‟s point of disagreement with that of Aziz 
starts with regards to his theoretical-methodological approaches, case and variables selection 
criterion and importantly the findings.  
 
Moreover, as regards his variables-evaluation, it is argued that the „political disorder‟ and 
„problems of governance‟ variables are not two but one- either political disorder or problems 
of governance. Moreover, the „saving democracy‟ connotation as applied by Aziz is also 
problematic on, at least, two grounds. One, the inference of saving democracy from „our 
ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people can understand and work‟ is 
invalid empirically and textually: empirically, a day before General Ayub‟s address, 
President Mirza had, though illogically and immorally, already declared the governmental 
activities (under his presidency) as „a dictatorship of the lowest order.‟ If Mirza is correct, 
then, arguably, there was no democracy which Ayub were to „restore‟; textually, if textual-
context is a guide, then above-quoted statement is futuristic in terms of promising and 
alluding to a process of electioneering which the coup maker claimed to set forth.  
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Regardless, having criticized- see next Chapter in this respect- the causal insignificance of 
such variables empirically and logically, the present study, while grounded in comparative 
politics, dismisses the external (power influence) variable altogether. Moreover, during the 
course of our explanation of each coup narrative, a contextualized analysis of this factor shall 
be attempted. In addition, as shall be explained in detail in the literature review, the 
„professional soldier‟, religious, ethnic, (military) class, cultural, higher defense expenditure , 
army chief (personality factor), „coup contagious‟-where coup in one county is thought to 
have caused coup in another country (Li and Thompson 1975)- factors/variables etc., do not 
possess empirically and theoretically the causal capability to explain the occurrence of coups 
d‟état- and hence military intervention- in Pakistan. 
 
Therefore, as is mentioned in methodology section, the present study takes agencies A and B, 
working/shirking and own/larger interest respectively, as its independent variables to explain, 
within the framework of the proposed model- which comes in the end of this chapter-, the 
occurrence of coups d‟états in Pakistan. However, before the study embarks such a course, it 
seems highly imperative to take a critical view of important works on civil-military relations 
theory in order to possibly find  an answer to the posed puzzle and the core question; if not, 
then the critical review shall serve as a theoretical basis for developing a conceptual 
framework for the present research .  
 
1.4 Theoretical Paradigms 
In the following sections, an attempt is made to conduct a critical review of the existing 
literature on civil-military relations theory. The aim is to possibly locate literature which 
could serve as either a theoretical basis or point of reference and departure. Also, the 
secondary aim shall be to formulate a model of Pakistan civil-military relations. 
 
1.4.1 ‘Sociological’ Perspectives17  
Under this, a critical review of not only Huntington and Janowitz‟s work but also that of their 
followers is presented due to the former‟s pioneering position in CMR theory. Their works 
atop this section due to the fact that: 
                                               
17 The term „sociological‟ is borrowed from Feaver (1996), when it comes to critical categorization of 
Huntington‟s and Janowitz‟s work on civil-military relations. 
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In the [American] context, it has been sociologists and political scientists operating 
within the sociological school who, following the Janowitz tradition, are responsible 
for the bulk of scholarship on [American] civil-military relations. 
       (Feaver 1996) 
 
In addition, the inherent objective here is to see if their work relates to the posed puzzle and 
helps to conceptualize a framework for the present study. 
 
1.4.1.1 Huntington- between ‘Professionalism’ and ‘Praetorianism’ 
Theoretically, this type of puzzle has been central to the literature on civil-military relations. 
The phenomenon and practice of military intervention in politics and the nature and dynamics 
of civil-military relations drew the attention of many. Samuel Huntington (1957) was 
probably the first one in this regard who conducted a serious study on the subject. Building 
his theory upon the general concept of professionalism, Huntington demolishes convincingly 
many clichés from outmoded theories of civil-military relations. In the specific CMR context 
of the US, he has attempted to explain the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations as 
well as the nature and categories of civilian control, namely, „objective‟ and „subjective‟. In 
the words of Peter Feaver:  
Huntington‟s causal chain is as follows: autonomy leads to professionalization, which 
leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which lead to secure civilian 
control.  
                        (ibid 1996) 
 
Nevertheless, his description and explanation of civilian behavior in the civil-military system 
is much less thorough and convincing. Also, though there is considerable discussion of the 
authority of the principal civilian offices yet the civilian element is summarily and 
unjustifiably dismissed in contemptuous pronouncements about liberal ideology. Moreover, 
related to insufficient analysis of civilian politics is an over-rigorous conceptual 
concentration upon solely military aspects of the military which reflects inadequate attention 
to more general political theory. In addition, there remain some questions in this account of 
his that demand further explanation. 
 
For instance, is the call for broad-minded officers always a demand that they deny their 
professionalism? Can it be a plea that strategic decisions be uncontaminated by service 
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chauvinism? Is the formulation of qualitative requirements an esoteric business for officers 
alone, or should civilian scientists intervene? Is it inherent in the professional function that an 
officer be alert to technological developments? The reverse is at times suggested by 
deductive logic. Does the professional military ethic require a pluralistic strategy? Or, in a 
poor nation, may such a strategy be so costly as to endanger political stability and thus 
military security? More generally, is there a necessary identity between professionalism and 
security? Finally, if the system of separation of powers, despite its baneful influence on 
civilian control and professionalism, is justified on other and higher grounds, has liberal 
ideology no comparable compensating advantages? These questions somehow led Feaver to 
critically sum The Soldier and the State into „four‟ hypotheses which, argues Feaver (1996), 
cannot stand the test of rigorous empirical analysis, and „draws erroneous inferences and 
makes predictions that have not proven accurate.‟  
 
In Changing Patterns of Military Politics (1962) Huntington has ostensibly re-emphasized 
the structure and responsibility of the armed forces. With respect to military coups or overt 
intervention the thrust of the argument is: if the division of function and military training is 
addressed towards external threats rather than internal, there is likelihood that the military 
would not intervene. This explicit emphasis on the external variables implicitly points to his 
earlier thesis of „professional‟ armed forces. In addition, quite ironically, the frequency of 
military coups in developing countries are not viewed as pathological but an alternative to 
revolution and a form of gradual change. 
 
Nonetheless, progression, if not an outright paradigm shift, with regards to his conception of 
society-state interaction and civil-military relations is acutely visible in Political Order in the 
Changing Societies (1968). The argument of this work hangs massively on a perceptive 
distinction between two closely related concepts of „political modernization‟ and „political 
development‟. The term „political modernization‟ is used mainly with reference to the spread 
of political participation, and „political development‟ is maintained to mean the establishment 
of institutions that regulate the rate of modernization in all spheres of life. Logically, 
Huntington demonstrates that the underdevelopment of a society‟s political institutions will 
result in the waste of its modernizing potential. On the other hand, more regulation than the 
rate of modernization required is merely repressive and may be intolerable.  Also, political 
stability is valued both as an end in itself and as a condition for the consolidation and 
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extension of public benefits. But the primary concern for political stability does not lead him 
to oppose all revolutionary changes including the return of the praetorian to politics. 
 
As regards coups or return of the praetorian, Huntington (1968:80) has introduced the 
concept of „praetorian polities‟. Among the praetorian polities he identifies „oligarchical 
praetorianism‟ where the influential social forces are „the great landowners, the leading 
clergy, and the wielders of the sword‟ (Huntington 1968:199-201). The anti-colonial struggle 
by such polities proved an „artificial phenomenon‟ due to their low levels of social 
mobilization argues Huntington. Resultantly, the slow development of political institutions 
along with rapid mobilization of new groups into politics caused by economic modernization 
gave birth to chaos, uprisings and political disorder. The emergent political vacuum is filled 
by the military. Thus, persuasive cases are made for the merits of both „modernizing 
monarchs‟ and soldier-politicians the like of Ayub Khan. Interestingly, he further argues that 
„the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political 
and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but 
the political and institutional structure of the society.‟ 
 
The importance of Huntington‟s work granted, there are empirical, if not theoretical, 
anomalies in this account too. For example, he does not perceive the possibility of a growing 
revolutionary potential in any of the major industrial societies of today. Moreover, his 
categorization of political gap, which in his opinion is widening between the rich and poor 
countries, is as confusing as the economic gap. By the conventional standards of political 
science, this argument may carry conviction. However, his analogy between the measurable 
economic gap and his so-called political gap‟ seems dubious. Also, his developmental thesis, 
when applied on the Pakistan case in the 1960s, takes, on the one hand, surface-view of 
political realities, and over-negates, on the other hand, the presence of economic disparities 
among different sections of society within the country- this shall be explained  later in the 
study. 
 
Besides, when it comes to governance the complications inherent in the analysis simply creep 
up. To put this plainly, there is no way to hold that one society is better governed or more 
developed than another except as a matter of value or an act of faith (see Mitra and Singh 
2009:233-238). Moreover, it is naive to question Huntington‟s belief that the industrial 
societies of the world are less chaotic than others. Are the industrial societies really less 
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chaotic than others by Huntington‟s own standard of measurement? Furthermore, he does not 
expect democracy to develop in a one-party state which attempts to centralize power. His 
realism also tends to exclude the vision of effective modernization under the auspices of 
political institutions that are designed for the dispersion of power. The primacy of order in his 
thought implies an exceptional solicitude for authority and the managerial approach to 
political development. 
 
1.4.1.2 Janowitz: Portraiting the ‘Professional’  
Janowitz has attempted to draw a social and political portrait of the professional soldier with 
the help of a wealth of available documentary and historical material along with intensive 
interviews. The study focuses on the past and present American military elite and those 
officers who by virtue of their rank and reputations were destined to join the inner circles of 
military decision making. Having served in the military service and being a sociologist 
himself, Janowitz preferred to take a sociological view of the military institution.  In the 
words of one of his critics:  
Like Huntington, Janowitz focuses on the officer corps and the concept of 
professionalism. Janowitz rejects, however, the ideal-type division of labor that 
Huntington claims is essential to the professionalization of the military. Indeed, 
Janowitz documents in some detail the unavoidable politicization of the military given 
its global reach and the centrality of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry to both international and 
domestic politics. 
       (Feaver 1996) 
 
Apparently it seems that he faced little difficulties related to clarity of vision and precision of 
arguments yet somehow he remained unable to institutionally look at the civil-military 
„problematique‟- the civilian control of the military.  
In fact, [then,] the primary control mechanism for Janowitz is the same values-based 
one that Huntington relied on: professionalism, albeit differently constituted. 
Janowitz‟s „pragmatic‟ professionalism is perhaps analytically richer than 
Huntington‟s „radical‟' professionalism.  
                                                                                                                                 (ibid) 
 
What the foregoing suggests is that, on the one hand, Janowitz‟s Professional Soldier 
(1960:3-17) could not rise above the „professional‟ to provide an alternative explanation of 
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civil control and, on the other hand, it guides little towards seeking the explanation for 
military coup d‟état even beyond the US context.   
Similarly, Janowitz has more or less followed the same „professional‟ path in The Military in 
the Political Development of New Nations (1964:50-64). The central question this work 
addresses is to explain how characteristics of military institutions and personnel affect their 
activities in the processes of modernization and democratization. Having collected data on 
fifty-one countries in Asia and Africa he classifies them into five groups according to the 
place of the military in politics: (a) authoritarian-personal regimes, (b) authoritarian-mass 
party regimes, (c) democratic-competitive regimes, (d) civil-military coalitions, (e) military 
oligarchies. In the first three types the military occupy, respectively, a symbolic, 
instrumental, or subordinate role. In the last two, they are involved in politics as coalition 
partners or as dominant components. Interestingly, to explain these five patterns of civil-
military relations, he pays little attention to the history of military organization, the period 
since independence, and the level of economic development. Instead, he argues that in all the 
new and modernizing nations the military and the socio-political context in which they 
operate tend to have common characteristics, resulting in a high potential for military 
involvement in politics and making that involvement unstable. 
Nonetheless, this volume‟s new version Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing 
Nations (1964:5-20) did not add any new insights  despite  its  attempts at re-packaging the 
„professional‟ with an excessive number of cases, and that from different socio-cultural 
background. These works including On Military Intervention (1971) attempt to sociologically 
look at patterns of civil-military relations cross-nationally. Overall they, on the one hand, de-
emphasize the importance of institutional explanation of civil-military relations, and, on the 
other hand, extremely compromise the imperative of contextuality. Also, within the gambit of 
empirical data, lesser attention is paid to Latin America as compared to East Asia. 
To sum up, the sociological perspectives as operationalized by Huntington and Janowitz 
focus, one way or the other, more on  societal variables than political-institutional ones owing 
to the fact that Janowitz was a sociologist, and Huntington, despite being a political scientist, 
tilted more towards political sociology. This is rightly observed in the following:  
To political scientists, institutional civilian control is the heart of civil-military 
relations. To sociologists, civil-military relations is about the integration (or the 
absence of it) of civil and military institutions. 
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                                                                                                                                             (ibid) 
 
In addition, Michael Desch had also criticized Huntington‟s praetorian societies which imply 
that weak state institutions are less effective tools of civilian control. In this respect, Desch 
(1999:9) ably pointed out that Huntington‟s distinction leaves „unanswered the question of 
what determines whether a state has strong civilian governmental institutions or not.‟ 
 
1.4.2 The Comparativist
18
 Literature 
The term comparativist pertains to literature on CMR which attempts to cross-
nationally/culturally analyzes the different patterns of civil-military relations. It also tries to 
explain the factors behind military coups d‟état. The aim in this section is twofold: one, to 
find if this literature provides any theoretical clues to the puzzle; two, to see if its findings are 
in any sense relevant to the case of Pakistan. Besides, the review would remain confined to 
pioneer work of this category. 
1.4.2.1 The Men on Horseback 
In his classic on military intervention, The Man on Horseback, Samuel E. Finer (1988:34-78) 
has attempted to look at and analyze cross-nationally the phenomenon and practice of 
military intervention from a purely sociological-historical perspective. The distinctions and 
hypotheses forwarded in the account could be organized around the following themes:  (a) the 
strengths of the military: organization and coherence, control of arms, emotional and 
symbolic status, and military virtues; (b) the motives for intervention: from identification 
with a national interest- conceived as standing above parties and particular governments or 
even constitutions- to identification with sectional interests -class, regional, or corporate, if 
not individual, self-interest; (c) the mood to intervene, created by feelings of self-importance 
or morbidly high self-esteem. 
 
                                               
18
 The terms „comparativist‟ is borrowed from Feaver (1996). The other comparativist literature which is not 
mentioned in detail here includes: Colton, Timothy. 1979. Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: 
The Structure of Soviet Military Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Colton, Timothy. 1990. Soldiers 
and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press; Rouquie, Alain. 1982. The Military and the State in Latin America, trans. Paul E. Sigmund. Berkeley: 
University of California Press; Stepan, Alfred. 1971. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Welch, Claude (ed.) 1976. Civilian Control of the Military. New York: 
State University of New York Press; also Welch, Claude. 1987. No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement 
from Politics in Africa and Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press. 
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Finer notes that neither the capacity for intervention, nor the motivation to do so, nor the 
mood triggering off action would be sufficient without opportunity to intervene, created by 
increased civilian dependence on the military especially in crisis situations. It is this interplay 
of disposition and opportunity that constitutes the key to the success or failure of various 
types of military intervention- from influence and pressure to displacement and supplanting 
of civil authority. Moreover, like Huntington, Finer has conditioned disposition and 
opportunity to the levels of political culture i.e. mature, developed, low, and minimal. It is 
maintained that national political cultures could be ranked according to the following three 
criteria: 
1. The extent of public support for the procedures used to transfer political power and for 
the corresponding belief that only those procedures are legitimate. 
2. The degree of public awareness regarding the individuals and institutions holding 
sovereign authority, and the degree to which the population believes that no other person 
or group can legitimately hold that power. 
3. The extents to which the populace is organized into groups such as political parties, 
labor unions, business associations, or churches that are capable of acting independently 
of the government. 
 
In other words, the higher the political culture of a nation ranks on each of these three 
dimensions, the lower the likelihood of military intervention in politics. However, Finer 
(1981:242) is critical of Huntington‟s developmental thesis with respect to praetorianism. He 
argues that Huntington is primarily concerned with the relationship between the „strength of 
political institutions and increasing mass participation in politics‟, not military intervention. 
Not only this, he has also come up with a critique on Janowitz‟s five types of civil-military 
relations. The latter is criticized for being passive with respect to criterion „for assigning any 
one particular regime to any of these categories.‟  
 
Nonetheless, his own work falls short of being conceptually and even empirically 
comprehensive. For example, there is little reference made to the social, economic and 
institutional structures associated with the different types of political cultures, and to the ways 
in which these factors, in turn, affect the outcome of military intervention. Also, the study 
lacks a more exhaustive analysis of comparable situations- over a period of time- to locate 
deviant cases i.e. despite a low political culture intervention was weak or unsuccessful, or 
cases where despite a developed political culture such interventions take place. Besides, 
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perhaps more attention could have been paid to the interaction between military mentalities 
and ideologies and those of the civilians. Also, the study excessively compromises the 
importance of contextuality of a specific case especially during the course of comparative 
analysis. 
 
1.4.2.2 Soldiers in Politics 
Eric Nordlinger in his Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments discusses 
various methods for civilian control of the military particularly in the Third World context. 
With respect to military coups, having carefully reviewed various hypotheses about the 
military decision to topple the government, he concludes that too often coups occur when 
corporate grievances of the military coincide with a deficit of legitimacy produced by poor 
government performance. Moreover, how coups occur is explained with (over)emphasis on 
the officers and their attitudes towards politics and politicians.  
 
Also, the account discusses the attitudes, policy preferences and governing style of the 
soldiers when in power. In this respect, Nordlinger builds upon his earlier work on the 
comparative performance of military regimes (Nordlinger 1970). Importantly however, his 
findings about the military‟s economic performance put the latter on the negative side of the 
equilibrium vis-à-vis civilians. Despite the claims made for, and often by, the military as an 
agent of change, he finds that most military regimes tend to accept or protect the status quo, 
with military governments much more uniformly conservative than their civilian counterparts 
(Nordlinger 1977:176). Moreover, even the more radical military regimes normally turn out 
to be ineffective in promoting reform. Their conservativeness and concentration of power 
within them make their claims about national integration and development hollow, which 
often in the aftermath of military intervention results in lingering crises, concludes 
Nordlinger. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the relative significance of the work, it is not proven to factual critique. 
To begin with, the overall reading of it gives the impression that it unavoidably tends to over-
generalize in terms of focus on the „typical‟ case and to underplay the range of variations, 
thus neglecting the explanation of such variations. Possibly, the major exception in this 
regard is a section on the Latin American military. This, in turn, endorses, though with 
qualifications, Nun‟s thesis on the ties of the military to the middle class, and Huntington‟s 
propositions that the military usually plays a progressive role in traditional societies; then it 
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switches to a moderating role; and finally becomes the guardian of the status quo as mass 
mobilization threatens middle class interests (Feaver 1996). Nevertheless, the logic of the 
argument is grossly simple. In addition, there is a lack of evidence of strong class 
identifications among the Latin American military.  
 
Moreover, the difficulty in this case stems from the sometimes uncritical reliance on 
statistical studies especially cross-national co-relational analyses which are methodologically 
very suspect. Also, there is little discussion of foreign military assistance programs, foreign 
advisory roles, foreign military aid and  training even though these relate to the increased 
professionalization of the military and thus to the growth of a sense of corporate identity 
which Nordlinger quite properly stresses as a key determinant of military behavior. 
 
1.4.2.3 Perlmutter- Praetorianism Revisited 
Amos Perlmutter (1974:4-20) also views the civil-military relations generally from primarily 
a praetorian perspective. In this respect, though in the context of Egypt‟s CMR, he has 
developed a concept of „military praetorianism‟ whereby the military plays „a highly 
significant role in key political structures and institutions‟. Furthermore, he has identified two 
types of praetorian armies: the arbitrator army and the ruler army. The arbitrator army having 
established its writ prefers to return to barracks due to time-limit, acceptable social order, 
lack of independent political organization and fear of civilian retribution etc. The ruler type 
army has a propensity to stay in power. Moreover, she remains the dominant political power 
bent on maximizing her power and perks. His view does not regard military rule as a 
particularly efficient means of establishing broadly based political structures: 
Military rule is politically restrictive and fails to integrate new men and economically 
and socially liberated groups and classes; [thus]...the level of political 
institutionalization is limited, rigid and non-adaptive;...economic changes do not 
affect social cohesion on the distribution of power; and above all praetorianism... after 
a certain period of time, develops an inner momentum of its own.  
                                                                                                      (Perlmutter 1974:125) 
 
The major problem posed by praetorianism, then, is how to expedite the removal of the army 
from control over executive functions and its domination of mass political institutions, which 
stifles the expression of the political desires of the masses. A state de-praetorianizes to the 
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extent political legitimacy requires it; unfortunately the army acts as an obstacle to this 
process once it perceives its power and status interests threatened. 
 
In The Military and Politics in Modern Times Perlmutter (77:85-98) distinguishes among 
three types of soldiers: professional, praetorian, and revolutionary. Each type is subdivided 
further. Professional soldiers are examined historically with Prussia, Germany, France, Japan, 
and the Soviet Union as cases. Each of these cases, according to the writer, demonstrates that 
instability „invites‟ the military to intervene. Similarly, praetorian soldiers characterize most 
of the Third World- the cases selected from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America point 
to it. The praetorian army, asserts Perlmutter, tends to „replace weak and unstable political 
groups and regimes.‟ However here, his analysis is faulted due to the problem of 
determination of weakness and instability prior to army intervention. Anyhow, the third type 
of soldier, the professional revolutionary, is subdivided between revolutionaries and 
routinized revolutionaries with the People‟s Liberation Army of China and Zahal of Israel as 
respective cases. Moreover, he has relied upon his earlier „arbitrator‟ and „ruler‟ typologies 
primarily built upon the Egyptian and Syrian cases. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the informative nature as well as comparative ambition  of this account, 
it falls short of building up an alternative „theory‟ of civil-military relations due to 1) lack of 
definitional/conceptual clarity, 2) little attention paid to causality, 3) logical inconsistency, 
and (4) verification-difficulties. In this regard, intriguing is his concept of „corporatism‟ 
whose definitional status keeps changing almost every time the word is used. Moreover, this 
concept incorporates almost every possible definition, losing all coherence and meaning in 
the process. In addition, one finds that the three ideal types of military orientation- 
professional, praetorian and revolutionary- become almost indistinguishable. Also, the third 
crucial concept- army (military) intervention in politics- is never defined at all (Fever 1996). 
 
Remaining again within the confines of Huntingtonian „praetorianism‟ Perlmutter‟s Modern 
Authoritarianism has categorized praetorianism as one of the types of modern authoritarian 
system. In this regards, he describes five principal types of authoritarian regimes: 1) 
communist party states, 2) Hitler‟s Nazi system, 3) fascist regimes, 4) corporatist states, and 
5) praetorian dictatorships. The thrust of the argument is that the modern authoritarianism is 
populated and dominated by „oligarchic political elite‟. The military as a „parallel and 
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auxiliary‟ institution is used as instrument by the political elite in praetorian-authoritarianism 
(1981:1-13). 
 
Despite the significance of Perlmutter‟s work, the limits of generalizibility are too obvious. 
The primary focus of his analysis remained on the Middle East and its militaries, and the 
manner they attempted to intervene in politics. Also, the European states along with Middle 
Eastern and Latin American states are presented as cases where praetorian authoritarianism is 
projected as a vivid phenomenon. However, in doing so, Perlmutter (1981:28-62) seemingly 
tended to bypass the basic principles of comparative politics. How the Iraqi and Peruvian 
militaries and their interventions in politics could be compared? On what principles and 
levels the USSR and Cuban cases could be compared?  Unfortunately, the comparative thrust 
of context-sensitivity is also paid no attention at all. 
 
To summarize, the comparativist literature attempts to cross-nationally/culturally explain 
different patterns of civil-military relations. In this respect, its insights are quite useful, and 
the data is informative in nature. Moreover, it, at least, provides a theoretical foundation to 
build alternative model(s) of civil-military relationship especially in the context of 
developing states. Nonetheless, despite its merits, the limitations of this literature are all too 
oblivious. To begin with, the comparativist literature pays little attention to the contextuality 
of a given case. Also, the problem of comparability remains unsolved. In addition, it has an 
inherent tendency to over-generalize. Also, its models, in many cases, are not empirically and 
even theoretically, sound. Last but not least, despite its attempts at difference, it 
(un)intentionally follows the Huntingtonian tradition with a possible exception of Finer 
(Feaver 1996). 
 
1.4.3 The Structuralist Thought  
The structuralist thought as per its foundational positioning attempts to understand and 
explain the problem of civilian „control‟ of the military, in particular, and civil-military 
relations, in general, from the structural perspective. It emphasizes exclusively the specific 
structure of a state and society vis-à-vis its international state structure. In the section 
following a review of this literature is conducted with the aim to see whether this literature 
provides insights to the puzzle and the questions posed by the present study. 
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1.4.3.1 Desch- The Structural Theory of Civil-Military Relations 
 Michael C. Desch, an American political scientist, focuses on a crucial issue in civil-military 
relations, namely, civilian control of the military. He attempts to develop, and test a theory 
which explains why we get different levels of civilian control. In doing so, Desch revives an 
old, unresolved debate concerning the effect of the international system on civilians‟ ability 
to successfully control the military. However, in this respect, unlike many, he has coupled 
quite systemically external threats with internal ones. Therefore, he suggests that the degree 
to which civilians control the military is shaped essentially by two factors: 
external/international and internal/domestic threat environments- both real and perceived.  
 
Furthermore, on the basis of a proposed „structural‟ theory of civilian control, Desch deduces 
several hypotheses and predictions about the nature of civilian control in different threat 
settings. The thrust of his argument is: states in high external and low internal threat 
environments should have good civilian control; those with low external and high internal 
threat settings should have the least effective civilian control; and those with high/high and 
low/low will vary, but are likely to be poor and mixed, respectively - see his model on the 
next page. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the ambition as well as relative significance of this model, it is 
indeterminate in two important threat configurations.  In a first setting with both internal and 
external threats high, the model cannot predict whether there will be good civilian control, 
because the external threat has made the military outward. Or there shall be bad civilian 
control, because the threats have unified the military and the presence of an internal threat is 
sufficient in order to distract the military inward. In the second scenario, the model suffers 
from a similar fate of unpredictability as is argued by Feaver below:  
When both threats are low, the model cannot say whether there will be good civilian 
control, because the military will be divided (and thus, presumably, easy to control), 
or bad civilian control, because without any threats the military‟s orientation will be 
uncertain (or because the divided institutions slip into contentious factionalism). 
Which outcome prevails depends, according to Desch, on ideational factors, such as 
organizational culture and clashing world-views, a story that transpires more or less 
off Desch‟s structural stage…one wonders whether the causal mechanisms are 
undertheorized.    
                                                                                                                   (Feaver 2000) 
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Regardless, in order to test his model, Desch has selected twenty three different case studies 
which  specifically focus on  civil-military relations in eight post-World War II  states- 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, Soviet Union/Russia, and the United 
States. Obviously, an ambitious study like this, which attempts to cross-nationally explain 
complex phenomenon and practice- the civilian control of the military-, has its explanatory 
limitations which Desch admits, at times, quite openly. Furthermore, his reliance on 
secondary historical sources and the problem of determination of threat „perception‟ - both 
international and domestic- are major instruments of critique of his otherwise „parsimonious‟ 
theory (ibid 2000).  
 
Table 3 ‘Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of 
Threats’              
                                                     
External threats 
High                      Low 
                                                                              
 
 
Internal threats High/Low                        
 
 
                     
 
 
1.4.3.2 Is Desch’s Model Applicable to the Case of Pakistan? 
Desch‟s model, or rather theory, as is seen above, is innovative and has the potential of 
generalizibility. In the following, an attempt is made to see if his theory is applicable to the 
case of Pakistan which has a long history- as shall be seen later in this study- of very complex 
civil-military relations where coups have been staged quite intermittingly. In order to see 
whether the Pakistan case fits into Desch‟s model, it is suggestively imperative to summarize 
on the next page the assumptions of it. The model claims that the civilian „control‟ over the 
military would be: 
 
 
 
 
Poor 
(Q3) 
Worst 
(Q4) 
Good 
(Q1) 
Mixed 
(Q2) 
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Table 4 Summary of Desch’s Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Having summarized and tabled the assumption of Desch‟s model, the thesis, with history in 
terms of primary and secondary sources as its guide, takes the case of Pakistan and attempt to 
apply the model to it with the help of Table 3. Pakistan, as the Table shows, never had:  a) a 
high external and high internal threat; b) a low external and low internal threat; c) a high 
external and low internal threat
19
; d) a high internal and low external threat. Therefore, in 
light of the afore-mentioned it is argued that despite Desch‟s model comparative potential of 
generalizibility, it cannot be applied- as Table 5 shows below- to the case of Pakistan on 
purely empirical grounds. Importantly enough, had it been applicable empirically, even then 
the problem of determination of threat perception in the context of Pakistan would have 
further complicated and restricted the scope of its application.   
 
Table 5 Application of Desch’s Model to Pakistan’s Case 
      Source: Data gathered from Desch‟s work (1999). 
 
1.4.4 The Actor-oriented Work 
The agency work, which though is not in abundance, assumes actors capable to affect, in 
principle, any change in the „structure‟ or whatever of state and/or society or any state-society 
                                               
19 India- and for that matter Afghanistan- is structurally projected as a case of external threat to Pakistan, 
especially at Partition (see, for instance, Aziz 2008). However, the underlying methodological and theoretical 
basis of this threat construction is, arguably, problematic since the question of threat perceiver is left 
unanswered by such accounts. The preset study shall, therefore, attempt, from its conceptual-methodological 
perspective, the very question of external threat perception, construction and importantly rationalization. 
▪  good if the external/internal equation is high/low 
▪  worst if the external/internal equation is low/high  
▪ mixed if the external/internal equation is low/low                        
▪  poor if the external/internal equation is high/high 
Civilian Control Threat Equation Threat Intensity 
Level 
Pakistan Case 
Good External/Internal 
 
High/Low No 
Worst External/Internal 
 
Low/High No 
Mixed External/Internal 
 
Low/Low No 
Poor External/Internal 
 
High/High No 
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institution(s). Also, it assumes actors to be rational- they have a clear conception of costs and 
benefits. Furthermore, the agency work, with a background in economics, assumes and treats 
actors as principal and agents. In the following, an attempt is made to explain how the agency 
theory is developed with respect to civilian control of the military, in particular, and civil-
military relations and politics, in general. The specific aim is to see whether the assumptions 
of agency theory are applicable or useful to the case of Pakistan.  
 
1.4.4.1 Peter Feaver: The Agency Theory (AT) of Civil-Military Relations 
Peter D. Feaver, renowned American political scientist, set forth his arguments, more 
empirical in nature and less theoretical in content, in his article „The Civil-Military 
Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control‟(1996). This 
article, as is seen before, severally criticized the weakness in Huntington and Janowitz 
theories of CMR. Moreover, it quite convincingly categorized and placed almost all 
important work on different patterns of civil-military relations under the theoretical influence 
of the two. Empirically, Feaver‟s arguments stood the test of the day; his „outlines‟-or better 
assumptions- of a new theory of civil-military relations also gained ground argumentatively. 
Besides, in his next important articles „Crisis as Shirking‟(1998) and „Civil-Military 
Relations‟ (1999), he further explained the „problemaqtiue‟- the perennial question of how 
the civilian control soldiers-,  and  identified a few useful variables related to the problem. 
Also, an attempt was made to explain, with the help of agency theory, the „souring of 
American civil-military relations‟. 
 
Nonetheless, his assumptions with respect to agency theory of civil-military relations got 
formalized and theorized properly in his famous Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and 
Civil-Military Relations (2003). In this account, Feaver developed his arguments, by contrast 
to Huntington‟s and others, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. To begin with, the 
theoretical core of this volume lies in agency theory which was primarily developed by non-
political scientists- economists. However, it is used by political scientists though infrequently 
and insufficiently.  
 
In principle, the agency theory is normally presented as the „work‟ or „shirk‟ trade-off. Those 
responsible for supervision- the „principals‟- wish to extract the maximum effort for the 
minimum cost. Those who carry out the tasks- the „agents‟- hope to get away with the 
greatest reward for the least work. Nevertheless, translating this model from economic to 
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political realms leads to major problems. The issues are further compounded in applying 
them to the military. In this respect, Feaver (2003:36-65) suggests three reasons: first, 
military agents prefer to be told what policy to pursue. They wish to deal with threats from a 
position of advantage in terms of controlling the tempo and the scope of the conflict, thus 
resulting in a preference for offensive operations; second, military agents wish to have their 
accomplishments given appropriate recognition by others; third, they wish to carry out their 
tasks with minimal civilian interference and oversight.  
 
By this basic logic, Feaver identifies six possible logical outcomes based on decisions by 
principals to monitor the military intrusively or otherwise; by agents to work or shirk, and 
then by principals to punish the military or not in case shirking occurs. Furthermore, the 
interaction among a limited set of variables, whose values are exogenous to the model, 
determines if one outcome or another is reached or not. Thus, the resultant model is able to 
provide powerful interpretive tool for explaining changing patterns of civilian control over 
the military from the Cold War to the present.  
 
In addition, Feaver aptly demonstrates the concept of power in four ways. First, he dissects 
Huntington‟s theory of civil-military relations which prescribed that the United States needed 
to adopt objective civilian control based on a conservative ideological shift so as to prevail in 
the Cold War. From the agency theory perspective, Huntington expected a narrow gap 
between civilian and military policy preferences as civilians changed their preferences to 
match those of the military. Under such conditions, civilian control could operate with non-
intrusive monitoring. Feaver documents and argues that this model outcome did not occur as 
Huntington predicted, and yet the US prevailed in the Cold War. Second, on the basis of a 
history of Cold War civil-military relations, Feaver empirically describes that the gap 
between civilian and military preferences remained wide throughout the Cold War, while the 
costs of monitoring declined and the probability of punishment for shirking was high. Under 
these conditions, as agency theory expects, civilian monitoring of the military was intrusive 
and military compliance with civilian preferences- working- was high. This explains why the 
U.S. prevailed in the Cold War. 
 
Third, Feaver uses his model to explain the „crises‟ in US civil-military relations in the post-
Cold War era. The gap between civilian and military preferences, in this period, remained 
wide and the costs of monitoring were still low. But the probability of punishment for 
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military shirking declined also. The details that explain why expectations of punishment 
declined cannot be rehearsed; they include, but certainly go beyond, Clinton‟s weaknesses as 
commander-in-chief. However, the effect as expected by agency theory was to push the 
pattern of civilian control away from intrusive monitoring with working toward a pattern of 
intrusive monitoring with shirking, which marks a crisis in civil-military control. Fourth, 
Feaver describes how agency theory helps explain the decisions to use force in the post-Cold 
War era. In this regard, his contribution has shown that the decision to work or shirk is not an 
either-or proposition but rather a substantial variation in the degree and modes of shirking. 
 
1.4.4.2 Agency Theory’s Assumptions and their Advantages 
Feaver‟s Agency Theory and the subsequent Agency Model of civil-military relations, as the 
study has seen, are framed in the USA‟s civil-military relations context. The present research, 
due to the comparative sensitivity of contextuality, resorted to Feaver‟s „Informal Agency 
Theory‟ in order to build its conceptual framework on the assumptions of principal-agent 
framework, in particular, and the agency theory, in general. In the following, the assumptions 
of agency theory are explained in details and its theoretical advantages are weighed vis-à-vis 
sociological and structuralist perspectives. 
 
Explanatorily, at the heart of the principal-agent framework is the assumption that both the 
principal and the agent are rational actors: they have the ability to calculate costs and 
benefits. In other words, the principal-agent duo is rational. In the Informal Agency Theory -
onward agency theory- of civil-military relations, Feaver has maintained the same 
assumption. The agency theory, however, treats civil-military relationship primarily as a 
„strategic interaction‟ whereby the actors, either the principal or the agent, makes things 
happen rather than the structural (or cultural) settings. The actors being rational have their 
interests i.e. political, economic or military etc., which they rank in terms of preferences- 
which itself is a process and indicator of a rational calculus. Though the actors define their 
interests in a specific cultural/ structural context and at times the context shapes and affect 
their interests, yet importantly it is the actors who, even being affected by the culture/ 
structure behave rationally. They have the ability to (re)rank their perceived interests 
accordingly. Put simply, the agency theory and the principal-genet framework, which the 
former is grounded in, are actor-oriented.  
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Similarly, in a civil-military relations setting, the agency theory assumes the civilians to be 
principal and the military as agent. The underlying assumption behind this is the long history 
of civil-military relations especially of Europe. Conventionally, the democratic theory (and 
the general practice in the West) delegated authority from the civilians (society-state) to the 
military- an institution of the state- to guard the civilians from the internal and external 
threats. The civilian principals were/are democratically authorized to make the military 
agents do its bidding. If the military obeys the orders of the civilians, then in the lexicon of 
agency theory the military is „working‟. And if the military agents are strong enough to put 
aside the civilians‟ orders, then the latter is „shirking‟. In other words, working and shirking 
occur due to inherent differences in the roles played by civilians and the military. 
Nonetheless, according to the theory, both the civilians and the military have a convergence 
of preferences when it comes to the „security of the state‟. But this argument is made in the 
context of the USA, and may not necessarily hold true in the case of Pakistan as shall be 
explained later in the thesis. 
In addition, according to agency theory, the civilians have a set of preferences to „punish‟ the 
military when the former are able to catch its shirking. Also, the theory provides the civilians 
with incentives and rewards to be rationally offered to the military agent to prevent shirking- 
the extreme of which is a military coup. The occurrence of a coup or a „crises‟- as the terms is 
used in the USA civil-military setting- is not, according to AT, to be assigned to the structure 
as is normally done in the literature on civil-military relations and, for that matter, democratic 
transition. The crisis, coup or any rupture in civil-military relations signifies the strategic 
interaction between the civilian principals and the military agents. If the civilians are weak, 
coward and selfish, unintelligent, or ignorant, then the rational military with the advantage of 
coercive power would attempt to maximize its interests- primarily economic- even in an 
advanced democracy such as the USA. Therefore, the question of political culture, political 
system, the level of democratization, which are in their essence indicators of political 
development, is not that central to civil-military relations problemaqtiue. The central focus of 
the agency theory is on the strategic interaction, preferences and the subsequent (in) action of 
the principal and the agent.  
1.4.4.3 Summary of Agency Theory’s Assumptions  
Having presented above an overview of Feaver‟s agency theory of civil-military relations it 
would seem appropriate here to summarize the assumptions of agency theory. Moreover, this 
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and the subsequent section would attempt to make a comparative analysis of the core 
assumptions of agency theory and sociological, comparativist and structural perspectives in 
order to plausibly mark the (possible) theoretical/explanatory advantages of agency theory 
over its predecessors and/or counterparts.  
 
To begin with, the agency theory of civil-military relations as postulated by Feaver 
(2003:103-111) assumes that: 
 Civil-military relations are primarily a strategic interaction; 
 Civilians are the principal and the military is the agent; 
 Civilians and the military are rational actors- they have a clear conception of cost-
benefit analysis. Also, they hold preferences which lead to actions; 
 The problem of delegation occurs when there is divergence between preferences of 
the two; 
 To make its preferences prevail- or to make the military work- the civilians devise and 
implement oversight mechanisms/regimes. In the absence of an oversight regime, the 
rational military tend to shirk: the minimum form of which is a „crisis‟, and the 
maximum, a coup. 
 The question of military intervention is beyond the confines of a democracy- whether 
functional, transitional or advanced.. As already mentioned, it is posited that the 
civilian control of the military is a game of strategic interaction. Even in the USA- an 
advanced democracy- there are many instances of potential „crises‟ of civil-military 
relations; 
 The „punishment‟- be that physical or financial, as assumed in the theory- helps to 
explain why the agent military stops short of a coup (in the context of the US civil-
military relations.); 
 Civil-military relations could be understood and explained on a „daily-basis‟. 
 
1.4.4.4 Advantages 
The agency theory has theoretical/explanatory advantages over any other theory of CMR. 
Why and/or how? Consider the following: 
▪ It accords top priority, logically, to the „agency‟ of actors; that they are capable of making 
things happen. The sociological and structuralist perspectives believe in the precedence of 
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„structure‟ thus underemphasizing the significance of agency. After all, it is the actors‟ 
agency which makes or breaks „structure‟ in the first place; 
 
▪ It assumes that the actors- both principal and agent- are rational; they have a clear 
conception of costs and benefits. They tend to maximize their benefits and minimize the costs 
during their strategic interaction. The non-agency theories pay little attention to this fact, and 
instead give more weight to factors such as culture, norms, values etc; 
 
▪ It attempts to understand and explain the puzzle central to civil-militantly relations, namely, 
the civilian control of the military. In this respect, it assumes actors‟ interests as central to the 
puzzle. Their interests mould their set of preferences which in turn produces a set of actions. 
If the civilians are vigilant and are able to devise and implement oversight mechanism, they 
enhance control in their favor in terms of winning over the preferences of the agent military. 
If not, the military‟s preferences prevail and it gets out of control. Thus, the agency theory is 
capable of answering the puzzle. On the other hand, the sociological and structuralist 
literature accords more importance to exogenous variables whose impact, under complex 
situations, is difficult, if not impossible, to identify and  measure; 
 
▪ Since it assumes civil-military relations as strategic interaction among the principal civilians 
and agent military and proposes oversight mechanisms to control the agent, it helps to explain 
the CMR on an almost „daily‟ basis. In other words, it provides a researcher with both 
theoretical and empirical tools to measure the patterns of interaction between the principal 
and agent, and to explain and possibly predict the nature and direction of their relationship. 
Thus, it enables one to explain why- and why don‟t- crises and coups occur. The non-agency 
theories though rely and revolve around a host of variables, they remain unable to rationally 
pinpoint cause(s) for a coup. 
1.5 Is Feaver’s Theory Applicable to Pakistan’s Case? 
Peter Feaver‟s theory is certainly an innovative and quite useful addition to the literature on 
civil-military relations. Its assumptions are logical and theoretically powerful. They are quite 
capable, as is explained above, to analyze the empirical data especially in the US‟s civil-
military relations context. Nevertheless, the theory has its operational constrains outside the 
specific US context for it assumes: 
 There are only two actors- civilian and military; 
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 The civilian are constant  principal and the military is constant agent; 
 The United States political system is open, plural and democratic. 
The above three empirical/ theoretical facts, however, may not be present in many developing 
states/transitional societies such as Pakistan. This implies that the assumptions of agency 
theory are useful and have explanatory power but they need to be contextualized or better 
modified. Importantly, Feaver (2003:292-302) himself has openly suggested to „modify‟ his 
work in order to solve the often difficult but central problems of contextuality and 
comparability.  
1.5.1 Contextualization of the AT’s Assumptions 
Having explained the basic assumptions of agency theory, it seems appropriate now to 
modify and contextualize them so as to apply them effectively to the case of Pakistan. To 
begin with, it seems appropriate to give a brief historical overview. The state of Pakistan 
came into being on 14 August 1947 out of a United India which was a colony of Great 
Britain. Thus, it would not be inappropriate to historically assume Pakistan to be a 
postcolonial state, which like India inherited a semblance of state institutions such as civil 
bureaucracy and military, and a measure of constitutionalism and electoral exercise- the India 
Act of 1935 and the 1946 election, along with the Constituent Assembly (CA), are cases in 
point respectively. Moreover, under the Partition Plan of 1947, the 1935 Act was to serve as a 
body of rules and regulations until the newly created states make their own constitutions. The 
inherited constituent assemblies were legally responsible to draft constitutions for the new 
republics of India and Pakistan.  
With the hindsight of history it suffices to assume that this legal and constitutional 
arrangement as well as the assumptions of democratic theory made the people of Pakistan 
through their elected representatives constitutionally, legally and morally the principal in 
terms of agency theory. In other words, politicians such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the 
Governor-General, Liaqaut Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister (PM), and Maulvi Tamizudin, 
the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, were a few among the principal civilians
20
 who 
were delegated  authority by the British.  
                                               
20 The term civilian(s) is primarily used for politicians in the study. However, it also means the general masses 
who elect(ed) the politicians in the first place. Nevertheless, the real determinant of the usage would be the 
context in which the term may be applied. 
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Thus, what the above-mentioned informs us is that the civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the 
military were legally, constitutionally and morally the agent (however, it is altogether a 
different story that the civil bureaucracy assumed the principal position (see Flow Matrix 2 
on the next page) within a few years after independence; this actually is one of the puzzles of 
the present study as shall be explained in Chapter 3). For now, a matrix below is proposed 
which contextualizes the agency assumptions with respect to the principal-agent relationship 
in the specific context of newly independent Pakistan: 
Flow Matrix 1 Four Actors: Principal-Agent Relationship at Partition 
 
 
 
 
 
What can be deduced from the matrix is that at independence politicians were able to get the 
authority delegated, both conceptually
21
 and practically, by the masses to run the affairs of 
the state of Pakistan. Therefore, from the perspective of AT, they assumed the principal 
position since independence. The remaining actors i.e. civil bureaucracy, military and 
judiciary, assumed an agent position legally, constitutionally and morally. The Jinnah-led 
principal, in order to make the agents especially the military and the civil bureaucracy work, 
attempted to re-structure not only the latter‟s institutional organization but also urged upon 
the agents to do the principal‟s bidding (see Chapter 3 for details).  
However, quite to the principal‟s surprise, the agents especially the military preferred to shirk 
in terms of not carrying out the former‟s plan of action during the war against India over 
Kashmir in 1947-48. Importantly, in the post-Liaquat period, the agent civil bureaucracy was 
                                               
21 The term „conceptually‟  points  to the logical and historical significance of democratic theory which provided  
basis, originally to the European masses,  for the attainment of fundamental human rights i.e. speech, 
organization, participation, election etc. Though the agency theory of civil-military relations  has taken the 
democratic theory into  consideration yet the present study, for reasons of emphasis and clarity, logically tends 
to base itself on the core  assumption- namely, people/masses elect their representatives- of democratic theory 
with respect to the  important question of who shall rule and how.  
Judiciary  
(Agent) 
Military 
(Agent) 
 
 
Civil Bureaucracy  
(Agent) 
Politicians 
(Principal) 
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able to replace the politicians as the principal of Pakistan‟s state. Not only this, at later stages 
in the history of Pakistan, as has already been mentioned and as shall be explained briefly in 
the following section, the military also assumed the principal position and vice versa. The 
following matrix summarizes the context-specific flow of principal-agent relationship in 
Pakistan (‟s history): 
Flow Matrix 2 Principal-Agent Relationship in Pakistan22 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.2 Actors and Agency: Rationalization of AT’s Assumptions 
As the need for contextualizing the agency assumptions was felt due to the agency theory‟s 
specific focus on the US case, it seems now appropriate to not only explicitly explain the 
theoretical relationship between agency and rationality- rational choice theory- but also the 
strategic interaction among and/or between  actors, their interests, preferences and subsequent 
actions. In addition, the aim is to contextualize the case of Pakistan under the assumptions of 
agency-rationality.  
 
To begin with, it is highly necessary to highlight the „rationalist framework‟- in other words 
rational choice theory, upon which agency theory is based. The rationalist method, in 
Feaver‟s words, is: 
A fruitful point of departure, not out of an ideological commitment to rational choice 
theory…The use of the rationalist method cuts against a trend in the general political 
science literature to focus nonmaterial determinants of behavior, be they identity, 
                                               
22 Since the assumptions of these relationship shall be incorporated into the model ( see page 61), the terms can  
be abbreviated sequence-wise as follows: a) Politicians, P-A-P-A; b) Civil Bureaucracy,  A-P-A; c) Military, A-
P-A-P; d) Judiciary, A. These abbreviated  terms  are used in the model to denote context-specific flow in 
principal-agent relations in the case of Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. 
 
Judiciary  
(Agent) 
Military 
(Agent-Principal-Agent-Principal) 
 
 
Civil Bureaucracy  
(Agent-Principal-Agent) 
Politicians 
(Principal-Agent-Principal-Agent) 
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norms, beliefs, or ideas…Paradoxically, this focus on the nonmaterial determinants of 
behavior is where civil-military relations theory has more or less remained for the past 
forty years…if anything, then, civil-military relations theory needs to make room for 
material factors. Agency theory does that.          
                                                                                                                      (ibid: 12-14)                                                                                                             
What the foregoing suggests, is that agency theory being grounded in rational choice, 
assumes actors to be inherently rational: that they have certain interests and to achieve and 
maximize them, they have certain preferences which, in turn, give birth to certain actions or 
policies. Thus, it is assumed that the actors in terms of principal and agent(s) interact 
strategically to maximize interests. The interests produce a set of preferences which, in turn, 
produces actions. In addition, agency theory treats, implicitly, the principal and agent, 
civilian and the military, as actors in terms of institutions. However, to emphasize the role 
and position of actors as institutions, which conceptually make a clear distinction between 
individual/personal actors and institutional actors, the assumption of neo-institutionalism are 
accordingly appreciated (Mitra 1999; also North 1990:3-26). Therefore, it is assumed that the 
actors in the Pakistan‟s CMR context are rational institutions with certain institutional values 
and interests (Mitra 2001; also 1999). 
Besides, in the case of Pakistan, the strategic interaction among and/or between different 
actors occurs in a specific context of civil-military relations. The sets of interests i.e. 
primarily political and economic, preferences and policies (actions) are inherently present due 
to the rationality and agency of the actors. This implies that the interests, preferences and 
subsequent actions are not a product of context or culture, per se as is over-assumed by 
sociological and structural theories. The agency does not, however, attempt to reduce the 
importance of context. Rather, the significance of context lies in providing actors with a 
strategic space to interact with each/one another rationally. 
 
Nevertheless, it is the actors who transform culture and context into „sources of values, 
networks and organizational resources‟ (Mitra 2006:23; also 2008). Therefore, the task of the 
researcher is to locate the existence of actors within the context-oriented strategic space, and 
then, within the confines of that context, attempt to explain their interaction or otherwise 
based on interests be they political or economic etc.  
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In other words, the context and culture- and/or cultural context or contextual culture- is a 
product of agency and rationality for, arguably, it is the strategic interaction between/among 
rational actors which gave birth to cultural norms/values/beliefs etc., in the first place. 
Interestingly enough, the importance of interests and the way they generate „accommodation‟ 
is accepted by the exponents of „cultural‟ studies of politics too (Diamond 2009:155156). 
Last but not least, the flow matrix, on the next page, attempts to not only summarize the 
foregoing but also help understand the strategic interaction, actors, interests, preferences and 
actions in the case of Pakistan: 
Flow Matrix 3 Four Actors’ Strategic Interaction 
 
 
1.6 Designing the Model 
As is explained, the Flow Matrix 3 indicates strategic interaction among/between four actors 
who are contextually assumed to be principal and agents in terms of agency theory- as the 
Flow Matrix 2 has already shown. Indubitably, the very fact of strategic interaction points to 
the contextuality of the present case which assumes that politicians on behalf of the state 
delegated authority, at Partition, to the agent military to protect the former against any 
internal/external threats. In this respect, it seems not inappropriate to quote the founding 
Strategic Interaction 
       One Principal  Three Agents 
Interests 
Preferences 
Actions 
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father of the country- M.A. Jinnah. Addressing the officers of staff college Quetta on 14 June 
1948, he said: 
I would like to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the 
prescribed oath to you. “I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I 
owe allegiance to the Constitution and Dominion of Pakistan (mark the words 
Constitution and the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan) and that I will as in 
duty bound honesty and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan [Armed] Forces 
and go within the terms of my enrolment wherever I may be ordered by air, land or 
sea and that I will observe and obey all command of any officer set over me…..”…if 
you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adapted for 
use in Pakistan, which is our present Constitution, that the executive authority flows 
from the head of the Government of Pakistan, who is the Governor-General and, 
therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the 
sanction of the Executive Head. This is the legal position. [emphasis added] 
                                                                                                                    (Jinnah 1948) 
As is obvious from the quote, this delegation was based on legal and constitutional, if not 
moral, principles. In addition, it is assumed that the case of Pakistan, unlike the US case, has 
four, instead of two, actors. Also, the present case assumes that out of the four actors there is 
contextually one permanent principal, and three agents. Moreover, the four actors are 
assumed to be rational and capable of affecting any change to minimize their costs and 
maximize their interests. However, as regards the interests, it is assumed that the actors 
primarily hold politico-economic interests i.e. electoral victories, budgetary allocations, non-
budgetary economic enterprises, special funds etc. 
Besides, the very fact of strategic interaction implies that the actors especially the politicians 
and the military have certain preferences which they rank accordingly; the problem of 
delegation occurs when the agent military has a divergence of preferences, which normally 
includes policy persuasions, „desire for respect‟, relaxed/minimum monitoring/oversight 
(Feaver 2003:58-65). In Pakistan‟s case, the military, however, has the tendency to influence 
policies in a way that helps boost its „economic‟ interests, both budgetary and non-budgetary. 
Moreover, this study believes in the primacy of political interests which, in turn, facilitates 
economic interests of the actors especially the military with which the study is primarily 
concerned. However, non politico-economic interests such as the legal or religious are not 
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excluded as such. Their presence shall be noted if and when they have an impact on politics 
and the state. 
In addition, according to the study‟s model, the politicians, on the other hand, make sure that 
their preferences prevail: if their preferences prevail it means the military agent is under 
control and „working‟; however, if the military preferences prevail, this means the military is 
„shirking‟- not working as the civilian politicians would have liked it to. Importantly 
however, the working or shirking never occurs in a vacuum. According to our agency model, 
politicians must devise some monitoring mechanism- an oversight regime- to make military 
do its bidding. They must be over-vigilant as regards information related to the tasks assigned 
to the agent military. In this respect, as elected representatives of the people the „civilian have 
a right to do wrong‟ and importantly to „judge‟ on behalf of the nation. In addition, with 
respect to an oversight regime, Feaver‟s appreciable contribution is that he has brought the 
„punishment‟ back in the business - in the US case it starts from „audits‟ and ends at court-
martial and „purges‟(Feaver 2003:86,94). In the absence of (or in the presence of poorly 
devised and implemented) an oversight regime, the rational military, after having calculated 
the costs and benefits, shirks of which overt demonstration and maximum form is a military 
coup d‟état. 
Nevertheless, the example of Pakistan, unlike the US case, has its own peculiar context, four 
actors, their agency and rationality. Therefore, this study assumes that the civil bureaucracy 
too was able to directly intervene in politics and thus assumed the principal position. From 
the perspective of AT however, the agent civil bureaucracy, in principle, was delegated 
certain powers in the capacity of an agent as indeed the military or judiciary was delegated to 
„work‟ in order to consolidate the state-nation. Again, to highlight the caseness as well as the 
civilian principalship of Pakistan, it is instructive to resort to the principled principal 
politicians who were able to legally-constitutionally delegate the authority to agents of which 
civil bureaucracy was one. In this regard, Jinnah, while addressing the gazetted officers on 25 
March 1948, said: 
Whatever community, caste or creed you belong to you are now the [civil] servants of 
Pakistan. Servants can only do their duties and discharge their responsibilities by 
serving. Those days have gone when the country was ruled by the [civil] bureaucracy. 
It is people‟s Government, responsible to the people …do your duty as servants; you 
are not concerted with this political or that political party; that is not your 
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business…you are not rulers. You do not belong to the ruling class; you belong to the 
servants. [italics mine]    
                                                                                                                    (Jinnah 1948)                                                                                                                                                            
However, quite contrary to Jinnah‟s advice, the civil bureaucracy rationally did shirk to 
replace the civilian politicians as the principal, as shall be explained in Chapter 3. This 
implies that in the model/thesis „working-shirking‟ (agency A) terms are not confined to only 
civilian politicians and the military; rather they equally are applicable to other actors as well. 
Moreover, the model emphasizes rationality of the actors the military being one. In this 
respect, it assumes an actor‟s inherent capability to prefer own to larger interest (or vice 
versa) an act, and hence indicator, of agency- which is termed agency B in the model (-
guided explanation).  
 
In addition, the proposed model assumes that the agent military, after having chose to shirk in 
terms of a (successful) coup d‟état, and preferred its own interest (i.e. coup) to a larger one, 
takes the principal position which is context- or better case- dependent. Thus, the very act of 
coup and preferring own to larger interest points to its agency and rationality. In other words, 
a coup is interest-oriented: it is staged to maximize (the military‟s) political and economic 
interests. Nevertheless, in this respect, the study‟s categorical assumption is that the military 
assumes principalship of Pakistan sans legality, constitutionality and morality (This shall be 
substantiated with the help of empirical evidence.) However, in the post-coup period, the 
agent judiciary, as shall be explained in this thesis, endorses a coup rationally.  
 
Furthermore, what the model assumes is that as the principal military, it is capable, as a result 
of its agency B, namely, preferring own interest, of staging a coup which is assumed as an 
extreme form of punishment against the shirking agent(s).
23
 As the model-guided analysis 
shall show, the principal military chooses to stage a coup only when its political (and 
indirectly economic) interests are assumed to be institutionally and/or constitutionally 
threatened by one of its agents. In other words, the agent(s) had opted to shirk by not 
performing the task (of working) as the principal military would have it performed. On the 
other hand, when the principal military does not resort to a coup, as the model implicitly 
                                               
23   There is no need for the military to shirking, for it is already the principal actor. Instead, in such as a specific 
context, it stages a coup, while points to its inherent agency B in terms of preferring own to larger interests. 
Therefore, the causal but context-specific model further highlights it.  
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assumes, the agents are assumed to be working i.e. the agents are obeying the military‟s 
orders. However, an agent‟s working should not be assumed a marker of its essentliazed 
weaker position or any structural constraint per se. Rather, it points to its rationality: it does 
not attempt to shirk since the cost would be higher than the intended benefits and vice versa. 
In addition, unlike Feaver as his case did not have any coup problem, the present research, as 
hinted above, assumed coup to be a form of punishment. The coup punishment is primarily 
accorded to the respective agent institutionally; for instance, the constitution is abrogated; the 
parliament and provincial assemblies are dissolved; the offices of Prime Minster and Chief 
Ministers cease to function/exist; the judiciary is enforced to take a „fresh oath‟ in terms of  
PCO; LFO is issued; opposition political parties are banned
24
. 
However, the coup punishment also has a  physical dimension i.e. shirking politicians are 
either put behind bars, physically tortured, forced into exile and even killed. But, the element 
of punishment is lacking in the case of civilian politicians and civil bureaucracy when they 
happen to assume principalship. Instead, they rationally prefer let the military go scot free. In 
this respect, it is argued that the politicians in their capacity of either principal or agent do not 
accord any preference to establish an effective oversight regime. Though there are a few 
attempts at, arguably, creating an implicit oversight mechanism yet the attempts remain 
unable to operationalize such measures effectively.  
Last but not least, this model-guided study brings rewards i.e. politico-economic benefits, 
along with punishment into the business. In this respect, it is assumed that the principal, be 
that politicians, civil bureaucracy or military, prefer to politico-economically reward that 
section of agents with whom their preferences converge. The rewards may take the form of 
facilitated political space i.e. no-espionage through intelligence agencies, party tickets to ex-
military men/civil bureaucrats to promotion to senior posts- in the case of judges  civil 
bureaucrats and top military officers- easy bank loans, official land allotments, relaxed or no 
financial accountability etc. However, quite contrary to non-military principal(s)‟ 
expectations, the model assumes that the rational military calculates such measures as 
weaknesses and prefers to shirk.  
                                               
24 The normal practice of the military in the (immediate) post-coup period is to arbitrarily abrogate the 
respective constitution, and replace it with a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). This is followed by the 
norm of a „fresh oath‟ administered to the judiciary especially the higher courts, under the PCO. In this respect, 
the judges, who refuse to take an oath, are arbitrarily either retired or expelled from the service. Also normally, 
the military promulgates a Legal Framework Order (LFO) in order to restructure the country‟s political system. 
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Finally, it is proposed that the model on the next page summarizes the foregoing, and 
explains the intricacies inherent to the specific civil-military relations of Pakistan. Arguably, 
the model has a predictive ambition too. It assumes that until the politicians are able to 
increase the politico-economic cost for the rational military, the latter shall continue to 
maintain its principal position and stage a coup if and when necessary. 
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1.7 Hypotheses 
Since the methodology used in this thesis- a combination of process tracing and analytic 
narratives- differs from a historical (grand) narrative in the sense that it carries out an 
analytical explanation grounded in theoretical variables, it, therefore, becomes imperative to 
test a specific theory-oriented „law‟ that acts as a statement of regularity between a set of 
events. Hence, the thesis begins with six sets of hypotheses to be tested. In this respect, it is 
stated that the first hypothesis (H 1) is exclusively based on the general agency theory- 
agency A in the context of this study. Similarly, the theoretical base of H 4 is also agency 
literature; however, this hypothesis is operationally intermingled with agency B- rational 
choice. Moreover, hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 are purely derived from the theoretical literature of 
rational choice. In addition, the final hypotheses- H 6- is derived from the literature on 
Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. 
 
The six hypotheses correspond, one way or the other, to the main puzzle and core and 
supporting questions of the study: 
 Is the coup- and hence military intervention- caused by structure or agency? 
 Why does the military intervene in Pakistan‟s politics? 
 How does the military intervene in the country‟s politics? 
 Is it possible to single out any dominant cause for its intervention? 
 
Having stated the theoretical as well as empirical basis of the hypotheses and appreciated 
their correspondence to the posed puzzle and the questions, it seems then appropriate to state 
the hypotheses themselves. The following section deals with it. 
 
1.7.1 Primary Hypothesis 
The primary hypothesis along with the core question of the study is posed as under: 
 
H 1. Military intervenes in politics because of its inherent agency, and not culture, identity, 
religion, conspiracy, „structure‟ or internal/external threats. It is a rational institution which 
attempts coup(s) after having calculated the costs and benefits of the exercise. The coup-
attempt marks (more) politico-economic benefits than cost.  As shall be explained in the next 
chapter, the existing literature is replete with structural, conspiratorial and/or identitist 
descriptions which foresee the military not only staging a coup but also remaining in politics 
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for a considerable period of time. These types of works have excluded the military agency 
and rationality altogether. Therefore, it is high time these essential features of the institution, 
which after all is made up of rational humans, were accorded due importance and 
acknowledged their potential to explain extreme actions like a military coup d‟état. 
 
1.7.2 Secondary Hypotheses 
The secondary hypotheses of the present research are presented as follows: 
H 2. The military intervention- both direct and indirect- is primarily caused by its political 
interests. Normally the literature on civil-military relations in Pakistan, and its politics has 
not touched this aspect of the problem (see Chapter 2). Though Siddiqa (2007:1-7) 
highlighted the importance of economic variables the analysis is short of a systematic 
determination of the dominant cause(s).  
 
H 3. Having intervened in politics the military utilitizes its political space to maximize its 
economic interests.
25
 The conventional literature in Pakistan‟ civil military relations excludes 
this aspect of military‟s economic interests altogether. In this regard, though Jalal (1990) has 
pointed to the political economy of defense, this narrative, by no means, qualifies as an 
empirical account of the military‟s economic activities- as shall be explained in this study. 
Moreover, the level and degree of the data provided is limited. In addition, the analysis 
attempted is methodologically, if not theoretically, unconvincing since there are no explicit 
attempts at causation between „political economy of defense‟ and military intervention. 
Besides, more recently, Siddiqa has boldly enumerated a variety of business enterprises led 
by the military especially its top brass. However, her work falls short of a systemic 
comparative correlation between Milbus- military businesses- and military intervention in 
politics.  
 
H 4. The military stages a coup d‟état when its political space is perceived to be constrained 
by non-military actor(s) - politicians, civil bureaucracy and judiciary. The existing literature, 
as we shall explain in chapter 2, is void of any rigorous analysis of this aspect of the problem. 
Normally structure or the weaknesses of political institutions is (over)emphasized to justify 
military intervention. In other words, a „by default‟ syndrome is highly appreciated. Quite to 
                                               
25 The study shall empirically explain that a (successful) coup is economically beneficial for the military. 
Rationally, it gives incentives to the various components (the Army, the Air Force, the Navy etc.) of the military 
institution (and even its subsidiaries such as the Fauji Foundation) to, overall,  stand united vis-à-vis other actors 
such as politicians and/or civil bureaucracy. 
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the contrary, this hypothesis marks the importance of the „by design‟ side of the political 
coin. 
 
H 5. The coup is staged by the military to politically enable itself to (re)negotiate the rules of 
the game with other stake holders i.e. politicians, bureaucrats, judges. In Pakistan‟s civil-
military relations context, it is usually considered that the military stages a coup to remove 
undesirable elements from the political scene and that‟s it. Arguably however, this sort of 
thinking is fundamentally flawed since it takes agency and rationality out of the picture. 
Empirically even, this type of assertions over-ignores the military‟s politics in terms of 
consciously attempting a (re)negotiation of rules of the games which are perceived to be 
threatened, for instance, of change in terms of incorporation of pro- parliamentary/democracy 
provisions in constitution  by actors in a specific context.  
 
H 6. Coup is a marker of the military‟s political weakness rather than strength.  
Normally in the Pakistan‟s context staging a coup is considered as military‟s institutional and 
politico-economic strength (Aziz 2008; Siddiqa 2007). It is also postulated by such literature 
that she has „embedded influence‟ in the politics, economy and society of Pakistan. However, 
one wonders, if it is so, then why it would take the pain to stage a coup?   
 
 To „test‟ each of these statements, the study applies the model proposed above which 
claimed that agency A in terms of working/shirking and agency B in terms of own/larger 
interest explain the occurrence of a coup and (overt) military intervention in the domestic 
politics of Pakistan- coup here denotes policy measure adopted rationally by the military. 
Moreover, it is proposed that a coup is caused by military agency which rationally takes 
contextual constraints into account. In other words, this model-oriented explanation distances 
itself from cultural and/or structural studies of the phenomenon at hand.  
 
Besides, the present study is aware of its limits as regards generalizibility. Since it is engaged 
in small-N comparative analysis, the danger of a selection bias should be apparently high for, 
at least, a comparativist of political science. Nevertheless, in defense of  analytic narratives of 
coups d‟état it is argued that the case-selection should not reflect any selection bias since all 
cases- five in number- of coups are selected for a theoretical as well as empirical analysis. 
This in itself, as mentioned earlier, is a contribution of the present study since the existing 
accounts are devoid of it.  
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Moreover, the coup cases assumed methodologically as analytic narratives are selected for 
their empirical potential to help understand and explain the phenomenon of military 
intervention in Pakistan. In addition, the thesis assumes coup d‟état as dependent variable due 
to its empirical utility in terms of displaying the effects on it of explanatory variables as 
suggested by the CMR literature. Besides, the study has a comparative ambition. However, 
being primarily a case study of military intervention in one developing state- and transitional 
society- its findings could not necessarily be applicable to a case of military intervention from 
the developed world or case(s) of sort from developing states/transitional societies.  
 
Nonetheless, the findings of this research may serve a comparative purpose in three different 
ways: a) it informs and emphasizes military agency and its centrality as regards military 
intervention in domestic politics; b) it vociferously points to military‟s rationality in terms of 
political and economic interests- this aspect  of military institution, according to this study, is 
highly important  in order to understand and explain the occurrences of a  coup d‟état in 
particular and military  intervention in general; c) hypotheses posed by this study could be 
tested cross-nationally/culturally since the proposition of mere hypothesis does not  raise 
issues related to contextuality or case-sensitivity.
26
 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter began with the introduction of the central puzzle posed by this study, namely, 
whether it is structure or agency which draws the military into and out of politics. This was 
followed by the core question which asked why the military intervenes in Pakistan‟s politics. 
To explain this intriguing question and solve the puzzle, the study aligns itself within the field 
of comparative political science and has selected five cases of military coup d‟état. These 
cases, for methodological reasons, were assumed as essentially five analytic narratives of 
coups. Furthermore, coup d‟état was assumed to be the dependent variable whereas 
shirking/working (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) were taken as explanatory 
variables to analytically explain each coup narrative.  
 
Having defined the main puzzle, core question, variables and analytic narratives the chapter 
critically reviewed the major existing literature on civil-military relations theory in order to 
design a theoretical framework for the study. With this in mind, different theoretical 
                                               
26  Przeworski. 2003. Capitalism, Democracy and Science.  An Interview with Adam Przeworski. It is available 
from: http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/przeworski/przeworski_munck.pdf. 
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paradigms were termed and categorized into sociological perspectives, comparativist 
literature, structural thought and actor-oriented work respectively. Each of these categories 
was analyzed critically. To begin with, the sociological perspectives as presented by 
Huntington (1957, 1962 and 1968) and Janowitz (1960) sought to look at the civil-military 
nexus from the societal, and not necessarily at the political/institutional dimension. Regarding 
the question of military intervention and civilian control of the former, these works heavily 
emphasized the importance of subjective/normative factors i.e. „subjective civilian control‟. 
However, Huntington though introduce and applied the concept of „objective civilian 
control‟, it could not exclude the ideological factor to maintain a balanced relationship 
between the praetorian and the civil. Importantly, despite its pioneering position within the 
domain of CMR theory, these sociological perspectives were even criticized on empirical 
grounds; that they remained unable to predict the nature, patterns and importantly dynamics 
of civil-military relations especially in the USA. 
 
The comparativist literature, on its part, tended to take a cross-national/cultural view of civil-
military relations and especially military intervention. The exponents of this literature (Finer 
1960; Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1974, 1981) also relied more on the cultural rather than 
purely on institutional and political factors. Moreover, this literature, while aiming at a 
comparative analysis of different cross-national cases, seriously compromised contextuality. 
For example, it is very difficult to understand, from the perspective of comparative politics, 
how a contextually different case from Latin American can be compared with that of the 
Middle East.  
 
The critical review of comparativist literature was followed by a similar review of structural 
theories of „civilian control‟ over the military. The theorist, Michael Desch (1999), attempted 
to explain the intriguing question of civilian control over the military from primarily a 
structural- threat perspective, using cross-national cases for this purpose. Nevertheless, 
despite the significance of this structural thought, the chapter described, with the help of 
tables, that this theory could not be applied to the Pakistani case on empirical grounds, since 
Pakistan did not fit into Desch‟s model/theory.  
 
Having made a critical review of the structural thought, the chapter then examined actor-
oriented- or the agency theory of civil-military relations. The agency of CMR, as postulated 
by Peter Feaver (2003), is grounded in a rationalist framework. As a point of departure, it 
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starts with a critical analysis of pioneering works, especially of Huntington and Janowitz, on 
the subject of military intervention and/or civilian control of the former. Moreover, this 
theory explicitly gives due attention to actors, their interests, preferences/choices, and 
subsequent actions/outcomes. In other words, the agency theory while not demoting non-
material factors relies on material factors in order to understand and explain the complexities 
inherent in civil-military relations. In addition, since the actor-oriented work appreciates the 
rationality and agency of actors, it helps to explain CMR almost on a daily basis. Therefore, 
due to its emphasis on actors, choices, rationality etc., Feaver‟s theory was deemed highly 
useful for the puzzle and core question of the present study.  
 
However, since Feaver‟s work is primarily specific to the US case, it became apparent that its 
application to the case of Pakistan was limited due to critical empirical differences between 
them. Hence, the need for modifying its otherwise useful assumptions was seriously felt. 
Therefore, the chapter, in its later part, contextualized and rationalized the agency theory‟s 
assumptions vis-à-vis Pakistan. In this respect, the analysis identified four actors- politicians, 
civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military-, specified their interests in political and 
economic terms and importantly, categorized the four actors into either principal and/or 
agents contextually, over a span of about six decades of Pakistan‟s civil-military relations.  
 
Furthermore, with the help of the foregoing, an agency model of Pakistan‟s civil-military 
relations was designed. The model, grounded in the agency theory, incorporates the above-
mentioned four actors, their (politico-economic) interests, preferences in terms for 
working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) - the explanatory variables. 
The deductive model is both context-specific and causal in the sense of explaining coup-
causation as it occurs in a certain context whereby the four actors strategically interact with 
each/one another  for rational reasons.  
 
More precisely, when the military is an agent, it stages a coup, while marking agency A in 
terms of shirking, to achieve political interests- i.e. political power- which, in turn, is used as 
an instrument to facilitate economic interets- hence agency B in terms of preferring own to 
larger interests. However, when the military is the principal, itself a result of its agency and 
rationality, it stages coups, again registering its agency, to protect its political and economic 
interests. Here, it rationally chooses to stage a coup in order to disallow a section of shirking 
agents, either politicians or judiciary, to sustain its shirking in terms of preferring a larger 
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interest which is, by its very nature and character, antithetical to that of the military. Finally, 
having designed the model, the chapter then attempted to ground the study‟s hypotheses in 
the causal model in order to test them. Six hypotheses were generated and each corresponds, 
one way or the other, to the main puzzle and to the core and, secondary questions of the 
study.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
The aim of this chapter is to critically review the major existing literature on Pakistan‟s civil-
military relation in particular and politics and the state, in general. This will be done in six 
sections followed by a conclusion. The first section shall deal with that literature which 
believes that Pakistan inherited not only weak political institutions but also external security 
threat especially from a „Hindu‟ India. The first war in and, over Kashmir, in 1947-48 added 
to Pakistan‟s insecurity. Therefore, it was quite natural that the military received the bulk of 
the country‟s budgets since 1947-48. Moreover, during the 1950s political institutions further 
deteriorated due to the incompetence of the politicians. India kept looming as a potential 
threat. Thus, in order to secure the country and provide it with a semblance of stability, the 
military intervened in Pakistan‟s politics overtly. Over the decades, the military remained in 
politics due to politicians‟ in-fighting and incompetence. This literature over-simplifies the 
phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan‟s politics. Very importantly, this type of 
work puts the burden of responsibility on the politicians‟ shoulders and absolves the military 
entirely.  In other words, it explicitly legitimizes not only military coup/intervention but also 
military rule. Therefore, this kind of work is referred to here as the „legitimist‟ point of view. 
 
The second section deals with so called „conspiracy theory/theorists‟. This category of works 
refer to those accounts on Pakistan‟s politics, democracy and civil-military relations which 
believe, sans evidence, that no meaningful change in Pakistan‟s politics/CMR can occur 
without the consent and involvement of external actors/factors especially the US, India and 
Israel. Furthermore, there is an internal dimension to the conspiracy perspective as well. 
According to this, a section of politicians conspired with the military to affect every change 
in Pakistan‟s political system that has occurred. This section is followed by those accounts on 
Pakistan‟s civil-military relations which have the tendency to describe and understand 
politics, military and the state in terms of a multiplicity of domestic, regional and 
international factors. Moreover, these accounts attempt to over-generalize their findings. In 
addition, they seriously compromise context. Hence, these accounts are termed and 
categorized as „generalist accounts‟. A fourth section briefly reviews that part of the literature 
which believes in the instrumentality of Pakistan as a state. The latter is, more precisely, 
viewed from the US‟s geostrategic interests in the South Asian region.  
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The „structuralist literature‟ is critically reviewed in the fifth section of this chapter. This 
category of literature massively focuses on the structure of the colonial-state of British India 
whereby civil bureaucracy and the military are regarded as well organized, highly disciplined 
and comparatively modern entities. At Partition, the post-colonial state of Pakistan 
structurally inherited these as part of the colonial legacy. Thus, the civil-military bureaucracy 
continued to retain its old position, role and attitude. Also, in view of this literature Pakistan 
enjoys qualified stability since the rule of law flows in structural continuum. Nonetheless, the 
present study views and categorizes these works as essentialist in addition to being 
structuralist, for it depreciates and demotes both context and agency. Moreover, this type of 
literature ignores many a missing link which demands re-evaluation empirically. 
 
The final section attempts to critically review the „path dependency-historical institutionalist‟ 
account of military, politics and the state in Pakistan. This work tends to establish general 
patterns and institutional values- Muslim separatism, the Hindu threat, well-entrenched civil-
military- bureaucracy etc.- from within the framework of the colonial-state. These 
historically- induced patterns and institutionalized values set forth a particular path in the 
post-Partition period. The external security threat (primarily from India) brought the military 
in politics for reasons of state survival. When brought in, it never left since it had, over time, 
institutionalized its control over civilians and importantly become a parallel state. This work 
too compromises agency and context.  Finally, this section is followed by a conclusion which 
summarizes the critically reviewed literature- from the legitimist to path dependency 
perspectives. 
 
2.1 The Legitimist Point of View 
The legitimist literature tends to legitimize military‟s intervention in politics one way or the 
other. General Fazle Muqeem Khan (1963:67-199) was one of the pioneers of this sort of 
writing. His work is primarily concern with the history of organization, recruitment and 
warfare of Pakistan army. Moreover, it looks at the army as a modern organization which has 
the potential and capability to modernize the country. Therefore, the military rule is justified 
and legitimized on such grounds. However, the writer has not taken into account the 
contemporaneous accounts of corruption of Ayub‟s family, let alone of entire regime. Also, 
the prevalent incidence of poverty, low governance and low expenditure on health and 
education are ignored. One wonders how the military rule could be legitimized in the 
presence of these evidences.  
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In the same vein, Ayub Khan (1967:49-66), the military ruler of Pakistan from 1958-69, has 
himself presented a legitimist account of political developments during this period. 
Nonetheless, having ignored the pinching questions about the abrogation of the 1956 
constitution, the suppression of fundamental  human rights etc., the writer  believes that the 
„masses‟ were guided  towards democracy and development. Furthermore, it is writer‟s 
conviction that the western type of democracy is alien to the people of Pakistan. Hence, the 
only panacea for their grievances is military rule. Thus, Ayub Khan has justified and 
legitimized his martial law and subsequent political developments. However, having gone 
through his account one is compelled to ask a simple question: why did he not mention his 
family‟s corruption, the suppression of media and citizen‟s basic rights, poor law and order, 
the resentment of the Eastern Wing, the sorry state of health and education and to cut the long 
story short, defeat in the 1965 war against India?  
 
Similarly, instead of writing a critique on Ayub‟s regime, his policies are theorized by 
Samuel Huntington in his famous Political Order in the Changing Societies. Huntington‟s 
(1968:250-255) „developmental thesis‟ posits that the military rule leads to socio-economic 
development in changing societies. In so doing, he assumes Ayub Khan as „Solon‟- or in 
simple terms, a modernizer. Thus, in the name of modernization, military rule is legitimized 
in Pakistan by Huntington. However, very much like Fazle Maqueem, Huntington has also 
ignored the above-mentioned areas which bemoaned military-led-modernization thesis in 
Pakistan. In addition, these writers remained unable to see lack of development in East 
Pakistan and only focused, and that too through GDP indicators, on West Pakistan. 
Importantly, this was done despite the fact that the GDP indicated least expenditure for health 
and education and a massive amount for defense- this shall be explained in detail later in the 
thesis. 
 
Raymond Moore (1979:229) has, while towing the legitimist line, come up with more or less 
the same themes. Moore‟s point of reference was the military rule led by General Zia-ul-Haq, 
who put the 1973 constitution in abeyance through a military coup d‟état in July 1977. Moore 
also thinks that socio-economic development, if not democracy, can be ensured by a military 
rule. However, his account did not take into account Ayub-led military rule which failed to 
bring- as shall be explained in Chapter 4- any meaningful change in the political system of 
Pakistan. Moreover, Moore has also remained oblivious to the post-coup suppression of 
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human rights, suspension of the constitution, the dictation to the judiciary, massive poverty, 
poor state of health and education etc., in Pakistan. 
 
Military rule is analyzed in terms of “legtimation of regimes” till 1971 in Pakistan: The Roots 
of Dictatorship (1983:41-78). The army served as arbitrator in the view of this study. The 
military had no interest to intervene in politics. Rather, it is the failure of administration on 
the part of civil bureaucracy which brought Ayub Khan in power. Like all legitimist accounts, 
this study is also extremely neglectful of the suppressiveness of Ayub and Yahya regimes, let 
alone Zia. Interestingly, it did not answer why the military tends to prolong its rule by hooks 
and crooks once it had served as an arbitrator. 
 
G. W. Choudhury (1988:6-23, 27-50) has also played with the same cards in terms of 
assuming military as a modernizer. He traces the genesis of military intervention from the 
pre-partition days. The military‟s intervention under Ayub Khan is legitimized due to the 
„inherited‟ weak and ineffective political leadership as well as weak political parties. Then, 
there was a „Hindu India‟ against whom the country could only be defended by the armed 
forces. Thus, the eulogization of Ayub‟ rule is understandable. However, the writer, who 
otherwise wrote some balanced accounts on constitutional development in Pakistan, has 
failed to grasp the importance of democratic process, and the damage done to it by successive 
military interventions. Moreover, Choudhury has also legitimized the military rule led by 
General Zia- ul- Haq since , in author‟ view, Pakistan progressed under his „martial law‟ in 
all respects. In addition, Zia is considered the right person to make the country „transit‟ from 
authoritarianism to democracy. One wonders what made Choudhury turn a blind eye to the 
grim realities that the people of Pakistan faced i.e. (forced) Islamization, suppression of basic 
human rights, Afghan Jihad, lawlessness, a huge incidence of poverty etc. The present study, 
hence, would take a critical view of these developments in Chapter 6. 
 
Similarly, Shahid Javed Burki has written extensively on Pakistan‟s politics. While writing 
from an economic-growth perspective, Burki (1980:39) believes that the country achieved 
more economic growth under military rule. In this respect, the economic growth achieved by 
the middle class under Ayub is vehemently cited. However, at the same time the reality of the 
trickle downs of this growth to the poor is ignored. Moreover, the repressiveness and 
authoritarianism of Ayub‟s military rule find little place in the account. In addition, Burki has 
(1980:91-105) made a reference to the military sociology which is far from touching the 
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central questions of military intervention in Pakistan‟s politics. Furthermore, the account 
(1980) is silent on Balochistan operation, the formation and diffusion of Pakistan National 
Alliance (PNA) and the nature and scale of rigging in the 1977 elections. 
 
In addition, in his later account, Burki has (1991:1-16) legitimized 1977 coup. In the writer‟s 
view, Zia was, unlike Ayub and Yahya, reluctant to take over. In fact, he was forced by 
Bhutto and his (bad) polices to intervene. Should mismanagement of policies by an elected 
Prime Minister invite a military coup d‟état? The account provides no answer. Moreover, if 
the Bhutto‟s harmful policies were a danger for the security and development of the country, 
what did Zia regime do on these fronts? Burki did take the pain to address these questions. 
Interestingly, the writer has ignored the military intervention and its causes, and has instead 
highlighted the methods used for intervention. In addition, the account details social 
background of the army generals in order to explaining Pakistan‟s politics and the role of 
military in it. However, the causality of this variable is not established at all. 
 
The legitimist narrative is further corroborated by the „memoirs‟ of Lt. Gen. (rtd) Gul Hassan 
Khan (1993:133-134), who became Pakistan army chief just after the birth of Bangladesh in 
December 1971. Gul also believes that since the creation of the country politicians and civil 
bureaucrats ran the affairs of the country blatantly. Ayub Khan had no dubious designs to 
take over. He even had cordial relations with President Iskander Mirza. Ayub Khan staged a 
coup because he was suspicious of some „ambitious‟ generals who could have staged a coup 
against him. Had it happened Pakistan would have been in serious security dilemma vis-à-vis 
hostile India. Therefore, it was Mirza who declared martial law and Ayub was to administer 
it. Thus, the burden of 1958 coup and the subsequent martial law is put on incompetent 
politicians and power-hungry bureaucrats. Interestingly however, Gul has not convincingly 
answered why then Mirza was sent into a forced exile after almost three weeks of the coup.  
 
Moreover, the causes of politicization of generals are not provided with any empirical 
evidence. Retrospectively, however, the ex-army chief thinks that Ayub Khan was not sincere 
in his efforts to democratize the country. He gave Pakistan a „constitution and a half-baked 
democracy‟ (1993:137). But again the writer has provided legitimacy to Ayub in the Ayub-
Yahya encounter. For instance, Gul thinks that it were „ministers‟ (read politicians) who 
impressed upon Ayub to impose martial law in March 1969. However, the latter, in the best 
interest of the country, did not do so. Instead it was Yahya Khan who imposed martial law 
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(1993:247-248). Ironically, the writer believes that Ayub Khan and his family did not do any 
corruption. Not only this, he is also silent on his acceptance of ambassadorship of Austria 
offered by Bhutto who earlier had literally put the Lt. Gen. in „protective custody‟ and forced 
him to resign from army chiefship. Nonetheless, despite this benevolence by Bhutto, the 
writer believes that it was Bhutto, and not Zia, who pushed the country into another martial 
law. In believing so, he has shed little light over the causes and consequences of the 1977 
coup. 
 
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (2002:135-158) has also legitimized the military intervention in 
politics on the grounds of national security and incompetence of civilian politicians. In is 
essence, it is a strong argument that Pakistan faced (even) militarily a powerful enemy- India; 
that there was strong threat to the very existence of the state of Pakistan since the first war 
over Kashmir in October 1947. Nonetheless, this type of arguments, though grounded in 
factuality of pre- and post-Partition cross-border bloodshed, presents one side of the coin. 
Suppose, one assumes that there was a strong Indian military threat to Pakistan, the question 
is who/which was supposed to perceive that threat? Was there any unanimity on the reception 
and construction of the threat perception? Were the politicians and the masses from East 
Bengal, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh and Balochistan taken into confidence 
in the process, if any, of threat construction?  
 
Moreover, the military could only stage its first coup in 1958- a period when the Pakistani 
military has sufficiently nationalized. It was also a beneficiary of a huge amount paid in 
military aid by the USA. Pakistan had also signed defense pacts i.e. SEATO, CENTO, with 
the USA. Very importantly, this was a time when India was internationally considered by the 
capitalist block a pro-Moscow country. One wonders why the military then staged a coup in 
October 1958- from Cheema‟s logic of national security- when Pakistan, an ally of the US, 
faced no security threat from India. Interestingly, this reasoning also fails to answer why the 
two countries did not fight any war between 1947/48-1958. 
 
In addition, the argument that incompetent politicians bring the military in politics is weak. In 
this respect, the question arises: if this was the case, why the military then, during the 
preceding decade, did not urge/force the civil bureaucracy and the politicians to sincerely 
make a constitution and put the country on the path of, at least, electoral democracy? In light 
of the above, it is argued that such types of explanations willfully or wishfully expect 
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democracy and development from an organization which is different in its training and 
orientation to such concepts. Moreover, this line of reasoning over-emphasizes the concept of 
„threat perception‟. Therefore, there is a need to explain and place the threat perception thesis 
along with military intervention in a proper context. 
 
The last prominent exponent of legitimism is General (retd) Pervez Musharraf. Following the 
logic of his military and non-military predecessors, Musharraf, in In the Line of Fire, has put 
the blame of ruining the country on the civilian leadership. He (2006:93) argues that the 
Pakistan‟s political leadership „played a total lack of statesmanship‟. The politicians failed to 
serve a country which was created to „escape Hindu economic and political domination and 
social discrimination‟ (2006:136). They remained feudals and ruled the country on caste, 
tribe and clan basis (2006:154-155). The writer (2006:156-157) further argues that Mirza and 
Ayub dissolved a parliament which was „unelected‟ and „lacking legitimacy‟. Therefore they 
abrogated the constitution. However, over power-sharing Ayub prevailed and Mirza was sent 
home. Musharraf, however, admits that the Constitution (1962) Ayub „introduced‟ was 
authoritarian and „antidemocratic‟. On his October 1999 coup, Musharraf (2006:93-109, 136-
138) blames the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who withdrew from Kargil. Moreover, 
Sharif replaced the writer with a pliant army chief to win the next elections.  
 
If one critically analyzes this account, one notices that Musharraf, like Ayub and Gul Hassan, 
has presented a half-picture of Pakistan‟s politics and civil-military relations. Interestingly, 
the account suffers from many an empirical mistake. For example, he thinks that the 
Constituent Assembly was „unelected‟. However, the historical fact is that it was elected 
though by a limited franchise in 1946. Secondly, the question of a government „lacking 
legitimacy,‟ is not legally to be decided by a president or an army chief but the judiciary. In 
this regard, Tamizuddin case is a case in point, which the writer has somehow ignored. 
Thirdly, suppose Sharif asked the military to withdraw from Kargil war zone, can the former 
be constitutionally, legally and morally blamed for it? Fourthly, if an elected prime minister 
decides, for whatever reasons, to replace the serving army chief, does the replaced army chief 
has any legal-constitutional right to dismiss an elected prime minister and then send him  into 
exile? Fifthly, suppose Sharif was authoritarian, on what basis the army chief put the 
constitution in abeyance, packed the assemblies, and issues a Provisional Constitutional 
Order (PCO)? Finally, the writer has put all the blame of the 1971 debacle on Bhutto and 
Mujib-ur-Rahman. Ironically however, Yahya Khan (military) is absolved of any 
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responsibility. In addition, the writer is highly subjective when it comes to Kargil war which 
the Pakistan‟s army started after a few months of the signing of peace-oriented Lahore 
Declaration between Pakistan and India. 
       
2.2 Conspiracy Theorists 
The term conspiracy theory/theorist(s)  refers to  those accounts on Pakistan‟s politics, 
democracy and/or CMR etc., which tend to make a reader believe, without any evidence 
though, that any domestic change in Pakistan‟s politics/CMR is caused  mostly by external 
actors/factors i.e. the US, India, Israel. In addition, the conspiracy theory has internal 
dimension too, whereby a section of politicians conspire with the military to affect any 
change in the country‟s political system.  
 
To begin with, Tariq Ali, self-proclaimed has written extensively on the different phases of 
Pakistan‟ politics from a conspiracy perspective. His (1970:87,168-169,215; see also 
1983:99,134) central argument is that the Pakistan‟s military involves in politics on the behalf 
of the USA. In the Cold War context, Pakistan allied with the capitalist block against the 
communist USSR. The military was encouraged by Washington in 1958, 1969 and 1977 to 
stage a coup because a strong general as head of the military and the state would better serve 
the Washington‟s geostrategic interests. Also, his conspiracy theory has an „internal 
dimension‟. In this respect, he argues, contrary to established facts, that Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rahman and Maulana Bhashani, the popular leaders from East Pakistan, were informed by 
the army of the 1969 takeover. Moreover, Bhutto started denouncing the Awami League‟s 
(AL) „six points‟ only after having been informed and encouraged by the General 
Headquarters (GHQ). In addition, Ali asserts that in 1972 Bhutto became president and Chief 
Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) only with the support of the military.  
 
From the surface, Ali‟s arguments seem catchy. However, they stand on weaker empirical 
ground. Moreover, he has failed to grasp the intricacies of contextuality of the Pakistani 
politics in general and civil-military relations in particular. For example, on the 1958 military 
coup, he has not provided any solid reason for the intervention other than 1959 elections- 
which are, at best, means but not ends of staging a coup. In addition, on Bhutto-army 
relationship he has assumed Bhutto to be a weak partner and military, a master. In so 
assuming, however, the writer has ignored, on the one hand the „demoralization‟ and 
„unpopularity‟ of the military‟s officer cadre, and on the other hand, the electoral standing, if 
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not popularity, of Bhutto in post-1971 period. Besides, the writer has not highlighted the fact 
that a demoralized organization with stakes in Pakistan‟s politics needed a „strategic 
understanding‟ with Bhutto more than the latter desired with the former. Put simply, Ali‟s 
accounts are essentalized, subjective and conspiratorial in nature. 
 
Another addition to conspiracy theory has been made by Aqil Shah (2006:51-58) who traces 
the US influence in Pakistan‟s politics from an entirely different angle. Shah has attempted to 
understand the functioning of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) - i.e. the World Bank 
(WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) etc. - and their role in „aiding authoritarianism‟ to 
Pakistan.
27
 Put in simple terms the thrust of his argument is that the military had allied with 
the IFIs. Hence, the civilian governments were dismissed on account of mismanagement of 
the economy despite the fact that the former had little resources at their disposal. However, 
Shah, in this respect, has not probed the presence of corrupt practices among politicians 
and/or bureaucrats. Moreover, he argues: the more aid Pakistan got from the US, the more 
influence of the American economic advisors- the US-led IFIs aided Pakistan due to the 
former‟s geostrategic interests. In other words, the writer‟s reasoning takes conspiratorial 
tone: that the US influences Pakistan through the IFIs, and that Pakistan has no independent 
sovereign status. Nonetheless, in assuming so, Shah has ignored the open-ended fact that the 
IFIs are a global phenomenon. There are many countries in the world that have signed mutual 
agreements for economic collaboration with the World Bank or IMF. Does the economic 
assistance-based on mutual agreement from the IFIs imply a „given‟ influence of the US in 
Pakistan? Suppose one assumes so, then why this influence failed to force Generals Zia or 
Musharraf not to take over in 1977 and 1999, for instance? Moreover, having put all the 
burden of responsibility on exogenous factors, the account has demoted the importance of 
domestic variables, actors, their rationality and context. 
 
2.3 The Generalist Accounts 
The generalist accounts have a tendency to assume a multiplicity of domestic i.e. political, 
economic, cultural etc., regional i.e. economic, security etc., and international i.e. economic, 
geostrategic etc., factors to have affected the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations 
in Pakistan. Moreover, these accounts generally take a historically linear view of socio-
economic and political developments. In addition, these works seem to carry an implicit 
                                               
27
 For more on this type of claims see Nayar (1991:78-84). 
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conspiratorial tone towards politics in Pakistan. To begin with, Ayesha Jalal is atop this list. 
She (1990:117-135) believes that the British had a strong say among the Pakistan‟s military. 
They placed their trusted officers at the top. Even Ayub Khan was promoted as C-in-C on the 
advice of General Gracey. Moreover, the territorial status quo over Kashmir was suggested to 
Pakistan by London and Washington. About the October 1958 coup, Jalal is categorical that 
the USA State Department was not only aware of the coup but also supportive to the military-
civil bureaucracy. The then US ambassador to Pakistan, James M. Langley, served as a 
medium. In this respect, she writes: 
Suggestions by some American diplomats in Pakistan that Washington try and steer 
Mirza away from his authoritarian tendencies were countered by the argument that 
this would defeat US purposes by reviving the old slogan: the „real Prime Minister [of 
Pakistan] is named Hildreth. In any event, the state department and the joint chiefs 
had not been seeing eye to eye on who was their „best man‟- Mirza or Ayub…The 
American foreign and defense establishments, however, were agreed on one thing. 
They would back the military and bureaucratic combination most capable of restoring 
a semblance of stability in a country in which they had so much for so little… 
                                                                                                                     (Jalal 1990:268-269) 
 
On the question of the causes and mode of October 1958 coup the writer (1990: 270, 301) 
argues that it was the „evolving dialectic between state authority and the political process‟  
which, in the crucial pre-coup months, played an important part in urging the military to 
takeover to „dispelling if not altogether resolving‟ the „crisis of the state‟. In other words, the 
military intervened in politics with the explicit aim of „countering threats to its alliance with 
the civil bureaucracy and certain dominant social and economic classes.‟  
 
Despite the significance of her work in terms of information especially about the initial 
„political economy of defense‟ as well as coherent style, there are certain areas which require 
a critical examination. To begin with, Jalal‟s narrative is based on „dialectical‟ linearity  of 
events whereby the politics  of Pakistan is understood and described from within the 
framework of state authority (structure)  and political processes- the two implicit explanatory 
variables- which are impacted by international (state structure and political) processes- the 
implicit intervening variables. From the surface, the triad of state authority-political 
processes-international factors looks catchy in terms of detailing the importance and impact 
of a respective factor(s). Nevertheless, from the perspective of comparative politics, the 
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narrative is rendered analytical ambiguity if not self-contradiction since it is not clear, spatio-
temporally, which factor/variable caused what, how and why. For example, as the quote and 
the follow-up paragraph above show the 1958 coup is, on the one hand, expressly ascribed to 
international factor, and on the other, the „evolving dialectic‟ between state authority and 
political process takes the toll. Interestingly, if the military staged the 1958 coup to counter 
threats to its alliance with the bureaucracy and dominant classes- as Jalal believes- the 
question that this statement poses is: who did the military was afraid of? If it were civil 
bureaucracy and the „dominant classes‟, then the military was already in „alliance‟ with these 
powerful section of population. From this logic there should be no threat to the alliance. Or 
suppose the military took the alliance partners on in around October 1958, then, from this 
angle, there should be no alliance at all. In addition, this work is limited in nature and scope 
as it hardly coves the post-1958 period. 
 
Nonetheless, Jalal (1995:16-38) has further elaborated her previous work, though with no 
significant analytical modifications. This account is comparative in ambition in the sense that 
it attempts to explain „democracy and authoritarianism‟ in three South Asian states- India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. From the very outset, this work suffers from a lack of theoretical 
framework and a rigorous comparative method- the writer though seems aware of it (Jalal 
1995:1-3). Moreover, the triad of state structure (here used as state formation grounded in 
„colonial legacy‟), political processes and the international factor(s) is kept central to the 
narrative along with the „twin dialectics of centralism and regionalism as well as nationalism 
and religious communalism in the pre- and post-independence eras (1995:2, 54-55).  
 
However, again one faces the difficulty of distinguishing between not only dependent and 
independent variable(s) bust also the causal linkages between two or more variables. 
Importantly, this account, while aiming at a historical-comparative analysis of the three cases, 
has accorded much attention to Partition and its „strategic and economic consequences‟. 
Though the author has emphasized the post-Partition political process, the impact of pre- and 
post-Partition „structural and ideational postures‟ have added historical linearity to the 
narrative (Jalal 1995:3, 120-121). In addition, this work is also limited in scope as it hardly 
covers post-1993 period. By and large, Jalal‟s accounts are very informative and ambitious. 
However, when analyzed critically they are a unique mixture of structural and conspiratorial 
overtones.  
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Similarly, Veena Kukreja also does not lag behind her Pakistani counterpart. She too argues 
that Pakistan had developed a threat perception from India. An oligarchic rule of civil 
bureaucracy and military prevailed in the country due to weak political institutions and 
ineffective political leadership (1991:37-66; 2003:1-8). The military since 1947 emerged as a 
„final arbitrator‟ in the Pakistani state and society. The civil politicians including Nawaz 
Sharif weakened the political institutions. In this respect, with a conspiratorial tone she 
writes: 
As soon as Sharif learned about Musharraf‟s intention, he sent his brother Shahbaz 
Sharif and then Chief of the ISI, Lieutenant General Ziauddin to the US to persuade 
Washington to counter possible moves by Musharraf. The US warned the Pakistani 
military establishment against a military coup, which was given calculated publicity. 
Despite the cautionary warnings from the US, Musharraf remained committed to his 
plan but postponed its implementation. Given his apprehensions about Musharraf, 
Sharif assumed that inner difference in the upper echelons of the army high command 
coupled with US opposition to any coup will neutralize Musharraf.                                                                                                     
                                                                                           (2003:262; see also 2005:66) 
 
In addition, Kukreja has come up with a „Composite Model‟ of civil-military relations in 
South Asia, namely, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The model consists of an amalgam of 
Huntington and Janowitz‟s work on the subject of military intervention. Under this model, 
the writer has proposed the following four independent „summary variables‟ to explain civil-
military relations in South Asia. In addition, each summary variable is extended to some 
other factor or variables: 
a) The level of the institutionalization of civilian political procedures: (i) the level of the 
institutionalization of the political system and the roles of the political leadership and 
political parties in institution-building; (ii) the functioning of democratic institutions; (iii) 
the legitimacy crisis. 
b) The level of military institutionalization: (i) its traditional orientation, (ii) its organization 
and size, (iii) representativeness, (iv) social origins and ethos (v) military expenditure (vi) 
aid to civil authority. 
c) 1. The domestic socio-economic and international environments: (i) the level of socio-
economic development in Pakistan, (ii) the weak social base, (iii) the social cleavages and 
ethnic problems, (iv) Islamic ideology. 2. International Environment: (i) Pakistan‟s 
security environment, (ii) Impact of Foreign aid and Cross-National Coups. 
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d) The nature of boundaries between the military establishment and its socio-political 
environment. 
                                                                                                               (1991:37-57) 
 
Kukreja‟s model is rich in terms of information it contained. Also, it is ambitious as regards 
generalizations. However, there are certain issues related to contextuality, nature and 
character of comparison and the limits of generalizibility which demand a thorough 
examination of the model. To begin with, it seems that there is no effort made to compare the 
four variables with each other in order to determine cause(s) of military intervention in one 
and/or all cases studied. Furthermore, the thrust of the analysis is to put the three cases in the 
two-pronged model which comprehensively relies on imported input- all sub-variables 
support the summary variables which in turn conform to the „praetorian polity‟ and „low 
political culture‟. However, what determines the weakness or otherwise of political 
institutions in a praetorian polity or low political culture, the writer is silent. In addition, the 
concepts of praetorian and low political cultures (societies) were- as is explained in previous 
chapter- primarily based on a cross-national analysis of military intervention. Kukreja, on her 
part, does not mention if large-N study and its conceptual frameworks could be applied to any 
of the three South Asian countries.  
 
Besides, Kukreja‟s analysis, implicitly and explicitly, excludes the military from the 
responsibility of the derailment of democratic process in, for example, Pakistan. To justify 
her reasoning, she has resorted to Janowitz‟s „reactive militarism‟ (1991:59-64). One again 
wonders how an imported concept could be matched to the empirical realities of Pakistan. 
Interestingly, her efforts to empirically analyze each of the sub-variables lead one nowhere, 
empirically. For example, in order to support the „Islamic ideology‟ variable she argues: 
 In Islam, there has never been a distinct separation between the civil and military 
authorities, whereas the concept of civil-military relations in the western countries has 
essentially evolved out of secularism and the separation of the civilian functionaries 
from the military functionaries of government, with the former acting as controllers 
and the latter as the subordinate professionals. Since in Islam there is no background 
of secularism and no distinction between the military and civilian components, an 
overwhelming majority of Muslim states, consequently, are military-ruled or military-
dominated. 
                                                                                                                        (Kukreja 1991:52) 
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The foregoing, in principle, is writer‟s own analysis. However, operationally her argument is 
based on the works of Saleem M.M. Qureshi, Leonard Binder and A. Ahmed – all there, 
according to this study, are not professionally trained in theology- more precisely the 
religious text- and its relationship with military organization in an Islamic state (the study 
would explain this phenomenon in detail in Chapter 3, because Kukreja had obscured the 
difference between the state and its military.) Also, she, while playing with the conspiracy 
theory, argues that the impact of the US aid and the „cross-national coups‟- coup contagious- 
in Iraq, Egypt, Burma and Indonesia had „some bearing on the condition in Pakistan 
(1991:55). However, the mechanism though which such a „bearing‟ is effected is not 
informed about. 
 
2.4 The Instrumentalist Work 
The Instrumentalist literature looks at the Pakistan‟s military from the prism of Washington‟s 
geostrategic interests especially in South Asia. In the context of Pakistan, Stephen Cohen in 
his The Pakistan Army (1984:7-49), has contributed to this type of reasoning. The writer has, 
for the most part, taken a sociological view of Pakistan army especially its regimental and 
organizational aspects. The work though is very informative in nature, it lacks a theoretically 
enriched and methodologically sound analysis of Pakistan‟s politics and/or its civil-military 
relations. Moreover, the account is limited in scope. Besides, Cohen has patiently contributed 
another account, The Idea of Pakistan (2004:87-130), which takes a historical view of the 
„idea‟ of Pakistan. However, the book provides no idea as to why the military takes over the 
rein of political power every now and then. In a nutshell, this account gives the impression of 
being a new version of his previous work on Pakistan. 
 
2.5 The Structuralist Literature
28
 
The military‟s power is studied as a structural problem by Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990). He 
starts his arguments from the pre-Partition period in which „Muslim ethnicity‟ and „Salariat 
Nationalism‟ formed the two pillars of Pakistan or rather salariat movement. The salariat 
wanted to secure their economics interests vis-à-vis the majority Hindus of British India. 
Thus, Pakistan was a result of their efforts for economic security. In independent state of 
Pakistan, civil-bureaucracy and the military became upper echelons of the salariat class. 
                                               
28  For a purely (cross-) „cultural‟ study of CMR, see Rebecca L. Schiff (2009:43-47).  In Schiff‟s view  Pakistan 
lacks „concordance‟ among its political elite, citizenry and the military on account of her „culture‟ (ibid:79-89).  
However, this account, very much like the literature critiqued in this Chapter, demotes actors‟ agency, 
rationality and context.   
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Furthermore, the civil bureaucracy-military oligarchy was numerically dominated by the 
Punjabis. The use of religion for political purposes is, in Alavi‟s views, a post-independence 
phenomenon- it was cited and used to contain ethnic movements. In addition, the state, in his 
Marxian perspective, is an „overdeveloped‟ structure having strong capitalist links with the 
„metropolitan bourgeoisie‟. Within the framework of „overdeveloped state‟ of Pakistan the 
„landed-feudal‟ class along with the „indigenous bourgeoisie‟ strives to collaborate with the 
civil, if not military, bureaucracy to further its interests politically, socially and economically.  
 
The thrust of Alavian thought, however, is that the bureaucracy is central to the state structure 
in Pakistan whereby the state functions „autonomous‟ of the dominant „classes‟. In their bid 
for political power the three „classes‟- namely, landed-feudal, indigenous bourgeoisie, 
metropolitan bourgeoisie being engulfed in some political crisis resort to the bureaucracy and 
the „charismatic‟ military for arbitration. Interestingly, Alavi argues that military enjoyed 
„charisma‟ at least in West Pakistan, which differentiated it from civil bureaucracy and the 
corrupt politicians. Therefore, he has termed the 1958 coup „a bureaucratic coup‟, because it 
was Mirza who viewed the 1959 elections as a problem, not General Ayub Khan. Moreover, 
in the 1950s and 1960s the military remained a „junior partner‟. In this regard, only Zia 
regime entitles to be a true „military regime‟ in Pakistan. Besides, Alavi also gives a 
conspiratorial tone to his analysis. In this respect, he argues that Bhutto‟s assumption of 
office in 1972 was clarified by Richard Nixon- the then US president.   
 
Despite the significance of Alavi‟s work, the present study believes that the room for 
improvement is always there. To begin with, the author is not clear about the concept of 
„overdeveloped‟ state. How and why is it assumed so? Is the state „overdeveloped‟ vis-à-vis 
civil society? If yes, then the dominant landed-feudal and indigenous bourgeoisie classes are 
part of the society, and they are developed at least functionally in enhancing their politico-
economic interests. Another way to understand Alavi‟s thesis is by looking at the state‟s 
institutions. If one looks at the state‟s elective institutions such as parliament, then one finds 
that they have not been able to establish themselves even after 62 years in Pakistan. Hence, in 
light of the above, it seems that the state‟s developed institutions- namely civil and military 
bureaucracy- have been, from Alavi‟s Marxian „peripheral capitalism‟ paradigm, equated 
with an „overdeveloped state‟. Moreover, though his concept of salariat is innovative, the 
writer has remained unable to not clarify how the various elements of the „salariat oligarchy‟ 
interact with each other, and especially with the non-salartiat actors. The internal rifts i.e. 
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differences over politico-economic interests etc., between civil bureaucracy and the military 
or between the civil-military bureaucracy and landed-feudal class are also ignored. 
 
Besides, Alavi has taken an essentialist view of the oligarchy which is ontologically assumed 
as a „given‟: it remains there through all seasons. However, empirical evidences are just the 
opposite- this shall be explained in Chapter 3. In addition, the military‟s charisma thesis is 
also problematic. In West Pakistan especially in the Punjab it may be argued that the military 
enjoyed a sort of charisma pre-1958 period, for it was engaged in relief activities i.e. aid to 
civilian authorities during floods etc. Nonetheless, one cannot conclude, from this, the same 
about Sindh, Balochistan and East Bengal if not NWFP. These provinces had comparatively 
lower representation not only in the military but also civil bureaucracy. In short, despite 
contributing a Marxist reading on Pakistan‟s politics and the state, Alavi‟s accounts are over-
essentialist, over-generalizing and often empirically least sustainable- there is a noticeable 
tendency not to cite references to many a claim (see Alavi 1988). 
 
The next structuralist account is narrated by Mohammad Waseem. His works (1994:42-59, 
85-101; also 1987:13-18) have very convincingly established the transformative links of the 
colonial civil bureaucracy with that of Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy was well trained and 
disciplined in the art of administration and politics under the British. Pakistan inherited a 
healthy share of this „colonial legacy‟ which underscored the existence of political and social 
forces due to the structural nature of the colonial state. 
 
In analyzing the structure and stature of the civil bureaucracy in the colonial state, Waseem, 
however, has paid little attention to the non-civil bureaucracy - the military- which was part 
and parcel of the colonial state. Moreover, the writer has not emphasized the changes (and 
their causes) in the organizational structure of the civil bureaucracy in the postcolonial state 
of Pakistan. In addition, the author structurally believes in the continuum of „rule of law‟ 
from pre-Partition till the present. However, in this regard, he has ignored the contextual 
difference between the colonial and post-colonial states as well as the identifier of the rule of 
law. This essentialization of structural view of rule of law raises the following question: 
should the Provisional Constitutional Orders issued by army chiefs be assumed as the 
„qualified stability‟ and identifier of the „rule of law‟ in Pakistan? 
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In addition, Waseem‟s work is not primarily concerned with the nature, patterns and 
dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Its main objective was to establish a 
hypothesis that the civil-bureaucracy was a part of the colonial authority structure (Waseem 
1994:1). Peripherally though, the military intervention in politics is understood from 
Huntington‟s concept of praetorianism. In other words, the writer tends to believe that weak 
political institutions made military to takeover. Again, the questions regarding the 
determinants of weak state institutions and the objectives behind the coups are unanswered. 
 
Another strcturalist account is presented by Husain Haqqani. He (2005:10-26), like Alavi, has 
analyzed the pre-Partition decade to formulate his core assumptions. His narrative revolves 
around the Muslim League‟s „Islamic project‟ grounded in Pakistan‟s movement which is 
assumed- unlike Alavi‟s salariat movement- a „religious movement‟ whereby Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah was unclear about the nature of the future state of Pakistan. Hence, after Partition, 
Pakistan was turned into an ideological state based on religion by religious leaders, 
politicians and theologians. Moreover, the „ Kashmir dispute as well as the ideological 
project fueled rivalry with India, which in turn increased the new country‟s need for a strong 
military‟ argues Haqqani. In this respect, „the religious sections‟ of the British intelligence 
service inherited by Pakistan were used accordingly. Herein lies, according to him, the 
genesis of mullah-military alliance which impacted Pakistan‟s politics in the future. 
 
About the 1958 coup the writer (2005:38-81) brings in the civil bureaucracy-military‟s 
apprehension about the 1959 elections. In addition, Ayub Khan is termed as a non-secularist 
who „simply wanted to do what he perceived was good for the state and declare it as Islamic‟. 
Therefore, Pakistan was able to maintain its „Islamic identity‟ intact during the 1965 war. Not 
only this, the military operation in East Pakistan (1971) was characterized as a war for 
country‟s Islamic identity argues Haqqani. On the post-1971 politics his (2005:86-116) belief 
is that the military needed Bhutto for its institutional safety and prestige and to divert 
domestic criticism to the former. Writing further on the military-mullah nexus, the writer 
informs that the nexus remained intact even when military remained in barracks. After all, it 
was this nexus which brought the downfall of Bhutto in 1977.  Also, there is a conspiratorial 
tinge in his analysis of politics in the 1990s. For example, he (2005:201-259) describes that 
the USA sided with the military against Benazir Bhutto‟s first government; and the military 
under Musharraf was reluctant to intervene- it staged the October 1999 coup reactively. 
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Haqqani‟s account is very interesting from the outset. The worth of his work lies in the 
empirical data he has presented about the role of intelligence agencies in factionalizing 
political parties in general and opposition in particular. However, his account is extremely 
essentialist. It assumes the role of religion in the making of Pakistan „essential‟ and a „given‟. 
Thus, the state of Pakistan is essentialized as „Islamic‟ since pre-partition days. It is, from 
Haqqani‟s logic, the duty, be that religious or otherwise, of the mullah-military combine, civil 
bureaucracy and politicians to protect the „Islamic‟ identity of the state. Nonetheless, in 
response to this logic, it is argued that Haqqani has failed to realize the instrumentality of 
religion as enacted by Jinnah, the Muslim League, the mullah and the military etc. For 
example, if the county was achieved in the name of Islam, then why did all the above- 
mentioned actors remain passive, divided and disinterested in turning Pakistan into a Sharia-
based state? Empirically, the efforts in this regard till today fall under the „instrumentality‟ of 
religion- the present study would explain this dichotomy in Chapter 3. 
 
Moreover, in his essentialist jargon, Haqqani has looked at only one side of the coin. He is 
apparently logical that the military needed Bhutto to divert the criticism off to him. But the 
empirical ignorance of this line of reasoning is exposed by the very fact that Bhutto packed 
his military bosses within a few months of his assumption of the offices of President and 
Chief Marital Law Administrator. Moreover, he brought major changes not only in the 
command and control system of the military but also the organizational structure of the civil 
bureaucracy. In addition, he established a parallel police force- Federal Security Force (FSF) 
- for his own political objectives. Similarly, Haqqani‟s conspiratorial assertion about the role 
of Washington and the reluctance of the military to stage a coup are, at best, reflector of 
wishful or willful thinking which lack empirical and logical foundations. Besides, his work is 
least concerned with the nature, patterns and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan.  
By and large, the account tends to exclude, if not absolve, politicians from the problemaqtiue 
of Pakistan‟s CMR. 
 
Finally, Ayesha Siddiqa‟s Military Inc. (2007) is one of the very important structural 
accounts of Pakistan‟s politics and the military. The aim of this study (2007:1) was to explore 
the internal economy of the military „as a driver of armed forces political ambitions‟ in a 
„militaristic-totalitarian‟ political system where the „head of the state is an army general‟. The 
fundamental question it addresses is whether having engaged in internal economy the 
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military‟s top leadership is interested to withdraw from politics. To answer it, three 
hypotheses are proposed as under: 
[1] Milbus [military businesses] is military capital that perpetuates the military‟s 
political predatory style…Consequently, profit is directly proportional to power. 
Financial autonomy gives the armed forces a sense of power and confidence of being 
independent of „incompetent‟ civilians…[2] The military economic predatoriness 
increases in totalitarian systems. Motivated by personal gains, the officer cadre…seek 
political and economic relationships which will enable them to increase their 
economic returns…[3] The military‟ economic predatoriness, especially inside its 
national boundaries, is both a cause and effect of a feudal authoritarian, and non-
democratic political system. 
                                                                                                            (Siddiqa 2007:2-3) 
 
Having posed the fundamentals of her research, Siddiqa (2007:33-72) identifies six types of 
civil-military relations in the international state system. To discuss civil-military relations 
from 1947 to 1977 in Pakistan, she borrows Huntington‟s praetorianism. According to her 
analysis, the military since the first war, in and over Kashmir, started asserting its military-
corporate position in the security state of Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy and other elites 
used the military to enhance their interests. But in 1958, with the first martial law, the 
equation got changed in favor of the military. Interestingly, however, to discuss politics under 
Ayub Khan, Perlmutter‟s concept of „arbitrator military‟ is taken out of her proposed 
typology and applied to discuss politics and the Milbus in the 1960s. In this regards, she 
argues that the Ayub regime created its cronies based on „patron-client relationship‟ from the 
civil bureaucracy and politicians to plunder the national resources predatorily. Furthermore, 
during this period the military had obtained „political and financial autonomy‟ that gave it 
confidence to keep its hold over Pakistan‟s state. In addition, Siddiqa sees Yahya‟s coup as a 
continuation of Ayub‟s regime. However, the post-1971 period witnessed a strong Bhutto vis-
à-vis the military whereby the Milbus stumbled from 1972-1977. Nonetheless, Bhutto, who 
was a landed- feudal himself, also engaged in predatoriness along with other elites- the 
military being one. His downfall, however, was caused by his dependency on the military 
organization.  
 
Besides, Siddiqa‟s Milbus thesis argues that from 1977 to 2005 - or better 1977 onward- the 
military has „morphed into a dominant class‟ exerting influence socially, economically and 
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politically (2007:19-23). Moreover, to theorize her „class‟ thesis, the author has resorted to 
Alavi‟s „three classes‟- metropolitan bourgeoisie, indigenous bourgeoisie, landed-feudal- and 
added „military class‟ to Alavi‟s Marxist typology of classes. Having ensconced itself within 
the existing class structure of Pakistan the military enters into politics as an equal partner of 
other members of the elite/oligarchy/establishment. Not only this, its „arbitrator‟ status is 
transformed into „parent-guardian‟ one. Thus, the organization is able to produce its „military 
politicians‟, civilian „politicians or entrepreneurs‟ who were „propelled into prominence by 
the military‟. On their part, the civilian elites, due to their „mutual interests‟ and „mutual 
dependency‟, never challenged the military predatory and „feudal-authoritarian‟ style and 
attitude. Thus, in Siddiqa‟s (2007:24) analysis the military is the most powerful institution in 
Pakistan. It could only be forced to return to barracks by sustained mass-based political 
movement and massive international pressure especially by the USA. 
 
Doubtlessly, Siddiqa‟s work is monumental in terms of its original contribution towards 
documenting military businesses. Moreover, the attempt at establishing a structural linkage 
between Milbus and (feudal) authoritarianism as well as between existing classes and military 
(class) is impressive. Nevertheless, despite this significance the account carries many a 
theoretical and empirical contradiction. For example, one wonders on what grounds the writer 
has assumed the military both a „class‟ and „praetorian-feudal‟ construct. Historically, the 
class is the production of Industrialized European societies. How could it be mixed with a 
Third World conception of a pre-industrial and pre-capitalist institutional „feudal‟?  
Moreover, the concept of „feudalism‟ is a European export to South Asia. Does one find 
„feudalism‟ or private property in pre-colonial India? The writer is silent on it. In addition, 
the author has equated the officer cadre‟s economic ventures with a military class. In this 
regards, she argues: 
The senior generals (both serving and retired) are the primary beneficiaries of the 
internal economy. The whole economic process of benefits is structured in such a 
manner that those at the top received the bulk. 
                                                                                                                         (Siddiqa 2007:13) 
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In light of the quote, one is urged to ask: do the middle rankers, JCOs and NCOs also form a 
part of the „military class‟29? Do all the serving and retired military personnel are unanimous 
over the distribution of socio-political and economic benefits? The writer has not highlighted 
these queries. Perhaps a better way to deal with this subject was to term officer cadre a class 
if class conception was deemed central to the analysis. Or this could have been put in Alavi‟s 
indigenous bourgeoisie. After all, the military‟s enterprises do make business with the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie. Moreover, if the military class is structurally considered a crucial 
construct, then the writer has somehow ignored the „military class‟ in colonial Punjab (Yong 
2005:90-108,241-280). From a strcturalist perspective, Siddiqa could have established a 
linkage between the pre-colonial and post-colonial military class and its economic ventures 
along with the dominant classes. Interestingly, despite emphasis and reliance on structure, her 
narrative is post-independence.  
 
Moreover, the author‟s handling of the core question is problematic. She argues that the 
military, as an organization and a class- economically, politically and socially- is the most 
powerful force in the country. Having engaged in internal economy the officer cadre could 
only decide to return to barracks if there is an indigenous political movement and internal 
pressure. This claim, instead of answering the core question, raises certain questions: a) how 
and when do/shall the indigenous movement start since the writer has given no timeframe? b) 
Who does/shall start and lead this indigenous movement? c) How does/shall one know if and 
when the exogenous pressures come to the support of an indigenous movement? d) Why does 
the military stage a coup when it has become the most powerful institution with the discretion 
and privilege to produce its own (military) politicians?  
 
In addition, the present study argues that Siddiqa‟s hypotheses 1 and 3 (2007: 1-2, 14-15, 21) 
do not hold empirically. Also, hypothesis 3 is problematic conceptually. To begin with, in the 
description of her first hypothesis she proposed that „profit is directly proportional to power‟. 
If this is so, then how can one explain Zia‟s coup in July 1977? Because, if the above logic is 
correct, the military‟s Milbus and „class‟ status only thrived  and strengthened after Zia 
assumed power. In other words, this means a profit-deficit and (Milbuswise) weak military 
staged a coup in 1977. Interestingly, however, the empirical evidence provided by Siddiqa 
goes against her hypothesis. Similarly, her third hypothesis could not be justified on 
                                               
29  The acronyms JCOs and NCOs stand for Junior-Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers 
respectively. These acronyms along with others could be seen under Abbreviations. 
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ontological and empirical grounds as well. Ontologically, the writer has taken the feudal as a 
given and being, and not becoming. 
30
 Empirically, the socio-economic, if not political, 
transformations taking place within the Pakistani society have not been taken into account 
with respect to understanding and constructing not only the basis but also the body of a 
feudal. In other words, one wonders who could be a feudal in Pakistan? What is the 
empirical, if not theoretical, basis to measure this phenomenon? The account is silent on it. 
As regards her second hypotheses, it is argued that instances of non-military predatoriness 
could also be found in democratic countries. Arunacahl in India is a case in point (Barbara-
Harris 2007). In other words, exploitation of economic resources is not necessarily confined 
to the military or its cronies in a non-democratic country. It is rather contextual than cross-
national. Moreover, the conceptual basis of this hypothesis, namely, „predatoriness‟, is 
borrowed from Charles Tilly.
31
 Hence, during the course of this conceptual importation the 
context of Pakistan‟s case is grossly compromised. One wonders how a 
Sixteenth/Seventeenth century Europe could be compared with Twenty/Twenty-first century 
Pakistan if not South Asia? 
 
Last but not least, equally problematic and questionable is Siddiqa‟s use of civil-military 
relations typology
32
 which is based on Western experiences of state-society interaction (Mitra 
1997:1-6). One wonders why the „context‟ and „embedded values‟ of the Pakistani society are 
accorded no attention at all (Mitra 2006:29-52). Moreover, her analysis revolves around 
„patron-client‟ model where the military is essentialized as patron (2007:51-54). However, 
the account is replete with instances where the military looks like a client especially after 
1971 debacle. Interestingly, the work (2007:15) takes conspiratorial tone when it comes to 
the US becoming a patron of Pakistani military. Finally, her account (2007:16) shifts the 
focus away from civil-military relations to have and have-nots. 
 
Maya Chadda in Building Democracy in South Asia (2000) has also taken a structural view of 
„democracy‟. Chadda (2000:13-97, 226-232) has attempted a comparative analysis of India, 
                                               
30 Her ontological positioning could explicitly be traced in her entire work including newspaper and magazine 
articles (see, for instance, „New Land Barons‟ Newsline (July 2006). In addition, this observation is based on my 
personal observation of her outlook toward reality conception along with detailed discussions on the subject of 
CMR and military intervention in politics. 
31 Charles Tilly has, in his later works, given due importance to the principles of comparative politics, thus 
emphasizing the importance of context (see Tilly 2004:5-6). 
32 The writer has no model of her own. This CMR typology is based on the works/models of Amos Perlmutter   
and Samuel Huntington respectively (see Chapter 1 in this respect).  
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Nepal and Pakistan‟s political system and the way democracy and its opposite has impacted 
each of the case respectively. Though the study is very informative and ambitious, the lack of 
comparative model and method, however, reduces its significance. Moreover, the contextual-
normative sensitivity of the three states is not taken into account. Even, on empirical grounds 
it is extremely difficult to justify her arguments. For example, she has narrated politics in 
Pakistan from an elitist mindset which is essentially marked as a  supreme force capable of  
using even „coercive‟ measures to democratize, integrate and „consolidate‟ the state in 
Pakistan. One wonders did the elite- civil-military bureaucracy, politicians etc. - consolidate 
the country in 1971? Besides, her „elite bargaining‟ approach is defective in the context of 
Pakistan as it creates the myth of an elitist leadership riding over a monolithic nationalism.  It 
also reduces or better ignores the role of public masses in shaping the political developments 
in the country. Implicitly, the account seems to suggest that the military may use illegitimate 
and illegal means of violence in the name of national consolidation. 
 
2. 6 The Path-Dependent Perspective 
The Pakistan‟s military intervention in politics has been studied from a path dependency-
historical institutionalist perspective by Mazhar Aziz in Military Control in Pakistan (2008). 
Aziz builds his argument from the pre-Partition Hindu-Muslim relationship which, in his 
view, was defined as Hindu-Muslim conflict by the Muslim League (2008:4, 12-13). The 
Muslim League was the platform where the Muslim minority interests were provided a 
political cover. In other words, the writer has disregarded Alavi‟s work on the salariat which 
explained the Muslim League‟ politics in Muslim-minority provinces- UP, CP etc.- from 
economic rather than religious perspective. However, in assuming so, Aziz has not provided 
any empirical evidence to refute Alavi‟s salariat theory. Moreover, he did not include in his 
analysis the Muslim-majority provinces where the League made pacts and electoral 
arrangements with the local elite in the 1940s.  
 
Moreover, the writer has remained unable to notice that it was by early 1940s that the Muslim 
League resorted to religion for political purposes. Additionally, it raises another question: 
was the League‟s politics and policy based on religion when it was founded in 1906 or during 
the 1920s and 1930s?  It seems, in view of the present study, that Aziz has failed to 
distinguish between a process of securing Muslims‟ (elite) interests within the framework of 
British India- whereby the League had to face the Congress as a political rival- and the 
instrumentality of religion for political purposes. After all, had a religiously induced Muslim 
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separatism been a unifying factor since the formation of the Muslim League- as Aziz has 
argued (2008:14) - there would then have been no political arrangements/alliances between 
Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims in the form of Unionist party to which little reference is made. 
Interestingly, the conception of Muslim separatism, as applied by Aziz‟s account, is 
essentialist in nature for it over-ignores the intra-Muslims religious, if not politico-economic, 
differences. The manner the writer has de-emphasized and demoted the presence of sectarian 
element in aftermath of partition is beyond comprehension- the Munir Report is a case in 
point.   
 
Aziz‟s analysis of the post-colonial state and society of Pakistan is also guided by the path 
dependency and historical institutionalism. In this respect, he transformed his thesis of pre-
Partition Hindu-Muslim religious conflict into India-Pakistan religious conflict. Pakistan 
perceived from the very beginning a threat from India. Subsequently, this threat perception 
led to „state survival‟ policy. The military, which was already „fairly entrenched and 
organized in 1947‟, was brought in politics (2008:4). In this regards, he argues: 
Although it is debatable what special competencies the military might have brought in 
for administering the state at that point in time, one can validly infer that the military 
would have taken the first steps in accumulating experiences and skills to manage 
civilian affairs. It is likely that these steps laid the foundation of institutionalization of 
the military-bureaucratic nexus within the state. 
                                                                                                                          (2008:36) 
 
The concepts of threat perception and state survival, as the above-mentioned highlights, are 
very catchy from the outset for India and Pakistan had fought a war over Kashmir in 1947-48. 
Nonetheless, they point to a very important aspect of the phenomenon, namely, which 
institution perceived the external threat and how. Also, which institution was responsible for 
the „survival‟ of the state at inception and on what basis- since the military was only „brought 
in‟?  
 
As regards the phenomenon of military intervention in politics, Aziz has considered only 
three coups in Pakistan- that of 1958, 1977 and 1999. The 1969 coup d‟état is assumed, like 
Siddiqa, as a continuation of Ayub-led military rule (2008:45). To explain the occurrence of a 
coup, the author has looked at consequences, and not the actual cause(s) of a coup. In this 
regard, only two variables- law and or order, and political instability- are taken to understand 
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the consequences in post-coup period. Also, to support his argument, the writer has taken 
National Defense College (NDC) as a case study to view the perception of the military about 
itself. His findings are that the military intervened (staged a coup) due to its „institutional 
interests‟.  
 
Nevertheless, as regards Aziz‟s efforts to explain coup occurrences and/or military 
intervention, it seems many important dimensions of the phenomenon are missed. To begin 
with, the „brought in‟ syndrome is stressed though from the prism of consequences. However, 
it is not specified which actor(s) and/or institution brought the military in. If it was threat 
perception, then there is not mention of its perceiver- this also implies that Aziz‟s 
„institutional interests‟ thesis did not apply to the 1958 coup. Interestingly, however, the 
reason/factor pointed out for coups (intervention) is none else but the military‟s institutional 
interests. But, the scope, degree, limits and meaning of this usage is left unexplained.  
 
Besides, the defective aspect of path dependent and historical institutionalist approach is that 
it ignores the importance of causes. Secondly, it ignores the contextual differences and 
actor‟s preferences between two events, phenomena or periods. In this respect, one may ask: 
did the 1977 coup have the same context (in this case of consequences) as the 1999 one had? 
Thirdly, this approach does not study civil-military relations on daily basis. In other words, 
this path-dependent and consequences-orientated approach has no theoretical capability to 
comprehensively answer the reasons for a fresh coup by looking merely at the consequences 
for the latter (if defined as variables) take time to get cognized and documented. 
 
Last but not least, historical institutionalism-path dependency is also essentialist and 
structural in nature and character since it tends to assume path as a given. For example, about 
the 1977 coup the writer argues that it occurred due to institutionalized military rule 
historically. This very conception of „institutionalized‟, in view of the present study, implies 
that the military had to intervene. In other words, the agency, rationality and political 
interaction of other actors are underestimated. Even empirically the 1977 coup cannot be 
assumed being „institutionalized‟ for it begs a question: when and how the military rule was 
institutionalized in the pre-coup period? The present study shall explain it in Chapter 5. 
Finally, Aziz‟s concepts of „military control‟ (of civilians if not the state) as well as „parallel 
state‟ are not theorized/problematized properly. For example, it is hard to find the indicators 
of military control and a method by which they could be measured. Similarly, the concept of 
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a parallel (military) state is, in view of the preset research, a new version of Alavi‟s 
overdeveloped state- the study shall take these relevant issues up in Chapter 3.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to critically review the existing literature on Pakistan‟s civil-military 
relations in particular and politics and the state in general. In this respect, the literature was 
divided into six sections and categorized as the legitimist point of view, conspiracy theorists, 
the generalist accounts, the instrumentalist work, the structuralist literature and the path-
dependent perspective respectively.  
 
The first section of the chapter looked at the legitimist point of view. The legitimists (Khan 
1960; Huntington 1968; Rizvi 2000; Cheema 2002) believe that Pakistan‟s political 
institutions remained unable to grow democratically. The politicians, by and large, were 
incompetent too. Instead, it views the military as a modernizing force. Therefore, it was quite 
natural on the part of the military to takeover in such an institutional vacuum. Moreover, 
since India had viewed Pakistan as its chronic enemy and had fought a war with Pakistan in 
Kashmir in 1947-1948, it was imperative, on the part of the military, to administer political 
obligations for the security of the state and the society.  Hence, the military‟s intervention in 
politics is not viewed as a problem at all by these accounts. Rather, coups d‟état and military 
rule is legitimized on account of the country‟s weak political institutions, politicians‟ 
incompetence and external security threat. Nonetheless, this point of view suffers from 
theoretical as well as empirical weaknesses. For example, despite its uni-focal over-emphasis 
on the inherent weaknesses of political institutions, there is no mention whatsoever of the 
factors which might have left political intuitions weaker. Furthermore, despite its rhetorical 
stress on the external security threat, the legitimists have failed to name which institution of 
the state was supposed to perceive the threat and on what grounds. In addition, the military-
as-modernizer thesis is empirically invalid as shall be explained in this study.   
 
In the second section, the chapter took a critical view of the so called conspiracy 
theory/theorist(s). The term referred to such accounts (Ali 1970, 1983) on Pakistan‟s politics, 
democracy and/or civil-military relations etc., that had a tendency to posit, without any 
evidence, that no domestic change in Pakistan‟s politics/CMR can occur without support 
from the outside- by external actors/factors especially the US. Also, the conspiracy theory 
had an internal dimension whereby a section of politicians conspires with the military to 
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affect any change in Pakistan‟s political system. However, besides making a case of 
Pakistan‟s politics/CMR without evidence, the conspiracy theory lacks internal consistency. 
For instance, following the breakup of Pakistan, Bhutto was assumed to be a weak partner 
and the military to be a strong master. However, this conception and construction of the 
Bhutto-military relationship ignores, on the one hand, the demoralization and unpopularity of 
the military‟s officer cadre, and on the other hand, the electoral standing, if not popularity, of 
Bhutto in the post-1971 period. In addition, the conspiracy theory is highly essentialist in 
nature in that it demotes the value of context and the significance of agency and rationality. 
 
The generalist accounts were analyzed in the third section. These accounts (Jalal 1990, 1995; 
Kukreja 1991, 2003) have a tendency to describe and understand Pakistan‟s civil-military 
relations from a rather general perspective in terms of first selecting multiple domestic, 
regional and international variables and then understanding the phenomenon of military 
intervention by operationalizing them. Moreover, these accounts were found to have a 
comparative ambition whereby Pakistan, Bangladesh and India were studied, with the help of 
a „composite‟ model- which contained a variety of variables-, comparatively. The military 
intervened in Pakistan‟s politics on account of the stated variables. However, there is no 
mention of a single- or two- particular variable which might have caused a coup/intervention, 
for example, in 1958 or 1977.  
 
In other words, a generality of a variety of variables is prescribed in order to understand the 
phenomenon. However, as mentioned above, these accounts, despite their informative nature, 
severely suffer from a lack of theoretical as well as empirical rigor.  The proposed model, 
which, for the most part, is grounded in imported concepts such as „praetorian polity‟ and/or 
„reactive militarism‟, suffers from explanatory capability to explain which factor causes 
military coup and how.  Importantly, though the generalist accounts posit that a combination 
of various variables compelled the military to takeover, they are silent as to why the military 
takes the pain to intervene in the first place.  Besides, these accounts give an explicit 
impression of carrying structuralist as well as conspiratorial overtones. 
 
Having conducted a critical review of the generalist accounts, the chapter then attempted a 
similar review of the instrumentalist work in the fourth section. This work (Cohen 2004) 
looked at the Pakistan‟s military from the lenses of Washington‟s geostrategic interests in the 
South Asia region especially during the Cold War period. Despite its pioneering position 
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within the domain of CMR-literature on Pakistan, the account focused primarily on the 
sociological aspects of military organization. In other words, the question of military 
intervention falls outside the purview of the instrumentalist work.  
 
The structuralist literature came up for a critical review in section five of the chapter. The 
exponents of this literature (Alavi 1988, 1990; Waseem 1994; Siddiqa 2007) exclusively 
focus on the socio-economic and political structure of the colonial state and the society. Since 
structural accounts are conceptually grounded in Marxian conception of reality, they 
overwhelmingly attempt to locate and understand the existence, collaborative instinct and 
potential and socio-economic and political significance of classes within and around the 
British India state. Accordingly, three classes, namely, indigenous bourgeois, landed-feudal 
and metro-politan bourgeois, were identified, which viewed and treated the state as 
instrumental to maximize their returns. In addition, since the colonial state is viewed as an 
interventionist force in terms of its modernizing capability, the indigenous bourgeois and the 
land-feudal entered into a structural relationship with the civil-military bureaucracy, the 
functional face of the state, in order to access and link itself with the metropolitan bourgeois. 
 
Moreover, the structuralists argued that a section of the indigenous bourgeois- the salariat- 
resorted to protest and participatory politics in order to secure and maximize their socio-
economic interests vis-à-vis Hindus and the British. The movement for Pakistan was, in 
substance and form, a salariat movement according to this literature. Hence, when British 
India was divided, the post-colonial state of Pakistan inherited the colonial state in terms of a 
civil-military bureaucracy and importantly the classes from the colonial to the post-colonial 
state and the society. In other words, there is qualified difference between the two states since 
the classes and the civil-military bureaucracy remained intact. Furthermore, the structuralist 
position does not view military intervention and constitutional/legal issues related to „rule of 
law‟ as valid problems since, structurally, Pakistan observed „qualified stability‟ and a 
continuation of the rule of law on account of its being an „overdeveloped state‟. In addition, 
most recently, one exponent of structural school of thought on Pakistan‟s politics/CMR 
argues that the military had, socio-economically, morphed into a military class due to its 
engagement in military businesses (Milbus). Therefore, the focus of studies on Pakistan‟s 
military ought not to be on how the military intervened in politics, economy and the society 
but rather how it should vacate the corridors of power. 
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Nonetheless, despite its informative character regarding the nature and functions of different 
classes in the colonial and post-colonial state, the structuralist literature, by and large, suffers 
from conceptual as well as empirical weaknesses. Conceptually, it has remained unable to 
distinguish between the nature, character and functions of the state and the classes (society). 
Moreover, the literature is devoid of any criterion to conceive and construct a class. In other 
words, it has ignored the inter/intra class dissimilarities and differences. Hence, context and 
individual rationality and agency are seriously compromised. Also, the structuralists‟ concept 
of the „overdeveloped state‟ is both conceptually and empirically invalid: conceptually, the 
state is, in a Marxian context, equated with the civil-military bureaucracy, thus ignoring , on 
the one hand, an institutional distinction between the civil bureaucracy and the military, and 
on the other, between the state and society. Empirically, the literature excluded the political 
institutions functional within British India- for instance, political parties, legislative councils 
etc. One wonders on what criterion a civil-military bureaucracy-based state is termed 
„overdeveloped‟ and that too in the presence of the state‟s political apparatuses.  
 
As regards the post-colonial state of Pakistan, the structuralists‟ reasoning of structural 
transformation of the colonial-state into the post-colonial is additionally 
conceptually/logically flawed since it ignores the significance of context, agency and 
rationality. Importantly, this line of reasoning tends to give the impression that politicians and 
political institutions are inherently weak and incompetent to run the affairs of the state. In this 
sense, there is no fundamental difference between a structural and legitimist point of view. 
Equally illogical, empirically unfounded and thus misleading is the structuralists‟ concept of 
„qualified stability‟ and „continuum‟ of the rule of law, because these concepts seriously 
undermine the contested legality, constitutionality and morality of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism (of the 1950s) and military interventions.  
 
Last but not least, the conception of a military class is also problematic. Firstly, it lacks an 
explicit criterion to judge- or statistically measure- which section of the military organization 
falls within the military class. Secondly, if income and engagement in the Milbus is the basis, 
then, from this logic, the population below the „officer cadre does not form part of the 
military class since it is the officer cadre which accrues most of the politico-economic 
benefits.  Thirdly, since the concept of military class is an addition to Alavi‟s class thesis, one 
wonders what makes the military a different class from the indigenous bourgeois or the 
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landed, feudal classes. Besides, the structural literature, by and large, shifts the focus away 
from civil-military relations to the haves and have-nots. 
 
In the final section, the chapter critically analyzed the path dependency-historical 
institutionalist perspective on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. The major themes covered 
by this work includes the colonial legacy in terms of Muslim separatism, the military 
institution, (pre-post Partition) threat perception and importantly, institutionalization of these 
values and patterns (path) in the state of Pakistan. Having institutionalized the external threat- 
primarily from India- this account posited that the military was „brought‟ in to politics by the 
state‟s psychological insecurity. Thus, when brought in, the military never left. Instead, it 
established „control‟ over the civilians and emerged as a „parallel state‟.  
 
Despite its significance in terms of applying the assumptions of path dependency and 
historical institutionalism, the account suffers from conceptual and empirical shortcomings.  
To begin with, like the structuralists, it assumes the structure of the colonial state and takes its 
inheritance by Pakistan‟s state, as a given.  Importantly, it fails to describe how and, by 
whom, the threat perception was perceived. In addition, like the legitimists, this work tends to 
implicitly legitimize the military‟s intervention in politics on account of, firstly, an 
institutionalized external threat perception and, secondly, path dependency. In addition, the 
proponent of this work has ignored the causes of military coups. In other words, context, 
agency and rationality are under-appreciated. Ironically, the work, while attempting to 
explain the military‟s control over its civilians, lacks any definition and indicators of the 
concept. Finally, equally problematic is the concept of a parallel state due to its lack of 
conceptual and empirical rigor.  
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Chapter 3 
Politics and the State- From Construction to Military Intervention  
The primary aim of this chapter is to highlight the theoretical as well as empirical 
shortcomings in the existing literature on the construction of Pakistan‟s state. In this regards, 
the thrust of critical analysis of the first three sections centers on the works of legitimists and 
structuralists. Quite contrary to the latter‟s belief, the present study, with the help of its 
deductive model, posits that the political leadership, the principal at Partition- until October 
1951-, rationally designed the state‟s physical and institutional apparatuses especially the 
civil bureaucracy and military. The latter were delegated certain powers, as is normal with 
modern states, to assist the civil section of the state in matters related to domestic and foreign 
policies Moreover, it was the politicians, as principal actor, who perceived the external (i.e. 
Indian) threat rationally, not structurally, and responded to it accordingly. However, despite 
the political leadership‟s constitutional supremacy, the military was able to shirk during the 
first war in and over Kashmir in 1947-48. No coup d‟état occurred at this point of time since 
the institutional and, importantly, the political costs of the action would have been greater 
than perceived benefits. 
 
The chapter, while applying the assumptions of its causal model, identifies the actors, both 
principal and agents, specifies context and explains the actor‟s interests, their 
preferences/choices in terms of working/shirking and the outcome in terms of their 
own/larger interests. The study argues that the principal politicians in the post-war period, by 
and large, accorded more preference to their own rather than larger/national interests. In this 
respect, to appease the socio-economically disrupted section of the populace and address 
issues related to law and order and external security, the principal rationally relied on its 
agents especially the civil bureaucracy. Moreover, to deal with the authoritarian clergy, 
which attempted to influence politics and the state socio-politically, the principal was able to 
negotiate the Objectives Resolution
33
 with the former. However, according to the present 
study, the Resolution was more politically motivated than purely religiously inspired. 
Importantly, this section highlights the principal actor‟s failure to devise any oversight 
regime/mechanism for the agents, especially the military. This failure, however, can be 
explained by the fact that the principal needed the military for political reasons. 
                                               
33 The Objectives Resolution was adopted on 12 March 1949 by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The 
resolution, proposed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, proclaimed that the future constitution of Pakistan 
would not entirely be modeled on a European pattern, but rather on the ideology and democratic faith of Islam. 
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The last part of the chapter connects the preceding section in terms of marking the agency 
and rationality of the civil bureaucracy whose preference of shirking prevailed in the post-
October 1951 period. The former principal, the politicians, could not resist its agent since the 
former also accorded more importance to its own rather than party and/or national interests. 
Hence, the period from October 1951 to October 1958, is, by and large, replete with 
examples of politicians working. However, a section of politicians, out of their own interests, 
was able to shirk in terms of depriving the principal of its discretionary powers to dismiss 
governments. This smart political move, nonetheless, was thwarted by the agent judiciary. 
The latter also acted rationally in terms of maximizing its returns. Moreover, during this 
period the military, according to the model‟s explanation, worked as an agent. Nevertheless, 
due to the principal‟s own interests, there developed a collaborative relationship between the 
two. This also helps explain why the bureaucracy could not devise any oversight regime etc.  
 
The chapter ends by mentioning the dissolution of Prime Minister Noon‟s ministry as a result 
of martial law declared, paradoxically, by the leader of the civil bureaucracy- Iskander Mirza 
(this is taken up in the next Chapter). A conclusion, at the end of this chapter, summarizes the 
analysis so far. 
 
3.1 The Structured ‘Structure’ of the ((Post) Colonial) State 
There is, undoubtedly, abundance of work, as is already mentioned in the introduction to the 
present study, on the colonial state of British India and the „newly‟ established states of India 
and Pakistan. However, with respect to civil-military relations in Muslim-majority provinces 
and later in Pakistan if one critically reviews the major exiting literature on the (post) 
colonial) state, it falls , for the most part, either  under the  structuralist or legitimist literature 
as explained in details in Chapter 2. The thrust of the structuralists‟ argument stands on the 
„structure‟- politico-institutional in particular and socio-economic in general- of the state and 
society. In this respect, Hamza Alavi argues that since the state was „overdeveloped‟ from the 
colonial days, it structurally kept intact in the post-colonial phase/period too. Moreover, the 
civil-military bureaucracy assumed influential position in the overdeveloped state to 
maximize their returns along with the „landed-feudal‟ and „indigenous bourgeoisie‟ classes 
which had structural links with the „metropolitan bourgeoisie (Alavi 1988; also 1990). 
Similarly, following the Alavian structuralist tradition, another exponent of structuralism 
argues: 
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Although the political community at large occasionally seemed to dominate the 
political scene through the election campaigns, religious movements, ethnic violence 
or legislative activity, it is essentially to the structural dynamics of the state that we 
must ascribe the primary responsibility for shaping the political events throughout the 
post-independence period. [italics mine] 
                                                                                                             (Waseem 1994:1) 
 
In addition, the structuralists argue that since the political leadership such as M.A. Jinnah and 
Liaqaut Ali Khan and the political organization, the Muslim League, were housed in  the 
Muslim-minority provinces of United India, their migratory nature and character structurally 
made them less effective in terms of being an inchrage of the subsequent political 
developments  in especially Muslim-majority provinces. Also, the Muslim refugees from 
India extremely affected not only the physical demographics of the country but also the 
institutional balance structurally for the former had assumed important positions in civil-
military bureaucracy (Waseem 1994:102-110).  
 
In almost the same vein, the legitimists go one step further in legitimizing the influential 
positions held by civil bureaucracy and the military on the basis of „weak‟ political 
institutions and security threats from India- the Hindu enemy. In this respect, the 1947-48 war 
between India and Pakistan is seen from Hindu-Muslim (pre-partition structural) rivalry 
perspective. Furthermore, the conspiracy theorists, path dependency work and instrumental 
accounts are no different from structuralist and legitimist perspectives since all of these, one 
way or the other, tend to de-emphasize the rationality and agency of actors involved in 
negotiating not only the transfer of the authority but also locating and establishing  it within 
the state of Pakistan. 
 
3.1.1 Non-Overdeveloped State 
From a purely structuralist and/or path dependency-historical institutionalist perspective, 
Pakistan may be termed a post-colonial state. However, in theoretical disagreement with the 
existing body of knowledge, it is argued that Pakistan like India rationally preferred to carry 
on with institutions such as a civil bureaucracy and the military which were established by 
the British for purely administrative purposes. The inheritance of the colonial legacy by 
Pakistan‟s state does not necessarily imply a structural continuity of the pre-colonial 
bureaucratic state as is most often made it to be (Waseem 1994:130-131). For if one assumes 
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so, the very meaning of Independence (movement) and subsequent Partition lose its 
significance. After all, the Jinnah-led Muslim League had a rational agenda of Muslim 
interests to negotiate with the Congress and London (Jalal 1999: 174-207).  
 
Moreover, the Pakistan state preferred to carry on with the tradition of electoral-constitutional 
politics. The 1935 India Act and the 1937 and 1946 elections are cases in point. Also, in 
terms of leadership and political organization, the coming of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan 
from Muslim-minority to Muslim-majority areas was a rational decision, not a structural 
constraint per se. So was the case with the Muslim League as a political party and Muslim 
refugees- or rather the cross-migration which occurred as a result of costs-benefits calculus. 
After all, a good number of Hindus and Muslims preferred to stay on in Pakistan and India 
respectively on the basis of rational choice. Suppose they did never have any option other 
than to stay on their respective land, then the question arises: why did not they commit 
(collective) suicide in the absence of any choice? The empirical fact of preferring life to death 
is sufficient to take the air out of Aziz‟s argument of a structured monolithic Hindu-Muslim 
pre-Partition conflict and the subsequent Partition on purely „religious‟ basis (Aziz 2008:14-
15). 
 
Additionally, again in empirical disagreement with the structural-legitimist-path dependency 
etc., literature, it is posited that the „inheritance‟ of the legal, institutional and political 
apparatuses could never imply that Pakistan was/is bound to tread the same „path‟ set by pre-
Partition political developments. For if one assumes so, the rationality and agency of the 
actors as well as the contextuality of Pakistan‟s case gets seriously compromised. 
Paradoxically enough, the structuralist thought is self-contradictory. It, on the one hand, 
believes in the demarcation between pre-colonial and colonial periods and, on the other hand, 
disbelieves in any such demarcation between pre-Partition and post-Partition periods. 
Regarding this, Waseem argues: 
Many still conceive the British administration as mere continuation of the pre-existing 
economic and political traditions of the country…This approach while discussing the 
formal continuity of various roles and titles from pre-colonial to colonial periods, 
tends to ignore the qualitative difference between their respective systems of 
administrative functions. A closer look at the two systems will reveal a fundamental 
shift in the location of sovereignty and patters of regulation of the economy, which 
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together shaped the contours of what we know the modern state system of Pakistan.  
[italics mine] 
                                                                                                                          (1994:13) 
 
Furthermore, Waseem‟ explorative hypothesis of „colonial authority patterns‟ exclusively 
investigates the structural linkages between the civil bureaucracy and other societal elements. 
However, it never explored the structural linkages, if any, between civil bureaucracy and the 
military under the British. Importantly, the posed hypothesis does not answer why the 
(bureaucratic) authority „structure‟ was established in the first place. Was it a structural 
product or a rational decision by London whose role as „mai-baap‟ (parents) of the 
subordinate civil bureaucracy is ironically ignored whereby the mai-baap position of civil 
bureaucracy vis-à-vis Indians is strangely accepted? (see Waseem 1994:15-15,53). 
 
Besides, the overdeveloped thesis as postulated by Alavi and adhered to by his followers, is, 
by any standard, a Marxian construct which views the state from class(es) perspective, and 
implicitly, questions the very being of the state. Moreover, within the specific context of 
South Asia especially with regard to Pakistan‟s state at Partition, Alavi has equated the civil-
military bureaucracy with the state itself (see Chapter 2 for details). Supposedly, if the civil-
military bureaucracy was well organized and trained in the art of administration and violence 
under the British, how could it be justified that it has a control over the Pakistanis- both 
people and their chosen representatives? The present study therefore assumes, from the 
perspective of agency theory-neo institutionalism, that it was not the overdeveloped state 
which structurally made certain classes to assume power(s). Rather, it was a non-
overdeveloped state- a normal modern-style state with certain state institutions such as civil 
bureaucracy, military, judiciary, parliament (CA), the office of Prime Minister etc. 
 
3.1.2 Legitimacy Thesis Exposed 
As regards the weak political institutions and their vulnerability to invite military intervention 
in politics, it is posited that this thesis too revolves around structure of the state and leaves 
many questions unanswered. For example, suppose weak political institutions- the weak 
Muslim League, the weak Constituent Assembly, the weak judiciary- made extra-
parliamentary forces to take over at or after the Partition, even this  supposition leaves the 
question of cause(s) of weakness of the political institutions unexplained. Empirically even, 
the legitimacy granted by the existing body of literature to the political role and rule of civil 
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bureaucracy and the military is unfounded since the people and politicians of East Bengal 
preferred to question the domination of the state by the minority-population from the very 
beginning. In addition, the structural argument, on the one hand, ignores the contextual 
differences between pre- and post-Partition periods and, on the other hand, undermines the 
agency and rationality of the actors. Therefore, it is argued that the legitimacy thesis as 
propagated by legitimists is logically, legally, empirically and morally flawed and thus 
misleading. 
 
Besides, another structural construct over-emphasized by the existing body of literature is the 
security threat posed by Hindu India which was/is bent upon destroying the very state of 
Pakistan. Thus, according to legitimist, conspiracy theory, path dependency, instrumentalist 
and structuralist works the bureaucratic-military oligarchy assumed powerful position to 
confront the Indian threat as was/is rightly perceived by them (see Chapter 2). Again, the 
mentioned literature extremely suffers from self-contradiction. On the one hand, it presents 
and poses India as a legitimate enemy but, on the other, it remains unable to mention, locate 
and explain the mechanism as well as the legality, constitutionality and morality of Indian 
threat perception by the bureaucratic-military combine especially at Partition. Moreover, if 
the war in Kashmir is cited as a point of reference and departure, then this case empirically is 
irrelevant as it were the tribals from Pakistan who , in the first place, crossed into the valley 
and waged a war against India (Jalal 1990:56-60). However, suppose it was civil bureaucracy 
and the military top brass which perceived the Indian threat in 1947-48, then again facts 
inform differently. The Pakistan army was under the politicians constitutionally and morally. 
How then a subordinate institution could perceive threat in 1947-48 and make judgement on 
the behalf of the entire nation is beyond one‟s comprehension. Furthermore, the initial refusal 
of British army chief, Masservey, to open fire in Kashmir should not be lost sight of in this 
regard. 
 
To summarize, the existing body of literature especially the structural, legitimist and path 
dependency accounts projects an overdeveloped state, weak political institutions, baseless 
political leadership and Indian threat to legitimize, structurally or otherwise, the political role 
and rule of bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the political system of Pakistan. However, 
having pointed out conceptual and empirical weaknesses of these works, it is posited that 
Pakistan is a normal state whose political leadership rationally chose a specific course of 
actions regarding the nature of the state.    
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3.2 Actors, Interests and Preferences: The Institutional Construction of the State 
In theoretical-empirical disagreement with the existing literature on Pakistan‟s politics in 
general and civil-military relations in particular, the present study, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
tends to explain Pakistan‟s CMR and the state in light of the proposed agency model. To 
begin with, under the Independence Act, the state of Pakistan got located temporally and 
spatially in August 1947 in (West) Punjab, East Bengal, NWFP, British Balochistan; the 
princely states of Bahawalpur, Swat, and Balochistan were to decide their fate in terms of 
integration with either India or Pakistan as per the terms of Partition Plan. Population wise, 
the areas under Pakistan counted around 73 million heads. Moreover, India and Pakistan also 
witnessed cross-migration of more than 14 million people (Yong and Kudaisya 2000:81-82; 
Hay 2006:67; also Maini et al 2009: x). The reality of cross-migration should make those 
realize who only preferred to look at the one side of the coin- the Muslim carnage at the hand 
of the Hindu enemy- at the expense of the other: the Hindu-Sikh carnage at the hand of the 
Muslims. If this historical fact is objectified and properly contextualized, then it leaves little 
room for arguing for a structural/embedded threat perception of a Hindu enemy. 
 
As regards the  question of state sovereignty, under the Independence Act Pakistani political 
leadership, being principal legally, constitutionally, politically/democratically and morally, 
chose to rationally carry on with 1935 India Act (as amended in 1947), Constituent Assembly 
(elected in 1947; which was to served as parliament), office of  Governor-General (with 
absolute powers), office of Prime Minister (PM), non-elective civil bureaucracy and non-
elective military (with its British officership)- the latter two being the agents. The third agent, 
the judiciary, was established in terms of Federal Court of Pakistan by the state‟s elective 
authorities in 1948 under the Federal Court of Pakistan Order, 1948
34
. These facts explicitly 
pointed to the location and institutional construction of the state by the rational political 
leadership. 
 
Moreover, as regards assumption of offices of Governor-General and Prime Minster, M.A. 
Jinnah, being the leading politician, had certain choices contextually.  Either he could assume 
the office of PM (as Nehru did in India) or become the Governor-General of the newly 
established state of Pakistan. If neither of the two, Jinnah could have assumed the 
presidentship of the Muslim League and/or the Constituent Assembly; or he could prefer 
                                               
34 www.supremecourt.gov.pk 
 106 
none of the officers and instead decide to leave the business of the state to his associates 
especially Liaqaut Ali Khan. Nevertheless, Jinnah, with a keen interest to construct and 
consolidate the state of Pakistan, preferred politics than privacy. Therefore, preferring a 
larger interest, he chose to not only assume the office of Governor-General but also president 
of the Muslim League and the Constituent Assembly at Partition. Logically, if he had no 
larger interest in mind then it is empirically impossible to ascribe his multiple roles to any 
other variable. This fact should also take care of Alavi‟s (1988) exaggeration of Jinnah‟s 
„ailment‟ and thus his instrumentality vis-à-vis the civil bureaucracy. The ailment thesis, at 
best, alludes to his physical state of health. His mental health, however, needs to be 
dissociated from the physical on account of available empirical evidences in terms of his 
orders, visits and speeches delivered especially to civil servants and military officers. 
Importantly, had Jinnah been really ill and weak then history must have recorded a coup 
against his ostensibly powerful position by, at least, the non-elective institutions. 
 
In addition, with regards to political organization and activity in the immediate post-Partition 
period, the Muslim League preferred to base itself in the newly state of Pakistan since the 
former was previously housed in Muslim-minority provinces. To establish itself 
organizationally and expand itself electorally, the party made certain compromises with 
political actors at provincial and local levels. Especially in East Bengal, where the local 
political parties and actors had a different conception of the state, the League prioritized 
rational political alliances with the localized politicians who, in turn, were cognizant of 
majority Bengalis. The latter, by then, had a firm belief in their agency and rationality as 
regards the democratic-moral right for government formation at the centre.  
 
3.2.1 Actors, Interests, Preferences: The Physical Construction of the State 
As regards the process of constructing the state physically, Karachi was accorded preference 
over Lahore or Rawalpindi to be the capital due to its commercial strength and transport 
facilities, which linked it to the capitalist centers internationally. Moreover, the state‟s 
institutional apparatuses, in physical sense, were housed in least developed socio-economic 
environment. However, having institutionally established the state system, the politicians 
turned to the physical construction and subsequent consolidation of the state. 
 
In this respect, as a result of hectic negotiations with London and the Congress, the political 
leadership was able to accrue material benefits in terms of its share of the British India‟s 
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assets. In addition, the civil service- All India Services comprised of the Indian Civil Service 
(ICS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS)- was divided. 
During the first quarter of 1947 the cadres of the Indian Civil Service and Indian 
Political Service had a strength of 1,157 officers (excluding those assigned to Burma). 
Of these 101, or 9 per cent, were Muslims. Ninety-five of these opted for Pakistan. 
They were joined by one Christian officer, fifty British officers, and eleven Muslim 
army officers. Of these 157 officers, only 36 were actually available for 
administrative work, the remainder being posted to judicial or diplomatic 
assignments. Of these 136, fewer than twenty had more than fifteen years‟ experience, 
and half had less than a decade of service. Qualitatively, only eight of these officers 
held positions in the secretariat of the Indian government and only three attained the 
rank of joint secretary to the central government. About ten other officers in services 
other than the ICS and IPS can be added, thus making a total of 146 officers of 
administrative experience available for creating the new state of Pakistan. [italics 
mine]  
                                                                                                                             (Braibanti 1966:116) 
 
The foregoing, contrary to structuralists‟ essentalized „steel frame‟ thesis, empirically marks 
not only rationality of the officers but also the degree of their agency. Moreover, as regards 
the principal‟s agency and calculus, it chose to modify the British „system of the cadre 
organization‟ in 1947 since Muslims traditionally were under-represented in the service 
cadres. Therefore, Pakistan could not inherit enough trained personnel to fill requisite posts in 
the civil bureaucracy (Kennedy 1987:29-31). This fact should make the structuralists realize 
that the principal politicians rationally maintained the cadre system, not structurally. In 
addition, though the formal encadrement of the CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) took place in 
1950 yet at Partition 
the External Affairs, Commonwealth Relations, and Political Departments of the 
Government of India, were merged to form the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Commonwealth Relations. Later, in 1948, the units of the Political and External 
Departments which had formed an adjunct to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
separated to form the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions…The Pakistan Foreign 
Service was formed in 1948 to man diplomatic, counselor, and commercial posts 
abroad within the overall control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Commonwealth Relation. 
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                                                                                                          (Kennedy 1987: 36) 
 
Furthermore, the civil authorities modified the British „Land Branch and the Cantonment 
Executive Service‟- the latter service was recruited by the Public Service Commission- into 
Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service (PMLCS) in 1947. Overall, Pakistan‟s 
political leadership established thirteen Central Superior Services. The former chose to retain 
the British old cadre system to manage the governmental affairs effectively. The latter, on its 
part, saw in it an opportunity to excel materially in terms of pay and promotion opportunity 
provided by the dearth of senior officers as well as the Bengalis who, despite being in 
majority, were under-represented in the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan (ibid: 182).  
 
Similarly, the British military was also divided on the basis of 3 June 1947. Field Marshal 
Auchinleck carried out the orders to reconstitute the armed forces. In this regard, the Field 
Marshal handed down principles with respect to the reconstitution of the armed forces on 2 
July 1947. Also, the Armed Forces Committee, headed by the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), 
was established to supervise the process. Thus, the future of the troops was decided by 15 
August 1947 without much hurdle. However, the units under the Punjab Boundary Force and 
the troops oversees were to be divided at later stage. On the same day, the Joint Defence 
Council was created which consisted of: 
 The Governor-General of India as an independent Chairman 
 The Defense Ministers of India and Pakistan 
 The C-in-C of the undivided India 
 
The C-in-C, or the Supreme Commander, as he was informally called to distinguish him from 
the C-in-Cs of India and Pakistan, had no „operational‟ control over the armed forces of the 
two states. Importantly, the Joint Defence Council and the office of the Supreme Commander 
were to close down on 1 April 1948. To fill the posts, Field Marshal Auchinleck was 
appointed as the Supreme Commander, and General Masservey was appointed the Pakistan 
Army‟s C-in-C by  the principal politicians (Rizvi 2000:38-41). As regards the military 
manpower, immediately after the Partition the army consisted of six cavalry regiments, eight 
artillery regiments, and eight infantry regiments. In others words, the country‟s share of the 
British Indian army came to about 36 per cent or about  140,000  personnel out of a total  of 
some 410,000 personnel in 1947. With regards to military‟s division, Pakistan, at the end of 
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the day, had to settle for 30% of the Indian army, 40% of the navy and 20% of the air force. 
Moreover, the moveable stores and relevant equipment were to be divided between the two 
countries in proportion to their respective military strength (Cloughley 2006:22; Jalal 
1990:42).  
                                                                  
In addition, the issue of the division and administration of surplus stores was, on the choice of 
Pakistan‟s politicians, referred to an arbitral tribunal, for the issue of the stores was 
considered essential for Pakistan‟s armed forces build up as the sixteen  ordnance factories 
were located in India. As regards the Pakistanization of the military the pace was slow due to 
dearth of Muslim officers in the Birth military. For instance, during the World War II, there 
were only four Muslims lieutenant-colonels of which one was appointed temporary colonel, 
and one acting brigadier. The latter was, within a few days, promoted to the rank of major-
general. Moreover, out of all the Muslim officers, whose percentage accounted for around 
23.7, four decided to stay in India. The non-Muslims officers who opted for Pakistan decided 
for India just after the Partition. Besides, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) appointed a 
nationalization Committee, in February 1948, to examine the problem of nationalization and 
reorganization and other allied matters, and to make recommendations for the complete 
nationalization by the end of December 1950. Importantly, a considerable number of British 
officers were retained in the three services (Rizvi 2000:46-47; also Cohen 1984:41-45). 
 
3.3 Civilian Principal- The Perceiver of Threat 
The legitimist, conspiracy theorist, and strcturalist literature point to the Indian threat 
perception, one way or the other. Nevertheless, these works have not, theoretically and 
empirically, explained which institution perceived the threat and how. The following is an 
attempt to explain actor(s), their preferences and actions and the context in which they 
rationally constructed strategies domestically and importantly, externally. 
 
To begin with, quite logically, the political leadership, the principal of newly created state of 
Pakistan, preferred to establish state institutions, as is already explained, in order to not only 
construct but also consolidate and run the affairs of the state. Had they abstained from this 
crucial obligation the very meaning and purpose of Partition and subsequent independence 
would have been lost. Nevertheless, when the politicians were busy according preference to 
the division of assets with the state of India after the Partition, the fact of cross-migration 
brought with it massive massacre of civilian population on both side of the boarder. Though 
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the Punjab Boundary Force was established on 1 August 1947 by the Central Government to 
maintain peace in the Punjab, it was abolished within a month‟s time by the Joint Defence 
Council. Therefore, in the absence of any peace keeping mechanism, the Pakistani (and even 
Indian) government, by design, assigned the evacuation of the refugees to the military.  The 
agent military performed the task well. Moreover, the latter was called upon by the principal 
to help the refugees and flood affectees in the autumn of 1947.  Coincidently, this was also 
the time when Delhi dispatched troops to a predominantly Muslim state of Kashmir after 
having secured Maharaja‟s „formal letter‟ for military assistance (Hussain 1998:10). 
 
Since the political situation was turbulent in the valley from the pre-accession days; the 
Muslim dissidents had refused to abide by Maharaja Hari Singh‟s Dogra raj. The stories of 
the persecution of Kashmiri Muslims along with settled Afridi tribesmen and Punjabis 
factored into the preference-ranking of tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province. 
These tribals primarily intervened into the Srinagar valley to maximize their economic 
returns in the post-British withdrawal period. Importantly, they were logistically encouraged 
by the Frontier government. Also, the involvement to the level of commanding the Azad 
Forces by a serving army officer, Colonel Mohammad Akbar (pseudonym General Tariq) 
factually refutes Pakistan‟s denials of non-fighting (Jalal 1990:57-59; also Weeks 1964:228-
229).  
 
Initially, the politicians, especially Jinnah and Liaqaut, opted not to engage in Kashmir due to 
severe shortage of arms and ammunitions. Moreover, the army high command also preferred 
not to engage with India militarily due to its assumption that the Azad Forces were doing 
well. Moreover, the engagement of the force oversees and in Punjab Boundary Commission 
factored in the top brass‟s calculus not to engage militarily at this stage. However, in early 
October 1947 the political leadership led by Jinnah ordered invasion in the wake of Indian 
troops airlift due to political interests (Schofield 2000). Had they not taken any action there 
was a high political cost to pay by these politicians who were still to politically reach the 
provinces and the localities where the Muslim League organizationally stood on weak 
footing.  
 
However,  despite the Azad Forces‟ being assisted by five percent of Pakistani regular army , 
its British C-in-C, General Douglas Gracey, refused to obey the civilian orders without 
permission to attack from the overall C-in-C, Field Marshal Auchinleck, who was based in 
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Delhi. Importantly, with regards to civil-military relations since independence, this was the 
second time the military advised against military operation against India, and, formally, it 
was the first instance when its high command was able to shirk- it refused to carry the 
principal‟s orders. However, in April 1948, the Pakistan Army C-in-C‟s preference 
converged with that of the civilian principal. Little wonder then, the action was taken in terms 
of troops intervention in Kashmir in order to stop India seizing it all. The following table 
summarizes civil-military divergence/convergence of preferences and subsequent action 
during this Kashmir (and 1965/1971) war against India: 
 
Table 6 Decision for Conventional and Tribal Attacks by Pakistan 1947-1971 
 Regime Civilian 
Choice 
Military 
Choice 
Outcome 
 
Srinagar Valley-  Early Oct 1947 
 
Civilian Yes No Attack 
 
Jammu- Late Oct 1947 
 
Civilian Yes No No Attack 
 
Kashmir- April 1948 
 
Civilian Yes Yes Attack 
 
War Scare- Jun-Aug 1951 
 
Civilian Yes No No Attack 
 
Rann of Kutch- Mar-Apr 1965 
 
Military NA Yes Attack 
 
Kashmir- Aug-Sep 1965 
 
Military NA Yes Attack 
 
East Pakistan- Dec 1971 
 
Military NA Yes Attack 
Source: Schofield, Julian.2000. „Militarized Decision-Making for War in Pakistan:1947-1971‟, Armed Forces & 
Society, 27(1):131-148. 
 
What the foregoing empirically informs is that it was the principal who judged the 
situation/conflict and decided accordingly. In other words, it is the political leadership which 
perceived the Indian threat in the wake of India‟s military action in Kashmir, and for that 
matter, in Junagadh (1947) and Hyderabad (1948). In this respect, Prime Minister Liaqaut Ali 
Khan wrote a letter dated December 30, 1947 to India‟s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and 
categorically pointed to India‟s non-acceptance of Pakistan, non-compliance to divide the 
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assets and forcible occupation of formally princely states including Kashmir. Again, in 1948 
while addressing a military parade in Dacca, the Prime Minister prioritized state‟s defense 
over any other governmental activities (Rizvi 2000:52-56). The above very explicitly points 
to principal actor‟s agency and rational calculus in terms of preferring larger to own interests. 
However, it does not imply that the politicians did not have their own political interests 
attached to the outcome of the war in Kashmir.  
 
What it, nonetheless, denotes is that the top political leadership was able to maintain a 
sublime strategic balance between larger i.e. national and own i.e. personal/party interests. In 
this regard, the plausible variables which would have factored into Liaqaut Ali‟s set of 
interests and subsequent threat related judgment were his and his party‟s weak organizational 
base and lingering problems of governance, for the issues of law and order, inter-provincial 
disparity, language, constitution, general elections, weak economic base were taken up by the 
opposition political parties for mobilizational politics. Hence within this specific context, the 
perception of threat from India was a strategic move by the politicians to ward off criticism of 
poor governmental performance. Moreover, contextually the civilian leadership strategically 
engaged the agent military and the civil bureaucracy in order to possibly solve a few of 
above-mentioned issues. In addition, had there been a given/structural Indian threat, then 
subsequent history would have recorded Indian military attacking Pakistan proper (excluding 
princely states including Kashmir) in, for instance, 1947, 1948, 1951 or 1958 (Hussain 2010). 
 
In addition, in this respect the oft-cited anti-Pakistan statements by Indian leaders such as 
Krishna Menon may serve to be perceived as an indication of military attack on Pakistan. 
However, these threat-slogans, if contextualized, were primarily directed to the domestic 
Hindu-fundamentalist constituency. Empirically enough, one should never lose sight of 
Gandhi‟s assassination. Furthermore, once a state is perceived as an enemy then the 
perceived state, as a rational actor, reacts to safeguard its interests atop its physical survival. 
If this logic is applied to India-Pakistan case in 1947-1948, it is (the politicians of) Pakistan 
who perceived India- which was numerically/territorially/militarily stronger than its 
counterpart- as a threat; whence perceived as a threat, India reactively perceived Pakistan as 
an enemy par excellence. 
 
3.4 Politics- Principal and the Agents 
 113 
As is explained the previous section, Pakistani politicians were opting to militarily engage not 
only with India in Kashmir but also the dissidents within the state of Pakistan. Of the latter, 
the Khan of Kalat preferred independence to integration with Pakistan in the post-Partition 
period. However, his belated and divergent preference was acted down through a military 
operation in Balochistan in March 1948 (Ali 1983:123). Coincidently, during this period 
(February 1948) the country‟s first budget was prepared and presented in the assembly. As 
mentioned above, due to their perception of Indian threat in particular and a realization to 
ensure state‟s physical survival, the principal opted to allocate as much as 70% of the budget 
for defense- precisely, the central government spent Rs. 461.5 million during 1948-49 in 
actual terms (GoP 1959). Paradoxically, though the political leadership was able to prioritize 
not only state‟s defense but also massive allocation for defense, it remained unable to device 
any mechanism to oversight the monetized military.  
 
Moreover, despite its focus on building state‟s non-elective institution(s), the central 
government, however, failed to assuage provincial grievances which further got aggravated. 
Moreover, the country‟s first industrial policy, made in April 1948, further disfavored the 
provinces. The financial constraints coupled with issues related to constitutionalism, 
electoralism, and ideologism (role of religion in the state) factored into the choice-set of 
provincial opposition politicians who questioned securitization of the state by the principal 
politicians at the centre. The latter, on its part, having calculated the contours of 
mobilizational politics decided to tactically engage not only the Muslim League‟s own 
dissidents but also opposing section of the political force. In this respect, both Jinnah and 
Liaqaut opted to reorganize their party, revise its constitution, and visited different places to 
deliver appeasing speeches.  
 
Meanwhile the war in Kashmir was still on; due to her geostrategic interests the US had, in 
March 1948, imposed arms embargo on both India and Pakistan. Importantly, this was a time 
when the rational and agent military, while preferring its own to larger interests,  shirked in 
terms of establishing direct connections with Washington to procure weapons. In this regard, 
the military, as a rational actor, saw more benefits than costs since the very absence of any 
oversight regime/mechanism indicated civilian‟s lack of appreciation of the former‟s agency 
and rationality (Hill 1980:25). However, at this point of time, the military abstained from 
staging a coup for its political as well as institutional cost would have been higher for an 
institution in the process of increasing its coercive capacity. 
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Importantly, it was not the military alone that shirked; individuals from the foreign and 
defense ministries, who shared commonality of interests with the former, also shirked due to 
their own interests. Nonetheless, as results of military‟s collaborative efforts with the US, the 
latter, though without lifting the arms embargo, provided Pakistan US$10 million as credit. 
Although this amount was primarily released for refugees rehabilitation, it was spent on 
weapons procurement the bulk of which was „discarded‟ and „defective‟ (Jalal 1990:76-77). 
The principal, arguably, refrained from bringing the individuals from the agent military under 
book or  better control due to its political interests such as using the agent for maintaining law 
and order , integrating the princely states and fighting the war. 
 
Politically, the situation was less comfortable for the politicians in power. The political tussle 
in Punjab between Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, the Muslim League‟s chief minister, and 
Mumtaz Daultana, the finance minister, added into Jinnah and Liaquat‟s set of preferences 
whereby the two, especially Jinnah, chose to favor Daultana. In post-Jinnah period- he died in 
September 1948- the new Governor-General, Khawaja Nazimuddin, got the Punjab‟s 
legislature dissolved and ordered the Governor to takeover the administration under section 
92a of the (amended) 1935 India Act (Aziz 1976:4-5). The Punjabi politicians took it 
seriously and decided to take the prime minister along with province‟s British governor on. 
East Bengal was also not lagging behind in this respect. The principal‟s anti-majority 
policies- i.e. Urdu as national language, low share of Bengalis in military and civil 
bureaucracy, revenue extraction for the centre (especially for defense), low industrialization, 
poor agriculture sector development etc.- could not converge with the interests of the 
majority Bengalis who opted for agitational politics to obtain their democratic rights. 
However, rational Nazimuddin, a Bengali himself, remained unable to stabilize his province 
politico-economically if not socio-culturally.  
 
Also in Sindh the power struggle among local politicians such as Ayub Khuro, Pir Ilahi 
Baksh, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Yusuf Haroon marked their agency and rationality 
in terms of preferring their own politico-economic interests to provincial issues related to 
economy and governance. In NWFP and Balochistan the central political leadership dealt 
with anti-League and anti-Pakistan elements strictly and, at times, militarily. In sum, the 
principal politicians especially the centre‟s leadership gave more weightage to its political 
interests in terms of centralization of power than the larger interests in terms of giving proper 
autonomy to the provinces. Nevertheless, the former had to pay the price by facing the 
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agitational politics led by non-PML politicians and political parties.  To curb this and any 
other form of opposition and dissention, the principal in 1949 introduced a legal measure in 
terms of Public Representatives Disqualification Order (PRODA). The PRODA policy 
accorded much power to the agent civil bureaucracy which now had an opportunity to closely 
observe the strengths and weaknesses of the principal. 
 
3.4.1 Religion, Politics and the State 
Ideologically and constitutionally the state of Pakistan during 1947-49 progressed little 
despite vociferous activism by opposition political parties and social forces. Of the latter, a 
section of clergy due to its religio-social and politico-economic interests opted to defy the 
government. In this respect, a paradoxical example is of Jamat-i-Islami (JI).  In the pre-
Partition period the Jamat led by Mawdudi had opposed the very creation of Pakistan state. 
However, it started to agitational politics, in the post-Partition period, in order to Islamize the 
state. Therefore, in order to appease such religious actors and maximize its political interests- 
i.e. non-passage of a constitution which would have shifted the balance of power in Bengalis‟ 
favor- the Constituent Assembly, on the behalf of the principal politicians, opted to pass, on 
12 March 1949, an Objectives Resolution than a constitution. On this Objectives Resolution, 
the subsequent establishment of a Board of Ta‟limat-e-Islamiyyah, its recommendations to 
the Basic Principles Committee (BPC), the concept/establishment/creation of „Islamic state‟ 
and Islamic ideology/identity, there is, doubtlessly, abundance of work available (Binder 
1961:116-154; also Malik 1996:33-46). Since the existing literature has fallen short of 
defining an Islamic state comprehensively, this section attempts to explain this phenomenon 
with the help of primary sources. 
 
To begin with, in the context of Pakistan‟s state, the work and efforts of Mawdudi and his JI 
assumed a pioneering position. Mawdudi influenced intellectually and politically a significant 
section of Muslim population in Pakistan and abroad, particularly the Middle East. His was a 
well-defined ideology/theory, namely: to establish political order in terms of state power(s) in 
a specific geographic area and then expand the order to the rest of the world, both Islamic and 
non-Islamic. Despite its coherence and appeal, Mawdudi‟s ideology, if not practice, was 
prone to severe but logical criticism. For example, his associate in the Jamat-i-Islami, Amin 
Ahsan Islahi, opted to argumentatively differ with him over the interpretation of religious 
texts i.e. the Qur‟an, hadith etc (Islahi 2000:19-32; also 2003). Moreover, the latter resigned 
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from the JI due to his ideological differences with the Amir (leader) of the Jamat (Islahi 
2004:87-116). 
 
In recent times, a former member of JI and pupil of Mawdudi and Islahi,- though 
intellectually more closed to the latter- Javed Ahmed Ghamidi has not only carried over 
Islahi‟s tradition of constructive criticism but also put forth his arguments as regards the 
concept and practice of Islamic state. While commenting on the Objectives Resolution and 
the concept of Islamic state
35
 he said: 
 
Box 3.1 The Concept of an Islamic State 
 
I think the passage of Objectives Resolution was a useless activity. It or any other 
such measure could never have Islamized the Pakistan state. Indeed, the method was 
[is] wrong. Instead of passing Islamic resolutions and rallying for such causes, our 
religious leaders should have focused on the education of our masses… As a result of 
education they would become good Muslims; and then they would elect good 
Muslims for their parliament…[Because] the establishment of any political order 
[Nazm-e-Ijtimai] has to be based on the opinion of a [given] Muslim society. Indeed, 
it is the decision of God as enshrined in the Qur‟an…Once in parliament, the elected 
can, on the behalf of the Muslim society, make laws which are not repugnant to the 
[last] book of God [the Qur‟an]…The parliament can also legislate on matters which 
the Qur‟an has not provided any legal basis…This is, in my opinion, what the Qur‟an 
informs us about Islam‟s political system. 
 
Interview with Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, Religious Scholar and Founder of Al-Mawrid- an 
Islamic research Institute. Lahore: 22 March 2008 
 
 
Moreover, regarding the Objectives Resolution the opinion of the following legal expert 
happened not to be categorically different from that of Ghamidi.  He commented: 
 
                                               
35 The concept of an Islamic state was found to be categorically different for religious scholars (and leaders) 
other than Ghamidi. All of them vociferously differed to Ghamidi‟s interpretation of religious texts. However, 
interestingly, none of them (belonging to different sects such as Deobandi, Brelvi and Shia) agreed to one 
another regarding the definition and dimensions of an Islamic state. According to the author, the religious views 
as expressed by these scholars other than Ghamidi are, more or less, the same as are founded in the existing 
literature on this subject. In the author‟s opinion, Ghamidi‟s arguments are stronger than that of his counterparts. 
Hence, his views are presented in the study. Further information about Ghamidi and his works is available from: 
http://www.al-mawrid.org./pages/research_detail.php?research_id=5. 
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Box 3.2 Islamic or Muslim State? 
 
I think it‟s [Pakistan] a modern democratic state…The mere fact, which it 
mentions, that sovereignty belong to Allah [God] and that it should be exercised by 
the chosen representatives…means that we [it] wanted to have a parliamentary 
democratic system in Pakistan…Therefore we are a Muslim state, and not an 
Islamic state as many of our political actors have tried to define it. 
 
Interview with Hamid Khan, Former President Supreme Court Bar Association, Member 
Pakistan Bar Council, Senior President  Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf [PTI]. Lahore: 20 
March 2008 
  
 
Thus, in light of the foregoing, it is argued that religion is primarily about the establishment 
of a Muslim society, not (an Islamic) state. Moreover, whence the society gets established 
and, if and when it collectively decides to establish a Nazmi Ijtimai (roughly political order), 
it has to religiously resort to the stated Qur‟anic principle.  
 
Nonetheless, Pakistan continued to move on in an ideological stalemate. However, as regards 
her foreign relations, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan in the capacity of principal decided to 
establish strong ties with the US from the very beginning. They based their preferences on 
geostrategic calculation in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, they also took into account 
not only the political sensibilities of the masses, especially the clergy which was 
fundamentally anti-communism, but also those of agents military and civil bureaucracy 
which happened to incline towards the West generally and the US particularly, for the 
military top brass was categorical as regards weapons procurement from Washington 
(Cheema 2002:58-60; Venkataramani 1984:64-94). Besides, the country started to establish 
cordial relations with the Muslim states of the Middle East. Moreover, to appease the masses 
and the belligerent clergy the prime minister supported the Arabs over the Palestine issue 
which led to severe tension not only within the principal-agent equation but also between 
Pakistan and the UK-USA combine. However, the start of relations with China was friendly. 
Karachi lost no time to recognize the Chinese state/government in 1949. 
 
Domestically, however, Prime Minister Liaquat-led government faced severe criticism due to 
its non-performance with respect to governance, economy, and constitution-making. The 
pooper sections, therefore, looked to non-Muslim League parties which, in turn, had a 
political interest to destabilize the government. The socio-economic and political situation 
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was much worse in East Bengal where the PML government lost the provincial election held 
in 1950. The politickeering was less comfortable in rest of the provinces too. Even within the 
party, the PM was politically constraint primarily at the hands of Punjab-based politicians 
who attempted to politically exploit the least popular position of the PM. Nevertheless, 
Liaquat was successful at political maneuvering to obscure the party-government distinction 
by assuming the office of party‟s president. Despite this, the issues related to low governance, 
economy, education, health, constitution, language, provincial autonomy, national election 
and foreign policy etc., were still to get solved if the PML government were to continue. 
 
In this respect, the principal led by Liaqaut had a limited set of choices. If the election were 
held, there was a strong likelihood of a government being formed by East Bengal based 
politicians and political parties; if constitution was democratically made, East Bengal were to 
be given its due share; if relations were to be normalized with East Bengal and non-Punjabi 
politicians and parties, in some kind of a compromise below general elections, agents military 
and civil bureaucracy were to get politically benefited along with a coterie of personalistic 
Leaguers. Anyhow, the rational PML government opted for the third choice though in the 
absence of any reached compromise. 
 
However, there was more cost to pay than the intended benefits. The opposition politicians 
especially in East Bengal gave the government a tough time in the wake of communal 
disturbances in 1950. Also they objected to the Interim Report of the BPC. The postponement 
of discussion over Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council went unaccepted by a 
majority of Pakistanis and the military too. The military actions in Korea further intrigued the 
PML government which after much ado decided to ally with the US-led coalition. The blow 
to civil-military relations, however, came in the form of a failed putsch- commonly called the 
Rawalpindi Conspiracy (March 1951)
36
. The conspiracy was planned and carried out by 
Major General Akbar Khan, the newly appointed chief of staff. The conspirators aimed at 
replacing the (central) government with a military regime. However, the shirking was timely 
detected and the conspirators got held up.  
 
                                               
36
 On Rawalpindi Conspiracy, see Akbar Khan‟s Raiders in Kashmir (1975) and Hasan Zaheer‟s The Times and 
Trial of The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951 (1998). 
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Nevertheless, this shirking marked, on the one hand, the underlying political interests of the 
agent military vis-à-vis the politicians, and, on the other hand, highlighted the inter-
institutional interests and preference-divergence; the chief of general staff led officers carried 
a different policy preference towards C-in-C37 and his associates not only over Kashmir (the 
former preferred a decisive military solution) but country‟s general politics and economy. 
Moreover, it pointed to the politicization of the officer cadre who attempted to judge the 
political issues of the country. Importantly, it signified the civilian control of the military; as 
an institution the latter remained unable to successfully topple the civil principal. Besides, the 
act of shirking marked the rationality and agency of the military as a rational institution. The 
C-in-C-led section rationally decided not to side with the disobedient section for reasons: 
first, the C-in-C section, being more powerful in terms of hierarchical command and control, 
preferred to exploit the coup-staging section‟s apprehension. When the coup stagers got  
arrested, the remaining power and influence further went into Ayub Khan‟s hands; second, 
had the military unanimously acted, the military and political cost would have been higher- 
i.e. less attention to military modernization, lesser opportunity to militarily capture Kashmir, 
severe political opposition etc.  
 
The politics in the post-shirking period centered primarily around the perplexing civil-
military relations. The politicians became more cautious of the agent military. In this regard, 
during the India-Pakistan boarder tensions in the summer of 1951, and on the question of 
Pakistan‟s strategic alliance with Washington vis-à-vis the Middle East, the PM made 
calculated decisions. He tried to reconcile not only with India but also kept the initiation of 
alliance-politics in his hands. 
 
Nonetheless, as regards his domestic policies they bore less fruit. The masses were least 
satisfied with governance and socio-economic policies. The state-related issues also kept 
lingering. Even his Leaguers chose to maintain a tough line. Before the PM took further 
                                               
37  General Ayub Khan was appointed C-in-C by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan-led principal politicians. It is 
maintained  that his appointment was a rational decision of the PM who saw more political  benefits than cost in 
the appointment of a general who was in PM‟s calculus least politicized, if not political, due to his originally 
junior-position within the army (military) ranks (General Iftikhar, who died in plane crash in late 1949, was to 
be appointed C-in-C by the rule/norm of seniority), his non-involvement in the refugees-settlement process, his  
being a non-Punjabi (a Hindku-speaking indeed), his belonging to non-influential political family and non-
involvement in the 1947-48 Kashmir War (see Khan 1967:6). 
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measures to possibly find a political solution to, at least, a few of these issues he fell to a 
pistol shot on 16 October 1951 in Rawalpindi.38 
 
3.5 Agency and Rationality- The Case of Civil Bureaucracy 
In the post-assassination period, the central cabinet by virtue of PM‟s death stood dissolved. 
Under the constitution the Governor-General, Khawaja Nazimuddin, was obligated to form a 
new cabinet. However, the norms of democracy and the spirit of the constitution were set 
aside by the agency of the hitherto agent civil bureaucracy who, having calculated the 
factionalized and personalistic politicians and their parties, chose to shirk extremely. 
Moreover, this undemocratic, if not immoral, assumption of state‟s powers by the civil 
bureaucracy points to its inherent capability to get things done. Also, it highlighted that the 
civil bureaucracy preferred its own interests to larger one- that of the state and the nation. 
 
Little wonder then, the civil bureaucracy grabbed the seat of power(s) by replacing politician 
Governor-General with a bureaucrat one- Ghulam Mohammad- and thus improved its 
institutional position from an agent to the principal, for its preference had prevailed. 
Ironically, the deposed Governor-General, a Bengali, was appointed prime minister of the 
country. In other words, the G-G opted to work than shirk. This also points to the deposed G-
G‟s rationality in terms of prioritizing own to larger interest. Importantly, the deceased PM‟s 
associates also chose to join the new government which highlights their capability to working 
than shirking for own their benefits. 
 
As principal of its agents- military, judiciary and the politicians, the civil bureaucracy opted 
for a non-popular/electoral mode of politics which resulted in further factionalization and 
personalization of political behavior on the part of politicians who had a penchant for own 
than party or national interests. Therefore, a section of politicians rationally allied with the 
principal in the power-game. So did the agent military. The latter was able to negotiate a 
strategic space with the civil bureaucracy. The C-in-C Ayub Khan was thus able to pursue 
military modernization in terms of weapons procurements from the US. The military was also 
                                               
38 Officially, there is little known about PM Liaqaut Ali Khan‟s murder except the murderer‟s murder- by the 
security police, minutes after PM‟s death.  Publicly, there is a lack of any authentic accounts on Liaqaut Ali 
Khan‟s assassination. Nevertheless, most recently in a private TV channel documentary named Band File 
(Sealed File) on the very assassination of the PM, his family (members) implicitly fingered at his rival 
politicians from the Punjab.  
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able to assert its input on the security/defense matters. On its part, the principal endorsed such 
measures as a way-out to not only appease the agent military but also use it to maintain law 
and order if need be.   
 
Politically, the so called Nazimuddin government faced issues related to economy, 
constitution and especially law and order. Ideologically, the state of Pakistan was still 
obscure. Though it rationally retained the secular laws of the British Indian state, it is 
maintained that the Pakistan‟s state was more secular than sacred in character. The secularity 
of the state was, however, constantly questioned by the authoritarian religious 
interpretation(s) by politically active clergy. Since the latter lacked political and participatory 
role in the government and a section of it had earlier opposed the state itself, it chose to 
influence and approach the state politico-socially. Therefore, the authoritarian clergy selected 
Ahmaddiya sect for this purpose as the latter‟s members had a considerable representation in 
the military and civil bureaucracy. The first foreign minister- Zafrullah Khan- is a case in 
point (Hasan 2008). 
 
The charge sheet against the Ahmiddiya sect was its violation of the finality of Prophet 
Muhammad. However, historically/empirically and logically if this was the case, then what of   
(Twelvers) Shias who believe in the office of  Ima‟mat (divine appointment of the leader).39 
Moreover, the majority of Brelvis and Deobandi (especially their scholars) also believe in the 
duality (human and non-human (Nur) of the Prophet‟s person.40 In addition, the majority of 
Sufis (mystics) have an established belief in direct linkage/merge with God. 
 
Thus, in light of the foregoing it is suffice to posit that despite the Ahmadiyya‟s claim to 
Mirza‟s prophethood the selection by Brelvi-Deoband-JI clergy of this case/sect was a result 
of a rational decision, namely, to highlight and undermined the former‟s representation in the 
government. In this respect, the clergy‟s plan was simple: since the Ahmedis are anti-
Muhammad, therefore, they are anti-Pakistan and anti-Islam; to purify Pakistan and Islam it 
is obligatory upon every Muslim-Pakistani to get them declared non-Muslims officially. In 
pursuance of this political objective, the clergy resorted to agitational politics during 1952-53. 
Due to failure of law and order apparatuses, the agitations led to communal riots in the major 
cities of the country. The Nazimuddin government, instead of principal civil bureaucracy, 
                                               
39 This is based on the views expressed by one Shia intellectual with the author. 
40  Deobandi interviewees unanimously believed so. 
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bore the brunt of socio-economically affected populace. Ultimately, on the behalf of the 
principal, martial law was declared in Lahore, Hyderabad and Karachi to establish the writ of 
the state. 
 
Though relative law and order was maintained by the military, the latter was thought to be 
part of the problem by Nazimuddin since the defense sector took much out of the preceding 
budgets, which, in turn, left less resources to assuage socio-economically affected people. 
After all, the Prime Minister was a politician with a constituency, however weak, to be 
answerable to. Hence, as a result of Nazimuddin government‟s calculation, the 1953-54 
budget, for the first time since 1947, reduced the defense share by one-third. Expectedly, the 
military top brass disliked it. Moreover, the incumbent Governor-General Ghulam 
Mohammad in strategic interaction with the agent military also got displeased, for his 
relations with the PM were already non-cordial. The PM, a former G-G, in order to politically 
assert the politicians‟ position in country‟s political system opted to curtail the powers of the 
G-G in the Constituent Assembly. However, the personalistic politicians accorded more 
weightage to their own than larger interests of the state and society. Resultantly, Nazimuddin 
had to pay the price himself; he was unsummarily dismissed by Ghulam Mohammad in April 
1953. He was replaced, on the whims of the principal, with Mohammad Ali Bogra, another 
Bengali and Pakistan‟s (former) ambassador to the US (Sayeed 1954). Bogra‟s appointment 
marked the agency and rationality of both the agent politicians and the principal bureaucracy. 
The former wanted to maximize his own politico-economic interests; the latter chose to 
appease not only the majority-Bengalis but also benefit from Bogra‟s US experiences with 
respect to foreign/defense policy.  
 
Bogra, without any political base, relied on Muslim League which was in shambles especially 
in East Bengal where provincial elections were scheduled to be held in early 1954. In order to 
rationally deal with the socio-economic issues and to gain political space vis-à-vis other 
personalistic Leaguers and non-League politicians, the PM worked out a constitutional 
„formula‟ which to a good extent had appeased the East Bengal politicians. Nevertheless, 
whereas Bogra politically benefited in the Bengal, the cost was higher in non-Bengal 
Pakistan. Indeed, the principal along with agent military had a different take on the 
constitutional formula which had proposed Bangla as national language- which from the 
perspective of democratic theory was justifiable (McGrath 2000:113-114). 
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However, on the foreign/defense policy front, Bogra government was least confronted. In 
fact, it was the principal bureaucracy and the agent military which negotiated the costs and 
benefits of strategic alliance with Washington in September 1953. Resultantly, Pakistan opted 
to sign a military agreement with Turkey, a US ally, against communist USSR in February 
1954. Two months later, Karachi also signed its first Mutual Assistance Agreement with 
Washington. The singing of the above agreements marked the agency and rationality of both 
civil bureaucracy and the military. The former did not want the latter to take political 
initiations in its hands. The latter did not shirk in terms of a coup at this stage for the political 
cost would have been higher than the intended benefits.   
 
The political cost, however, was paid by PM Bogra whose party lost provincial election in 
East Bengal to United Front (UF) - the former hardly won 10 seats as compared to UF‟s 223 
in an assembly of 309. In the post-electoral period, the Front became demanding. It 
demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly which had, in its opinion, become 
non-representative of Bengali interests. However, instead of meeting these democratic 
demands, the principal chose to take tough measures against the dissident section of 
politicians. Thus, Nazimuddin, Fazlur Rahman and Fazlul Huq were politically victimized; 
the latter was dubbed pro-India on accounts of a speech. The charge, however, was less than 
plausible (ibid 2000:119-120).  
 
The civil bureaucracy‟s anti-UF agenda further aggravated the socio-economic and 
importantly political situation in East Bengal- Karnafuli riots and subsequent deaths in March 
1954 is a case in point (see Table 7 on page 141). Bogra government also struggled in this 
respect as the ultimate powers and apparatus to maintain law and order rested with the civil 
bureaucracy. Moreover, on 20 September 1954 in his absence, a section of the coalition led 
by the United Front was able to ratify the constitutional/Bogra formula and repeal the 
PRODA. This non-consensual action put Bogra government on back burner politically. To 
cap it, the very next day, in an explicit act of shirking vis-à-vis the principal bureaucracy and 
even the PM, the Constituent Assembly amended sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution (1935 
India Act, as amended). The amendment deprived the Governor-General to dismiss the 
cabinet (ibid 2000:123, 134-154). 
 
Indubitably, the two acts marked the agency and rationality of the politicians who had 
calculated more political benefits than cost. They deemed this legislative performance as a 
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boaster to their political moral. Moreover, they might not have expected any extra-
constitutional act on the part of the principal led by Ghulam Mohammad. However, if they 
had assumed so, then it pointed to their short memory since the civil bureaucracy had earlier 
assumed power at will in October 1951, and had dismissed Nazimuddin government in April 
1953. Nonetheless, having viewed this politico-legal action, which entailed heavy politico-
economic cost for the civil bureaucracy, as an act of severe shirking, the principal in strategic 
understanding with the agent military chose to punish the shirking politicians.  
 
3.5.1 Principal Bureaucracy, Agent Judiciary and Politics 
As mentioned before, a section of politicians had attempted to shirk which had caused deep 
concerns in the corridors of power. The principal bureaucracy took it as an onslaught on its 
politic-economic interests. Therefore, she decided to teach the shirkers a blue lesson. 
Resultantly, the Constituent Assembly was dismissed on 24 October 1954 (Wheeler 1955). 
The dissolution created a legal-normative crisis in the country which was left with neither a 
constitution nor an assembly to make one. The incumbent civil bureaucracy and its leader 
Ghulam Mohammad had seen more benefits in this extraordinary act of highhandedness. 
Nevertheless, the politicians led by Maulvi Tamizuddin- the deposed Speaker of the 
Assembly- decided to challenge the G-G‟s action in Sindh High Court which gave its verdict 
in favor of the Assembly in term of invaliding the dissolution by the Governor-General. 
Hence, on latter‟s behalf an appeal was filed in the country‟s Federal Court (FC) - apex body 
of the agent judiciary which due to its weak institutional position preferred working in the 
preceding years.
41
  
 
However, this time around CJ Munir and his institution was faced with a really tough 
challenge. In this respect, it only had two choices; either to uphold the lower court‟s verdict 
or invalidate it.  It rationally decided to pick the second choice by denying jurisdiction to the 
Sindh Court to issue the writs in this case. The decision also invalidated a large number of 
laws passed by the assembly in the past five years. Therefore, the Governor-General chose to 
give his assent to these acts with retrospective effect under the Emergency Powers Ordinance 
No. 9. Importantly, however, this Emergency Ordinance‟s validity had been already declared 
ultra vires in a parallel case- Usif Patel vs. the Crown. Hence, on 10 May 1955, the G-G 
                                               
41
 The Federal Court, headed by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, only had „Munir Report‟- a judicial 
commission was formed under FC‟s Chief Justice Munir to report on the anti-Ahmediyya disturbances- to her 
credit (see Chaudhri 1973:181-215). 
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rushed to summon a Constituent Convention. As a result of it, he assumed the necessary 
powers „to make laws or invalidate present or past laws, pending an answer to his special 
reference to the Federal Court‟. The agent court, while marking its rationality, acknowledged 
the necessity of dissolution of assembly and Governor-General‟s need to validate the laws in 
retrospect (Waseem 1994:128).                                                                                                              
 
As the above informs the Federal Court necessitated the bureaucracy‟ principalship on a 
unique basis. Was the court correct in its judgement? Was it a protector of the state? What did 
make the FC to judge so?  
 
 
In light of the foregoing, it is argued that the agent judiciary having based its decision on the 
contentious and controversial „doctrine of necessity‟ acted rationally to maximize its political 
and economic interests. The Chief Justice would have rationally anticipated the wrath of the 
principal had the verdict been given differently. Indeed, the doctrine was the brainchild of the 
CJ himself who misread theoretically-empirically Hans Kelsen thesis on Law. In this, Munir 
failed to distinguish between legality and legitimacy for, Kelsen had focused on efficacy as a 
condition of validity, and not a reason for it. Thus, the CJ‟s „revolutionary legality‟ was quite 
novel which legitimized the Governor-General‟s arbitrary act (Newberg 1995:74). Also the 
arguments put forth by some political analysts- as is explained in Chapter 2- to implicitly 
legitimize the necessity-doctrine by pointing out the non-representative character of the 
Constituent Assembly are factually weak and thus untenable.  How could the G-G dissolve 
the assembly on the basis of slow-legislation and non-representativeness?  Suppose this was 
the case, why did not then the G-G (re) act in 1952 or 1953 to dissolve not only the assembly 
but also hold fresh general elections? After all, the opposition politicians especially from East 
Bengal were demanding it vociferously.  
Box 3.3 The Doctrine of Necessity? 
 
The doctrine of necessity was a novel device in the legal realm of the country. It 
was in fact unprecedented. [Chief] Justice Munir based it wrongly on the Kelsen 
work[s] on law which had no relevance whatsoever in this case…Actually the court 
did not want to confront the Governor-General…He [the latter] had [ a] support of 
the Army [military]. 
 
Interview with Anwar Kamal, President, Lahore High Court Bar Association and Advocate 
Supreme Court of Pakistan. Lahore: 17 March 2008. 
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Nonetheless, in the post-verdict period, PM Bogra preferred working. After all, it was the 
assembly, which he had little political base, and the opposition politicians who paid the price. 
Bogra‟s rational decision was welcomed by the civil bureaucrats who now sat in the cabinet 
under the banner of Muslim League. Importantly, General Ayub Khan, the C-in-C, had also 
accepted the defence portfolio in order to maximize his institution‟s politico-economic 
interests i.e. to assert military‟s input about foreign/defence policy and finances effectively. 
Quite contrary to Bogra‟s position, the real challenge for the principal lay in the fresh election 
to the Constituent Assembly by the provincial assemblies. For this purpose, the Governor-
General increased its total seats to eighty.  
 
Moreover, the former used carrot and stick policy to get pro-principal politicians elected- the 
dismissal of Punjab‟s Leaguer Chief Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, is a case in point. The 
politician and their parties also bargained to win over as like-minded members as possible. 
Especially in East Bengal it was mere rationality and agency which prevailed. For instance, 
the United Front, which hitherto posed a united political opposition to the principal and its 
allied section of politician, was politically no longer united. Indeed, Suhrawarday‟s Awami 
League (AL) had been expelled from the coalition in April 1955. Little wonder then, owing 
to their non-commonality of political interests the UF-minus-AL decided to support the 
principal politico-electorally (Jalal 1990:209-210). 
 
Subsequently, the election process got completed in June 1955. The electoral results were 
mixed; none of the parties, the disorganized Muslim League included, was able to form 
government on its own. Therefore, after hectic political give and take between the principal 
and agent politicians, it was the principal-led Muslim League and the United Front which 
agreed to form a coalition government in the centre under the  premiership of Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali, the ex-Secretary General. Iskander Mirza, the former defence secretary, 
chose to become the acting Governor-General. Fazlul Haq, the leader of UF, opted to assume 
Governorship of his province- East Bengal.  
 
Despite the lingering issues of socio-economic under-performance, role of religion in the 
state, constitution etc., the Chaudhri government paid more time and attention to the 
principal‟s old project of centralization of state power in terms of proposed One Unit; the 
proposal aimed at merging of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan, Balochistan State Unions, 
Bahawalpur, Khairpur into One Unit as par with East Bengal. The underlying assumption 
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was to decrease the administrative, electoral and political weight of the majority Bengalis. 
Nevertheless, the principal‟s preference prevailed despite United Front twelve votes going 
against the bill which legally established „West Pakistan‟ on 14 October 1955 (Sayeed 
1980:44). 
 
Moreover, the incumbent civil bureaucracy was also able to draft, present and negotiate a 
constitutional bill in the assembly. Mirza, the G-G, after having secured his nomination as the 
provisional president, signed the bill on 2 March 1956. Thus, on 23 March 1956 Pakistan was 
able to formally have its first constitution made by indirectly elected Constituent Assembly. 
However, the constitution, since it was the brainchild of the bureaucracy, gave authoritarian 
powers to the president who was to be elected indirectly. Moreover, the assemblies and 
cabinets were to stand on his discretion. Thus, instead of being a device to consolidate the 
state, it was a rational mechanism to authoritatively control the shirking elements which had 
been agitating for proper provincial autonomy. Besides, despite naming Pakistan as „Islamic 
Republic‟ the principal tactfully put the Objectives Resolution outside the main body of the 
constitution- it served as a preamble only. In other words, Islam was not officially declared as 
state religion (see Choudhury 1956). 
 
On the foreign/defence policy front, the civil section of the government led by Chaudhri had 
practically no choice but to toe the principal and the agent military‟s line. Therefore, Pakistan 
continued to remain an ally of the US for the politics of alliance was instrumental to accrue 
economic and military benefits from Washington. Nonetheless, the opposition politicians 
especially Awami League and the socio-economically affected masses held the PM 
responsible for all the ills. Even his League-associates chose to defect/shirk in order to gain 
more political benefits. Though Chaudhri tried his best to survive politically, the shirking 
from the ML, which resulted into establishing the Republican Party in collaboration with the 
principal bureaucracy, further reduced his choices. Moreover, the AL-UF political rivalry 
brought Miza into action who imposed presidential rule in the Eastern part of the country. In 
this regards, the provincial food distribution machinery was handed over to the agent army- 
undoubtedly, much to the chagrin of the Awami League (Jalal 1990:261). However, after a 
few months when the presidential rule was lifted, the PM, in his last bid to survive his 
government, replaced UF‟s Sarkar Ministry with AL‟s Ataur Rahman. However, Chaudhri‟s 
preference diverged with that of his principal which had a different game plan. Hence, having 
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calculated the cost of confrontation with the principal, the PM, despite majority in the 
National Assembly (NA), opted to resign on 8 September 1956.  
 
In the post-Chaudhri period, the moderate Awami Leaguer politicians opted to form a 
coalition government with bureaucracy-backed Republicans. The issues which the new 
government faced at the centre were old in nature but quite different in context: poor socio-
economic situation, law and order problems, role of religion, public opposition to pro-West 
foreign/defence policy, the Kashmir issue
42
, undoing of One Unit, nature of electoral system 
(joint or separate) and demand for general elections.  
 
However, being in a coalition, Suhrawarday had little choice to revise country‟s FP/DP. On 
the domestic front, though he did try to solve the issues, the opposition looked more 
demanding. The blow came when, out of his own party, Maulana Bhashani created another 
party, namely, National Awami Party (NAP). Moreover, in the absence of any effective 
economic policy, the socio-economic situation worsened especially in the Eastern Wing, 
where the principal deployed army to check food prices and smuggling of gold etc. In 
addition, on 17 September 1957 the undoing of One Unit by the West Pakistan Assembly, as 
act of shirking by the agent Republicans to maximize their political benefits vis-à-vis the 
principal and its coalition partner, provided the Bengali opposition politicians an opportunity 
to demand the same along with equivalent representation in civil bureaucracy and the 
military. With respect to these demands, the PM contextually had two choices; either to try to 
fulfil the opposition demands- and that would be at the cost of principal‟s opposition- or 
resign since he had already failed to get a vote of confidence. Since the cost of confrontation 
with the principal would have been much higher, the agent PM tendered his resignation on 10 
October 1957.  
 
After Suhrawarday‟s resignation, the Republicans calculated the risk of going against the line 
of the principal. Ultimately, they decided to form a coalition government with the Muslim 
League led by Chundrigar. The tasks his government hurriedly accomplished were the 
reversing of $10 million of ICA aid, dumping the proposal for the establishment of National 
Shipping Corporation and approving the anti-smuggling ordinance- the latter delegated 
enough powers to the army to carry out the project (ibid 1990:263). However, the work he 
                                               
42 On 17 November 1956, the Kashmir Assembly had declared it an integral part of the Indian union. 
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failed to complete, due to poor negotiations with the Republicans, was the modification of 
electoral amendment act in the National Assembly. Subsequently, the PM resigned after 
nearly two months of premiership, for he remained unable to gain confidence-vote in a 
second bid too.  
 
Post-Chundigar politics of the principal revolved around the Republicans led by Noon. The 
latter, on 16 December 1957, was able to form a coalition government with Awami League, 
National Awami Party, Krishak Sramik Party, National Congress and the Scheduled Caste 
Federation. In a mulit-party coalition, Noon had a few options of his own to go by. The 
coalition partners- a majority of which belonged to East Pakistan- as well as the general 
opposition were demanding more provincial autonomy, socio-economic relief, end to army 
operation in the Eastern Wing, religious identity of the state, change in pro-West 
foreign/defence policy, a debate on Kashmir issue and importantly the holding of general 
elections.  
 
However, before the PM could take any measures, that given his limited choices, the political 
music-chair in the provincial politics of East Pakistan led to virtual chaos. Indeed, the Deputy 
Speaker, Shahid Ali, lost his life on the assembly floor on 20
 
September 1958. The situation, 
somehow, did get out of control. The public pressure mounted on the PM. Hence, quite 
rationally, instead of deploying the army, his ministry chose to relax the army anti-smuggling 
operation- though quite to the latter‟s dislike- and banned paramilitary organizations in the 
country. Moreover, in order to sustain his government, he expanded the cabinet to let AL 
maximize its political returns. However, the AL ministers resigned in displeasure over the 
nature of portfolios.  
 
Moreover, to add to Noon‟s misfortunes, the Khan of Kalat, on 6 October 1958, opted to 
obstacle the building of military bases in Balochistan. In the wake of all these developments, 
the principal led by Mirza was all concerned. It lost no time to engage strategically with the 
agent military to deal with the situation. Therefore, army operation was carried out instantly 
to scotch the revolt in Balochistan. However, to Noon‟s surprise, the next operation was 
carried out against none else but his government. On 7 October, 1958, the principle had 
declared martial law in Pakistan- this shall be the subject matter of the next chapter. 
Resultantly, the assemblies and cabinets stood dissolved; the 1956 constitution abrogated; the 
political activity banned (see Wilcox 1958). 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Since the existing structuralist and legitimist accounts had over-emphasized the structural 
transformation of the colonial state‟s institution into that of independent Pakistan, it was 
deemed necessary to critically analyze the impact, if any, of structure on the construction of 
the state. In this regard, the study, with the help of its deductive model, categorized actors 
into four groups, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military. 
Furthermore, with the support of empirical data, politicians were assumed to have been the 
principal actor at Partition- till October 1951- constitutionally, legally, electorally and 
morally. The other three actors were delegated powers, as is the practice of modern states, in 
the capacity of agents. Also, these four actors were assumed capable of getting things done 
(agency A) and rationalizing their preferences in terms of their own rather than the larger 
interests (agency B).  
 
Quite contrary to the structuralists thesis of an „overdeveloped state‟ (Alavi 1988), it was 
posited that the political leadership of Pakistan, instead of compelled by the structural 
constraints, had certain interests and strategies as regards the construction of the state in 
terms of institutions such civil bureaucracy and the military. Hence, though the former 
rationally retained the nomenclature of the so called pre-colonial civil-military bureaucracy, 
the latter was thoroughly overhauled in terms of a reorganization of personnel, ranks etc. 
Importantly, where needed new offices/departments were established by the principal. Thus, 
it was maintained that the overdeveloped state was, from a Marxist perspective, equated with 
the civil-military bureaucracy despite the fact that the latter remained an agent of the British. 
Undoubtedly, Pakistani politicians, though in a different context and for different purposes, 
also treated the civil bureaucracy and the military not so differently- the latter remained an 
agent.  
 
In addition, the chapter exposed crucial weakness in the legitimacy thesis, which believes that 
the military intervened in politics due to external (i.e. the Indian) threat perception, on logical 
and empirical grounds. In this respect, it was maintained that the legitimists fail to explain 
which institution(s) perceived the threat, for without a perceiver a threat cannot be 
constructed and hence military intervention cannot be justified. This study attempted its own 
analysis of the crucial early years of Pakistan‟s history and, with the help of the model, 
explained that it was the principal politicians who perceived the external threat and then 
rationally constructed strategies to deal with the situation. In this regard, the first India-
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Pakistan war (1947-48) in and over Kashmir is cited as a case in point whereby the principal, 
having judged the matter, ordered the agent military to engage India militarily. The latter, 
instead, preferred to shirk twice, revealing its agency and rationality.  
 
Paradoxically, however, the principal abstained from punishing the agent meaningfully for 
example by devising an oversight regime/mechanism. However, in the post-war period, the 
principal did appoint, from its perspective, an apolitical Commander-in-Chief in order to 
prevent future shirking. Besides, having realized the consequences of agitational politics of 
the authoritarian clergy, the principal politicians chose to appease not only the clergy but also 
the general masses. In this regard, the Objectives Resolution (1949) was passed in the 
constituent assembly. However, contrary to the existing literature on the impact of the 
Resolution on Pakistan‟s state, it was posited here that the aims of this Objectives Resolution 
were political rather than purely religious, instrumental as it was for the political leadership in 
resolving future difference with the religious authorities.   
 
Moreover, the chapter, with the help of its casual model, explained the change that took place 
in the principal in October 1951. It was posited, in this regard, that in the post-Liaqaut period 
the agent civil bureaucracy‟s preference for shirking prevailed in terms of assuming the office 
of the Governor-General arbitrarily- against the spirit of the constitution. The explanation 
emphasized the importance of the bureaucracy‟s inherent agency to affect this change to 
maximize its political and economic benefits. Also, the working agency and rationality  of 
politicians- both Muslim Leaguers and the general opposition- were pointed out, for they 
accorded more preference to their own rather than larger, party and/or national, interests. In 
the changed political context of Pakistan‟s state, the judiciary and military worked as agents. 
 
In its last part the chapter emphasized the strategic interaction between the principal, 
politicians and the military whereby each actor engaged the other for rational reasons. For 
example, in 1954 a section of politicians opted to repeal those sections of the constitution 
which empowered the Governor-General to dismiss governments at his discretion. However, 
before this smart politico-legal move could take root, the agent judiciary chose to undo it, for 
the cost of confronting the principal would have been greater. Hence, the judiciary looked to 
benefits i.e. non-transfer, pay and pension, prolongation of tenure etc. Moreover, the military 
chose to work with the principal bureaucracy in order to accrue politico-economic benefits, 
especially military aid and hardware from the US. The former, on its part, strategically 
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interacted with the latter to not only appease it but importantly use it in extreme situations i.e. 
the maintenance of law and order. 
 
Overall, the chapter maintained that politicians, due to their preference for own interests, 
failed to devise any oversight regime/mechanism and/or to put up a politically united 
resistance to the principal bureaucracy. Thus, the latter, in October 1958, due to a 
commonality of interests and convergence of priorities with the agent military, opted to 
dismiss PM Noon‟s ministry. Importantly, the country was put under martial law. The 
October coup d‟état, the consequent martial law, its constitutional, legal and moral basis, its 
reasons and consequences for the state are the subject matter of the  next chapter.  
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Chapter 4  
Military Agency: CMR under Generals Ayub and Yahya  
This chapter seeks to explain the 1958 and 1969 coups in particular and the civil-military 
relations during this period in general. In order to achieve this objective, the chapter relies on 
the method of an analytic narrative as has been explained under the methodology section. 
Each of the analytic narratives is a combination of agency A (working/shirking) and agency 
B (own/larger interests). The respective narrative begins, in principle, from the time a coup 
occurs. However, the preceding periods are also taken into account given that the 
coup/martial law proclamation refers to the past in terms of a deteriorating law and order and 
economic situation of the country.  
 
The point of departure and reference, as a result, is the respective coup-text which the 
military cites to justify its intervention in politics. In order to understand and explain the cited 
reasons/factors/causes for a coup, a system of coding- based on the work of Robert Axelrod- 
is applied to identify conceptual variables in the text and subsequently to highlight their 
correspondence with the coup. The primary aim of this part of the narrative-oriented- but 
model inspired- analysis shall be to answer the core question, core puzzle and the hypotheses 
of the study. 
  
Having conducted an analysis to explain the above-mentioned correspondence between 
conceptual variables, the study reverts to its model to apply its explanatory variables, namely, 
working/shirking and own/larger interests (agencies A and B) formally in order to explain the 
occurrence of a coup, seek answers to the core question, supporting questions and the core 
puzzle and test the hypotheses. A secondary aim of this chapter shall be to explain the role of 
religion in Pakistan‟s politics and the state. In this respect, the study uses primary sources to 
make the point. 
 
The chapter ends with a conclusion which maintains that a coup was an outcome of military 
agency- to get things done. In simple terms a coup is rational rather than structural as the 
strcturalist and path-depend accounts make it out to be. Moreover, a putsch is always political 
in nature for the primary aim of staging a coup is to capture political power which then is 
used as an instrument for political and economic purposes. In addition, the conclusion also 
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points out that the rational judiciary and politicians looked to their own rather than larger 
interests. 
 
4.1 Actors and Agency: Explaining the First Coup  
President Iskander Mirza, as is mentioned in the previous chapter, declared martial law in 
Pakistan on 7 October 1958. Before one attempts to solve the president‟s puzzle- the 
declaration and imposition of martial law in the capacity of president and the subsequent 
appointment of General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) - , it seems 
imperative to present here the factors/reasons on the basis of which Mirza took this action. 
 
 
 
As the above shows President Mirza‟s proclamation refers to certain factors/reasons/causes of 
the coup. In order to assess the causal assertions inherent in the above text and analyze 
                                               
43 General Ayub Khan also issued a „Proclamation of Martial Law‟ the same day. In his proclamation the 
general stressed in unequivocal terms the „Martial Law Regulations and Orders‟. Besides, according to the 
author of the preset study, the excerpts do not exclude any reasons/factors deemed responsible for the coup and 
subsequent martial law.  
Box 4.1 Excerpts from  President Mirza’s Proclamation, 7 October 195843 
 
For the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the 
ruthless struggle for power, [and] corruption [by politicians]…Despite my 
repeated endeavors, no serious attempt has been made to tackle the food 
crisis…In East Pakistan…there is a well organized smuggling of food, medicines 
and other necessities of life…You do not raise the prestige of your country by 
beating the Speaker, [and] killing the Deputy Speaker…I am unable any longer 
to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal 
situation…[they] will be neither free nor fair…we have undertaken to safeguard 
the security of Pakistan…The Constitution…is unworkable…it is my intention 
to…devise a Constitution…[which] will be submitted to the referendum of the 
people…I have, therefore, decided that 
a) The Constitution of the 23
rd
 March, 1956, will be abrogated. 
b) The Central and Provincial Governments will be dismissed with 
immediate effect. 
c) The National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies will be dissolved. 
d) All political parties will be abolished. 
e) Until alternative arrangements are made, Pakistan will come under 
Martial Law. I hereby appoint General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, 
Pakistan Army, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and place all the 
Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command. [italics mine] 
  
                                                                                                              (Khan 1967:Appendix II) 
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critically the coup-narrative, a simply system of „coding‟, as postulated in Axelrod‟s 
Structure of Decision (1976:291-332), is applied. In this regard, the first step is to identify 
conceptual variables that the author- President Mirza- emphasizes
44
. In this case these are the 
following: 
A = the ruthless struggle for power; beating the speaker; killing the deputy speaker; 
the present chaotic internal situation (law and order variable)
45
 
B = corruption [by the politicians]; food crisis; smuggling of food, medicines and 
other necessities of life (economic variable) 
C = devise a constitution; referendum (democratization variable) 
D = to safeguard the security of Pakistan (securitization variable) 
E= Pakistan will come under Martial Law (policy variable) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the primary objective of the present study is to explain military‟s 
intervention in Pakistan‟s politics- for this purpose, it assumes coup d‟état as its dependent 
variable. Since the above-mentioned conceptual variables do not, empirically, match with the 
independent variables of the study, namely, working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger 
interests (agency B), it thus becomes imperative to, in light of the above , describe the direct 
correspondence between the coup and these variables . This is done as follows: 
1. The problems of law and order require military intervention for its solution. Thus, the 
coup is staged; and the martial law is imposed subsequently (positive relationship):  
A        +            E 
2. The deteriorating economic situation can only be improved by bringing the country 
under a military rule. Hence, the coup is staged (positive relationship): B      +           E 
3. Since the elections will be neither fair nor free, the country shall be given a 
constitution by the military government. It would be put before the people for their 
approval in a (free and fair) referendum. Thus, Pakistan can be democratized under 
the supervision of a martial law authority (positive relationship): C        +           E 
 
                                               
44 On 8 October 1958- a day after the coup- General Ayub Khan, too, addressed the nation. Surprisingly, the 
general also referred to the same reasons/factors/causes. 
45 The conceptual/theoretical basis for the application of law and order and other variables- economic, 
democratization and securitization- shall come in subsequent analysis. 
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4. Since the corruption and incompetent politicians have brought the country to the brink 
of disaster, Pakistan‟s security can only be ensured by the military (positive 
relationship):  D        +          E 
 
The following observations can be drawn in light of the above: 
 The October coup-action and the subsequent martial law is justified by President 
Mirza (and General Ayub for that matter) on accounts of  problems of law and order 
and economy, democratization and securitization; 
 Law and order and economic problems are cited as primary reasons/causes due to 
their extremely  negative impact both on the people and the state;  
 Democratization and securitization are cited, undoubtedly, as reasons/causes of the 
coup. However, they seem complementary in nature;  
 The coup/martial law is presented as a panacea to the stated ills Pakistan suffered 
from; 
 The military aims to perform the stated tasks. 
 
Having described the stated reasons/causes of the coup, their (textual) correspondence with 
the dependent variable and importantly drawn observations about this action, it seems 
appropriate here to explain the president‟s puzzle before one conducts an analytical narrative 
of the coup. To begin with, issuance of coup/martial law proclamation and 
declaration/imposition of martial law by President Mirza marks the convergence of 
preferences between Mirza-led bureaucracy and Ayub-led military. Moreover, Mirza 
established a martial law administration headed by him in the capacity of its president; the 
administration was, over all, a mixture of military men and bureaucrats. 
 
Surprisingly however, on 26 October 1958, Mirza appointed General Ayub Khan as Prime 
Minister of Pakistan- the latter took oath the next day along with his cabinet which comprised 
politicians too. Quite dramatically however, in the evening of 27 October, Prime Minster 
Ayub Khan opted to pack the president off along with the Office of Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, his cabinet refreshed its oath with a slight change of transforming itself into the 
cabinet of President Ayub Khan. 
 
However, the question that arises in light of the above is that why Mirza chose to take such a 
measure which ultimately caused his downfall along with the civil bureaucracy- the principal. 
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As is already critically explained under the literature review, President Mirza, being head of 
the civil bureaucracy, preferred a total collapse of the existing political system due to his 
electoral-political calculation, for  there was a strong likelihood of his being ousted at the 
hand of agent politicians especially from East Pakistan. Logically then, being already in a 
cordial strategic engagement with the agent military, Mirza would have taken the military 
high command into confidence to declare martial law in his name. On its part, the military, 
being a rational actor, would not have any problem with this kind of arrangement as, at the 
end of the day, the entire coup-burden falls on the president‟s shoulders. Thus, one sees a 
unique staging of a coup and subsequent martial law imposition by a bureaucrat-turned 
politician. 
 
Moreover, from 7 to 27 October, Mirza delegated almost all powers of administration to 
Ayub-led Advisory Council. Also, important members of the civil bureaucracy had started 
working under the military command. Plausibly, these facts would have boasted latter‟s 
confidence to stand the test of the day- at least administratively. To cap it, Mirza‟s decision to 
appoint a General-C-in-C-CMLA as prime minister would have further added insult to injury.  
 
Therefore, having calculated Mirza and his institution‟s political strength and weaknesses 
along with that of politicians General Ayub Khan formally opted to take over the reins of 
Pakistan as leader of a new principal actor- the military. However, the removal of Mirza 
added to Ayub‟s concerns when it came to legitimacy and legality, if not morality, of the 
coup since it was neither sanctioned by the abrogated constitution nor the people of Pakistan. 
Hence, the matter was put before the agent judiciary still headed by Justice Munir. A quote 
from an interview, given on the following page, brings into light the pertinent questions 
related to the legality, if not political legitimacy and morality, of the coup and consequent 
martial law. In addition, an analysis of this puzzle shall be made with the help of this primacy 
source. 
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Box 4.2 A Critique of the Doctrine of Necessity 
 
The martial law- or [technically] the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order- was 
challenged in the Supreme Court. It was headed by Justice Munir...The question 
before the Supreme Court was if the Lahore High Court‟s writ had abated under the 
Order [Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, Clause (7), Article 1]…In his judgment 
Justice Munir  maintained that a successful  revolution or coup  is a  internationally 
recognized legal  method to change a constitution…Therefore, the martial law had 
created a new law-creating organ…I think Justice Munir made an arbitrary 
judgment…he relied  on Kelsen [indeed his General Theory of Law and State]  to 
make a case…He, in fact, decided  hurriedly to legitimize the martial law… I think 
there was no need on the part of the Supreme Court  to decide its cases while 
entering into  question  of the validity of the  Laws (Continuance in Force) 
Order…Even before the imposition of martial law, there were appeals pending before 
the [Supreme] Court…these appeals were heard a few days after the martial law…it 
shows that the Court dragged the validity of the Order into a controversy…It did not 
wait until someone could directly  challenge the very  validity of the martial law  
[Laws (Continuance in Force) Order]. 
 
Interview with Hamid Khan, Former President Supreme Court Bar Association, Member 
Pakistan Bar Council, Senior President  Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf [PTI]. Lahore: 20 March 
2008. 
  
 
What the above informs is that the judiciary dealt with the politico-legal situation rationally. 
She was well aware of her weak institutional position vis-à-vis the new principal which had, 
unlike the former one, coercive power(s) at its disposal (Rotermund 1997:7-16). Therefore, 
instead of challenging the martial law regime in the national interest, the judiciary preferred 
to validate it in order to maximize her politico-economic interests i.e. stay in office with 
regime‟s blessings, remuneration etc. Had Justice Munir-led Supreme Court not 
controversially  validated  undemocratic, illegal , unconstitutional and immoral coup action a 
legal precedent would have been set which, at least, might have been  referred to in the future 
legal cases. In this respect, the maximum cost the Justice and his team would have to pay was 
to lose the pay and pensions. But as is maintained previously in the study, the actors in 
Pakistan‟s civil-military relations had developed a penchant for their own politic-economic 
than lager interest. 
 
Nonetheless as the above shows the military was successful at obtaining the judicial 
legitimacy. However, according to present study‟s theoretical position, it never implies that 
the reasons/causes cited for the October coup also got legitimized by the verdict of an agent 
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judiciary. Therefore, it becomes imperative to conduct a theory/model-guided analytic 
narrative of this coup.  
 
4.2 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup 
 As the preceding section shows, having assumed the principal position the military put its 
coup-case before the agent judiciary which provided the former with judicial legitimacy 
ultimately. However, in order to understand and explain the cited reasons/causes of the coup, 
and for that matter the core question, puzzle and hypothesis respectively, one is urged to 
conduct a critical analysis of  this puzzling phenomenon since the legitimacy granted by an 
agent actor cannot be taken for granted academically. In order to achieve this objective, the 
first step is this direction is to explore, in light of our deductive model, whether positive 
correspondence exists between the four conceptual variables, drawn from the coup-text 
earlier in this chapter, and the coup d‟état- dependent variable of the study. In addition, the 
secondary aim of this exercise shall be to determine the status of the study‟s hypotheses. 
Hence, the following four sections would deal with each variable respectively. This would be 
followed by a summary of the results. 
 
4.2.1 Law and Order Variable 
Law and order is generally considered a state‟s primary responsibility. Its maintenance is 
often equated with good governance. However, governance itself is a fluid, encompassing 
and contested concept (Huntington 1968; Pierre and Peters 2000:1; Adsera et al 2000:5; 
Campbell et al 1991; Hollingsworth et al 1994; Williamson 1996; Rhodes 1997; Pierre 1998: 
Kohli 1990). Nevertheless, while disagreeing in principle with the existing approaches to 
governance, Mitra (2006) has theoretically and empirically attempted to define, measure and 
explain governance from a rational choice-neo institutionalist perspective. He argues 
As a conceptual variable, governance has the paradoxical attribute of being visible by 
its absence rather than its presence…It is therefore important, particularly for the 
purposes of prediction, to develop conceptual and operational measures of governance 
from the point of view of social forces whose perceptions necessarily differs from that 
of the state. Seen through the eyes of the modern state, political order and challenges 
to legitimacy can be measured in terms of murders, riots and other forms of challenge 
to the authority of the state. 
                                                                                                                            (Mitra 2006:20) 
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Moreover, in providing the quantitative, among others, basis for his subsequent theory of 
governance, Mitra (2006:39-47) maintains that governance is low when there is large 
numbers of murders and riots per million population. What the foregoing informs is that 
almost all major indicators related to the break down or otherwise of a governmental 
apparatus are comprehensively covered by it. Therefore, in order to explain whether the 
coup(s) were caused by disorderly rule, the present study relies on Mitra‟s. However, since 
the nature of the question at hand is quite different from that of Mitra- it is not about 
measuring governance (cross-regionally)-, the study, therefore, sticks to the quantitative part 
of the former, namely, the higher the number of murders and riots per million population, the 
lower the governance. In this respect, however, the study tends to undertake a statistical 
analysis of murders and riots, the latter where applicable
46
, in order to analyze the law and 
order situation at a specific point of time i.e. occurrence of a coup. 
 
In addition, it is posited that the term „law and order‟ is retained for two reasons: first, it is 
used by coup-makers implicitly and explicitly; secondly, it is maintained for the sake of 
clarity and simplicity. In other words, there should be no conceptual and definitional 
difference between governance and law and order variable. Moreover, as regards the data for 
analytic narratives of the five coups, the study relies on the official source (MoF) in order to 
maintain objective standards; the official data is representative of the entire country for it is 
based on the reported crimes committed in the administrative boundary of a police station 
(thana), located at the bottom of the district administration.  
 
As regards the data on Pakistan‟s population, the study has relied on the same official source 
due to reasons: a) the population data on pre-1971 Pakistan is wrongly presented by both 
Population Census Organization- a department of Statistics Division (GoP)- and Population 
Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. 
Erroneously, the former assumes (West) Pakistan as Pakistan and the latter believes (East) 
Pakistan as Pakistan. Interestingly, the Yearbooks from 1971 onwards present (West) 
Pakistan‟s population data as Pakistan‟s for the pre-1971 years47; b) since the data on murders 
and riots is taken from the yearbook(s), it seems more logical to take population data from the 
                                               
46  The riots category, as shall be shown in this research, disappears from the official data sources after a few 
years of General Zia-led military takeover.  
47 To see the details of the misleading and erroneous data as presented by Population Census Organization   
(Pakistan) and  the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs ( the United Nations) 
visit the following: http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop_by_province/pop_by_province.html and 
http://esa.un.org/unpp respectively.  In the latter‟ case, the country name has to be selected manually.  
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same sources as it is inclusive of increase in population contextually. Having explained the 
theoretical underpinnings of the present variable, it now seem appropriate to explain whether 
the law and order situation had worsened in 1958 to such an extent that it  became inevitable 
to stage the coup to prevent  the state from collapsing.  
 
To begin with, as is obvious from Iskander Mirza‟s proclamation, one of the reasons/causes 
of the October coup was the deteriorating situation of law and order in the entire country 
especially East Pakistan. However, Mirza- and Ayub Khan for that matter- remained unable 
to define the parameters of law and order. Nor did they give any number of committed 
murders and riots in their respective addresses to the nation. Nonetheless, as per the study‟s 
governance framework, it is posited that murder and riots, see Table 7 below, are taking place 
since 1948 in Pakistan. In other words, the presence of murderers and riots is not a 1957 or 
1958 phenomenon at all.  
 
Table 7 Murder & Riots per Million Population 
 
                  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1959, 1968 
  
 
         Year Murders per 
million pop. 
Riots per 
million pop. 
Pop. (million) 
1948 60 69 71.500 
1949 49 66 73.500 
1950 44 78 75.000 
1951 37 58 76.808 
1952 42 60 78.428 
1953 44 63 80.082 
1954 42 67 81.772 
1955 40 58 83.498 
1956 39 65 85.261 
1957 42 74 87.061 
1958 40 66 88.900 
1959 35 59 90.777 
1960 39 61 92.696 
1961 43 69 93.831 
1962 42 56 96.639 
1963 42 61 98.674 
1964 39 68 100.753 
1965 42 64 102.876 
1966 44 68 105.044 
1967 43 70 107.258 
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Moreover, as per the model it was the civil bureaucracy who was in charge of the country in 
terms of principal since October 1951. Therefore, the reported crimes of murders and riots 
from October 1951 to October 1958 were logically and empirically committed under the very 
principalship of the civil bureaucracy. If there were any problems of law and order, it was the 
legal-administrative, if not moral, responsibility of the principal, whose leader was Mirza 
himself since 1955, to either prevent its occurrence or accept its responsibility. Neither of the 
two, however, happened as coup was the preferred choice of action. Regardless, if one looks 
at the trend of murders and riots- see Figure 1 below- committed from 1948 to 1958, it 
indicates relative decrease in both the categories.  
 
 Figure 1 Trend: Murder and Riots per Million Population 
 
 
The Figure shows the principal‟s stress on problems of law and order as justification of the 
coup and consequent martial law is empirically/statistically unfounded. Nevertheless, before 
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Mirza could consolidate his institution‟s principalship over Pakistan, he was disgracefully 
sacked by agent military‟s leader, General Ayub Khan, within less than a month‟s time. 
Interestingly however, having assumed power Ayub Khan, in his first address to the nation, 
also tried to justify the takeover and military‟s direct intervention in politics on the basis of 
problems of law and order. Moreover, having assumed the reins of power, he vowed before 
the nation to maintain law and order which was deemed essential for the country‟s 
development especially economic. However, if one put his-led military rule under statistical 
scrutiny, as the Figure has done below, one notices that there was a rapid increase in both 
cases of murders and riots as the overall trend in both cases is going upward steadily. 
 
Thus, in light of the study‟s statistical analysis, what, therefore, can be posited is that despite 
the oft-made claims by the principal  military the problems of law and order remained not 
only there but also got deteriorated significantly. Moreover, the military despite its claims of 
modern weaponry and well-trained manpower remained unable to prevent the incidences of 
murders and riots. The presence of latter, according to this research, points to military 
domination of the political system as well as the political process. In addition, the general 
public, as a last resort, resorted to agitational politics to politically pressurize the regime. As a 
result, General-President Ayub Khan opted to give in, though rationally, in March 1969.  
 
4.2.2 Economic Variable 
Economic variables are simply a broader family of variables through which one measures 
economic trends or an economic phenomenon like economic (under-)development, (un) 
employment, markets for goods etc. However, these concepts are contested regarding their 
definition and/or measurement (see for example, Mankiw 2004:4-15, 64; Begg et al 2008:14-
15, 377-394; Krugman and Wells 2009:2-6, 569-587). Especially, there are different 
historical debates/theories on defining development (see Huntington 1968). The bottom line, 
however, is that economic development is more than economic growth. Since the economic 
growth in developing countries is not equally shared, due to income/assets inequality and lack 
of equal opportunities, by majority of the people, other indicators of human well-being like 
education, health, freedom, water and sanitation are needed to be examined. The Human 
Development Index (HDI), which is developed by the development economists, incorporates 
three important dimensions of human well-being such as: a) life expectancy at birth, general 
health; b) literacy rate; c) GDP per capita- total income divided by total population (Haq 
1995). 
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Finally, the evaluation of economic development includes economic growth as one of other 
determinants of development. However, high economic growth does not mean better 
economic development.  Therefore, under the present variable the task would be twofold: 
one, to explain on the basis of empirical data whether in the pre-coup period the economic 
situation in terms of key (macro) economic indicators along with social sector development 
i.e. poverty incidence etc., was deteriorating; and two, to explain whether the economic 
problems, the military had cited at the time of the coup were resolved under the military rule. 
Finally, to avoid any sort of confusion related to the use of concepts such as economic 
development and/or economic growth, the study has, for the sake of clarity, accorded 
preference to merely macro/social economic indicators and hence has applied the term 
economic variable for reasons of neutrality and clarity. 
 
Having outlined the conceptual basis for this variable it is deemed necessary to trace and 
explain the positive correspondence between worsening economic situation and consequent 
staging of the coup, for the economic factor was also cited as a justification. However, the 
author(s) did not define and conceptualize it properly. Hence, the subject demands a 
methodologically sound and theoretically enriched analysis. Therefore, one is urged to ask 
the following questions: first, whether the economic situation was worsening under the 
Mirza-led civil bureaucracy during 1952-58
48
; second, whether the economic problems were 
solved by the new principal- the military.  
 
To begin with, having assumed the principalship the civil bureaucracy in strategic interaction 
with agent military and working politicians prioritized import-substitution. Resultantly, 
laboriously earned capital was invested on the importation of machinery for the capital-
intensive industrialization since the country lacked the capital goods sector. Moreover, the 
agriculture sector- which was major contributor to GDP since 1947- was neglected in terms 
of resource allocation. Importantly, the securitization drive factored into the set of available 
choices. No wonder then, in order to appease the military and the opposition, defense 
expenditure was allowed to squeeze the allocations for the social sector- see Table 8 on the 
following page. 
 
                                               
48  The study counts the period 1952-58 roughly since economic data, for this period, is not available on monthly 
or quarterly basis. In this regard, however, care is taken to maintain numerical balance by keeping the entire 
1958- coup occurred on 7 October 1958- under the civil bureaucracy as 1951 is excluded from  the latter‟s 
principalship- which it assumed on 26 October 1951.  
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Table 8 Defense Expenditure: 1949-1958 
Year Defense Expenditure 
(Rs. million) 
Percentage of the total 
Government Expenditure 
 1947-48* 236.0 65.16 
1948-49 461.5 71.32 
1949-50 625.4 73.06 
1950-51 649.9 51.32 
1951-52 792.4 54.96 
1952-53 725.7 56.68 
1953-54 633.2 58.7 
1954-55 640.5 57.5 
1955-56 917.7 64.0 
1956-57 800.9 60.1 
1957-58 854.2 56.1 
    1958-59** 996.6 50.9 
       * 15th August 1947 to 31 March 1948  
       ** 1 April 1958 to 30 June 1959 
        Source: Rizvi.2000. 
               
As the Table shows, the civil bureaucracy opted to privilege the agent military due to rational 
reasons: namely, the latter was seen instrumental for law and order purposes; the military was 
appeased so as to make it work; and to give a political signal to other agents especially 
politicians that there is a collaborative interaction between the principal and the military. This 
also points out that both the principal and the agent(s) gave preference to their own than 
larger interest. 
 
In addition, as a result of state‟s interventionist approach in terms of import-substitution, poor 
resource allocations to agriculture and social sectors etc., a certain resourceful section- for  
example, the migrant traders, large land-owners- of the population was able to extensively 
benefit by the economic policies.
49
 Moreover, since the civil bureaucracy was the principal, 
its members especially at the top echelon also maximize economically. The sufferers, 
however, were the illiterate, non-sanitized and malnourished who lived both in the urban and 
rural sectors of both wings of the country. Importantly, the inter-wing socio-economic, if not 
politico-administrative, disparity further increased- see Table 9 on the following page. 
 
 
                                               
49
  In order to see the extent of business-minded persons‟ collaboration with a military regime in Pakistan, see 
Hasan, Naveed. 1997. Managing Practices and Business Development in Pakistan, 1947-1988. Vermont: 
Ashgate Publishing Company. 
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Table 9 Index of Disparity in per Capita Income 
(West minus East, divided by West) 
Year Index of Disparity 
1949-50 17.9 
1954-55 19.5 
1959-60 24.5 
1964-65 31.1 
1969-70 37.9 
              Source: Ahmed, Viqar and Rashid Amajd. 1984. The Management of 
                              Pakistan‟s Economy: 1947-1982. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
What the Table informs is that the index of disparity remained low during the politicians‟ 
period- 1949-50. But, it witnessed a gradual increase during the principalship of the civil 
bureaucracy. Importantly, the Table marks the principal actor‟s rationality in terms of 
allocating more resources to the Western part at the expense of East Pakistan, for lesser 
resource-allocation to the Bengalis gave the principal politico-economic leverage vis-a-vis 
the former. However, this economic disparity, from the very beginning, entailed negative 
consequences for the state of Pakistan which shall be explained later in the chapter.  
 
Nonetheless, Pakistan‟s aggregate economic performance remained sluggish during this 
period as Table 10 shows on the next page. This sluggish performance of the economy was, 
as mentioned above, caused none else but the principal civil bureaucracy itself due to its 
performance for certain economic measures which, indubitably, brought economic returns to 
not only the principal but also the working agents who rationally allied with its policies- the 
making and functioning of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) is a case in 
point (Hasan 1997:73-82). 
 
Thus, in light of these quantitative evidences, it is posited that despite the overall sluggish 
economic performance the occurrence of coup cannot be ascribed to this variable since the 
coup and the subsequent martial law was carried out by the bureaucracy itself, though in 
strategic understanding with the military. Moreover, instead of conspiring coup with the 
agent military, Mirza, if not his institution, should have the moral courage to, on the one 
hand, accept the responsibility for the presence of growing inter-regional as well as poor-rich 
disparity and, on the other, leave the corridors of power. Interestingly however, President 
Mirza, as leader of the civil bureaucracy, hanged on to power until he was disgracefully 
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removed from the scene by General Ayub Khan. Also, the military under Ayub forced the 
civil bureaucracy to an agent position. 
 
Table 10 Annual Growth Rate, 1950-58, at 1959/60 Factor Cost (% per annum) 
* The annual growth rate for 1950/1 means the rate for the period 1949/50 to 1950/1. 
 Source: Zaidi, S. Akbar. 2005. Issues in Pakistan‟s Economy, 2nd edn. Karachi: Oxford University Press.  
 
Having assumed direct political power the military became the principal, as explained above, 
since its preference had prevailed. The replacement of civil bureaucracy as principal was an 
arbitrary act of power. However, the military was able to seek judicial legitimacy from the 
agent judiciary. Importantly, in the post-Mirza period, Ayub-led military also vowed, in line 
with General Ayub‟s October 8 address to the nation, to improve country‟s economic 
situation in the capacity of a self-appointed modernizing principal.  
 
In this respect, the regime opted to disband many of the controls which were imposed post- 
Korean War. For example, the 1959 trade policy shifted the policy focus away from direct 
controls towards indirect controls on domestic goods‟ prices and imports. The Export Bonus 
Scheme stirred the process of liberalization viewed essential by the military for opening up 
the market, at least, for specific commodities (Hasan 1998:160-166). Also, the introduction of 
Open General License (OGL) and „Free List‟- importation of certain goods sans any license 
provided an opportunity to new traders to maximize their returns. The primary reason behind 
such a generous trade policy, however, was the extensive inflow of foreign aid whose volume 
increased from 2.5 per cent of GNP in the mid-1950s to 7 per cent of GNP in the mid-1960s. 
 
Year* Agriculture Manufacturing Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
Banking  
and 
insurance 
Public 
administration 
and defense 
Services GDP 
Large 
scale 
Small 
scale 
1950/1 2.6 23.5 2.3 6.1 9.1 2.5 4 3.9 
1951/2 -9.1 18.7 2.4 0.5 10.0 4.0 4 -1.8 
1952/3 0.2 23.6 2.2 0.6 7.6 -4.4 4 1.7 
1953/4 13.6 28.7 2.3 6.3 8.5 -2.4 4 9.4 
1954/5 -0.8 24.1 2.3 5.5 2.6 4.6 4 2.7 
1955/6 2.1 17.5 2.3 2.3 21.5 1.6 4 3.4 
1956/7 2.3 8.1 2.3 3.2 22.9 -2.6 4 3.0 
1957/8 1.9 4.9 2.2 3.4 -1.7 -2.2 4 2.6 
1950-
54(ave.) 
1.8 23.6 2.3 3.4 8.8 -0.1 4 3.3 
1954-
58(ave.) 
1.4 13.6 2.3 3.6 11.3 0.4 4 2.9 
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Overall, the GNP grew annually at around 5.5% through both the second (1960-65) and third 
(1965-70) plans period (Zaidi 2005:98-100). Moreover, the large-scale manufacturing along 
with other sectors register growth especially during the first half of the decade.  However, the 
outbreak of the 1965 war impeded the economic activities especially in the large-scale 
manufacturing sector. The Green Revolution, however, came as a rescue to the regime‟s 
development plans in the post-war period. As a result, the agriculture sector, which was 
neglected in the pre-coup period, was able to achieve considerable growth rate. The overall 
performance of the economy under the military rule can be viewed in the Table below: 
 
Table 11 Annual Growth Rate, 1958-70, at 1959/60 Factor Cost (%per annum) 
Year* Agriculture Manufacturing Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
Banking  
and 
insurance 
Public 
administration 
and defense 
Services GDP 
Large 
scale 
Small 
scale 
1958/9   4.0 5.6 2.3 2.5 12.9 9.8 4.0 5.5 
1959/60           0.3 2.7 2.3 5.9 22.1 -2.7 3.8 0.9 
1960/1 -0.2 20.3 2.9 6.9 10.0 1.3 4.7 4.9 
1961/2             6.2 19.9 2.9 7.8 8.5 3.9 4.0 6.0 
1962/3 5.2 15.7 2.9 9.8 11.5 2.8 4.2 7.2 
1963/4             2.5 15.5 2.9 10.1 8.9 9.7 4.0 6.5 
1964/5             5.2 13.0 2.9 7.9 37.9 17.8 7.0 9.4 
1965/6             0.5 10.8 2.9 8.7 10.9 56.5 1.1 7.6 
1966/7             5.5 6.7 2.9 5.3 12.7 -14.4 4.3 3.1 
1967/8            11.7 7.6 2.9 3.7 11.8 -2.5 4.0 6.8 
1968/9             4.5 10.6 2.9 7.1 8.5 5.0 3.9 6.5 
1969/70           9.5 13.9 3.0 10.9 19.4 3.6 6.8 9.8 
1958-
64(ave.) 
3.0 13.3 2.7 7.2 12.3 4.1 4.1 5.2 
1965-
70(ave.) 
6.2 10.4 2.9 7.2 16.9 11.0 4.5 7.2 
* The annual growth rate for 1958/9 means the rate for the period 1957/8 to 1958/9. 
 Source: Zaidi. 2005. Issues in Pakistan‟s Economy. 
 
Nevertheless, the economic indicators in the table above present half the picture. They ignore 
the distributional aspect of economic growth in agriculture, industry and services vis-à-vis 
East Pakistan and resource-less section of the population generally.      
Indeed, the model of economic development adopted in the sixties consciously 
promoted inequalities as a necessary precondition for successful economic growth. 
The doctrine of functional inequality was based on the premise that the initial stages 
of capitalist development required a high degree of inequality. This was due to the 
necessity of channeling resources to those classes which have a high savings rate. 
These high savings would be converted into investment, which would raise the rate of 
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economic growth. This model implied a diversion of resources towards industrialist in 
an effort to raise their incomes and, consequently, their savings. The model, 
associated with the works of G. Papanek and Mahbub-ul-Haq, was explicit in its 
distributional implications. The second five-year plan [indeed] warned that “it will be 
necessary to tolerate some initial growth in income inequalities to reach high levels of 
savings and investment”. 
                                                                                                                         (Noman 1990:40) 
                                                                                                                                          
As the Table and the quote show, in the absence of any mechanism for redistributive justice, 
the adopted policy framework helped divert resources to industrial capital in West Pakistan. 
Noticeably, this empirical development was viewed by majoritarian and rational Bengalis as 
further encroachment on their economic rights. In addition, the poor-rich disparity also grew 
in Pakistan, by and large. It was made public by economists such as Mahbub-ul-Haq that 
twenty two families owned between them 66% of industry, 97% of insurance and 80% of 
banking. Moreover, 65% of total loans disbursed, between 1958-1970, by the PICIC went to 
37 monopoly houses of which the largest thirteen accounted for about 70 per cent of these 
loans (Noman 1990: 41; Zaidi 2005:102; also Hasan 1997:295-296).  
 
Importantly, Ayub‟s own son, Gohar Ayub, after having resigned from the army got engaged 
in business enterprises under the auspices of his father and parent institution- the military 
(Khan 2007:51). Interestingly however, he was criticized by the opposition politicians for 
gaining special privileges in terms of import licenses etc (Gauhar 1993:492). Besides, the 
resource allocation to the social sector especially education under the military rule was the 
worst in Asia. This neglect of social sector, during this period, contributed an annual 
population growth rate of 2.8% from 2.3%. Moreover, the industrial wage of workers fell 
despite a constant rise in per capita national income- see Table 12 below. 
             
              Table 12 Index of Real Wages of Industrial Workers: 1967-68 
                              (Base Year 1954=100) 
 
               West Pakistan 
                                      All industries                                            88.8 
                                      Cotton textiles                                          76.9 
               East Pakistan 
                                     All industries                                             101.1 
                                     Jute textiles                                                94.6 
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                                     Cotton textiles                                            81.7 
  
 
 
 
The Table shows, on the one hand, the decrease in industrial wages cross-regionally and on 
the one other, it highlights the principal‟s priority in terms of ignoring the larger section of 
Pakistan‟s population. Importantly, the decrease in the wages is an indicator of the poor‟s 
worsening economic condition which, as is explained under law and order (large number of 
riots), made the front of agitataional politics against Ayub-led military rule. 
 
Last but not least, the projected high growth rate during the period under study was 
significantly based on foreign aid as hinted earlier. Little wonder then, in the 1960s in 
contrast to the earlier decade, the composition of external capital flow was overwhelmingly 
96% compared to 62% in the 1950s in the form of grants and only 4% in the form of loan as 
compared to 48% in 1950s. This availability of easy finance led to extravagance even in 
development expenditure and actual costs often overran the estimated costs of projects by 
more than hundred percent. While aid undoubtedly contributed to a high rate of growth in the 
1960s, it also imposed considerable burden on the country in terms of non-repayment as a 
larger proportion of foreign assistance became to be financed by loans rather than grants 
(Hasan 1998:156-166). 
 
Another great disadvantage of the foreign assistance during the 1960s was that a high 
proportion of it was in terms of tied loans and involved the use of local financing for which 
the country lacked fiscal resources. By the end of 1967, Pakistan had contracted an external 
debt of $3.7 billion. Moreover, a basic weakness of Pakistan‟s use of foreign aid during the 
1960s was that much of the aid was spent on mega infrastructure projects, such as the shifting 
of capital to Islamabad and large irrigation projects which largely benefited the affluence in 
the country while little was done to show any compassion for the poor and those who did not 
benefit from the high growth in the 1960s. These feelings of disenchantment were capitalized 
by the military‟s opponents and helped to fuel riots in 1968 (see Papanek 1967:225; Amjad 
1982: 12). 
 
In addition, even the flow of the aid from the United States and the Western countries got 
suddenly stopped in 1965 as a result of war with India. To some extent, this was compensated 
Source: Noman.1990.  
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by aid from China especially for defense and establishment of heavy industries. However, the 
United States expressed its disapproval of Pakistan‟s leaning towards China and the Soviet 
Union, her enemy by then, by not pledging the aid which had been endorsed by the 
Consortium and, importantly, by canceling Ayub Khan‟s visit to Washington. Resultantly, 
Islamabad was left out in the cold during the war against India. Moreover, the myth that 
foreign aid was not politically motivated was exploded by the fiasco of the 1965 Consortium. 
Although in post- war period Washington chose to normalize its ties with Pakistan and agreed 
to support General Ayub Khan, the damage in prestige had been done and both his political 
power and economic strategy began to be questioned widely in the country. The resultant 
price hike (15% in 1966/67 from 10% in 1965-66), sugar crisis in 1967/68 along with 
growing inequality was perceived negatively by the masses especially in the Eastern wing 
(Noman 1990:40; Zaidi 2005:102-103). Indubitably, this became one of the reasons for anti-
military rule riots as is mentioned above. 
 
Therefore, as a result of agitataional politics, General Ayub Khan, the leader of the principal 
military, preferred life over death and resigned in the best interests of his person and 
institution. Thus, in light of the ongoing quantitative explanation it is maintained that the 
military rule was able to project economic growth at the macroeconomic level. However, 
these growth indicators were heavily dependent on foreign aid. Moreover, the military regime 
remained unable to (re)distribute the benefits of even this aid-dependent growth. In other 
words, the rich, including the principal and its allied agents, grew richer and the poor grew 
poorer. Besides, the military regime‟s doctrine of functional inequality further increased inter-
wing disparity which further widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan. Resultantly, 
the resource-less masses given the opportunity allied with the shirking politicians to register 
their anger and dissatisfaction in terms of agitataional politics. Thus, by and large, the 
military remained unable to resolve country‟s economic problems. Hence, in light of the 
empirical evidences, it is maintained that the positive correspondence between the coup and 
economic variable is unfounded. 
 
4.2.3 Democratization Variable 
There is an abundance of literature on the concept of democratization (Diamond 2008:1-38, 
also 1992; Doorenspleet and Mudde 2008; Koelble and Lipuma  2008; O‟Donnell 2007; 
Olson 2007; Fukuyama 2006; Ziblatt 2006; Croissant 2004; Morlino 2004; Xing 2001). 
However, the present research assumes it to be as a process embodying regular, free and fair 
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i.e. non-rigging by politicians and their parties, non-involvement of intelligent agencies to 
possibly factionalize, non-interference by the military with the Election Commission(er), and 
party-based elections i.e. at least major political parties of the day are not banned to 
participate in the electoral exercise by the respective military regime. Under this variable, the 
aim is to explain whether the country democratized in terms of achieving, at least, a 
semblance of electoral democracy under different military rules/regimes or not.  
 
Having stated the conceptual parameters of democratization, the analytic narrative turns to 
the October coup in order to empirically, while remaining within the model‟s framework- 
explain the stated positive correspondence between coup and democratization. To begin with,   
the martial law proclamation, as already mentioned, had banned not only political parties but 
also political activity (Gauhar 1993:51-52). Furthermore, a new law was enforced by the 
military regime called Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959 (EBDO). Under this 
law, the agents- in fact, a section of politicians and civil bureaucrats- had to be subjected to 
enquiry by tribunals either appointed by President Ayub Khan or governors- military 
appointees. The EBDO defined misconduct of a politician with the help of indicators such as 
any subversive activity, propagating any doctrine or committing an act which contributed to 
political instability, nepotism, favoritism, bribery, corruption, willful maladministration, 
diversion of public money and any other abuse of position or power (see Sayeed 1963-1964). 
 
Moreover, the legal reach of EBDO was extensive with respect to „elective bodies‟ as the 
latter included any assembly, board, committee etc. A tribunal for enquiry as mentioned in 
the law had to be composed of three members with the presiding officer being an incumbent 
or retired judge of the Supreme Court, the Federal Court or High Court; also a district and 
session judge, qualified to be appointed a High Court judge, could head a tribunal. This fact 
point to the principal‟s preference to reward those from the judiciary who preferred to work. 
In addition, as a punishment measure meant for those who may prefer to shirk, the EBDO 
could disqualify a person to become a member of any elective body until 31 December 1966. 
Furthermore, to be made to a politician, an officer could voluntarily retire from public life 
until 31 December 1966. As regards the operationalization of the law, many a politician of 
national standing- Ayub Khuhro, Suhrawarday, Qayyum Khan- came under its arbitrary and 
inhuman treatment. The disqualification of a section of politicians, it is posited, marked 
Ayub-led military‟s rationality. It, on the one hand, opted to harass yet non-EBDOed 
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politicians and, on the other hand, having disqualified a good number of them attempted to 
tilt the political leverage in its hands (ibid 1963-1964). 
 
Besides, in line with her political interactive strategy, the military introduced another law, 
Basic Democracies Order, 1959, to democratize Pakistan in a manner „people can understand 
and work‟ (Khan 1967) The system of Basic Democracies (BD) was initially a five-tier 
arrangement. They were: (a) union councils (rural areas), town and union committees (urban 
areas); (b) thana (sub-district) councils (East Pakistan), tehsil (sub-division) councils (West 
Pakistan); (c) district councils; (d) divisional councils; (e) provincial development advisory 
council. Organizationally, at the base of the system was the union council which consisted of 
one chairman and usually about 15 members- both elected (two-thirds) and nominated (one-
third). Practically, the nomination was abolished by an amendment in 1962 (Friedman 1960 
and 1961). 
 
Importantly, under the 1959 Order, of the five councils, only the union and district councils 
had been given specific functions. The divisional and thana council were to perform mostly 
coordinative functions. The union council was supposed to perform a variety of functions 
such as agriculture, small industry, community development and increased food production in 
the union. Also, it was to maintain law and order through the rural police and adjudicate 
minor civil and criminal cases through its conciliation courts. Moreover, they were given the 
responsibility of planning and implementing rural public works programs for construction of 
roads, bridges and culverts, irrigation channels and embankments. The union council was 
empowered to levy taxes, impose rates, tolls and fees also. Nevertheless, the most important 
feature of the basic democracy system was that it formed the national electoral college 
consisting of 80,000 members from East and West Pakistan for the elections of President, 
members of national assembly and of the provincial assemblies.  
 
What the afore-mentioned suggests is that the military chalked this brilliant plan of BD to 
explicitly democratize the country. However, this was not necessarily the case for the BD 
system was planned to possibly achieve certain objectives: a) to politicize the local populace 
with military virtues; b) to rationally interact with the local politicians directly giving them a 
choices either to ally or fear the EBDO; c) to depoliticize the provincial politics; d) to 
financially reward the working section of civil bureaucracy- after all they were to implement 
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if not make policies at the unit level; e) and importantly to politico-electorally  legitimize the 
regime. 
 
Little wonder then, on 14 February 1960, a referendum, where President- C-in-C- and army 
chief was the sole candidate was held. The basic but rational 75,283 democrats- with 95.6% 
turn out- elected Ayub Khan as president for next five years. Also, the elected president, 
through this Electoral College, was mandated to bless Pakistan with a constitution (Khan 
2002:221). However, politicians and their political parties- disqualified or banned- did not 
accept this arbitrary and controlled referendum. They resorted to agitational politics to urge 
Ayub to hold free and fair elections if not to leave for good. Since, the regime after having 
consolidated itself administratively and relatively politically with the support of working 
bureaucrats and democrats chose to use coercive measures to control the shirking section. 
Consequently, massive arrests were carried out; and punishment was accorded. 
 
Nonetheless, to further democratize the democrats- both basic and advanced- the president 
decided to set the rules of the game in terms of a new constitution. For this purpose, under the 
chairmanship of former CJ of Supreme Court, Justice Shahabuddin, a Constitution 
Commission was set up on 17 February 1960. The commission submitted its report on 29 
April 1961; the politicians and political parties generally welcomed its recommendations 
except the adoption of separate electorate. However, Ayub unwelcomed it; he put the report 
before his cabinet to civilize it to the principal‟s standards. Not surprisingly then, the 
constitution, the country was given in 1962, was totally opposite to the Commission‟s report 
as well as politicians‟ expectation. In fact, it formally introduced a presidential form of 
government whereby the president was repository of all powers. Besides, the Objectives 
Resolution still remained in the preamble- much to the chagrin of the clergy. Moreover, 
unicameral legislature was introduced along with a centralized federal system. Importantly, it 
introduced indirect election by the basic democrats for the president, the national and 
provincial assemblies (ibid 2002:249-251, 254-282). 
 
As the above shows, the Ayub-led military rationally determined the rules of the game. The 
underlying objective behind the politics of constitution was to retain the political leverage in 
its own hands. Therefore, all difficulties related to the election of national assembly and 
ministers‟ appointments were solved by the president under the Removal of Difficulties 
(Appointment of Ministers) Order, 1962. Moreover, all actions taken and proceedings carried 
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out by any martial law authority were given full protection under the Martial Law (Pending 
Proceedings and Protection) Order 1962. Importantly, indemnity was provided to all actions 
and proceedings in connection with the administration of martial law under Martial Law 
Orders (Repeal) Order 1962. In addition, the principal, by such measures, wanted to appease 
and reward the shirking and working politicians respectively (ibid:284).  
 
However, despite attempts at civilianization by revoking either the Presidential Proclamation 
or issuing Presidential Orders, the opposition politicians especially from East Pakistan 
preferred not to compromise their agency and rationality. They saw more politico-economic 
cost in the acceptance of the principal‟s principles- rules of the game. As a result, they opted 
for agitataional politics to demand their basic rights of speech, organization etc. The Ayub-
led regime, however, having calculated the situation chose to undo the ban on political 
parties. Thus, the Political Parties Act of July 1962 provided a political opportunity not only 
to opposition politicians but also allied ones to strategically interact with each other to 
maximize their returns.  
 
In fact, the military under Ayub did the same. She was able to ally a section of personalistic 
politicians from the Muslim League who had named their faction Muslim League 
Convention- the non-allied section called its faction Muslim League Council. In December 
1963, the Convention League chose unanimously President-Army Chief- C-in-C Ayub Khan 
its President. Moreover, the country‟s President assumed party‟s presidency in order to not 
only deal with opposition politicians more effectively but also fight the next presidential 
election politically least controversially since under the 1962 Constitution the President‟s 
term was to expire on 14 February 1965. Therefore, the presidential election was scheduled to 
be held on 2 January 1965 followed by election for new assemblies- both national and 
provincial. 
 
No wonder then, Ayub Khan decided to contest it: thus, he was the candidate from the ML-
Convention. The opposition political parties, on their part, were able to unite under an 
umbrella organization named Combined Opposition Parties (COP). However, they struggled 
to nominate their presidential candidate. After many negotiations, the COP was, somehow, 
able to convince Miss Fatima Jinnah- M.A. Jinnah‟s sister- to fight against General Ayub 
Khan electorally. However, before the presidential election could take place, the constitution 
required the election for a new electoral college – which would then elect the new president. 
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Hence, the election for a new college was scheduled for November 1964. During the run-up 
to the election, the COP, despite its internal differences, decided to give government a tough 
time. It demanded the withdrawal of Press and Public Ordinance, the Loudspeaker Ordinance 
and the Public Safety Act. Also, it complained to Election Commission about 
Gerrymandering and faulty voters‟ list. However, the agent EC, on its part, saw everything 
green. Resultantly, on the election day, out of Electoral College‟s 80,000 members, 3,282 
(around 4.5%) were selected by the government‟s political agents from the tribal areas; 
32,000 (around 40%) happened to be sitting Democrats. Both these categories, as mentioned 
earlier, were administratively and judicially facilitated by principal-led agents- civil 
bureaucracy and judiciary. If rationality is a guide, they were then supposed to vote for Ayub 
Khan on January 2 (see Mujahid 1965). 
 
The COP, on its part, was campaigning rationally too. Though it knew its disadvantages vis-
à-vis the principal and its agent section of politicians, it campaigned massively and 
enthusiastically in order to possibly urge the masses to stir, in turn, their respective 
Democrats to vote for Miss Fatima. In this respect, the COP left no stone unturned to criticize 
Ayub‟s failed domestic and foreign/defense policies. Indeed, they highlighted the 
malpractices in terms of corruption, misuse of authority etc., by his close associates including 
his sons. The Ayub side, at its end, never hesitated to label the COP, especially its Eastern 
component, traitors and unpatriotic.  
 
Nevertheless, election took place as scheduled. Ayub Khan was able to poll 49,951 
Democrats and Miss Fatima was honored by 28,691 Democrats. K.M. Kamal and Mian 
Bashir Ahmad, the minnows, were able to only poll 183 and 65 votes respectively. From 
East-West Pakistan perspective, Ayub got 28,939 against Jinnah‟s 10,257 in the West; in the 
East, the former obtained 21,012 against latter‟s 18,434 votes. In addition, the Electoral 
College elected members to the national and provincial Assemblies also. The majority of the 
elected, however, was in political alliance with Ayub. Expectedly, the opposition refused to 
accept the results and accorded a preference for agitataional politics. Consequently, many 
innocent lost their lives (Khan 2002:303-315; also Gauhar 1993:61-67). 
 
To summarize, after the October coup shirking politicians were arbitrarily banned and 
disqualified from politics respectively. General Ayub, as a sole candidate, was able to get 
himself elected as president through a controversial referendum by the Basic Democracies 
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system- a brainchild of Ayub‟s regime to legitimize his regime. The Democrats opted to work 
rationally to accrue politico-economic benefits. Moreover, the constitution the principal 
military gave to Pakistan was primarily a rationally devised mechanism to set the rules of the 
game on the principal‟s terms. Therefore, the indirect presidential and assemblies‟ elections- 
which were comprehensively rigged- was a further attempt to legitimize the otherwise 
illegitimate, illegal and immoral regime. The working politicians, while preferring own to 
national interests helped the former to achieve this all.  Thus, in light of the foregoing 
explanation it is maintained that the attempts at democratization were actually attempts at de-
democratization. Hence, the positive co-relation between this variable and the coup could 
only be defended at the expense of empirical evidences as presented in this section. 
 
4.2.4 Securitization Variable 
This variable ostensibly pertains to the country‟s internal/external security. The study, 
however, tends to rely on the concept of securitization over security due to the latter‟s 
encompassing and confusing nature i.e. military, socio-cultural, political, human and 
comprehensive security. On the other hand, 
The concept of securitization introduced by the Copenhagen School in the early 1990s 
is of particular relevance in understanding the security scenario in South Asia, as well 
as the role of mass media. Securitization involves the interpretation of security as a 
social construct and as an effect of mobilization. It is the process of raising security 
issues above politics so that they are made unquestionable…An important aspect as 
enunciated by the Copenhagen School is to create an awareness of the arbitrary nature 
of „threats‟, to stimulate the thought that the foundation of any national security policy 
is not given by „nature‟ but chosen by politicians and decision-makers who have an 
interest in defining it in just that way. Dominant sections of society identify and create 
the enemies of the state through the process of discourse by labeling them as enemies, 
or as threats to national security, etc…  
                                                                                                                     (Teresa 2009:20-21) 
 
As the above shows the very concept of security (threat) is primarily „constructed‟ by policy 
makers. In the context of Pakistan, securitization is assumed to be a process by which the 
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military attempts to not only perceive
50
  but also construct an enemy. Moreover, as regards its 
operationalization, it is aimed at militarily securing/defending the state against internal i.e. 
insurgencies, civil wars, large-scale terrorism etc., and external i.e. wars, cross-border 
infiltration etc., threats. In other words, securitization, in view of the present research, is two-
dimensional: subjectively, it is purely a domain of the military especially its defense 
establishment; objectively, it is operationalized to militarily secure the state against internal 
as well as external (objectified) threats. 
 
Having described the conceptual parameters of securitization the study now attempts a 
critical analysis of positive correspondence between this variable and the coup. As is 
explained in the previous chapter, after the creation of Pakistan‟s state, it was the politicians 
who assumed the official responsibility to perceive any security related threat from anywhere. 
However, in the post-Liaqaut period the civil bureaucracy having become the principal 
position did the same in a strategic interaction with the military. In October 1958, after 
disposing Mirza, the military under Ayub assumed the principal‟s seat and thus became a 
direct maker and implementer for that matter of country‟s domestic and foreign policies. 
Moreover, the study also explained that the bone of contention between India and Pakistan 
was the issue of Kashmir over which the two states fought a war in 1947-48.  
 
Nonetheless, under direct military rule, Pakistan did not face any grave security threat from 
anywhere. Indeed, in 1958-59, Ayub Khan gave vent to entering into a security pact with 
neighboring India. However, the move was restrained due to country‟s alliances with the US- 
the SEATO and CENTO are cases in point. Nevertheless, under the Ayub-led military 
Pakistan signed Indus Waters Treaty with India in September 1960.
51
 In addition, though 
Afghanistan, in the mid 1950s, attempted to disclaim the Durand Line, the two countries 
stopped short of any military escalation in terms of a war. Domestically, the Baloch tried to 
challenge the writ of the state. However, they were militarily dealt with in March 1959. Thus, 
as the foregoing suggests, at the time of October coup the country did never face any internal 
and external threat as such and therefore the invocation of securitization variable is 
                                               
50 The perception and construction of „threat‟ by the military as the principal is post-October 1958 phenomenon- 
see Chapter 3 in this respect. 
51  India‟s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Karachi for this purpose. This fact clearly points to the 
military‟s rationality regarding the „political‟ and „economic‟ nature of Kashmir and Indus „waters‟ respectively 
(see Khan 1967:107). 
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empirically unfounded. However, in order to see whether the state of Pakistan got securitized 
under the military rule, the following is an exercise in this respect. 
 
To begin with, minor incidents, after the cease-fire in Kashmir in 1949, on the Indo-Pakistan 
border and the cease-fire line in Kashmir were observed. However, „the tension between the 
two countries did not burst into a large scale war until April 1965.‟ (Rizvi 2000:139). The 
trouble started in January-March in Rann of Kutch- a desolate wasteland in the southeast 
extremity of Pakistan (approx. 22,000 square kms in area) separating the Sindh (Pakistan) 
from Gujarat (India)- when the Indian troops moved in the area due to its undemarcated  
nature. On 4 April, a Pakistani outpost at Ding was captured by the Indian Army. 
Subsequently, Pakistan moved her forces in the area lying between Chadd Bet and Beir Bet 
which led to a full-scale war in the two states in the Rann of Kutch. However, before the 
conflict escalated to other parts of the two countries, the two, in June, were able to reach, 
though with British mediation, a cease-fire agreement which provided for the restoration of  1 
January 1965 position and submission of the issue to either talks or a three-member 
arbitrational tribunal (Cheema 2002:67-68). 
 
Ironically enough, after military de-escalation, cease-fire agreement and submission of the 
Kutch affair to arbitration, the Pakistani side opted, in August, for military operations- 
Gibraltar and Grand Slam- in Kashmir with an explicit objective to take Kashmir with the 
help of the Kashmiries from India. However, the Kashmiris‟ non-military attitude might have 
come as a surprise, if not a blow, to Pakistani planners. On the one hand, the Indian Army 
retaliated in time and occupied the critical passes in Kargil and, on the other, she was able to 
occupy two strategically important points in the Pakistani part of Kashmir- Tithwal and Haji 
Pir. Despite all this, on 1 September, the Pakistani military decided to cross the cease-fire line 
and attempted to move in Chamb-Akhnur sector. However, due to change of command at the 
critical juncture, poor organization, lack of coordination and poor planning, it remained 
unable to achieve the desired objective in Kashmir. Meanwhile, the Indian military probably 
surprised its counterpart by preferring to cross the international boarder in the Punjab sector 
on 6 September to engage Pakistan outside-of-Kashmir. Thus, since 1947/48 it was the first 
occasion when the war spread not only along the cease-fire line but also India-(West) 
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Pakistan-proper border. Quite strangely, however, the two sides restraint somehow to engage 
militarily in East Pakistan (Khan
52
 1993:234). 
 
The war lasted for 17 days. During the war, the Pakistan side remained unable to get expected 
military support from its allies especially Washington. On the other hand, India received 
positive diplomatic support especially from Moscow. Nevertheless, the two states ranked the 
international and local input into their respective preference-order and agreed to accept, on 23 
September 1965, a Security Council Resolution calling for a cease-fire. Moreover, Moscow‟s 
diplomacy was able to urge the two sides to formalize their respective cost and benefits in 
Tashkent. As a result, after week-long negotiations, whereby Kosygin was a participant also, 
General Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri signed a declaration not to have recourse to force, 
and settle their disputes through peaceful means. Also, they agreed to withdraw their troops 
to 5 August position- the pre-hostilities point (Rizvi 1993:18-22). 
 
Subsequently, the diplomatic missions between the two countries started to function 
normally. However, besides post-war roadmap to normalization what this full-scale war 
informs is that Pakistani military remained unable to achieve its Kashmir objective. In fact, it 
had to face the Indian onslaught on Pakistan proper. Importantly, the principal military failed 
to securitize East Pakistan where the Bengalis were left to God if not the Indians. Indeed, the 
opposition politicians in West and especially in East Pakistan took Ayub regime on for its 
failure on the securitization project. Thus, in light of the foregoing it is suffice to posit that 
the principal, despite its claims and military operations, remained unable to securitize the 
state in terms of integrating Kashmir and importantly securing the Eastern Wing militarily. 
Hence, this variable also does not qualify as a reason and/ or cause of the coup. 
 
To summarize, in the preceding sections the study conducted an analytic narrative of the coup 
with the help of four conceptual variables drawn from the coup/martial law proclamation as 
issued by President Mirza in strategic understating with the agent military. Under the law and 
order variable it was maintained, on empirical grounds, that civil bureaucracy failed, on the 
one hand, to ensure high governance in the pre-coup period, and on the other, to accept the 
administrative-moral responsibility for this failure. Ironically however, Iskander Mirza, the 
                                               
52 Lieutenant-General Gul Hassan held several important appointments in the Pakistan Army: he was Director 
Military Operations during the 1965 war and Chief of General Staff during the 1971 war. In December 1971, he 
assumed command of the Army, and was its last Commander-in-Chief. He died in 1999. 
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leader of the principal bureaucracy, declared martial law in Pakistan on October 7, 1958 and 
appointed General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. However, within a few 
weeks after the coup, the military sacked Mirza and assumed the principal position. Having 
assumed direct power, the military attempted to, in line with General Ayub‟s 8 October 
address, maintain law and order. However, with the help of Mitra‟s definition of governance- 
murder and riots per million population- the study quantitatively showed that the military 
remained unable to achieve this objective. Instead, Ayub-led military‟s policies were 
perceived negatively by the resource-less who took to streets especially during 1968 and 
early 1969.  
 
Under the economic variable it was posited, on the basis of quantitative data, that despite 
military‟s efforts to boost economic growth, as indeed it claimed, the country‟s economic 
situation did not change meaningfully for the beneficiaries of the regime‟s policies were not 
the poorer section of the society but rather  a few families including those of Ayub‟s and 
working politicians. Moreover, the macroeconomic indicators which the principal military 
boasted of were primarily a result of foreign aid. Importantly, the regime‟s economic policies 
further increased the rich-poor and East-West socio-economic inequality, with the result that 
the disaffected left no opportunity to register its dissatisfaction in terms of agitational politics.   
 
Similarly, though the military claimed to democratize the nation by introducing it to a 
referendum, a constitution, a system of basic democracies, indirect elections to 
national/provincial assemblies, these measures pointed, as the study explained, to the 
opposite: de-democratization. Because each of these measures was politically motivated 
whereby the objective was to, on the one hand, electorally legitimize the regime, and on the 
other, to depoliticize the shirking politicians especially provincially. Importantly, the 
concentration of political power in the principal‟s hands further sowed seeds of alienation and 
deprivation among the majority Bengalis- this shall be explained in detail later in the chapter.  
Moreover, the principal also remained unable to securitize the state despite claims and 
military operations such as Gibraltar. The latter culminated into a full-scale war with India in 
Kashmir in 1965. Though with foreign mediation the two states were able to show restraint, 
Ayub-led military could not take Kashmir from India. Besides, another negative aspect of the 
war was that it exposed military‟s lack of vision and policy to defend East Pakistan. 
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Last but not least, the analysis also shows that the study‟s hypotheses could not be refuted for 
the positive correspondence between coup and the mentioned variables could not be 
established empirically. Hence, the study moves from here to its casual model in order to 
explain the occurrence of the October coup. The following sections shall deal with it.  
 
4.3 Military Agency: Causing the Coup 
As the preceding sections show none of the reasons/factors Mirza and then Ayub-led military 
cited was present empirically. Therefore, the study attempts to locate and explain the 
reason/cause behind the military‟s overt intervention in politics. To begin with, the critically 
reviewed literature such as structuralist accounts and the afore-mentioned conceptual 
variables remain unable to explain military intervention in Pakistan‟s politics. Hence, in light 
of our model it is posited that the agent but rational military was able to stage the coup on 
account of its inherent agency- its ability to affect change or get things done by and for itself. 
In other words, as a rational actor with the inherent ability to make things happen, the 
military chose to shirk in order to transform its institutional position from an agent to 
principal (agency A). In this respect, the cost-benefits analysis especially in the pre-coup 
period and the strategy vis-à-vis concerned rational actors to attempt a successful coup marks 
military‟s agency and rationality, empirically. 
 
Moreover, emphasizing and highlighting the military‟s rational action to stage the coup it is 
maintained that the primary reason/objective behind the act of extreme shirking- or agency 
A- is its preference to maximize its own interests- hence agency B.  The nature and kind of 
interests, as stated in the model, is primarily political and economic respectively. The coup 
itself points to the first set of interests for it is through successful coup that political power is 
captured to be able to negotiate rules of the game in the capacity of principal, as was 
explained under the democratization variable, and then facilitate economic interests- this shall 
be subject of the subsequent section since it is one of hypotheses of the research.  
 
Importantly, the military‟s political interests are not caused, as is explained in Chapter 2, by 
any exogenous factor i.e. socio-economic conditions or structure etc. Rather, they are 
inherent in soldiers who as rational human being constitute and represent the military as an 
institution. Viewed from this angle, the latter‟s political interests are at par with those of civil 
bureaucrats, judges and politicians. After all, who is not a maximizer given opportunity, 
capacity and importantly interest(s)?  
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Moreover, in light of the foregoing it is posited that the act of coup and consequent martial 
law is not an indicator of military‟s given political control, influence or strength and/or 
structure as is commonly understood. Had this been the case she would not have taken the 
pain to leave barracks, stage a coup,  make administrative plans, issue orders and regulations, 
arrest the shirking actors, make announcements about good governance and better economy,  
make political alliances with the politicians, contest elections, wage war and  ultimately face 
the music. Therefore, as per hypothesis it is maintained that the coup marks military‟s 
political weakness vis-à-vis other actors rather than her strength. As the present case shows, 
being politically weak and constrained vis-à-vis politicians and civil bureaucracy, it having 
calculated cost and benefits opted to collaborate and share the burden of coup-making with 
the civil bureaucracy and then replace the latter.  
 
Moreover, as mentioned above having directly assumed political power, the military 
prioritized to negotiate rules of the game with the agents on its term- the martial law rules and 
regulations and the 1962 constitution are a few examples. However, the direct assumption of 
political power indicated military‟s comparative politico-institutional strength vis-à-vis other 
actors involved in the game.  But, it remained politically a dominant actor among others 
contextually, and not structurally, ethnically, Islamically etc. Importantly, as per hypothesis, 
the military having directly intervened in politics tends to operationalize its political power to 
maximize its economic interests. The following section shall attempt to explain it. 
 
4.3.1 Maximizing Economic Interests 
As explained in the previous section that the coup was political in nature. It was staged to 
primarily achieve political power. The latter was then used as an instrument to maximize 
economic interests.
53
 In this section, an attempt is made to provide a quantitative-qualitative 
picture of the military‟s economic activities.54 The primary aim of this section is to test H2: 
military‟s political power facilitates its economic interests. 
 
                                               
53  The term economic interests should not be confused with the military‟s budgetary benefits such as defense 
allocation, for the latter had neither empirical relevance with the military‟s principalship- see Table 8- nor is it 
amongst the aims of the present study. Rather, the term pertains to the military‟s economic activities in the (free) 
market as an independent actor- indeed at par with other actors such as industrialists etc. Importantly, as 
critically analyzed in Chapter 2, the military‟s economic activities are an indicator of its agency and rationality- 
the study‟s explanatory variables- rather than a product of (feudal) culture, structure and/or military „control‟.  
54  This also includes individual efforts (by some General etc.,) to make money. This and similar sections in 
Chapters 5 and 7 shall highlight any individual/private gain empirically. 
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To begin with, the military after having directly assumed the reign of political power started 
allocating state land especially agricultural to itself. For this purpose, the Colonization of 
Land Act 1912 was amended arbitrarily. This Act was used as a legal instrument to grant land 
to military men at highly subsidized rates- varying from Rs.20-60 per acre. Table 13 below 
describes it in unequivocal terms:         
         
                      Table 13 Land Allotment to Military Personnel: 1965-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Source: Siddiqa. 2007. Military Inc. 
 
      
Moreover, this land allocation/acquisition method was highly arbitrary. For example, Ayub 
Khan, as leader of the principal military, arbitrarily gave (see Table 14 on the next page) this 
„colonized land‟ to military personnel, which was brought under cultivation by construction 
of new water sources i.e. barrages, dam. Precisely, under the policy, ten per cent of the land 
reclaimed through construction of three dams- Guddu, Kotri and Ghulam Mohammad in the 
Southern Sindh (1955-62) - was granted to military personnel. As a result, about nine million 
acres of land was reclaimed of which one million acres were granted to military men. 
However, the senior generals were able to accrue more benefits- General Ayub Khan (247 
acres), General Muhammad Musa (250 acres) and General Umrao Khan (246 acres)- from the 
scheme. Importantly, the defense establishment had the capability to bring any state land 
under its control ostensibly for „public purpose‟ by enacting the Land Acquisition Act 1894.  
District 
 
Province Acreage 
DI Khan NWFP 185,000 
Muzaffargarh Punjab 173,000.7 
DG Khan Punjab 153,000.5 
Rajanpur Punjab 133,000.3 
Vehari Punjab 170,987 
Pakpattan Punjab 193,676 
Multan Punjab 123,793 
Khanewal Punjab 143,283 
Sahiwal Punjab 173,407 
Lahore Punjab 273,413 
Kasur Punjab 387,283 
Sheikhupura Punjab 193,863 
Total  2,303,706.5 
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The military used its political principalship to fix the meaning of public purpose in terms of 
redistribution of the land for its officers‟ personal benefits.  
 
Table 14 Land Entitlement for Military Personnel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Source: Rizvi. 2000. 
 
 
Moreover, the maximizing military had an interest and ability to transfer urban land for its 
personnel. This phenomenon is historically post-Partition when the officers started obtaining 
land on „lease‟ in the cantonments. Primarily, it was the immigrant military officers who were 
granted the evacuee property in the cantonment areas. In the subsequent period, a 
considerable number of non-immigrant officers were also able to obtain this land on account 
of their seniority or prominence- General Azam Khan, among others, is a case in point.  The 
grant of this land to military officers on a 99-year transferable lease was extendable 
especially in cases where the officers happen to own the property. In addition, there was no 
bar regarding re-sale of the lease or any tax imposed on profit gained through its sale. 
 
Moreover, in the 1960s the army demanded 12,000 acres of agricultural land transferred to 
those military personnel affected by the construction of Islamabad- the capital. Furthermore, 
in 1962-63 the military‟s construction arm - the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) - built a 
„temporary camp‟ on privately owned land; the owners were given the impression that it 
would be vacated when the task of road construction was finished. However, the camp was 
arbitrarily made permanent without giving any compensation to its owners. In a similar case 
in Chamman district, Balochistan, 200 acres of privately owned land was occupied by the 
army which established itself in the district in 1963-64.   
 
Besides, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the Fauji Foundation (FF), which was established in 
1954 ostensibly providing for its personnel‟s welfare, was further consolidated and expanded 
in terms of infrastructure and resource allocation by the Ayub-led military. The FF invested 
Rank Acreage 
Maj.Gen. and above 240 acres 
Brigadiers and Colonels 150 acres 
Lt.-Colonels 124 acres 
Lieutenants to Majors 100 acres 
JCOs 64 acres 
NCOs and other Ranks 32 acres 
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in a variety of industrial unit such as tobacco, sugar and textile production in both wings of 
the country. For example, in West Pakistan the Foundation made investments in the 
acquisition/establishment of the Khyber Tobacco Company (Mardan), a cereal manufacturing 
factory at Dhamial (Rawalpindi), a sugar mill at Tando Mohammad Khan (Sindh), and a 
textile factory at Jehlum. In the Eastern Wing, the Foundation was able to acquire/establish 
East Pakistan Lamps and East Pakistan Electrical Industries (Dhaka), a rice mill at Rangpur, a 
flour mill at Chittagong and a jute mill nearby Dhaka. Furthermore, the FF had financial 
stakes in Fauji Ceramics and West Pakistan Lamps Ltd also- however they were liquidated 
later on (Siddiqa 2007:131).                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                           
What the afore-mentioned informs is that the focus of FF‟s infrastructural development 
remained in the West. Moreover, since the investment came primarily from West Pakistan-
based military and the returns also went to the principal, the resentment of majority Bengalis 
was quite natural. This fact is also reflective of regime‟s overall economic policies which 
increased inter-wing disparity as is already explained.  However, the military projected the 
FF‟s enterprise as a source of national development. Nonetheless, in light of the cited 
empirical evidences it is maintained that the practices of (state) land acquisition and 
expansion of FF‟s businesses certainty mark military‟s rationality in terms  preferring own to 
larger interest.  
                                                                          
Besides, to maximize profit at the organizational level of involvement, the Frontier Works 
Organization was established in 1966. Its primary task was to construct the 805 km 
Karakoram Highway (KKH). For this purpose, the army‟s corps of engineering was used. 
Though initially the organization was kept under the ministry of communication, it was 
brought under the direct administrative control of the ministry of defense (MoD) later on. 
Interestingly however, in the post-construction of KKH period, the FWO got never 
disbanded. Rather, it was viewed as a reserve force to be utilized in any unforeseen situation 
i.e. conflict, emergency. However, with the passage of time, the Organization got engaged in 
commercial activities.
55
 
 
Last but not least, the military‟s political rule was instrumental to provide economic 
opportunities for its individuals, both serving and retired, too. In this respect, Rizvi observed  
                                               
55 http://fwo.com.pk/ 
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During this period [1962-69], the senior military positions became a ladder for 
lucrative jobs in the public and private sectors. A good number of retired Lieutenant-
General, Major-General and Brigadiers, and their equivalent ranks in the other 
services, were provided with top positions in government and semi-governmental 
corporations, autonomous bodies and boards, where they could draw hansom salaries 
and other facilities…Some  of the senior military officers resigned their posts to take 
up some of these positions. A large number of military officers were absorbed in 
various factories and mills run by the armed forces. In 1960, the central and provincial 
governments fixed a quota in various services for the retired military personnel and 
agreed to make some concessions in education, age and other qualifications for them. 
Some of the senior officers were appointed ambassadors in foreign countries…The 
recruitment to the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was made open to the officers of 
the military in 1960 [also].  
                                                                                                                             (2000:128-130) 
 
In addition, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, President-General Ayub Khan was criticized 
by the opposition politicians for privileging his own son, Gohar Ayub. The latter, as 
mentioned earlier, accorded more preference to business than army service. 
  
To summarize, the October coup was a result of military‟s inherent agency. Being a rational 
actor, it saw more benefits than cost to perform this action. The latter was, however, political 
in nature as the primary aim of the exercise was to capture political power. Having obtained 
the political power, the military was able to replace civil bureaucracy as principal for its 
preference had already prevailed. In the capacity of Pakistan‟s principal, it started negotiating 
rules of the game with the concerned agent actors. Of the latter, a section from the judiciary 
and politicians rationally chose to ally with the regime in order to accrue more politico-
economic benefits. Importantly, the military herself used politics as an instrument to 
maximize economic returns. However, the military‟s political rule and its involvement in 
economic activities was a major source of alienation and deprivation among the resource-less 
section of population. Especially, the regime‟s political and economic policies further 
increased political and socio-economic inequality among the Bengalis. Consequently, the 
latter along with the affected sections from the West opted to challenge the military rule in 
terms of agitational politics. The following sections of the chapter shall explain it in detail.  
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4.4 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Second Coup 
As is explained in the preceding sections, the military‟s political and economic policies had 
increased not only political and socio-economic inequality but also caused deep resentment 
among the affected section of the population i.e. poor workers, students etc. The latter 
ultimately chose to capitalize any opportunity to register its anger and grief. In this respect, 
the shirking politicians from both wings of the country- Bhutto and Mujib are cases in point- 
afforded them with political platforms to start agitational politics. Consequently, the 
agitational politics of the late 1960s gradually transformed into a movement against military 
rule. Riots became an order of the day- see Table 9 in this respect. 
 
Thus, in such a deteriorating politico-economic and law and order situation the military- 
technically under General Yahya‟s command- negotiated an intra-military solution of the 
problem. It had a few choices at its disposal: a) to urge Ayub Khan to resign as president and 
pave the way for general elections; b) to let the civilian dispensation continue without Ayub; 
c) to declare martial law. All the three choices entailed more cost than benefits. Of the three, 
the last choice was fraught with obvious danger- martial law meant giving fodder to the 
opposition. The first choice was also dangerous: elections entailed the opposition especially 
the Awami League, in power. The second choice was seemingly less dangerous than the first 
and third. However, the absence of Ayub would have further strengthened the already 
demanding opposition. 
 
Nevertheless, General Ayub Khan, being a rational military-man, enacted the last choice in 
the larger interests of his institution. Therefore, on 25
 
March 1969, while addressing the 
nation he said:  
The situation in the country is fast deteriorating. The administrative institutions are 
being paralyzed…The mobs are resorting to Gheraos [closed-ins] at will, and get their 
demand accepted under duress…The economy of the country has been crippled; 
factories are closing down and production is dwindling every day…It is impossible 
for me to preside over the destruction of our country…Every problem of the country 
is being decided in the streets. Except for the Armed Forces there is no constitutional 
and effective way to meet the situation. The whole nation demands that General 
Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, should fulfill his 
constitutional responsibilities. The Pakistan Navy and the Air Force are with 
him…The security of the country demands that no impediment be placed in the way 
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of the Defense Forces and they should be enabled to carry out freely their legal duties. 
In view of this, I have decided to relinquish today the office of the President.  
                                                                                                 (Rizvi 2000:Appendix E) 
 
From the quote the conclusion is self-evident. The general, quite strangely, cited the same 
reasons/problems to hand over authority to another general which he referred to justify his 
martial law a decade ago. However, as per his address, the authority was handed over to army 
chief/C-in-C rather than the speaker of the National Assembly as stipulated in the rules of the 
games. Having taken the formal charge as leader of the principal, General Yahya Khan did 
not waste time to coup away the civilian face of the regime.  
 
Interestingly enough, the act of coup did not mark the military‟s comparative strength, 
„control‟ and/or „embedded influence‟, as is argued by Siddiqa (2007) and Aziz (2008) 
respectively. Had this been the case, the military would not have to intervene and wrap up its 
laboriously constructed political dispensation. Or had it really been in control of politicians it 
would have instantly replaced unpopular president by some working politician.  
 
Therefore, it is posited that the accounts, which believe in military control and/or embedded 
influence, remain empirically and theoretically unable to appreciate the realistic and logical 
importance of context, rationality and agency of the actors strategically engaged with each 
other and among themselves in the complex game of civil-military relations of Pakistan. The 
following sections tend to conduct an analytic narrative of the March coup in order to explain 
its causes and implications for politics and the state in Pakistan. 
 
4.5 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup 
The primary aim of this and subsequent sections is to explain why the coup was caused in the 
first place. What purpose did it serve?  How did the military view the event itself? Moreover, 
the secondary aim shall be to test posed hypotheses in light of the analytic narrative. Before 
the analysis proceeds any further, it seems not inappropriate first to mention the coup/martial 
law text which was read to the nation to justify the action. In this regard, see Box 4.3 on the 
next page: 
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Box 4.3 Excerpts from General Yahya’s Proclamation, 26 March 1969 
 
As we all know, his [Ayub Khan] effort did not meet with success. He, 
therefore, called upon me to carry out my prime duty of protecting this country 
from utter destruction…I have imposed Martial Law throughout Pakistan…the 
situation has deteriorated to such an extent that normal law enforcing methods 
have become totally ineffective… Serious damage of life and property has 
occurred…Production has gone down to a dangerously low level and the 
economy generally has suffered an unprecedented set-back…The armed forces 
could not remain idle spectators …My sole aim in imposing Martial Law is to 
protect life, liberty and property …I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that 
I have no ambition other than the creation of conditions constructive to the 
establishment of a constitutional Government...They [Armed Forces] have 
never regarded any sacrifice as too great to ensure and enhance the security and 
the glory of Pakistan…[italics mine] 
 
                                                                                               (Rizvi 2000:Appendix F) 
 
 
The conceptual variables identified in the above quote are the following: 
A = protecting this country from utter destruction; situation has deteriorated to such 
an extent that normal law enforcing methods have become totally ineffective; Serious 
damage of life and property has occurred (law and order variable) 
B = Production has gone down to a dangerously low; economy generally has suffered 
an unprecedented set-back (economic variable) 
C = the creation of conditions constructive to the establishment of a constitutional 
Government (democratization variable) 
D = protect life, liberty and property; to ensure and enhance the security and the 
glory of Pakistan ((securitization variable) 
E = martial law [coup] (policy variable) 
 
Based on the text above, the main causal relations observed are: 
1. The law and order situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the military has to 
intervene. Thus, the coup was staged and martial law declared:  A     +       E   
(positive relationship)  
2. The country‟s economic situation has worsened extremely. Thus, the military 
intervened to uplift Pakistan economically:  B       +           E  
(positive relationship) 
3. The martial law government would create conditions i.e. elections, so that Pakistan 
could gradually become a constitutional state:  C        +           E   
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   (positive relationship) 
4.  Since the law and order machinery has become dysfunctional, it is the military which 
would protect  and secure the people of Pakistan:  D       +           E 
(positive relationship) 
 
The following observations can be drawn in light of the above: 
 The March coup and consequent martial law is justified by General Yahya Khan-led 
military on accounts of  problems related to law and order, economy as well as the 
need for democratization and securitization; 
 Law and order and economic problems are cited as the major reasons/causes due to 
their  highly  negative effects both on society and the state;  
 Democratization and securitization are cited as complementary  reasons/causes of the 
coup; 
 The coup/martial law is seen and projected by the military as a panacea to the stated 
problems Pakistan suffered from; 
 The military has the will and capacity to carry out these projects. 
 
What the foregoing suggests is that the Yahya-led military provided the nation with certain 
reasons to stage the coup and impose martial law. From the military‟s point of view these 
reasons were self-evident. Interestingly, in this case the judiciary gave its judgment after the 
martial law had been lifted- Chapter 5 would explain it in detail. Thus, it becomes necessary 
to explain the positive relationship between the stated conceptual variables for no claim, 
logically and morally, be accepted without evidence and arguments in its support. Since the 
military did not define, let alone quantify, problems of law and order and economy etc., the 
following sections tend to take each conceptual variable  in order to , on the one hand, see 
whether the military‟s claims are empirically justified, and on the other, test the study‟s 
hypotheses.  
 
4.5.1 Law and Order Variable 
As General Yahya‟s proclamation serves as point of reference and departure, it becomes 
obvious that having assumed power the military under him attempted to legitimize the coup 
and consequent martial law on the basis of poor law and order. This attempt at self- 
legitimation, as explained under the same variable earlier in the Chapter, is self-contradictory 
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since the military, under General Ayub Khan, had already failed to fulfill the acclaimed 
responsibility.  
 
Regardless, having taken the principal military‟s claim as granted the present research 
attempts to put it on the touchstone of empirical evidence- see Table 15 below, in conjunction 
with Figure 2 on the next page. In order to statistically explain law and order the study has, in 
the absence of data on murders and riots in East Pakistan during 1969-1971- possibly due to 
war- relied on West Pakistan only, to conduct a comparative analysis of problems of law and 
order during Ayub and Yahya- led military rule respectively. 
 
Table 15 Murder and Riots per Million Population 
  Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1969, 1974 
                      
Nonetheless, having conducted a statistical analysis of total murders and riots per population 
in West Pakistan, the resultant trend of both murders and riots under the military rule during 
1969-1971 is on the rise. It means that the military under Yahya, despite its claims, badly 
failed to prevent the occurrence of murders and riots. Indeed, the incidents of riots highlight 
the political non-popularity of the regime as is qualitatively held in this study. Importantly, 
both the regimes comparatively registered upward trend in murders. In this respect, though 
the Ayub-led regime seemed to have witnessed a comparatively slight downward trend in 
murders by 1968, this fact is insignificant on two counts: first, if there is a slight downward 
trend in West Pakistan‟s murders case, then there is statistically sharp upward trend in the 
Year Murders per 
million pop. 
Riots per million 
pop. 
Pop. (million) 
1959 55 25 41.423 
1960 62 26 42.398 
1961 70 39 42.978 
1962 66 14 44.419 
1963 65 17 45.466 
1964 63 23 46.537 
1965 69 21 47.633 
1966 70 20 48.755 
1967 69 19 49.903 
1968 65 23 51.079 
1969 72 27 52.282 
1970 75 33 53.513 
1971 87 35 54.653 
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same category in East Pakistan; second, even in West Pakistan, from the year 1967 onward, 
there is sharp upward increase in the riots as the Figure illustrates below.  
 
Figure 2 Trend: Murder and Riots per Million Population 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, since the primary aim of this statistical analysis is to explain the occurrence of 
coup under General Yahya Khan with the help of law and order variable, it is self-evident 
from the Figure 2 that both categories of murders and riots registered an upward trend under 
his-led military rule. Thus, it is maintained that the March coup cannot be ascribed to the 
problems of law and order empirically.  
 
4.5.2 Economic Variable 
As is explained under this variable earlier in the chapter, Pakistan‟s economic performance 
was divisive in terms of giving birth to regional and poor-rich disparity. Since General Yahya 
was part of the last regime- indeed army chief- then the attempt at self-legitimation with 
reference to deteriorating economic situation is baseless logically and evidentially. How 
could one talk of (re)constructing the house which was demolished by one‟s very hands and 
this despite the vows about a durable construction?  
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Regardless, the study tends to examine the country‟s economic performance under the 
Yahya-led military rule in order to see whether there exists a positive correspondence 
between coup and worsening economic situation. However before a quantitative-qualitative 
analysis is conducted 
a word about the data is of particular interest. The Ayub government [regime] 
fell…and Bhutto took over from General Yahya Khan in December 1971. However, 
some studies, when examining the performance of the Bhutto period, lump the post-
Ayub three years with the Bhutto period, distorting the facts. One example is Nawab 
Haider Naqvi and Khwaja Sarmad‟s study, which in its evaluation of Pakistan‟s 
economy in the 1970s, considers 1969/70 to 1976/7 as one homogenous period and 
produces average growth rates for the whole of it. The Bhutto period was a distinct 
period, so clubbing it with the Yahya period does not reveal the true nature of the 
Bhutto regime [government]. The Pakistan Economic Survey of 1984/5 makes the 
same mistake and provides average growth rates for the period 1970-7, calling it the 
„Non Plan‟ period. 
                                                                                                                           (Zaidi 2005:104) 
                                                                                                                                                                
What can, in light of the quote, be deduced is that there is a contextual difference between the 
Bhutto government and Yahya regime and for a correct comprehension of the latter‟s claim to 
economic development, one needs to rely on the data of these years only. However, since the 
data normally is presented in conjunction with Ayub or Bhutto years, the study, therefore, 
takes an East-West Pakistan perspective to explain this variable. As the Table 11 (see page 
148) shows the year 1969-70 registered 37.9 as compared to 31.1 in 1964/5 as index of 
disparity in per capita income respectively. Moreover, the during the same period, the per 
capita GDP in East and West Pakistan marked a further increase in regional disparity- see the 
Table below. 
 
     Table 16 Per Capita GDP in East and West Pakistan at 1959/60 Constant Prices 
Year Per capita 
GDP East 
Per capita 
GDP West 
West-East 
Disparity ratio 
Index of 
disparity 
1959/60 269 355 1.32 100 
1964/65 293 426 1.45 141 
1969/70 314 504 1.61 191 
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        Source: Zaidi. 2005.    
 
In addition, according to official sources, overall in Pakistan  the „proportion of poor‟ in 
terms of headcount also increased to 46.53 in 1969-70 from 44.50 in 1966-67  respectively 
(Zaidi 2005:435). Besides, the country‟s trade deficit continued to stay in minus at Rs. 1, 604 
million in 1970-71; it was minus Rs. 1,676 million in 1965-66 and minus Rs. 1, 6333 million 
in 1960-61 respectively. Interestingly, as per our earlier analysis, the trade deficit remained 
negative under the civil bureaucracy too. However, under the first  government- of  principal 
politicians- it was recorded positive at Rs. 125 million in 1947-48 and Rs. 176 million in 
1950-51 respectively (Saeed 2005:107; see also Zaidi 2005:163). 
 
Importantly, during the Yahya-led military rule the exports‟ share of the Eastern wing 
remained significant. For instance, in 1969/70  
 just raw jute and jut-related manufactured products originating from East Pakistan 
were providing more than 47 per cent of Pakistan‟s total exports. In 1969/70, East 
Pakistan was a large market from West Pakistan, absorbing 50 per cent of the West‟s 
exports, while the East wing provided 18 per cent of (West) Pakistan‟s total inputs for 
that year. 
                                                                                                                           (Zaidi 2005:162) 
 
What the quote informs is that East Pakistan served as the backbone of country‟s economy. 
However, the West-based military principal, while according preference to its own political- 
and economic as shall be explain later in the chapter- interests, tended to ignore the socio-
economic,  if not political, development of that part of  Pakistan. Little wonder then, the 
majority Bengalis, as mentioned earlier, opted to agitational politics for their due politico-
economic, if not socio-cultural, rights. When denied by the principal military, the natural but 
rational result was their alienation and consequent separation from the state of Pakistan. In 
sum, in light of the foregoing the positive relationship between this variable and coup/martial 
law is unfounded empirically. 
 
4.5.3 Democratization Variable 
As is obvious from the proclamation, General Yahya Khan declared martial law in Pakistan 
the day General Ayub resigned. Therefore, the 1962 Constitution was abrogated; the national 
and provincial assemblies stood dissolved; the members of President‟s Council of Ministers 
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and the two Provincial Governors ceased to hold offices. Moreover, the General assumed the 
office of CMLA and appointed deputy army chief, air force chief and naval chief as Deputy 
CMLAs. In addition, he issued twenty-five martial law regulations on the same day. As 
regards the project of democratization the first step the CMLA took was the assumption of 
the office of President of Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What the above informs is that when there is martial law, there is no law. Hence, with all 
powers in the principal‟s hand, its leader General Yahya arbitrarily assumed the office of 
president with effect from 25 March 1969 through a notification dated 31 March 1969 
gazetted on 4 April 1969. Not only this, in order to democratize the country, he, on 28 
November 1969, outlined the rules of the game: that elections would be held on 5 October 
1970; parliamentary system would be preferred; the elected National Assembly would be 
tasked to frame a new constitution; maximum autonomy would be granted; One Unit is 
undone; and from 1 January 1970 the political activity could be resumed (Khan 2002:371-
383). 
  
Additionally, though all the pronounced points- which were converted into orders very soon- 
were important for one section of the opposition or other, the undoing of One Unit was 
indeed an act of arbitration. The principal did not bother to realize the fact that its doing had a 
history of debate, contestation and legislation in which politicians from two parts actively 
took part. Moreover, it was incorporated in the two late constitutions, however defective they 
were. To undo One Unit at this critical juncture without any reference to the people, if not 
politicians, was not without dangers, which related to state‟s physical integrity.  
 
Box 4.4 The PCO was Arbitrary 
 
The martial law proclamation was arbitrary…The PCO [Provisional 
Constitutional Order issued on April 4] promulgated by the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator [CMLA] was also arbitrary…I mean it 
had no legal or constitutional basis. It gave full powers to the CMLA 
who was also the army chief and Chief Martial Law Administer…No 
court was allowed to question anything done by the martial law 
authorities. 
 
A 32 year old Advocate of the High Court informed the author in March 
2008 in Lahore. 
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Importantly however, Yahya‟s announcements and regulations were political in nature. The 
principal having witnessed and calculated the popular demand for elections opted for it in the 
hope of not only defusing, at least in the short term, the anti-regime agitataional politics and 
thus maintain relative law and order but also expecting  a hung parliament given  the  intra-
opposition political differences. 
 
Nonetheless, working on the project of democratization a regulation was enacted, in 
December 1969, by the CMLA which strictly prohibited any opinion or action in a manner 
prejudicial to Pakistan‟s ideology, integrity or security. Moreover, on 28 March 1970, 
General-President, on behalf of his institution, formally made the rules of the game public by 
promulgating the Legal Framework Order (LFO), 1970. The LFO was a political device, at 
best, to manage the country‟s constitutional-political matters on the principal‟s terms. 
Moreover, the LFO was used as an instrument to further divert public and politicians‟ 
attention to electioneering. In addition, it set rules and regulations for the upcoming elections 
in terms of elections schedule, assemblies‟ seats, nature of religion etc. Commenting on the 
role of religion in Pakistan‟s politics at this critical juncture a politician-religious scholar 
opined: 
 
Box 4.5 Use of Religion for Political Purposes 
 
The state during Ayub period was not Islamic… General Yahya Khan 
issued the LFO to hold elections and gave country a [military‟s] 
constitution…In the LFO it was said that only a Muslim could 
become a President, and Pakistan is a Islamic state…But without 
proper legislation in parliament, these points were of no value…I 
think religion‟ name was probably used to keep the country 
united…As in East Pakistan the situation was getting worse… 
 
Interview with Senator Sajid Mir, President Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, 
Pakistan. Lahore: 20 March 2008. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the political forces responded to these arbitrary measures rationally. They 
preferred participatory politics over agitational for the ballot was seen more powerful than 
bullet received in the street. Hence, elections campaigns were launched by a variety of 
politicians and their parties which were more than twenty in number to contest for 313-seat 
parliament. Bhutto-led PPP, however, did not opt to nominate any candidate from East 
Pakistan. On the contrary, Mujib-led Awami League did nominate seven candidates from 
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West Pakistan. Both the politicians criticized Ayub and Yahya-led military rule for a 
multiplicity of reasons i.e. pro-West foreign/defense policy, non-resolution of Kashmir, poor 
economy and poor governance etc. Indeed, Mujib was more critical of West Pakistan and its 
military which deprived the majority Bengalis of their basic human rights. When the elections 
were held in December 1970- delayed due to floods in eastern part- the results were as given 
in Table 17 below: 
 
 Table 17 1970 Elections: National Assembly Results 
 East 
Pakistan 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Total 
Awami League 151  -  -  -  -  151  
Pakistan People‟s 
Party 
-  62 18  1  -  81 
Council Muslim 
League 
-  7  -  -  -  7  
Ahle Sunnat -  4  3 -  -  7  
Jamat-i-Islami -  1  2  1  -  4  
Qayyum Muslim 
League 
-  1  1  7 -  9 
Convention 
Muslim League 
-  2  -  -  -  2  
Pakistan 
Democratic Party 
1 -  -  -  -  1 
National Awami 
Party  
-  -  -  3 3  6  
Jamiat Ulema-e- 
Pakistan 
-  -  -  6  1  7 
Independents 1 5  3  7  -  16 
 153 80 27 25 4 291 
  Source: Election Commission of Pakistan. 
 
As the Table shows, the Awami League, due to its popularity and massive campaign, was 
able to clean sweep in the East. Importantly, though there were incidents of „moderate‟ pre-
poll rigging, almost all the parties viewed the election free and fair (PILDAT 2008). 
However, the process of post-poll rigging, and that too at the highest level, began with the 
interference of the principal in the process of government making. In this respect, Yahya met 
with Mujib in January 1971 to persuade him to soften his position on the Six Points. The 
latter instead preferred non-compromise over the Points which, in fact, was the basis of his 
party‟s victory. Moreover, Mujib asked Yahya to call the National Assembly session where 
he would show his strength to assume the office of prime minister. Since the AL had formed 
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the electoral majority it should have been, from the perspective of democratic theory, allowed 
to form government at the centre. Nevertheless, the principal having been unsuccessful with 
AL turned to PPP of Bhutto in order to urge the latter to politically negotiate with AL. 
Rational Bhutto, on his part, had a different priority from both Mujib and the military. He had 
a political interest to prolong the situation to a point where the principal military strategically 
opts to engage him to possibly form government in the West. In this regard, Bhutto‟s position 
on the Six Points is a case in point. Logically, had this not been the case, then Bhutto‟s 
January meeting with Mujib would have focused on the contours of coalition formation and 
not Six Points on which AL remained adamant. 
 
The principal military, on its part, chose to be flexible; it called for the Assembly‟s meeting 
on March 3. Meanwhile, the Awami League politicians- indeed party‟s parliamentary 
committee- had adopted a draft constitution which incorporated the Six Points. However, 
Bhutto prioritized non-compliance and called upon General Yahya to postpone the scheduled 
session of the parliament. Moreover, the former warned the participants of dire consequences. 
Yahya‟s preference converged with Bhutto due to the principal‟s policy of non-transfer of 
power(s) to majority Bengalis. Quite simply, had the military decided and allowed Mujib-led 
AL to form government there was strong likelihood of the former being taken on by  the 
shirking section of politicians. Therefore, the principal formally postpone the NA session on 
1 March 1971- indeed, no session was allowed by the Bhutto-military rational alliance (see 
Choudhury 1973). 
 
Thus, in light of the foregoing, it is maintained that the arbitrary assumption of presidentship, 
the passage of LFO, post-poll explicit rigging are clear indicators of de-democratization- of 
negative correspondence between coup/martial law and  democratization. These indicators 
certainly did not help to „create conditions‟ to make Pakistan return to a constitutional rule. 
Rather, it further consolidated military authoritarian rule which is explained in the next 
section. 
 
4.5.4 Securitization Variable 
Empirically, when General Yahya imposed martial law the country did not face any internal 
or external military threat. Had this been the case, then the immediate measure the military 
would have taken was to mobilize the troops rather than passing orders and regulations. 
However, the indicators of internal security threat, from military‟s perspective, started 
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emerging when, due to principal‟s authoritarian political position, Awami League and its 
followers decided to apply militant means to be able to politically negotiate with the 
principal. In his respect, though uptil 24 March, a series of meeting took place among Bhutto, 
a symbol of working politicians, Mujib, a sign of shirking politicians, and military- the 
principal-, the negotiations failed due to divergence of preferences between Bhutto-military 
and Mujib. The latter demanded either the acceptance or instant implementation of Six Points 
or independent Bangladesh- indeed 23 March was celebrated as Bangladesh day rather than 
Pakistan Day in the East (ibid 1973). 
 
As is already explained statistically, the situation in the East was deteriorating due to failure 
of governmental machinery. The AL‟s non-compromise position further aggravated the 
situation. Hence, the military formally opted for military means, on 25 March 1971, in the 
hope of keeping the state united militarily. As a result, Mujib was arrested and the crackdown 
started against the AL fighters- generally called Mukti Bahini- under Lieutenant-General 
Niazi who had replaced cautious General Tikka Khan. With respect to the military operation, 
the generals had already seen the Indian hand in the East problem on account of Indian 
planed hijacked to Pakistan in March. As a result of this issue, Delhi had already stopped 
Pakistani planes, both civil and military, to use her air territory. In addition, an explicit Indian 
involvement was witnessed when a formal war started on 22 November in East Pakistan 
between India and Pakistan. India had ostensibly chosen to rescue Mukti Bahini which was 
struggling against the military operation for the last six months (ibid 1973). 
 
Thus, as a result of India-Pakistan war, the latter, in the absence of any military support from 
her allies, had no option than to accept a de facto independent state of Bangladesh for which 
many had lost their lives; many got paralyzed for ever; and many got displaced for good. 
Formally, on 16 December 1971 the state of Pakistan physically broke up. The principal 
military‟s politico-military calculus proved erroneous. The process of securitization of the 
state, as vowed by Yahya Khan on 26 March 1969, abysmally died out in the country‟s 
disintegration. Hence, in light of the foregoing there is no ground whatsoever to attempt to 
legitimize the coup and the consequent martial law on the basis of this variable too. 
 
To summarize, having identified conceptual variables in the coup/martial law text delivered 
to the nation on 26 March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, the study, under the framework of 
its model, took each of them to empirically explain its stated positive correspondence with 
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coup d‟état. In this respect, the analectic narrative began with the problems of law and order 
which were invoked by the military to justify the martial law. However, based on Mitra‟s 
conception of governance, it was shown that the claim was self-contradictory empirically for 
the failure to maintain law and order was already the responsibility of the military since the 
first coup when General Ayub had vowed publically to accomplish this task. Regardless, the 
military under Yahya also remained unable to achieve this objective- the military operation in 
East Pakistan is a case in point. Similarly, on the economic front too the principal could not 
resolve country‟s worsening economic situation. Rather, rich-poor and importantly cross-
regional disparity increased to an extent where the majority Bengalis openly started a 
movement to seek separation from the state of Pakistan.  
 
Moreover, the stated necessary conditions to make the country return to a constitutional rule 
were never genuinely created. All measures in this regard pointed to the fact that the principal 
military was bent upon strengthening its rule through the promulgation of a Legal Framework 
Order and/or non-transfer of political power to the Awami League. Last but not least, the 
military operation in East Pakistan, the consequent war against India and the resultant 
breakup of Pakistan is sufficed to conclude that the principal also failed to securitize the 
state- which had now lost more than half its population and a considerable chunk of its 
territory.  
 
Besides, the ongoing analytic narrative shows that the study‟s hypotheses cannot be refuted 
for there was a lack of positive correspondence between coup d‟état and any of the 
conceptual variables. Nor is the core question or puzzle of the research solved. Therefore, in 
search of answers to these questions and the puzzle the study, in the following sections, 
returns to its causal model whereby the analysis is thoroughly model-guided- the explanatory 
variables tend to explain the occurrence of the coup- but the approach is akin to an analytic 
narrative. 
 
4.6 Military Agency: Causing the Coup 
As is informed by the preceding sections, the reasons the Yahya-led military gave to self-
legitimize the coup are empirically unable to explain the phenomenon. Nor do the constraints 
of structure, as the structuralist accounts make one believe, explain it since the military was 
already in political power structurally. Hence, from this perspective, there should not be any 
coup at all. Similarly, path dependency approach also suffers from empirical, if not 
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theoretical, shortcomings. One wonders why the military had to take the pain to stage a coup 
when it was already on the „path‟ of domination of politics if not the state. Moreover, the 
conspiracy theorists have noting logical and/or empirical to support their conspiracies: there 
was no looming Indian threat; the US was already seen differently by the GHQ post-1965 
war. Thus, in light of the above, following is an agency and rationalist explanation of the 
coup. The secondary aim of this analysis is to test the posed hypotheses.  
 
To begin with, the March coup was staged by the military‟ agency: its inherent capability, as 
a rational actor, to affect change. In this case, the change in terms of coup was political in 
nature. The rational military having calculated the anti-Ayub movement wanted to achieve 
the following: a) it wanted to maintain its political principalship since it was essential to 
flourish economically as shall be explained in the adjacent section. Additionally, it had a plan 
to protect the institutional prestige and integrity in the wake of popular criticism against 
extremely unpopular Ayub-led military rule- Ayub got replaced for this very purpose; b) the 
coup-attempt was calculated to maintain a hold on the slipping political space vis-à-vis the 
shirking politicians. Had there been no coup, she had to compromise her political interests in 
terms of handing over authority to shirking politicians; c) the military wanted to do politics 
with her rules of the game- the LFO is a case in point. In this regard, having staged the coup, 
it was able to buy time to effectively deal with the opposition. Had it not been the case then 
the political implication of non-action would have harmed military‟s political, if not 
economic, interests to a great extent. 
 
Thus, in light of the above it is maintained that the coup is the outcome of military agency in 
terms of , on the one hand, not sharing  the political power with the shirking politicians, and 
on the other, strategically interacting with working section of the agents especially politicians 
(agency A). The staging of the coup,  the consequent military rule and new rules of the game- 
which consequently led to country‟s breakup- point to the fact, in unequivocal terms, that the 
military, and working agents for that matter, gave more preference to their own than larger, 
national interests (agency B). 
 
In addition, as hypothesized it is posited that the coup-event highlights the comparative 
political weakness rather than strength of the military institution vis-à-vis other actors 
especially the shirking politicians. Because had the military politically been powerful and/or 
influential as is described by the existing accounts, then it would have been able to negotiate 
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the rules of the game with the shirking actors in an interactive strategic environment short of 
a coup d‟état. 
 
So far, the trust of the analysis has been on the political dimension of principalship. In the 
following section, the study, as per its hypothesis, tends to explain whether the assumption of 
political power in the capacity of principal facilitated military‟s economic interests.     
 
4.6.1 Maximizing Economic Interests 
The Yahya years, as explained under the securitization variable, were very chaotic as regards 
the political situation in the country. Therefore, military‟s economic activities did not 
increase substantially in this period- late March 1969 to late December 1971. Nevertheless, 
the process of maximizing economically continued. For instance, the army was able to 
establish, on 27 October 1971, the Army Welfare Trust (AWT) - the second welfare 
foundation after the FF. The raison d‟état behind its establishment was the inability of the 
Fauji Foundation to cater for needs of the army. However, this logic has its critics which 
points to the FF being dominated by the army already. The latter was responsible to inject 
investment to the AWT to run business enterprises the benefits of which were to be reaped by 
retired army personnel and their dependants.  
 
In addition, the financial help could have been sought from the Trust by army‟s high 
command apparently for its other welfare related projects. Besides, in the absence of any data 
regarding the business functions of the Fauji Foundation, what can be assumed is- since the 
FF never got disbanded during this period- the Foundation continued with its economic 
ventures supposedly for the welfare purposes.  
 
Moreover, since the country was placed under the martial law by the Yahya-led military the 
top brass naturally held important military and political positions. No wonder then, Lt. Gen. 
S.G.M. Peerzada, the Principal Staff officer to the President and CMLA, Lt. Gen. (later 
General) Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff Army, Air Marshal Nur Khan, C-in-C Air Force, 
and Vice Admiral S.M. Ahsan, C-in-C Navy, were the decision makers at the back of Yahya 
Khan. The latter two were later appointed Governors of West Pakistan and East Pakistan 
respectively in August 1969. Also, two more generals, Maj. Gen. Umer, Chairman of the 
NSC, and Maj. Gen. Akbar, Chief-ISI, were able to join this exclusive club which continued 
to „enjoy privileged position‟ (Rizvi 2000:182-183). Thus, in the light of the above-
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mentioned evidences it is suffice to posit that the military under Yahya used its principalship 
to maximize its economic returns. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The chapter began by explaining the first successful coup staged in Pakistan‟s political 
history. Since the coup and the subsequent martial law was formally declared, on 7 October 
1958, by President Iskander Mirza- leader of the principal civil bureaucracy- this itself posed 
a puzzle which the study looked at theoretically and empirically. In this respect, it was 
posited that Mirza issued the coup/martial law proclamation in a strategic interaction with the 
agent military. The former‟s aim was to secure and prolong his-led bureaucracy‟s 
principalship vis-à-vis shirking politicians especially from East Bengal. However, the rational 
military, having calculated the costs and benefits, chose to sack Mirza within weeks after the 
formal declaration of martial law and thus, assumed the principal position. The civil 
bureaucracy, with no coercive means at its disposal, could not resist this change. Strangely, a 
section of it chose to ally with the military. So did a section of politicians.  
 
As regards the reasons/causes for this coup Mirza, in his address to the nation on 8 October 
1958, pointed to factors such as the deteriorating law and order situation, worsening 
economy, the need for a true democratic/constitutional rule and security of the state. Mirza‟s 
reasoning was supported by General and CMLA Ayub Khan the following day. Importantly, 
in the post-Mirza period the above-mentioned justification continued to hold. Interestingly, 
the analysis noted that the legitimist, path-dependent and structuralist accounts tend to 
legitimize the coup one way or the other. Therefore, the study took the coup as an analytic 
narrative of a combination of working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interest (agency 
B).  
 
To conduct the narrative, the chapter used the coup/martial law text as a point of departure 
and reference. With a system of coding, conceptual variables were identified; namely, law 
and order, economic factors, democratization, securitization, coup/martial law. The first four 
variables were theorized accordingly since the coup was already conceptualized in Chapter 1. 
Moreover, the analysis noticed a positive correspondence between each of the four variables 
and coup/martial law. However, since logically and empirically the cited/stated 
reasons/causes could not be justified, it was thought imperative to empirically and 
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theoretically analyze the positive correspondence between the occurrence of a coup and the 
other conceptual variables. 
 
Hence, with the help of qualitative/quantitative data (primary sources included), it was 
maintained that the law and order situation was relatively better as compared to post-coup 
years.  Had it deteriorated to the extent claimed, it was the Mirza-led principal which was 
responsible for this failure. Therefore, the study found no logical, empirical and moral 
reasons to put the county under martial law. Even the Ayub-led principal military could not 
maintain orderly rule for the statistical analysis pointed to a larger number of murder and 
riots in the final years of the Ayub-led military rule- indeed this was, from the military‟s 
perspective, one of the main reasons behind the second military coup. As regards the 
economic situation in the pre-coup period, it was posited that though key economic indicators 
pointed to a slowdown in economic growth, it was the principal bureaucracy which should 
have accepted responsibility rather than declare martial law. Nonetheless, the new principal 
did attempt to modernize Pakistan but the growth indicators it projected, were primarily 
based on foreign aid- which was also affected negatively by the 1965 war. Importantly, the 
military‟s economic policies helped increase the rich-poor gap and particularly, cross-
regional inequality, with the result that the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan opted for 
agitational politics.   
 
With respect to democratization, the chapter explained that measures such as a referendum 
and the Basic Democracies‟ system were meant primarily to depoliticize the political forces 
especially at the provincial level. Though, a section of politicians strategically allied with the 
principal in this project of democratization, there were also those who chose to shirk for their 
own rational reasons. Similarly, the stated purpose of securing Pakistan from threats 
remained a distant dream- given the ongoing military operations in Kashmir and consequent 
war with India, in 1965. Moreover, the West-concentrated defense measures during the war 
further alienated the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan, with the effect that they began to lose 
faith in the state- the Six-Points are a case in point. 
 
Having explained the empirically negative correspondence between the conceptual variables 
and the coup/martial law, the analysis reverted to the causal model for an alternative 
explanation. Quite contrary to the existing body of knowledge- the legitimists, structuralists, 
conspiracy theorists, path-dependents etc. - the chapter posited that it was the military‟s 
 186 
agency (the ability to make things happen) - which resulted in the coup. More specifically, 
being a rational actor the military made a calculation of costs and benefits of the action and 
chose to shirk and replace the civil bureaucracy as principal (agency A). In other words, the 
coup was rational rather than structural- or conspiratorial- in nature. Moreover, it was 
political in character for the primary aim was to capture political power in order to negotiate 
the rules of the game, on the military‟s own terms, with other actors concerned; a section of 
which, preferring its own to larger interests, strategically allied with the military. In addition,  
political power was used as an instrument by the principal military to maximize its own 
economic interests (agency B). In a nutshell, the 1958 coup was an outcome of agencies A 
and B.  
 
Having explained the October coup, the analysis returned to the narrative of Ayub‟s military 
rule final year- a time where his regime faced agitational politics led by shirking politicians 
of both wings of the country. It was maintained that the primary reason behind public 
uprisings against military rule was the latter‟s lack of preference for re-negotiating the rules 
of the game with shirking politicians such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rahman. Instead, the principal chose to stage another coup on 25 March 1969. As its leader, 
General Yahya Khan, in his maiden address to the nation the following day, cited worsening 
law and order and the falling economy as primary reasons/causes for this action. The need to 
democratize and securitize the state were stated as complementary factors to self-legitimize 
the event. Quite interestingly, the study founded that the legitimist accounts also tended to 
legitimize it. The structuralists and path-dependent works, on the other hand, compromised 
the context and causes respectively. Moreover, the military remained unable to provide 
conceptual basis for its statements regarding law and order and/or worsening economy. 
 
Therefore, the study preferred to conduct an analytic narrative of this second coup as well. In 
this respect, in the coup/martial law text conceptual variables, namely, law and order, 
economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law were identified. It was 
observed that there existed a positive relationship between coup/martial law and each of the 
rest. Hence, it was deemed necessary to empirically- while remaining within the framework 
of the model- explain not only the positive correspondence of these conceptual variables but 
also the status of cited claims by the military.    
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With respect to law and order, the following was maintained: a) the claim that the country 
was facing a serious law and order problem was illogical and immoral since the military, 
which had attempted to justify its 1958 intervention on this aground, had failed to accomplish 
this task under Ayub-led rule; b) the Yahya-led military rule also failed to maintain law and 
order despite resort to a military operation in East Pakistan. On the economic front, the 
regime‟s arbitrary economic approach helped increase poor-rich and cross-regional 
inequality. Similarly, though the martial law administration was able to promulgate  its rule 
of the games- martial law regulations/orders are cases in point- and hold general elections,  
no meaningful change was let to happen by the principal who, while preferring its own 
interests, chose not to hand over political power to the representatives of majority Bengalis. 
The former was strategically supported by a section of West Pakistan-based politicians who 
also saw to their personal interests. The non-transfer of authority politically further alienated 
more than half of country‟s population. To cap it all, the project of securitization in terms of a 
military operation in East Pakistan to cover up failures related to law and order, economy and 
democracy, was a complete disaster: it paved the way for the state‟s physical disintegration in 
December 1971.  
 
Having explained the negative correspondence between conceptual variables, the analysis 
then centered around the model in terms of applying its explanatory variables, namely, 
working/shirking and own/larger interests to explain dependent variable- coup d‟état. In this 
respect, the analytic narrative continued as an approach. Thus, it was posited that the coup 
was a result of military‟s agency- being a rational actor it was able to affect change.  Hence, 
in the specific context of late 1960s when the Ayub-led military rule was seriously challenged 
by the shirking politicians, the former, in order to preserve its principalship, chose to stage 
the coup. The coup was thus rational than structural/conspiratorial in nature. Moreover, it was 
political in character since the primary objective was to control the political situation from 
military‟s perspective. Moreover, it enabled the military to renegotiate the rules of the game 
with the agents especially politicians- the LFO is a case in point. 
 
Most importantly, the military, having retained its principalship, used its political clout to 
further its economic interests. However, since the county‟s political situation was unstable- 
especially in East Pakistan and due primarily to the principal‟s political and economic 
policies, the extent of economic ventures remained limited. The chapter concluded that the 
Pakistani state disintegrated due to the principal military‟s preference for its own rather than 
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national interests. Though a section of agents strategically allied, for their own interests, with 
the military as regards the military operation in the East, the ultimate power, however, lay 
with the former. Had preference been accorded to the national/larger interest in time, there 
was a high probability of Pakistan staying united. The breakup of the state increased the costs 
for the military to continue its principalship. Thus, in the post-partition period the dynamics 
of civil-military relations were quite different. The next chapter shall attempt to explain this 
in detail. 
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Chapter 5  
CMR in ‘New’ Pakistan 
This chapter begins by explaining the change in principal with the help of the study‟s causal 
model. The thrust of argument, in this respect, is that the politicians were able to assume 
principalship for the military could not bear the cost of confrontation with the political forces. 
Hence, rationality prevailed and the military chose to go back to barracks. This fact also 
points to the politicians‟ agency. However, having assumed political power, the Bhutto-led 
principal accorded more preference to its own political and economic interests. Moreover, the 
opposition politicians also saw to their own interests. However, this politics of interests 
primarily remained rule-bound- the 1973 constitution is a case in point. 
 
Nevertheless, Bhutto was able to introduce measures such as the establishment of Federal 
Security Force (FSF) to implicitly oversee the agent military.  Moreover, the cadre system of 
the civil bureaucracy was fundamentally modified in order to reduce its shirking potential. 
However, Bhutto chose to appease the agent military in terms of defense allocations for 
political reasons for the former had a constituency which looked to India from a 
confrontational perspective. Moreover, in order to fulfill his electoral promises the Bhutto 
government opted to nationalize many an industry. Though this project of nationalization was 
socialist in character- and it benefited a section of the populace- it further widened the gulf 
between Bhutto‟s PPP and the affected section, especially industrialists.  
 
The chapter further explains that in the middle of his government‟s tenure Bhutto, while 
preferring his own interests, opted to sideline the socialist-inspired section within his party. 
Instead, his reliance on the landed-interests grew since they had electoral prospects. 
Moreover, he rationally resorted to religion for political purposes. In addition, in 1976 a new 
phase of land reforms was initiated to supplement the earlier process which had hitherto 
remained unable to bring meaningful change in the land holdings. However, the opposition 
criticized these developments for being politically motivated. Bhutto was also seen as feudal 
and authoritarian by his opponents. Rational Bhutto, on his part, decided to hold general 
elections in order to appease the opposition and seek the electoral support of his favored 
section.  Though elections were held accordingly and Bhutto‟s PPP won a majority of seats, 
the opposition accused the government of rigging. Subsequently, the opposition politicians- 
the PNA- opted to agitational politics.  
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At this critical juncture of civil-military relations in Pakistan, the chapter explains that Bhutto 
chose to declare martial law- under the constitution though- in major cities in order to assert 
the principal‟s control over the military vis-à-vis the defiant opposition whose members 
wrote letters to the military to intervene in politics. The chapter emphasizes the agency and 
rationality of the military in its subsequent analysis. The military, having calculated the cost 
and benefits of the coup-action ultimately staged it on 5 July 1977. The reasons cited for the 
coup and consequent martial law were related to problems of law and order and state of the 
economy, the need to truly democratize Pakistan and protect it from any kind of threats.  
 
Since the existing accounts tend to legitimize the coup one way or the other, the chapter takes 
this coup as its centre of analysis. In this respect, it assumes the coup-text in terms of its 
stated reasons/causes as a point of departure and conducts an analytic narrative of the coup. 
Under the analytic narrative, conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, 
democratization, securitization and coup/martial law are identified in the text. The first four 
variables are shown to have positive correspondence with coup. In order to empirically 
determine the status of positive relationship between coup and each of the variables, the 
chapter carries out a comprehensive analytic narrative combining agencies A and B- 
working/shirking and own/larger interests respectively. The model-inspired empirical 
evidence however, points to a negative correspondence between coup and each of the 
conceptual variables.  
 
Thus, the chapter then reverts to the model- especially its explanatory variables- to explain 
the occurrences of the July coup. The primary aim here is to test the study‟s hypotheses. 
Finally, the chapter concludes that it is military agency which causes the coup.  The latter is 
rational rather than structural and/or conspiratorial in nature and political in character. The 
political power is instrumental to facilitate the military‟s economic interests.  
 
5.1 Agency and Rationality- The Change in Principal 
In the post-partitioned state of Pakistan the contours of civil-military relations were 
contextually different from pre break-up period. The military top brass including General 
Yahya had admitted the defeat on 16 December 1971 (Khan 1993:259-345). The military 
defeat and the break-up of the country were received angrily by the people and politicians of 
new Pakistan- the old West Pakistan. The people, who had paid for the higher defense budget 
one way or the other, decided to question the armed forces‟ performance in the operation as 
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well as the war against India. Hence, on 18 December, agitational politics was again 
witnessed by the new state. The people and politicians demanded the removal of General 
Yahya along with those responsible for the defeat. Importantly, the mid-rank officers in 
Gujranwala cantonment, who blamed the military high command for the capture of their 
90,000 fellows, also demanded instant change at the top (Nawaz 2008:314-325; Khan 
2002:431). 
 
Thus, in the wake of popular anger and violent demonstration and dissidence within its ranks, 
the institutionally demoralized and politically paralyzed military rationally chose to go back 
to barracks. Therefore, on 20 December with General-President-C-in-C Yahya Khan‟s 
resignation- a rational act to not only save his skin but also that of his institution- the 
principalship shifted to agent politicians since their preference had prevailed. Therefore, 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, as leader of the new principal, assumed the country‟s arbitrary 
presidentship along with CMLA status- a unique one indeed- on the same day. However, new 
leader of the agent military came from the army- Lieutenant General Gul Hasan.  
 
As regards Bhutto‟s assumption of important positions, it was a product of rational calculus 
of the former and the military. The former, on account of his electoral success and 
comparative popularity in new Pakistan, made rational decisions to strategically interact and 
ally with the military- whose agentship had just begun- to pursue his and his party‟s politico-
economic interests as shall be explained later in the chapter. The latter, due to its politico-
institutional limited set of choices, also rationally engaged with a politician who was 
electorally unmatched by any other in new Pakistan. Supposedly, had the military despite its 
constrained political space opted for another politician - or  bureaucrat and/or judge for that 
matter- the socio-political reaction from PPP-led populace would have been drastic for  
military‟s long term  interests if not that of the country. Therefore, the arguments (see 
Shafqat1997:120-122) that Bhutto was a military‟s man; that he took the charge in national 
service; that he was psychologically power-oriented; that he was a power-hungry „feudal‟ and 
representative of feudal class etc., are empirically unfounded. Had this been the case then 
Bhutto should not have left Ayub in political lurch and establish an anti-principal political 
party. Rather he should have join hands with Mujib to gain power to pursue personal and/or 
class interests. Quite to the contrary, Bhutto‟s political calculus in post-election period points 
to his agency and rationality which is explained in the following sections. 
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5.2 Politics of Interests: The Case of Bhutto 
Bhutto was a politician with an added advantage of a party which preferred the prevalent 
ideologies of socialism and nationalism to pursue political and economic goals. In addition, a 
reference to religion in term of Islamic socialism was also made to appeal and appease the 
authoritarian clergy who too had has its political parties. Besides, as Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, he issued orders and martial law regulations which covered a wide range of 
subjects. For instance, Mujib was released; top industrialists, who were his rivals, were put on 
exist control list; anti-Bhutto journalists were arrested; basic industries were nationalized- as 
shall be explained later- in light of Economic Reform Order 1972; Land Reforms Regulations 
was enacted in March 1972; colleges and schools got nationalized in April 1972 etc (Ahmed 
1972 and 1973). The following sections tend to explain these policy measures in details. 
 
5.2.1 Bhutto and the Opposition  
As explained earlier, in the post-partitioned state of Pakistan, Bhutto-led People‟s Party was 
able to assume the principal‟s seat. Yet the opposition politicians had a different set of 
preferences to achieve their respective interests. Therefore, the opposition especially the 
National Awami Party (NAP) gave warning to the civilian martial law regime to restore 
democracy or face the consequences. However, having read the situation, rational Bhutto was 
able to reach an accord with Wali Khan-  leader of the NAP- and Mufti Mahmood- head of 
Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)- with respect to lifting the martial law, forming of governments 
in NWFP and Balochistan on majority principle and issuance of an interim constitution.  
 
As a result of preference-convergence between PPP and a section of the opposition, Bhutto 
issued National Assembly (Short Session) Order 1972 on 23 March 1972. Hence, under the 
order the NA session was called on 14 April 1972 where Bhutto was elected President of the 
Assembly unanimously. Importantly, unlike Bangladesh where fresh mandate was given to 
Awami League, in Pakistan‟s case the situation was quite the opposite. In the latter‟s case, 
Bhutto had given incentives to non-PPP politicians to support his party politically. The 
opposition politicians- especially from non-Punjab provinces-, due to their poor performance 
in the 1970 election, preferred to be part of the principal without a reference to their 
respective constituency. Nevertheless, the Interim Constitution- under which all the „existing 
laws were continued in force with necessary adaptations‟ (Khan 2002: 453) - was accordingly 
adopted by the NA on 20 April; the following day martial law was lifted. Subsequently, 
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under the interim arrangements Bhutto got elected as President of Pakistan. However, the 
governorship of NWFP and Balochistan went to NAP/JUI as part of rational understanding. 
 
Having politically controlled the situation, at least for the time being, Bhutto turned to foreign 
policy. The country that occupied his attention was none other than India- which kept 90,000 
soldiers as POW. The agent military was desperate about this issue along with the captured 
territory. In order to get himself politically more popular, and on the other, appease the 
military, Bhutto was able to negotiate successfully with Indra Gandhi the two issues at Simla 
in July 1972.  
 
Domestically, since the formation of the civilian government of NAP-JUI in NWFP and 
Balochistan, the common man was disenchanted with PPP and its coalition-partners‟ politics 
of confrontation, which was grounded in difference of preferences towards issues of economy 
and society. The PPP had an agenda of nationalization which faced resistance from tribalism 
of the two provinces. In order to politico-electorally reach in the two provinces in term of 
nationalization, Bhutto, in April 1972, chose to ally with Abdul Qayyum Khan- a veteran 
anti-NAP politician with a party of his own- the Qayyum Muslim League (QML). The latter 
was thus appointed minister of interior. The PPP‟s alliance with QML and its policies were 
equally confronted by the NAP-JUI coalition. Each side started a series of allegations: the 
Bhutto camp alleged the NAP-JUI to have involved in anti-state activities along with anti-
Punjabi measures; the NAP-JUI side accused PPP-QML of unnecessary interference in 
provincial matters. 
 
Consequently, the resultant mutual mistrust along with PPP‟s policy to create its own 
constituency in the two provinces would have made a presence in the choice-ranking of 
Bhutto who ultimately acted to dismiss Balochistan‟s Chief Minister and Governor on 14 
February 1973. Reactively but rationally, the NAP-JUI government in the Frontier province, 
in order to pressurize Bhutto, resigned in protest. In the following months, the top politicians 
from Balochistan- Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri- were 
arrested and put behind bars. Additionally, in Sindh, between early-mid 1972, the Bhutto 
government had to deal with Sindhi-Urdu controversy which was initiated by his cousin-
Chief Minister, Mumtaz Bhutto. The government‟s political handling of the issue led to 
language riots- see Table 20 on page 212 in this respect. However, despite the agitational 
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politics led by opposition politicians, a good number of whom were arrested, the Sindhi was 
declared official language of the province.  
 
5.2.1.1 Negotiating Rules of the Game 
As mentioned earlier, the interim constitution was an ad hoc arrangement in terms of 
informal rules of the game to prevent the state from further liquidation and run the 
governmental affairs. However, when the aggrieved opposition especially the NAP-JUI 
started leveling the public opinion against Bhuttoism, President Bhutto saw more benefits in 
the office of prime minister since his party already formed majority in the National 
Assembly.  Moreover, he had a preference for a consensual document i.e. constitution. Had 
he opted to go on his own, the autonomist NAP-JUI would have challenged it on the ground 
that it is partially-representative since PPP had lost elections in NWFP and Balochistan. 
 
In addition, the opposition politicians and their comparatively smaller and factionalized 
parties also favor the parliamentary system due to interests; a) they, at this point of time, did 
not opt to confront a powerful PPP; b) in a parliamentary system there is an opportunity to 
form coalition even against a major party i.e. PPP; c) had they opted for presidential system, 
then Bhutto‟s ongoing presidentship would not have been lost upon them. Thus, as a result of 
strategic interaction with the opposition, Bhutto, on 17 April 1972, appointed twenty-five 
members, six from the former constitution committee, to negotiate the formal rules of the 
game in terms of drafting the future constitution of Pakistan.  After long rounds of political 
negotiations between government and deeply-divided opposition, the committee, in October, 
was able to reach an accord on the basics of the rules. Subsequently, a Constitutional Bill was 
moved in the National Assembly on 30 December to opposition‟s disappointment. The latter 
had found that the Bill violates the accord in many respects. Therefore, in order to further 
press the government for Islamic-democratic constitution, the opposition was able to form an 
alliance- the United Democratic Front (UDF) - which put its proposals before Bhutto who 
first put them aside, but later took them for consideration.  
 
As a result, on 10 April 1973, the National Assembly passed the Constitution consensually. 
Indeed, there were not any dissenting votes by all the political parties on the floor; however, 
there were a few abstentions. 
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Box 5.1 The 1973 Constitution deemed its Abrogation ‘High Treason’ 
 
The 1973 Constitution was a big achievement of the politicians. They were finally 
able to make a consensus Constitution. It established a parliamentary form of 
government...Its main feature were…Council of Common Interests, National 
Finance Commission, Islamic provisions…The Islamic provisions, however, did 
not make the country Islamic since the Council of Islamic Ideology had only a 
recommendatory role…The smaller provinces though did not get what they wanted 
to, the important thing was that they got a document under which they can bargain 
for more…[Also] The Constitution had a provision [article 6] which deemed its 
abrogation high treason. It [article 6] was actually incorporated with the aim to stop 
military takeovers in the future. 
  
Interview with Hashim Sabir Raja, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab. Lahore: 20 March 
2008. 
 
 
What the above informs is that the politicians, despite their political and ideological 
differences were able to negotiate formal rules of the game for rational reasons as mentioned 
earlier. Importantly, this marked their agency in terms of working together for a common 
cause. Moreover, with the passage of the constitution, Bhutto, with good bargaining skills, 
was able not only to get all laws i.e. proclamations, martial law regulations/orders, 
President‟s orders, validated but also got indemnified the actors involved. In addition, Bhutto 
maneuvered the opposition in such a manner that the existing assembly was to continue till 
August 1977. Last but not least, before the Constitution could get enforced on 14 August 
1973, elections to senate, offices of President and Prime Minster were completed 
accordingly. The latter were assumed by PPP candidates; Indeed, Bhutto himself sworn in as 
PM on 12 August 1973. 
  
5.2.1.2 Politics under the Rules 
Prime Minister Bhutto, with rules of the game formalized, started his politics afresh. The 
rule-oriented politics had two parallel but opposite aspects: first, it had a confrontational 
overtone- the third amendment is a case in point; secondly, it carried a cooperative tinge. As 
regards its operationalization, a few days after the commencement of the Constitution, top 
politician from Balochistan were arrested on charges of corruption, malpractices etc., and put 
behind bars as a consequence of confrontational politics. However, the cooperative part was 
enacted when the PM, in order to politically control the situation in the wake of anti-
Ahmediyya movement- which got impetus again in May 1974-, got the latter declared non-
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Muslims in strategic alliance with the opposition especially authoritarian clergy
56
. For this 
purpose, the constitution was amended. Was the state‟s interference in religious matters 
justified religiously? 
 
Box 5.2 The State should protect its Minorities 
 
I think it is not the responsibility of the state to declare someone Muslim 
or non-Muslim. It should rather provide equal opportunities especially of 
education to its citizen. However, the fact of the matter is the Ahmedis 
had taken initiative to religiously differentiate itself from rest of the 
Muslims. What the general Muslims did to them was reactive in nature. 
But it never means that their honor, person and property are harmed by 
any person, party or even the state. 
 
Interview with Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, Religious Scholar and Founder of Al-
Mawrid- an Islamic research Institute. Lahore: 22 March 2008. 
 
 
What can be posited in light of the above is that the government- as part of the state- deemed 
it necessary to use religion for political purposes despite the fact that the Objective 
Resolution could only serve as preamble to the constitution. Moreover, the politicians 
accorded more preference to purely contentious religious issues rather than to provide basic 
amenities to the citizenry. Nonetheless, the Bhutto government continued with its policy of 
rule-oriented politicking. 
 
On the foreign policy front, it took due advantage of country‟s cordial relations with the Arab 
countries which were to be invited to the Second Islamic Summit Conference to be held in 
Lahore (see Moskalenko 1974) . In the wake of the conference, there emerged an opportunity 
to constitutionally determine the status of East Pakistan as the matter was left open in the 
constitution. Therefore, as a result of Bhutto and Arab leaders‟ agency, Bangladesh was 
recognized by Pakistan as an independent and sovereign state in 1974 (Brown 1972:179-
186). In addition, the recognition of Bangladesh had a rational dimension too: why not accept 
an existent reality and politically cash it vis-à-vis India, since another Muslim country was 
bordering her. In addition, the PM got another opportunity, when India went nuclear at 
                                               
56 Abdul-Hafeez Pirzada, the then PPP-cohort and close aide of Z.A. Bhutto, told  in a recent television 
program- Tonight with Najam Sethi (3 January 2010)- that „ the move  to declare Ahmedis  non-Muslims was 
primarily a [political] compromise in order to control the situation on the street. Had this move not been made, 
severe damage would have been caused to the state and the society‟. For details see: 
http://www.dunyanews.tv/newsite/play_program_video.php?id=6731&pid=1793. 
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Pokhran the same year, to politically further arise by signaling the start of Pakistan‟s nuclear 
program. In sum, Bhutto government‟s foreign policy contours were politically oriented since 
Bhutto had, during the 1970 elections, played with the Indian card- the next section explains 
it in a little more detail. 
 
5.2.2 Oversighting the Agents? 
As is already mentioned, Bhutto was a rational politician who believed in his agency- the 
inherent ability to affect change. Importantly, he was an extraordinarily intelligent politician 
who probably having worked with Ayub in various ministerial capacities had grasped the 
military‟s methodology if not mindset. Also, logically he would have known the working of 
civil bureaucracy more deeply. After all, both the military and civil bureaucracy had acted as 
principal contextually. Therefore, in order to secure the civilian principalship against the non-
parliamentary, non-elective and undemocratic institutions, Bhutto preferred to restructure 
them in such a way that their institutional capacity is de-concentrated if not de-centralized.   
 
Thus, the first victim in this regard was civil bureaucracy which was put to scrutiny and 
screening under a martial law regulation in March 1972. As many as 13,00 bureaucrats were 
scrutinized on charges of inefficiency, corruption misconduct etc. Moreover, further 
measures were taken in March 1973 to „reform‟ the administrative system of Pakistan. In 
Kennedy‟s words  
The implementation of Bhutto‟s service reforms altered the cadre system of 
organization of the bureaucracy in several important ways. First, the CSP, the lineal 
descendant of the ICS, was abolished. Its membership was scattered to the newly-
created District Management Group, Tribal Areas Group, and the Secretariat 
Group…Second, the practice of designating non-CSP officers as „listed post holders‟ 
in the All-Pakistan Services was abolished. Third, as a consequence of the former the 
century-old practice of the reservation of posts for members of the CSP and other elite 
services was discontinued. Fourth, the domain of All-Pakistan Services newly- 
constituted as the All-Pakistan Unified Grade; was expanded to include a majority of 
non-CSP and Non-PSP officers. Fifth, the former accounts services (PAAS, PMAS, 
and PRAS) were merged to form the Accounts Group.  Finally, the composition of the 
PFS was greatly modified and expanded to form the Foreign Affairs Group…Given 
the heretofore impervious nature of the cadre system, such modifications were indeed 
„revolutionary‟. 
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                                                                                                 (Kennedy 1987:105-106) 
 
The crux of the quote is that the „cadre system‟ was fundamentally modified.  Besides, under 
the 1973 Constitution, little relief was provided to the agent civil bureaucracy.  
 
 
Box 5.3 The Civil Bureaucracy-related Reforms were politically-
motivated 
 
The bureaucracy reforms under Bhutto were primarily politically-
driven. He did not want to have a strong bureaucracy. The reforms 
opened the gate for political appointments. The aim was to have a 
pliable bureaucracy which could implement the government‟s 
policies based on nationalization. 
 
A civil bureaucrat from the Police Department shared these views with the 
author on 25 April 2008 in Islamabad. 
 
 
Thus, in light of the foregoing, it is maintained that the civil bureaucracy reforms were 
primarily politically motivated as it provided the Bhutto government a „lateral entry‟ into the 
services. Hence, political appointments, often of PPP affiliates, were made to benefit the 
allies and create a semblance of oversight of the agent bureaucracy (Khan 2002:513). 
 
As regards the agent military, the indicators of implicit oversight- since the government opted 
not to pronounce and/or project it in this way- are concerned, the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator had a strategy, if not a proper plan, to be operationalized.  The first step taken 
in this respect was a PTV program which aimed at highlighting the military‟s weaknesses 
during the military operation in (former) East Pakistan and the 1971 war. The purpose of this 
move was clearly political: to get the military demoralized in popular perspectum.  Secondly, 
in an unprecedented move the CMLA sacked the C-in-C and air chief- Lieutenant General 
Gul Hasan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan respectively- on 3 March 1972 (Khan 
1993:384). They were replaced with General Tikka Khan and Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry 
accordingly. 
 
Interestingly enough, the sacked officers, when given the choice by Bhutto preferred 
ambassadorship in Europe to maximize politico-economically. This fact should further 
corroborate agency and rationality of the generals who in the past staged coups for their own 
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interests. Moreover, in August 1972 Bhutto got Brig. Ali, Lt. Col. Muhammad Kurshid, Col. 
Aleem Afridi, Col. Javed Iqbal, Brig. Iqbal Medhi Shah and Major General R.D. Shamim 
removed, for they, in the former‟s view, attempted to prevent the return of civilian rule in 
1971 (Nawaz 2008:335). Importantly, in order to reduce government‟s reliance on the army 
and general police for that matter- with respect to governance-, Bhutto established a parallel 
paramilitary organization, the Federal Security Force (FSF), in September 1972. This 
measure could fall under the implicit oversight mechanism which the politicians as principal 
had failed to come up with earlier. However, even at this critical juncture of civil-military 
relations, the establishment of FSF was politically driven move rather than purely 
institutionally.   
 
These politically-oriented actions by Bhutto-led principal was assumed as anti-military 
measures by the latter. Though the military, at this point of time, was not politically and 
institutionally in a position  to take the risk of a coup,  a few „young officers‟ led by Major 
Farouk Adam Khan opted to shirk in terms of attempting a coup against the Bhutto  
government on 30 March 1973. However due to effective military intelligence under General 
Tikka Khan, the plotters were arrested and  subjected to court martial  under Major General 
Zia-ul-Haq. The young officers were found guilty and therefore met with hard punishment. 
Bhutto, to make an example out of them for the rest of the military institution, „had the 
convicted officers distributed across the country in distant jails.‟ (ibid 2008:336-338). 
 
Moreover, having cognized the history of military coups and martial laws and importantly the 
recent attempted coup, Bhutto decided to go one step further. As is already mentioned, he 
was able to insert a provision in the 1973 Constitution which read:  
(1) Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or 
attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or 
by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason. (2) Any person aiding 
or abetting the acts mentioned in clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason. 
(3) [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] shall by law provide for the punishment of persons 
found guilty of high treason. 
                                                                                                (The Constitution 1973:Article 6) 
 
The incorporation of this specific provision serves, if read in conjunction with earlier 
measures taken in this respect, as a constitutional indicator of civilian oversight of the 
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military. Last but not least, as an implicit act of oversight the principal opted to order military 
operations against the Baloch nationalists between December 1972 to July 1977.
57
  
Two factors seem to have prevailed on Bhutto in this regard: first, military 
confrontation with the NAP-sponsored Baloch movement would not only drastically 
curtail the power of that party in the trans-Indus provinces but also enhance the 
popularity of the PPP government in the Punjab which was the core military 
recruitment area. Second, Bhutto did not see any harm in limited involvement of the 
military contingents in Baluchistan which was remote from the public mind in Punjab 
and elsewhere. This way the military would be fighting for national security on an 
internal front and would be off his back. 
                                                                                                              (Waseem 1994:323-324) 
 
The above-quoted, on the one hand, further corroborates the study‟s foregoing analysis, and 
on the other, points to the fact that the Balochistan operations were carried out on the orders 
of the principal. Importantly, the ordering of the operations highlights principal politicians‟ 
agency and rationality for they primarily saw to their own/party interests. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, the start of nuclear program by Bhutto government was basically political 
in nature. Being a politician with a constituency to look up to, at least during the elections, 
Bhutto had, more or less like the military, perceived India as a security threat to Pakistan. The 
agent military‟s input with respect to foreign/defense policy hence converged with the 
principal‟s preference. Thus, it should then not come as a surprise when the government 
opted to permit an increase in the defense expenditures during its tenure -see Table 18 on the 
next page.  
 
On its part, the military, in order to institutionally build up itself, utilized the much-needed 
money on various projects of modernization. Here, it is imperative to posit that the increase 
in the Indian defense expenditure, during more or less the same period, is not necessarily 
Pakistan-centered since India, after its defeat in 1962, had China in mind as a potential threat 
(Smith 1994:79-80). 
 
 
 
                                               
57 For a Baloch nationalist perspective, see Baloch, Inayatullah. 1987. The Problem of “Greater Baluchistan”: A 
Study of Baluch Nationalism. 
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Table 18 Defense Expenditure: 1972-1977 
Year Defense Expenditure 
 (Rs. million) 
Percentage of total 
Expenditure 
 
1971-72 
 
3,725.5 
 
59.09 
1972-73 4,439.6 59.34 
1973-74 4,948.6 42.02 
1974-75 6,914.2 42.83 
1975-76 8,103.4 46.00 
1976-77 8,120.6 
 
44.71 
    Source: Rizvi. 2000. 
 
Last but not least, to further consolidate the principal‟s control over the agent military, Bhutto 
opted for Zia, who in the former‟s calculus was pliable, introvert, apolitical and junior in 
rank. So, having by-passed six senior generals Bhutto appointed Zia COAS on 1 March 1976.  
Furthermore, PM Bhutto 
also strengthened his hold on decision-making related to defense matters. Having 
already deduced the former C-in-C of services to COS [Chief of Staff- for each 
service], he issued a White paper on Higher Defense Organization in May 1976 that 
gave the prime minister ultimate authority on matters related to defense and national 
security. A Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) would assist the prime minister 
in his deliberations, while a defense council headed by the defense minister would 
implement the DCC‟s decisions. Meanwhile, Bhutto continued to increase the 
strength of his newly-raised FSF from about 14,000 in 1974 to over 18,000 in 1976. 
The Pakistan Army [military] remained wary of this move. 
                                                                                                                        (Nawaz 2008:343) 
 
What can be posited in view of the above is that the principal had taken conscious measures 
to re-organize the former principal, the military, in order to control it. Little wonder, the 
Supreme Commander of the military (the Army, the Navy, the Air Force- see Organigram, in 
this respect, on the next page) was the country‟s President, constitutionally. Paradoxically, 
however, the principal politicians, while seeing to their own political interests, allocated 
significant amount of national budget to meet defense expenditure. As already explained, the 
agent but rational military, on its part, bought time to build and modernize itself. In this 
regard, the unity of command (by army chief in the case of the army, in particular, and the 
military, in general) played an important role.  
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Source: Siddiqa 2003:49 
 
5.2.2.1 The State of Agent Judiciary  
As regards the state of judiciary, it was little better than the bureaucracy institutionally. The 
third and fourth constitutional amendments- an indicator of politics under rules- curtailed the 
courts‟ jurisdiction and limited its powers related especially to contempt of court and judges‟ 
transfer. The Bhutto government took these measures in view of institution‟s history of 
political alliances, pro-military verdicts
58
, appointments and promotions. The amendments in 
question were an indicator of constitutional oversight to make judiciary do the principal‟s 
bidding. 
 
5.3 Politics of Interests Revisited 
As mentioned earlier, Bhutto‟s PPP had a pronounced agenda of nationalization grounded in 
socialism. Therefore, in order to politico-electorally reach and cultivate the masses- whom 
the slogan of roti, kapra and makan 
59
was already eared to since the 1970 elections-, many 
reform measures were taken between 1972-76 period in the sector of labor, industry, 
education, health and land. To begin with, with respect to industrial labor, which had over the 
years emerged as a pressure group, a new labor policy was initiated which provided for 
compulsory bonuses and relatively free education and medical care etc. However, these 
measures were heavily criticized by mill owners, who complained of additional costs of Rs. 
400 per worker per annum, and importantly investors who had a preference for capital-
intensive machinery. Moreover, the policy had negative effect on the trades unions which 
decreased in number due to the emergence and multiplicity of workers‟ councils. However, 
despite this labor measures, the industrial labor opted for agitational politics which resulted in 
police-workers encounters- 15 in 1972, 26 in 1973 and 32 in 1974 (see Table 20 on page 
212). 
 
Similarly, Bhutto‟s education policy set for many goals in terms of establishment of 276,000 
literacy centers, provision of 225,000 additional teachers and a National Literacy Corps, 
establishment of new universities, establishment of University Grant Commission, 
establishment of National Book Foundation and the National Curriculum Bureau and Service 
                                               
58 As explained in Chapter 4 the agent judiciary opted to legitimize Mirza/Ayub-led coup/martial law on the 
basis of controversial doctrine of necessity. However, her judgment regarding the second coup/martial law came 
posthumously: it declared Yahya a „usurper‟ in a post-Yahya period (see Khan 2002:444-445). 
59 Roti, Kapra and Makan stand for bread, cloth and a house respectively. 
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Corps and importantly nationalization of 178 private collages and 3,693 private schools. 
However, despite the impressive measures taken, the education policy was also politically 
motivated with the aim to, on the one hand, relieve the middle class, and on the other, to 
depoliticize the politically-minded intelligentsia.  
 
Nevertheless, the students especially of universities, the affected teachers and owners of 
nationalized institutions resented these measures vehemently. In addition, the health related 
measures were basically unrealistic given the goals set and limited economic capacity to meet 
them. By and large, the three reform policies were political rather than institutional in nature. 
These, by the very chemistry of their character, demanded more powers to be given to the 
civil bureaucracy for their intended implementation. 
 
Similarly, though Bhutto‟s land reforms of 197260 and 1977 were ostensibly meant to 
rationalize the landholdings to increase agricultural productivity, they also met with, more or 
less, the same political fate and that at the hands of PPP‟s landed-interest, who preferred to 
legislate at the provincial level in order to maximize their own economic interests. 
 
Box 5.4 The Land Reforms was a Farce 
 
The land reforms under Bhutto, and for that matter under Ayub, were a 
political drama to please the poor farmers and tenets temporarily. The big 
landowners let not any meaningful decrease in their landholdings happen. 
Where it [decrease in land ceilings] happened, it was mostly of anti-PPP 
landowners or small-medium size farmers who had already little resources to 
seek political or judicial help. 
 
 A 55 year ex-Patwari [land record keeper] and Zamindar [landowner] informed the 
author in April 2008. 
 
 
Thus, efforts at reforms, as the afore-mentioned suggests, changed little as regards socio-
economic conditions of the poor, overall.  However, this never implies the country overall 
faced an economic crisis as is normally projected- this shall be explained later in the chapter. 
What can be here emphasized is that the politics of interests prevailed to the extent that intra-
PPP politics- often between reform-oriented and land-oriented sections- generated political 
and policy differences to be faced and settled by Bhutto himself. Moreover, by the mid-1970s 
                                               
60  For details, see Sayeed 1975. 
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Chairman Bhutto, who was able to replace one dissident politician with other at party and 
governmental level, had limited set of choices; either to side with proponents of the 
nationalization project or the landed-interests which were direct affectees of the 
government‟s land reforms. According preference to his long-term political interests Bhutto 
chose to sack his socialism-oriented comrades and sided with the landed-aristocrats with 
electoral prospects due to their local influence among the socio-economically resource-less 
section of the population.  
 
The general elections under the constitution had to be held before 14 August 1977. Bhutto 
had started implicit campaign since early 1976. He invoked his successes with respect to the 
1973 Constitution, Simla Agreement, initiation of nuclear program, Sino-Pakistan friendship 
etc. Moreover, he attempted to sell his performance at domestic front with reference to 
reform measures. His main aim was to attract the poorest of the poor who could probably 
elect him again. When the government, in January 1977, formally announced the election 
scheduled for March, nine opposition parties were subsequently able to unite under Pakistan 
National Alliance- the PNA (Syed 1977). The PNA election campaign remained overall 
Bhutto-centric: that he ruined Pakistan‟s economy, society, and ideology; and that he himself 
was un-Islamic. Nonetheless, the Bhutto-led PPP, after having chosen landed-elite as its core 
candidature, finally contested the National Assembly election on March 7- the NA results are 
as below: 
 
 Table 19 1977 Elections: National Assembly Results 
 PPP PNA Independents  
Province Seats 
won 
% of 
total 
Seats 
won 
% of 
total 
Seats 
won 
% of total Total 
Punjab 107 93.0 8 7.0 - - 115 
Sindh 32 74.4 11 25.6 - - 43 
NWFP 8 30.8 17 65.4 1 3.8 26 
Balochistan 7 100.0 - - - - 7 
Islamabad 1 100.0 - - - - 1 
Tribal 
Areas 
- - - - 8 100 8 
 155 77.5 36 18.0 9 4.5 200 
  Source: Election Commission of Pakistan. 
 
As is obvious from the table, PPP was able to win comprehensively. The PNA was defeated 
everywhere except in NWFP. However, instead of accepting the results, The PNA 
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had all along mobilized the people against what it perceived as the government‟s 
plans to rig the elections. In fact, some quarters had predicted that the PNA would 
boycott the provincial elections on 10 March in the case of a sweeping PPP victory in 
the National Assembly elections. That is exactly what the PNA decided to do…The 
world press was circumspect in this respect. The Guardian, for example, 
acknowledged that „Mr. Bhutto has won unfairly and by no means squarely. But, there 
is a certain crude legitimacy to his victory.‟ However, the PNA was not prepared to 
bestow this legitimacy…It started its agitation from 14 March…Bhutto‟s offer to 
enter into a dialogue with the opposition was rejected by the PNA, which demanded 
his resignation…and the holding of fresh elections under the joint supervision of the 
Army and the Judiciary. 
                                                                                                 (Waseem 1994: 335-336) 
 
What the quote informs is that the PNA had a plan to bring Bhutto down one way or the other 
for rational reasons. The personalistic politicians, while preferring their petty to national 
interests had gone to the extent of inviting the military to intervene in country‟s politics 
again. However, rational Bhutto had his own game plan. In the wake of rigging allegation, he 
opted to appease the PNA in terms of offering a judicial enquiry and holding a referendum on 
the issue of his continuation as PM- in fact, he got the constitution amended for the sake of a 
referendum. However, the more Bhutto chose to reconcile, the more the opposition 
demanded. The PNA‟s agitataional politics, its demands, Bhutto‟s preference, and the 
military‟ attitude are explained in the next section. 
 
5.4 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Third Coup 
In the post-election period, the opposition, united for its political interests under the banner of 
PNA, had become devastatingly demanding. Since they deemed Bhutto government un-
Islamic and socialist, a resort to religion was made to arouse the public. Thus, the demands 
for the establishment of Nizam-e-Mustafa (the Prophet‟s system) was vociferously put 
forward. Not only this, it order to operationalized their plan for the system- in case Bhutto 
refuses-, they had brought their „thousands of students from orthodox religious seminaries‟ in 
order to wage a jihad against the un-Islamic government. Bhutto, on his part, decided 
rationally also. In order to appease the authoritarian clergy- JUI-JI-JUP were part of the 
PNA- and control the situation, he announced, on April 17, certain aspects of Sharia whereby 
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drinking alcohol and gambling  were prohibited officially; Friday was declared holiday also 
(see Wilder 1995). 
 
Nevertheless, Bhutto‟s Sharia measurers could not satisfy the opposition politicians who 
resorted to agitataional politics. On April 20, they called for a strike which was observed 
almost country-wide and caused problems of governance. Therefore, Bhutto, in order to 
maintain relative law and order, decided to declare partial martial law in Lahore, Karachi and 
Hyderabad under article 245 of the Constitution. Moreover, he got an amendment passed to 
the Army Act that enabled military action with retrospective effect. Importantly, the three 
services chiefs preferred to work- to remain under the principal‟s control. To this, Air 
Marshal (retd)-cum politician Asghar Khan, also head of a party which was part of the PNA, 
wrote letter to various military officers to shirk- disobey the civilian orders (Khan 1983:114-
118; also 2002:132-133). 
 
At this critical juncture of civil-military relations, whereby the former was able to maintain 
non-institutionalized civilian control through various politico-economic and administrative 
measures, the principal led by Bhutto showed possible caution to deal with the otherwise 
political military with a history of coups and martial laws. Thus, Bhutto‟s preference to 
declare martial law (under the constitution), amend the Army Act and consult the services 
chiefs was politically driven. In an environment where the opposition was calling for his skin, 
in a country where coups and martial laws were no exception and a nation where politicians 
and their parties were personalistic and desperately urging the military to takeover, PM 
Bhutto thought it rational to strategically interact and meaningfully engage the agent military. 
Had he maintained distance at this stage, the political signal it would have sent to the 
opposition was that the military was no longer under control.  
 
Nonetheless, to add insult to injury, the agent judiciary, out of blue, also decided to register 
her agency. On 2 June, the martial law was declared unconstitutional by the Lahore High 
Court. The court‟s judgment took the choice of applying military means for crisis-
management, away. The political choice, however, was still there for Bhutto and the PNA. 
From 3 June to 2 July, both parties progressed towards an agreement in an atmosphere 
of extreme mistrust. The agreement included the dissolution of assemblies, the 
holding of fresh elections on 7 October, constituting a supreme Implementation 
Council for overseeing compliance with the accord and appointment of higher 
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officers, withdrawal of the army to barracks in Baluchistan, the release of political 
prisoners as well as the withdrawal of the Emergency, Defense of Pakistan Ordinance, 
special courts and tribunals, Section 144 and restriction on press freedom. On 2 July, 
the opposition‟s negotiating team put the final manuscript of its accord with the 
government before the PNA‟s central council. It was categorically rejected by Asghar 
Khan and a few others. On the night of 4-5 July, the long-dreaded army [military] rule 
finally arrived. 
                                                                                                              (Waseem 1994:338-339) 
 
On 5 July, army chief General Zia-ul-Haq, whom Bhutto had superseded over six generals, 
had successfully staged the third military coup d‟état in Pakistan‟s history. Subsequently, the 
1973 Constitution was abrogated- though the General preferred to call it being „put in 
abeyance‟-; the National and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved; and importantly PM 
Bhutto put under „protective‟ custody (Rizvi 1984). Moreover, the General, like his 
predecessors, made, though in a totally different context, the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, having coercively and arbitrarily violated the rules of the game set laboriously by 
the politicians, the CMLA promulgated Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977 to run the 
state. The courts were not allowed to touch orders, regulations etc., issued by martial law 
authorities. Interestingly, the agent judiciary decided rationally: when given the choice on the 
Box 5.5 Excerpts from General Zia’s Proclamation, 5 July 1977 
 
It must be quite clear to you now that when the political leaders failed to 
steer the country out of crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed 
Forces to sit as silent spectators…I saw no prospects of a compromise 
between the People‟s Party and PNA…It was feared that the failure of the 
PNA and PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country into 
chaos…The Army had, therefore, to act as a result of which the 
Government of Mr. Bhutto has ceased to exist: Martial Law has been 
imposed throughout the country: the National and Provincial Assemblies 
have been dissolved and the provincial Governors and Ministers have 
been removed…the elections had been rigged on a large scale…[Thus ] I 
genuinely feel that the survival of this country lies in democracy and 
democracy alone…[Therefore] My sole aim is to organize free and fair 
elections which would be held in October this year…I sincerely 
desire…The life, honor and property of every citizen to be safe…the 
frontiers of Pakistan [are] fully guarded…[italics mine] 
 
        (Rizvi 2000: Appendix H) 
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coup day, the four Chief Justices of the High Courts of the four provinces preferred acting 
governorship of their respective provinces to possible removal; two days later, all the judges 
of the High Courts of Sindh, Peshawar, and Balochistan- from the Lahore High Court, twenty 
out of thirty- took fresh oath under the law of the military. 
 
Moreover, in the wake of Supreme Court‟s admittance of Nusrat Bhutto‟s petition about his 
husband‟ detention,  the CMLA, through an order, undid the Fifth and Sixth amendments 
which enabled Justice Anwar-ul-Haq to replace as Chief Justice of Pakistan the otherwise 
intriguing Chief Justice Yakub Ali. In addition, all the Supreme Court judges along with 
remaining ten judges from the Lahore High Court decided to take fresh oath. Interestingly 
enough, Justice Maulvi Mushtaq, whom Bhutto did not appoint as CJ Lahore High Court, 
was appointed the Chief Justice of Lahore High- he was also the Chief Election 
Commissioner along with being the acting Punjab Governor. 
 
Thus, after having perked and privileged the agentship of the rational judiciary, the martial 
law authorities did not expect unwanted verdict from the courts. Not unexpectedly therefore, 
in Nusrat Bhutto vs. the State, the Supreme Court opted  to unanimously validate the 5 July 
coup and subsequent martial law on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity- which by now 
would have become the grundnorm for the apex court (Khan 2002:585-595). Furthermore, 
the SC allowed the CMLA to amend the constitution at will. Thus, the military under Zia was 
able to get judicial validation.  
 
5.5 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup 
As the preceding section showed the military was able to obtain legitimacy for coup/martial 
law. However, the judicial validation by an agent judiciary itself makes it necessary to 
explain this phenomenon empirically as well as conceptually. The following sections, 
therefore, tend to assume the coup as a narrative and analyze it in the light of study‟s 
deductive model. Hence, it shall be an analytic narrative whereby the actor‟s interests, 
preferences, and actions- outcomes- are kept central to the analysis along with due 
appreciation of context. To begin with, following conceptual variables are identified in the 
coup/martial law text given above: 
A = political leaders failed to steer the country out of crisis; It was feared that the 
failure of the PNA and PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country into 
chaos (law and order variable) 
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B =   property of every citizen to be safe (economic variable) 
C = the elections had been rigged on a large scale: I genuinely feel that the survival 
of this country lies in democracy and democracy alone; My sole aim is to organize 
free and fair elections (democratization variable)                               
D = the frontiers of Pakistan [are] fully guarded (securitization variable) 
E = Martial Law has been imposed throughout the country (policy variable) 
 
The direct correspondence between variables are the following: 
1. Since the politicians have failed to „steer the county out of crisis‟, the military 
intervened to prevent Pakistan falling into a „chaos‟:   A        +           E  
(positive correspondence) 
2. The country was going through a crisis whereby people‟s property was unsafe and 
insecure. Had the crisis been continued to transform into chaos, losses to property 
would have further worsened country‟s economic situation. Hence, the martial law 
was  imposed to restore people‟s economic confidence and provide them with a safe 
economic environment to excel  economically:   B        +           E   
(positive correspondence)  
3. Since the opposition had alleged the elections to be „rigged‟; and since the military 
believe in democracy alone, it is its aim to hold „free and fair‟ elections and 
democratize the country truly. Hence, for this purpose coup/martial law was  
necessary:  C        +           E       (positive correspondence)   
4. Since the military has taken the political power directly, it shall never compromise 
Pakistan‟s security. It would protect its frontier at any cost:   D        +           E  
(positive correspondence) 
 
In light of the foregoing, the following observations can be drawn:  
 The July coup and the subsequent martial law are justified by Zia-led military on 
accounts of problems of law and order and economy, democratization and 
securitization.  
 The primary reasons/causes cited are related to governance and economy.  
 The complementary reasons/causes cited are democratization and securitization.  
 The military takes upon itself the task(s) to accomplish the stated goals. 
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As mentioned earlier, while explaining the first and second coup, the stated reasons/causes of 
the coup by the military could not be accepted or legitimized on their own. Hence, it becomes 
imperative to explain the current coup‟s occurrence empirically as well as theoretically. The 
following four sections are an effort in this respect. The primary aim of this exercise shall be 
to explore and explain the worth of existing positive correspondence between coup and rest 
of the variables. The secondary aim would be to test the study‟s hypotheses. 
 
5.5.1 Law and Order Variable 
Like his predecessors, General Zia-ul-Haq was no exception when it came to legitimation of 
the coup. As the proclamation is self-evident, law and order was cited as one of the reasons of 
this otherwise undesirable and undemocratic action. In this section, however, the study 
empirically examines the strength or weakness of military‟s justification for direct 
intervention in Pakistan‟s politics. To begin with, as per conceptual basis of law and order,   
as Table 20 shows on the next page, the study, in this section, attempts a statistical analysis of 
murders and riots per million population.  
 
To begin with, a comparative analysis- as Figure 3 shows on page 213- of murders and riots 
reported under the sacked government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Zia-led military rule is 
conducted accordingly. In this regard, the aim is two-fold: first, to see whether law and order 
had worsened under Bhutto as per our conceptualization and operationalization of the former; 
second, to see if the problems of law and order had been solved by the principal military led 
by General Zia-ul-Haq. Moreover, in order to achieve this objective, the thesis has relied on 
official source of relevant data.  
 
Importantly however, as regards riots data, the present research had to rely on 1978 and 
1979‟s data for statistically-oriented comparative purposes, for the category of riots is absent 
from the proceeding official record- the so called statistical yearbooks. Nevertheless, it, by no 
means, should affect the comparativeness of the two cases since the respective Bhutto years 
are greater in number. In addition, since the statistical analysis take murders and riots per 
million population- taking population increase into proper account- the difference in the 
number of years is, therefore, of no mathematical significance. 
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Table 20 Murder & Riots per Million Population  
    Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1977, 1988 
   
 
Besides, the analysis has accorded  coup year - coup occurred in July 1977-  to Bhutto period 
due to two reasons: first, objectively it was arithmetically odd and unfair to divide the year 
with respect to number of riots since our previously analysis and the present case is analyzed 
on yearly basis; second, subjectively, the study wanted to put more weight in Zia-led 
military‟s scale since the former, in addition to pro-military politicians such as Air Marshal 
(retd) Asghar Khan, blamed Bhutto for worsening law and order situation especially post- 
March 1977 elections. 
 
Turning to the findings, it is maintained, as the Figure is self-evident on the next page, that 
both murders and riots registered a significant downward trend during the Bhutto 
government. Hence, in light of this empirical evidence, it is suffice to conclude that the Zia-
led military‟s attempt at self-legitimation, by invoking the issue of low governance, is 
fundamentally preposterous. Importantly however, the principal military itself failed to 
improve upon the law and order situation despite oft-repeated vows during a more-than-a-
decade long military rule.   
 
 
 
Year Murders per 
million pop. 
Riots per million 
pop. 
Pop. (million) 
1972 73 37 65.333 
1973 70 27 67.201 
1974 70 25 69.123 
1975 66 22 71.238 
1976 65 21 73.347 
1977 56 23 75.518 
1978 54 22 77.753 
1979 47 24 80.055 
1980 52 - 82.609 
1981 55 - 85.484 
1982 53 - 88.459 
1983 51 - 91.537 
1984 54 - 94.722 
1985 54 - 98.306 
1986 60 - 101.521 
1987 62 - 104.840 
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Figure 3 Trend: Murder and Riots per Million Population 
 
Interestingly and ironically, the number and type of reported crimes increased during this 
period (see Table 21 on the next page). Noticeably, the Table contains crime categories such 
as attempted murders, cattle theft, other theft etc., which were hitherto non-present in the 
official record. Without attempting any generalizations, what is observable from the above is 
that the type, scale and degree of reported crimes increased mani-fold during this military 
rule. Importantly, this happened despite the Islamic (Hudood) laws
61
 which had made, for 
instance, robbery and/or theft a punishable crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
61
 It provided amputation of the right hand from the joint of the wrist for the first theft, and amputation of left 
foot up to the ankle for the second theft. For the third time, life imprisonment was provided (Khan 2002:628).  
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Table 21 Crimes in Pakistan: 1978-1987 
Abbreviations: Yr. = Year; A.M=Attempted Murder; K./A =Kidnapping/Abduction; C.L=Child lifting; D. 
=Dacoity; R. =Robbery; B.= Burglary; C.T = Cattle theft; O.T =Other theft; O. = Others; Tl. =Total  
Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1988 
 
 
Regardless of increase in number and type of reported crimes during the period under 
analysis, one can safely conclude, on the basis of murder-riots per million population 
statistical analysis that the latter went upward despite opposite claims by the military. 
Therefore, this law and order variable lacks causation potency vis-à-vis the July coup. 
 
5.5.2 Economic Variable 
Under the economic variable the task shall be twofold: first, to briefly explain country‟s 
economic performance under the sacked Bhutto government in order to legitimize the coup, 
as claimed by Zia-led military, or otherwise; secondly, to explain whether the military rule 
brought economic fruits- which the sacked government could not- after having staged the 
coup and taken charge of country‟s economic affairs. To begin with, in new Pakistan Bhutto 
started with his nationalization program- see Table below- which, as mentioned previously, 
had certain politico-economic objectives to achieve. 
 
Table 22 Nationalization under Bhutto: 1972-77 
Year/Period Type of Industry 
January 1972 Public takeover of 31 large firms in 10 basic Industries: iron and steel, 
basic, metals, heavy engineering, motor-vehicle assembly and 
manufacture, tractor assembly and manufacture, heavy and basic 
chemicals, petrochemicals, cement  and  public utilities. 
March 1972 Land reforms. 
 
March 1972 Management and control of 32 life insurance companies. 
Yr. M. A.M K./A. C.L D. R. B. C.T O.T O. Tl. 
1978 4168 7402 3934 99 84 482 10273 7538 18285 114709 166974 
1979 3735 7024 3428 82 110 517 8764 5656 15763 105449 150531 
1980 4307 7593 3166 62 70 530 8677 5094 15864 117049 162412 
1981 4732 8283 3489 72 112 622 7910 4637 16235 127251 173347 
1982 4707 8160 4593 92 110 484 7351 4111 22040 119000 170648 
1983 4636 8474 4281 75 125 558 7400 3829 20863 127836 178079 
1984 5104 8848 4736 105 240 813 8411 4306 17125 152462 202150 
1985 5345 8855 4877 86 236 875 8612 4259 17125 159028 209525 
1986 6076 10057 5155 102 340 1255 8499 5598 17352 174729 231723 
1987 6486 10669 5109 137 315 1216 8286 3793 19349 194376 249736 
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May 1972 Banking reforms; State Bank of Pakistan extends controls over 
scheduled banks, re-orienting credit policy towards small farmers and 
small industrial entrepreneurs. 
 
May 1972 Devaluation of rupee by 131 per cent 
June 1972 Comprehensive labor reforms. 
August 1972 Comprehensive public health program. 
September1972-
September 1974 
Nationalization of educational institutions. 
June 1973 Trade in cotton and rice nationalized. 
September 1973 Vegetable oil, petroleum marketing, and shipping nationalized. 
 
January 1974 Nationalization of all private and domestically owned banks. 
 
August 1976 Cotton ginning, rice husking and flour mills nationalized. 
Source: Zaidi. 2005. 
 
 
As is obvious from the Table, it was a phased nationalization which was carried out in 
accordance with political and economic concerns. For instance, one of its targets was the 
monopolist families of the 1960s whose financial position got affected negatively. However, 
the nationalization program, overall, remained unable to perform re-distributional functions. 
Indeed, it gave birth to a new section of industrialists (Noman 1988:77-78). Moreover, same 
was the case with his 1972 and 1976 land reforms. In addition, the trade balance stood 
negative.  
 
Nonetheless, it never implies that Pakistan‟s economy remained in shamble during the Bhutto 
government. In order to assess his government policies one must not ignore the context. The 
loss of East Pakistan along with a large market was a cause for concern- 18 per cent of the 
West Pakistan‟s imports came from the East. Thus, in the post-breakup period, new markets 
were to be found to compensate for this loss of market. Gradually, when the government was 
able to access new markets, the devaluation measure that it took started to bore fruits in terms 
of a 153 per cent increase in exports in 1972/73 as compared with the previous year. 
Moreover, the manufactured exports registered a growth of 19 per cent in 1973/74. This 
growth in exports had a positive impact on industrial sector output between 1972 and 1974. 
In addition, the agricultural output increased due largely to the higher support price for wheat, 
rice and sugar. A timely and adequate supply of essential inputs along with credit-availability 
also played an important role in this respect (Zaidi 2005:105-106). 
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However, this economic boom was short-lived due primarily to „the bad luck factor‟ which is 
outlined in the Table below. 
 
Table 23 Bhutto: Natural Catastrophe as Contextual Constraint 
Source: Zaidi. 2005. Issues in Pakistan‟s Economy.                                                               
 
 
Importantly however, owing to lack of appreciation of the „bad luck factor‟ by many 
researchers such as William McCleary, Nawab Haider Naqvi and Khwaja Sarmad, the proper 
comprehension of the state of economy under the Bhutto government got dangerously 
depreciated. However, in light of the ongoing what can be concluded is that „things were not 
as bad as they seemed, given the conditions inherited and the odds against Bhutto. Moreover, 
it was more bad luck than bad management which resulted in poor economic growth rates‟ 
(Zaidi 2005:107-108; also Noman 1990:97). Thus, it is maintained that the Zia-led military‟ 
claim of worsening economic situation under Bhutto is empirically unfounded. However, the 
following takes a look at the economic performance under the principle military to see if 
things were different, on this front, under the military rule. 
 
To begin with, the period 1980-88 generally witnessed a GDP growth rate of 6.5 per cent and 
real wages- in manufacturing- growth rate of 6.2 per cent respectively. Furthermore, the total 
annual growth in terms of value of output, labor and indicators for a large number of 
manufacturing industries stood at 9.6 per cent during 1978-88. However, despite these rosy 
figures, the productivity growth figures, during the period 1978-88, present a different story. 
The aggregate, in this respect, of 0.3 per cent per annum not only remained low compared to 
the 5 per cent in the 1960s but also the cross-sectoral variation was significant. Moreover, if 
the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates are aggregated, then the consumer goods 
Year/Period Nature and Type of  Loss 
August 1973 Massive floods hits Pakistan; import of food grain. 
October 1973   Four-fold increase in international petroleum prices; heavy imports cost;   
prices of fertilizers, essential inputs and oil soar; excessive inflation 
domestically. 
1974-77 World recession follows OPEC price rise; demand for Pakistani exports 
remains severely repressed and affects industrial output. 
1974-75 Huge failure of cotton crop by as much as 25 per cent at a time when 
international cotton prices had risen; affected industrial output.        
1976-77 Worst floods in Pakistan‟s history; crops destroyed; further import of food 
crops; excessive expenditure on public good measures, all affecting 
industrial output. 
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register negative TFP growth with the barring exception of apparel industry. Moreover, the 
period from 1975 to 1986 had witnessed little growth in employment in most of the industries 
along with decrease in the rate of labor productivity growth. Interestingly, despite greatest 
increase in employment, the apparel industry experienced output fall by 19 per cent (ibid 
2005:112).  
 
In addition, if one analyzes the economic performance under the military rule in terms of 
five-year plans, the overall impression is extremely negative. For instance, the Fifth Plan, 
1978-83, registered an annual GDP growth rate of 6.3 per cent which remained below the 
ambitious 7.5 per cent. Moreover, the commodity-producing sectors grew annually at 6.1 per 
cent, marginally higher than the 5.9 per cent growth of the service sector. However, in the 
1970s the service sector grew at 6.9 per cent- almost twice the annual growth rate of the 
commodity-producing sectors. Interestingly, the manufacturing output increased partly due to 
the investments made under the Bhutto government.  
 
Importantly however, the above-mentioned growth rate was achieved at the expense of long-
term development prospects. Moreover, rapid growth, with low investment rates, was a result 
of running down of infrastructure and neglect of replacement investment. In addition, part of 
the growth performance was achieved with the help of output being generated from long 
gestating projects.  
By the end of the Plan, debt servicing was absorbing 70% of gross aid inflow…The 
aggregate investment and savings performance was disappointing. The investment 
ratio fell from 16% to 13.4%. The decline was related to the change in strategy as the 
private sector was again given the prominence accorded to it in the sixties. While 
6.3% growth rate in private investment represented a substantial recovery from the 
nationalization-induced paralysis, it was not sufficient to compensate for the fall in 
public sector investment. Consortium aid donors provided strong support for the 
revival of private enterprise…[Moreover] the domestic savings ratio fell. The 
resource shortages would have been critical were it not for the rapid growth in 
remittances from the Middle East. Remittances grew by 20% per annum through the 
course of the Fifth Plan. In spite of the Gulf bonanza, only 70% of the Plan was 
implemented due to the resource shortage…[Also] there was compensating borrowing 
from the non-bank sources to balance the budget. Non-bank borrowing doubled 
 218 
during the course of the Plan. In 1982-83, the surplus on the consolidated revenue 
budget turned into a small deficit for the first time in Pakistan‟s history.  
                                                                        (Noman 1990:181-182; also Husain 2000:30-31) 
 
In addition, the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-84) met, overall, with a similar fate. For instance, 
despite projected 10 per cent increase in annual Middle Eastern remittances, the latter fell 
sharply. Moreover, the export diversification could not live up to the occasion and the narrow 
export base remained extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Moreover, the Plan‟s 
performance remained highly poor as regards fiscal performance. The estimated net foreign 
resource inflows of US$ 4.07 billion remained a distant dream; in reality, it barely amounted 
to US$ 2.8 billion. As a result, the domestic borrowing increased (ibid 1990:186).  
 
Regardless, one of the negatives of the economic activities under the Zia-led military was the 
mushrooming of a „parallel and illegal economy‟. The latter refers to diversion of aid inflows, 
the growth of smuggling, the rapid increase in weapons‟ sale and the large-scale drug 
business which gave birth to a „subterranean economy‟ whose estimated worth was about 20-
30 per cent of GDP (Husain 2000:30).  Little wonder then, the concentration of wealth in a 
few resourceful and politically well-connected hands further increased overall poor-rich 
inequality in a rapidly increasing population- the population growth rate was 3.1% in 1981 
(ibid:187)  
 
Therefore, in light of the ongoing empirical evidences it is posited that the much-enchanted 
growth rates were superficial in nature and character since they heavily relied on foreign aid 
inflows and the Middle Eastern remittances- the good luck factor- along with trickle- downs 
of economic policies initiated by the Bhutto government. In fact, despite the claimed 
macroeconomic stability Pakistan‟s trade and budget remained in deficits. Moreover, in real 
terms the socio-economic inequality persisted. Importantly, the „parallel and illegal‟ economy 
got thrived as a result of rational complicity between the principal military and a section of 
the agents. Besides, if one includes the negative effects of the drugs, weapons etc., on the 
rapidly increasing population- a significant portion of which was illiterate and poor- the 
cultural and psychological cost further adds to the aggregate. Hence, the stated positive 
correspondence between coup/martial law and economic variable cannot be held empirically. 
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5.5.3 Democratization Variable 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, having sacked an elected prime minster the military had 
put him in protective custody. However, the rational military opted to release Bhutto along 
with a few opposition members, on 28 July, to avoid any possible backlash from the 
opposition and especially the PPP. The following day, Bhutto, while addressing the party 
workers in the capital, gave vent that he had no intention to challenge the regime and its rules 
of the game. Thus, the politicians were allowed limited political activity. Moreover, the 
military gave the date for elections to be held on October 18 (Rizvi 1986). No sooner than 
later, quite contrary to the regime‟s calculations Bhutto decided to challenge the former with 
his speeches, addresses and slogans during the election campaign in almost all major cities, 
where he was accorded a hero‟s welcome. The former thought it prudent, given PPP‟s maiden 
vote, to take the opposition and military on, electorally. 
 
Meanwhile, Ahmad Raza‟s family- Raza was ex-PPP cohort- opted to revive the murder case 
of Nawab Ahmad Khan who was murdered in 1974. Accordingly, the hearing of the case got 
shifted to the Lahore High Court on 27 August. In relation to this murder case, Bhutto was 
arrested on September 3, and bailed on account of weak evidence on 13 September. 
Meanwhile, elections campaign was going on. But, the PNA was struggling as regards its 
candidature strategy. Having noticed the PNA‟s internal divisions, the military hinted to 
postpone the elections if the former so desired. Moreover, to further nail down the politicians, 
it started an inquiry into the assets of deposed MNAs and MPAs with an aim to intimate them 
and possibly disqualify them to contest again.  
 
On the other hand, in the post-bail period, Bhutto chose to confront the principal military.  In 
this regard, having calculated his popularity during the huge crowds, he preferred to threaten 
Zia and his aides of dire consequence in case he resumed power(s). His threats were taken 
seriously by the military with the effect that, on 17 September, he was rearrested under a 
martial law order. A section of opposition politicians, being mindful of Nusrat Bhutto‟s 
recent leadership qualities, called upon the military to hold the deposed government 
accountable before the election. Therefore, the rational military, with an institutional distaste 
for elections, in strategic interaction with the PNA leadership opted to postpone the election 
and put a ban on all political activities on 1 October (ibid 1986). Ironically, the ban on all 
political activities was not what the PNA had in mind. It only wanted PPP to be banned. 
Importantly, the PNA stumbled to chalk any unanimous strategy in the post-ban period and 
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thus crumbled like a house of cards- the withdrawal of Asghar Khan from its fold is a case in 
point. 
 
Quite paradoxically even, the martial law regime chose to dissolve the Hyderabad Tribunal 
and withdrew cases against the accused including Wali Khan, Marri and Bizenjo- the anti-
state elements. The factionalized PNA and released politicians urged Zia to hold 
accountability of Bhutto years than to hold elections. The regime‟s preference converged 
with the latter and Zia finally decided to start the three-phase process of accountability under 
the stewardship of working judiciary. The main hunt was purging of politicians especially 
from PPP whose leaders such as Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, a form Chief Minister and Governor 
of Punjab, and Sheikh Rashid, a former federal minister, were disqualified. 
 
Last but not least, instead of holing promised election, the military first gave hint of a 
„national government‟ formation; the factionalized PNA rationally rushed to it. But due to 
their divergence in preferences, the idea was given up by the principal. Instead, on coup 
anniversary, a cabinet consisting general, agent bureaucrats and a section of agent politicians- 
i.e. Muslim League (Pagaro) - was announced. Having a formal cabinet in placed, the regime, 
in order to further de-politicize and possibly factionalize the PPP, issued White Papers 
between 23 July and 27 August. The papers were aimed at highlighting Bhutto‟s misdeeds 
with respect to elections, media, press, public funds etc.   
 
Interestingly enough, the PNA, which had earlier, fail to mend electoral differences with the 
regime, opted to pursue its political, if not economic, interests by joining the military 
government on 6 August 1978. The CMLA and army chief, on his part, had a preference for 
country‟s presidentship when the office was vacated by President Fazal Elahi- a PPP man- in 
mid-September The remaining hurdle in the road to democracy was removed by the agent 
judiciary which, after a lengthy judicial process conducted by mostly anti-PPP judges, found 
the former President, CMLA and Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, guilty of murder.   
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Box 5.6 Bhutto was murdered judicially 
 
Bhutto was judicially victimized. [Chief Justice] Maulvi Mushtaq who had an 
obvious bias against Bhutto should not have chaired the bench of Lahore High 
Court who found him guilty of murder…Moreover, during the appeal process, 
Justice Qaiser Khan, who got retired during the appeal proceedings, should have 
been allowed to continue as ad hoc judge…Justice Waheedudin, who got ill, was 
also not allowed to sit on the appeal bench despite his request…The judgment 
was against the norm of the Supreme Court too; because when one members of 
the bench  retires, dies or is incapacitated, the Chief Justice constitutes another 
bench to hear the case afresh…The judgment [in appeal] finally was divided; four 
against Bhutto; three in his favor.  
 
A Senior Advocate Supreme Court and member Pakistan Bar Council gave this opinion 
in April 2008. 
 
 
What the aforementioned informs is that the agent judiciary worked under the auspices of the 
principal military primarily for its own politico-economic interests as mentioned earlier. 
Hence, there was no need for shirking. Instead, its workability had found Bhutto to be a 
murderer with the effect that the latter was hanged to death on 4 April 1979 (Wolpert 
1993:303-330). 
 
With Bhutto‟s death, the PNA-regime alliance also met with death, but due to rational 
reasons. The principal did not need the agent and factionalized PNA- also factionalized- any 
more in post-Bhutto period; the latter, on its part, had got Bhutto removed politically and thus 
saw more benefits in contesting elections- in Bhutto‟s absence-  than allying with the regime. 
However, to PNA‟s surprise, Zia opted to postpone the elections. Instead of holding general 
elections at national and provincial level, the military under Zia was able to hold, on 28 
September 1979, local body election, on non-party basis, to de-politicize the provinces and 
especially political parties and strategically interact with the local politician directly who, in 
turn, could support the regime politic-electorally (Rizvi 1986). 
 
When the PNA started questioning the postponement of general elections, the regime 
amended the 1962 Political Parties Act to further squeeze the parties which were now 
supposed to hold internal elections annually, register with the Election Commission, submit 
the details of their financial assets to the EC and importantly abstain from any activity 
prejudicial to Pakistan‟s ideology, public order, intendance of the judiciary and integrity and 
honor of the military. However, before the politicians and their parties were able to put their 
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house in order, the principal finally decided, on 16 October 1979, to take the principaled 
position to democratize Pakistan: the promised elections were postponed indefinitely; all 
political parties were dissolved; political activities banned; press suppressed etc. 
 
In the post-postponement period, the politicians especially from the PNA were able to 
nominate the military regime as their revival which left no stone unturned to de-politicize, 
factionalize and physically crush them as well as their organizational structure. Moreover, as 
rational actors they saw little opportunity to grow politico-economically under the 
authoritarianism of the principal. The only rational choice was to mend their differences and 
believe in their agency to stand united against the military dictatorship. In addition, a section 
of politicians, non-PNA contextually, started political negotiations with victimized People‟s 
Party. They were able to form, on 6 February 1981, a political organization- the Movement 
for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) - to demand an end to the martial law and holding 
of election in accordance with the abrogated constitution.  
 
The military, on her part, authoritatively chose to impose its rules of the game in terms of 
issuance of a Provisional Constitutional Order, the PCO, in March 1981 than to hold the 
elections and/or restore the Constitution. The opposition politicians in terms of MRD 
challenged these arbitrary rules of the game. They took to agitational politics and 
subsequently were accorded due punishment by the principal. 
 
Nonetheless, being a rational actor, the principal military having met with agitations came up 
with a strategy to appease the opposition and hence reduce the political cost to its rule. Thus, 
it preferred to hold general elections. But before the elections were held, the leader of the 
principal military, Zia-ul-Haq, was to become the president for had the elections been held 
without this arrangement, the politicians would have gained political clout. Thus, in 
Decameter 1984, a referendum was held. The populace, the majority of which was illiterate 
and rural, was given the following choice:  
„Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Muhammad 
Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity 
with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan, for the 
continuation and consolidation of that process, and for the smooth and orderly transfer 
of power to the elected representatives of the people.‟ [italics mine] 
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                                                                                                                           (Khan 2002:660) 
 
As a result, despite the MRD‟s boycott, the general was declared elected by the agent 
Election Commission(er). Subsequently, elections to National and Provincial assemblies were 
held The MRD boycotted it as they were held on non-party basis. The Jamat-i-Islami could 
only participate as a political organization due to its alliance with the regime.  
 
As the afore-mentioned suggests the electoral exercise under Zia-led military rule was a 
planned attempt at de-politicization of opposition politicians and their political parties as well 
as establishment of a pro-regime civilianized government. The overall objective of this 
electoral exercise aimed at making the masses believe that there was no military dictatorship. 
However, it continued.  
 
Nonetheless, another arbitrary action taken on 2 March 1985 before the NA session by the 
principal was to order amendment in the constitution in terms of Revival of the Constitution 
of 1973 Order (RCO). The RCO, among other things, provided for a powerful President. It 
was, it is posited, a strategy to institutionalize the principal‟s rules of the game (Khan 
1994:40-42). Thus, under the new rules, the President nominated the Prime Minister; the 
nominee was Muhammad Khan Junejo, a politician from Sindh. Junejo was calculated to be a 
pliable politician by the military who could never think of shirking. Moreover, under the new 
rules the provincial governors- generals indeed- were to appoint chief ministers. As a result 
of strategic interaction with the regime, a serving judge of the Sindh High Court was able to 
get appointed Chief Minister of that province and, in the case of Punjab, an industrialist, 
Nawaz Sharif, was able to strategically ally with the regime to assume chief ministership. 
 
In the post-civilianization period, quite contrary to military‟s calculus, the agent politicians 
especially the Prime Minister had a different set of preferences. Being a rational actor he 
wanted to maximize his political, if not economic, interests. Thus, he started maneuvering, 
politically, personalistic politicians who stood on weaker political ground in the absence of 
organized and functioning parties. However, the PM‟s efforts bore fruit; he was elected to 
assume the presidentship of (All Pakistan) Muslim League. To further mark his agency, he 
was able to lift emergency and restore fundamental human rights.  
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Importantly, with respect to civil-military relations PM Junejo had a different take on the 
martial law from that of the military. The former had a preference for an open political 
activity so that his party among others could gain politico-electorally. The principal, on its 
part, having noticed the potential of shirking in the civilian section of the regime opted to 
play a game. It gave the agent a choice: either institutionalize the established rules of the 
game to get the martial law lifted or settle with the status quo. The rational politicians, 
however, saw more political benefits in getting the martial law lifted. Therefore, they, in the 
parliament, opted to validate all martial law regulations and orders; the doers of these actions 
were indemnified accordingly. Importantly enough, the President under this Eighth 
Amendment got the powers- 58 (2)(b)- to dissolve  the parliament and provincial assembly at 
his discretion. Did the politicians make a correct political decision? 
 
Box 5.7 The Idea of a National Security Council could not materialize  
 
I think they made a political move to get the martial law lifted, so that they 
could excel politically. Because had they remained with the military, then the 
public would have seen no difference between them and the martial law 
authorities. But it was a costly deal…Because the President became more 
powerful. Perhaps the politicians thought when the martial law is over, they 
would take Zia on…[However] The fact of the matter is they did not allow him 
make the proposed National Security Council [NSC] a constitutional body. 
 
Interview with Liaqat Baloch, Secretary General, Jamat-i-Islami, Pakistan. Lahore: 19 
March 2008. 
 
 
In light of the foregoing, it is, quite contrary to the existing literature, maintained that though 
the politicians primarily saw to their own interests, they were able to deal with the military 
tactfully. In this respect, they were, on the one hand, able to get the martial law lifted and, on 
the other, did not let the principal totally overrule them in terms of constitutionalizaion of the 
NSC- which the military brought forward to oversight the agents. From the study‟s 
theoretical perspective, the incorporation of the 58 2 (b) contextually suited Zia as President 
and importantly as leader of the principal. However, the provision did not constitutionalize- 
or institutionalize as is commonly believed- the military rule in Pakistan since the military 
intervention is, as is so far explained, a result of military agency and rationality.  
 
Put simply, the politicians, despite the Eighth Amendment, had an equal opportunity to elect 
their candidate to the Office of the President in the future provided they had a preference for 
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this. Moreover, the military‟s efforts with respect to civilianization of its rule and 
empowerment (of the Office) of the President did not mark its often over-emphasized 
strength; rather, the very process of these developments highlighted its political weakness 
vis-à-vis the politicians. 
 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, in the post-civilianization period differences started to 
emerge between the principal military and the agent civil section of the government. The PM 
chose to, having perceived the military engaged at multiple fronts i.e. Afghan Jihad etc., 
shirk. To begin with, PM Junejo, showing his agency, had a different approach with regard to 
appointments of ambassadors, government secretaries and even heads of intelligence 
agencies- the removal of Major-General Nek Muhammad is a case in point. Moreover, the 
PM believed in austerity and, in this respect on the floor of the parliament, he vowed to 
putting Generals into Suzukis [italics added] (Khan 2002:690).  
 
In addition, the principal and the agent‟s preferences could not converge on issues related to 
weapons procurements, foreign visits and protocols, normalization with India, Ojheri camp 
and the Afghan Jihad. Indeed, with respect to the latter, Junejo, quite opposite to the 
military‟s position, opted to sign the Geneva Accord on 14 April 1988. From the military‟s 
perspective this action of his would have caused crisis in the civil-military relations. Not the 
least, there was, according to Zia‟s own aides, secret reports of his removal as COAS at the 
parliament‟s hands (Arif 1995:392-396).  
 
Therefore, the principal military having calculated not only the danger from the shirking 
agent but also the cost and benefits of his removal decided to punish the latter.  Little wonder 
then, on 29 May 1988, the National Assembly stood dissolved
62
.  The shirking agent was 
sacked accordingly. On the following day, the dissolution of provincial assemblies added 
insult to injury. Moreover, a caretaker government sans prime minister was announced. Also, 
in clear breach of the constitution, Zia gave 172, as against stipulated 90, days to hold 
generals elections. However, before Pakistan could be democratize the leader of the principal 
military died, in an air crash, on 28 August 1988.  
 
                                               
62 Interestingly, the reasons, Zia cited on 30 May, were more or less the same which his-led military gave on 
July 5, 1977. 
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To summarize, the Zia-led military in order to legitimize itself held non-party local bodies‟ 
polls, an arbitrary presidential referendum and non-party general elections.  The aim was to 
civilianize the rule. However, in the wake of post-election politicians‟ agency, the principal 
opted to undo the entire system than to (re)negotiate rules of the game with the former. Thus, 
in light of the ongoing it is posited that all attempts regarding democratization by the 
principal military during this period were arbitrary but rational in terms of preferring own to 
larger interests. As the empirical evidences have highlighted above, it would be morally 
unfair then to believe in the positive correspondence between coup/martial law and 
democratization.   
 
5.5.4 Securitization Variable 
As is obvious from the coup-text, Pakistan did not face any external or internal security threat 
from anywhere. Had this been the case, the reasons cited for coup would have placed the 
security concerns at the top. Regardless, following is an attempt to explain whether the 
military rule securitized Pakistan meaningfully. 
 
To begin with, in July 1977, Kashmir was undoubtedly an issue between India and Pakistan. 
But the two countries were not in a war on this or any other issue in the pre-coup and the 
immediate post-coup period. Interestingly, the military even did not wage one to take 
Kashmir militarily. Nevertheless, it got an opportunity to participate in a war, and that too 
indirectly as shall be explained later, which was fought primarily between the intruding 
Soviets and Afghans during 1979-1988 in Afghanistan. 
 
In this Afghan war, the rational military of Pakistan decided to ally with the US- whose 
President had severely criticized the regime‟ anti-human rights activities- to obtain politico-
economic benefits. Indeed, Zia‟s refusal to accept the first offer of $400 million as „peanuts‟ 
should not be, from any nationalist perspective, associated with a strategic threat from the 
Soviets whom the US was already bent upon chasing.
63
 Put differently, when a state 
perceives a threat to its physical survival, then it, arguably, must not negotiate the price for 
participation in the looming threat; rather, it should take its own security measures i.e. 
material offers to win allies etc., to confront the enemy. Moreover, the case to ally with other 
power(s) to fight a (common) threat is extremely problematic from the democratic theory 
                                               
63  For the details of the US aid to Pakistan military see Arif (1995:334-348; also 2001:183-188). 
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perspective: how could a martial law regime, consisting of a few individuals at the top, 
decide the highly important matter of life and death for almost 80 million people without any 
reference to them? How can it be justified even morally? 
 
Nonetheless, the regime rationally participated in the Afghan war which was subsequently 
labeled a jihad, an Islamic war, to kill the non-believes- the communist Soviets (Rashid 
2002:212). The overall material benefits the principal military received were little less than $ 
5 billion which went primarily to the military‟s purse; in fact, part of the money was used to 
procure weapons to modernize the institution rather than the nation. However, the socio-
economic and psychological cost the nation was forced to pay was huge. 
By the exodus was over, some 4 million refugees had settled into makeshifts camps in 
Pakistan and started permeating into the heartland…Apart from disrupting the social, 
economic, and political fabric of the tribal areas, the refugees brought their blood 
feuds and rivalries as well as links to the poppy-growing culture of Afghanistan that 
suddenly made Pakistan a major pipeline for heroin to the west…The Politics of 
Heroin author McCoy estimates that from „zero heroin addicts in 1979, numbers rose 
to 5,000 users in 1980, 70, 000 in 1983, and then in the words of Pakistan‟s own 
Narcotic Control board, went „completely out of hand‟ to over 1.3 million addicts in 
1985. ..[Also] a new „Kalashnikov Culture‟ was born in Pakistan.               
                                                                                                                                                (Nawaz 2008:371) 
 
As the quote mentions explicitly the socio-psychological impact of the war, in which 
Pakistan‟ military had participated while according preference to its own interests, was 
extremely negative on the general public. For example, the Kalashnikov culture points to, on 
the one hand, the free-movement of weapons in the county- in which a section of the 
principal was involved for material reasons- and on the other, inherent danger that it entailed 
for the society at large. As one commentator wrote: 
The government, particularly the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), was a conduit for 
the supply of arms and ammunition to Afghan freedom fighters. This afforded an 
opportunity to some of the generals involved in this effort to help themselves to 
handsome money by selling some of the arms to Iran…It cannot be said with any 
certainty whether it was to cover up such unauthorized sales of weaponry that an 
explosion occurred at Ojehri camp, or if the explosion on 10 April 1988 took place 
accidentally. Ojehri was an ordnance depot situated near the twin cities of Islamabad 
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and Rawalpindi and when it exploded, missiles, rockets and other weapons flew in 
different directions in the two cities, killing hundreds of people and injuring many 
others. About 100 people died within the first hour, most of them instantly, while 
many more were maimed permanently…There was also substantial damage to 
property.                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                               (Khan 2002:689) 
 
The flight of missiles, rockets etc., from Ojehri camp to the twin cities and the consequent 
losses  of person and property, as the quote describes, certainly help conclude that despite 
claims  to securitize the nation, the principal failed to „guard‟ the latter. Rather, the empirical 
evidences, as given above, points to its complicity as principal in the said case. One wonders 
how an institution, which arbitrarily received the lion‟s share of the national budgets- see 
Table below-, could be neglectful of its primary task and stated goal of securitization. 
 
Table 24 Defense Expenditure: 1978-88 
Year Defense Expenditure 
(Rs. million) 
Percentage of Total 
Expenditure 
1978-79 10, 168 34.00 
1979-80 12, 665 33.34 
1980-81 15,300 33.00 
1981-82 18,630 36.41 
1982-83 24,566 41.5 
1983-84 26,798 38.86 
1984-85 31,866 35.37 
1985-86 35,606 35.59 
1986-87 41,335 36.95 
1987-88 47,015 34.53 
  Source: Rizvi. 2000. 
 
Besides, related to the Afghanistan- and India for that matter- was the attributed linkages of 
Al-Murtaza Organization (AZO) for attempts on Zia‟s person. However, 
The only successful operation of the AZO that garnered the headline was the 
hijacking on 2 March 1981 to Kabul of a PIA aircraft…carrying, among others, a 
retired army officer, Tariq Rahim who was once an ADC [aide-de-camp] to Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto…Rahim, who apparently was seen by Murtaza as a traitor to Z.A Bhutto, 
was shot on 6 March by one of the hijackers…The flight then took off for Damascus 
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the next day. The hijacking ended that day, after Zia agreed to release some fifty-four 
PPP supporters in Pakistan jails. 
                                                                                                     (Nawaz 2008:378-379) 
 
What the foregoing suggests is that the military regime, on the one hand, linked AZO with 
Afghanistan and India and, on the other, negotiated political issues with the People‟s Party. In 
other words, the threat, if any, from the AZO was political than security, and was politically, 
not militarily, sorted out. In addition, during the Zia-led military rule, Siachin (1984) and 
Brasstacks (1987) could be cited as threats from India. However, on the latter the following 
account should suffice  
If Brasstacks was to be a precursor to an Indian attack into Sindh, it did not happen. 
However, the two nations had come close to a war, and the situation was only defused 
after Zia resorted to his famous „cricket diplomacy‟ by going to India to watch a 
cricket match between India and Pakistan.  
                                                                                                                             (ibid 2008:392) 
 
One wonders why the General, COAS and President, the most pious and defender of Islam- 
Islamization under him is a case in point- preferred to watch a cricket match in India than to 
wage a war against a Hindu-enemy? The fate of Siachin
64
 was no different. In this respect, a 
Pakistani military analyst observed: 
It is no secret that since the 1970s both countries had an „eye on the glacier‟. Their 
disagreement was due to their divergent comprehension of their bilateral agreement 
reached at Simla on the demarcation of the boundary and the Line-of-Control (LoC). 
Towards the end of the 1970s Pakistan had tacitly begun to exercise control over the 
glacier by charging a fee form mountain climbing expeditionary parties which 
annoyed New Delhi. In 1983 General Zia-ul-Haq ordered its occupation but the army 
could not comply due to its involvement in the country‟s politics and Afghanistan. 
Hence, in 1984, Islamabad was practically caught with its „pants down‟…Equally 
                                               
64
 The Siachin is one of the largest and longest non-polar glaciers stretching over approximately 1000 square 
miles and situated over 20,000 feet above sea level. It is located in the Karakoram mountains at the northern 
edge of the Indian subcontinent and south of China. The Siachin is an extension of the existing Kashmir 
problem. After 1984 the glacier was converted into the world‟s highest battleground when India launched its 
operation Maghdoot to occupy the glacier. New Delhi‟s venture was essentially a pre-emptive measure to block 
Pakistan‟s control of the glacier.  
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questionable was the Pakistani propaganda after the invasion. The [military] 
establishment believed that India had plans to threaten the Karakoram Highway 
linking China with Pakistan. Keeping in view the geographical and atmospheric 
hazards this argument is far from logical. 
                                                                                                             (Siddiqa 2003:20) 
 
Last but not least, the General, the leader of the principal, could not save himself: he died in a 
military aircraft. Thus, it light of the above-mentioned empirical evidences, it is maintained 
that there was not any existent internal/external threat in the pre-coup period. In the post-coup 
period the military regime joined the war in Afghanistan to accrue politic-economic benefits 
rather to confront any security threat. Importantly, the decision to participate in the jihad was 
entirely of the principal. As a result, the country became more insecure socio-economically if 
not religio-culturally and/or politically. Ironically, efforts were made to normalize with India. 
Yet the Kashmir issue remained there despite increase in the defense expenditures. Therefore, 
the securitization variable‟s positive relationship with coup and consequent martial law is 
unfounded empirically. 
 
5.6 Military Agency: Causing the Coup 
As the preceding sections have shown that positive correspondence did not exist, empirically, 
between coup/martial law and the conceptual variables drawn from the coup-text. Similarly, 
as seen in Chapter 2, the existing accounts do not help one either. For example, the 
conspiracy theory, which pointed to Washington, could not qualify as a scientific theory since 
empirically the US had bad ties with the military regime pre-Afghan Jihad. The structuralist 
accounts face the same dilemma: if structure brought the (structurally powerful) military in 
politics in July 1977, then why did not it bring it earlier, for instance, in 1974, 1975 or 1976 
and/or pre-election 1977? The path-dependent explanation (Aziz 2008) ignores context and 
importantly causes of a coup. Had there been military „control‟ in Pakistan, the former 
needed not take the pain to stage a coup and impose martial law for it was, from this logic, 
already in control of the state ? 
 
Thus, in light of the above, following is given, with the help of the model, an agency 
explanation of the coup. The primary objective of the explanation shall be to test the posed 
hypotheses and seek answers to the core question and the puzzle. 
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To begin with, the military had to assume an agent position post-breakup since politicians‟ 
preference had prevailed. The Bhutto-led principal took various measures to bring the 
military under civilian control. However, the nature and character of such measures could, at 
best, imply an implicit oversight of the agents- military, civil bureaucracy and judiciary. 
However, Bhutto preferred to appease the military in terms of defense expenditure for 
political reasons. The latter preferred to work than shirk since the cost of shirking would have 
been higher for a military which was demoralized after its defeat against India in December 
1971.  
 
Nevertheless, as a rational actor, with a taste for principalship, the military kept calculating 
(principal) politicians‟ weaknesses for the latter‟s weaknesses were the former‟s strength. 
Thus, in the specific context of July 1977, the agent military after having calculated the cost 
and benefits of shirking opted to stage the coup. The coup was successful since military‟s 
preference had prevailed (agency A). 
 
Thus, military agency and not „structure‟, conspiracy, path dependency etc., caused the coup 
and the consequent martial law.  The coup was rational in nature and political in character for 
the primary objective was to capture political power.  In other words, the military wanted to 
achieve certain objectives by staging the coup: a) it wanted to transform its agent character 
into that of the principal. Moreover, it wanted not to allow or better let the politicians to 
control the political process and gradually consolidate their position vis-à-vis the GHQ; b) it 
wanted to renegotiate the rules of the game which, if not changed, could have legally-
constitutionally, if not politically, strengthened the political actors and elective institutions 
vis-à-vis the military. Hence, what the above suggests is that the military preferred its own 
interest (agency B); the economic dimension of interests is explained in the next section. 
 
Moreover, as per study‟s hypothesis, the very act of coup highlighted the political weakness 
rather than strength, as the existing accounts often make one believe, of the military 
institution vis-à-vis the politicians. Had she been politically stable and composed there would 
have been no coup since the primary purpose of the action, as mentioned above, was political 
in character. However, political power was seen as an instrument by the military to facilitate 
her economic interests. Since this is also one of the hypotheses of the study, the following 
section tends to explain it in detail. 
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5.6.1 Maximizing Economic Interests 
As explained earlier in the chapter, Bhutto‟s implicit oversight mechanism meant to prevent 
military from growing politically. Moreover, he had an implicit agenda to let not the military 
flourish economically- the decrease in the latter‟s economic activities is a case in point. 
Therefore, as hypothesized in the post-Bhutto period the politically powerful military set on a 
course of economic maximization. In this respect, it was able to establish the National 
Logistic Cell (NLC) on 6 August 1978. It was a public sector organization directly controlled 
by the army. Its stated purpose was 
 to reduce the congestion at Karachi Port, which had resulted in a waiting time of 50 
days for the ships and was costing the Government $12.5 Million per annum in 
demurrage. In the process NLC introduced in the country the concept of 
containerization and became the largest multi-modal freight handler in the region.
65
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Besides, the Fauji Foundation continued with its business ventures. In this respect, it was able 
to incorporate Fauji Fertilizer Company (FFC), in May 1978, as a private limited company in 
a joint venture between Fauji Foundation and Haldor Topsoe A/S of Denmark. The initial 
authorized capital of the company stood at Rs. 813.9 million. The FFC commenced 
commercial production of urea in 1982 at a cost of Rs.3, 300 million with annual capacity of 
570,000 metric.
66
 Furthermore, the FF incorporated, on 4 December 1984, Mari Gas 
Company Limited (MGCL) as an unlisted public limited company with shareholding by the 
Government of Pakistan (GoP), Fauji Foundation and Oil & Gas Development Company 
Limited in the ratio of 40:40:20 respectively. However, the GoP in 1994 opted to divest 20% 
of its shareholding to the general public through an IPO (Initial Public Offering) at the three 
stock Exchanges of Pakistan.
67
  
In addition, the Fauji Foundation School of Nursing, located in the premises of Fauji 
Foundation Hospital Rawalpindi, was established in 1978. Also, the Foundation established 
Fauji Corn Complex, in 1982, with grinding capacity up to 50 Metric Ton Per Day (MTPD); 
to meet the growing demand of starches and derivates in the country and aboard, the first 
                                               
65  NLC Report 2009. Available from http://www.nlc.com.pk/website.nsf/publication.html 
66 http://www.ffc.com.pk/contents/aboutffc.htm 
67 See http://www.marigas.com.pk/Financials.shtm 
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Balancing, Modernization and Replacement (BMR) of the project was carried out in 1986 
which enhanced the capacity up to 90 MTPD.
68
 
In addition to the FF related economic ventures, the army‟s Welfare Trust- the AWT- also 
expanded operationally. For instance, in 1984 Askari Sugar Mills was established in Badin, 
Sindh.
69
 Moreover, rice, ginning and oil mills, a bicycle manufacturing plant and a fish farm 
and a hosiery factory were established in Lahore and Rawalpindi respectively.  The capital to 
run these enterprises was borrowed from public-sector banks. However, these ventures had to 
be closed down due to their unprofitability. Moreover, the AWT acquired 18,000 acres of 
land- the so called „the enemy land‟ and established five farms in Punjab and Sindh (Siddiqa 
2007:147). 
Importantly, the other services of Pakistan military- Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan 
Navy (PN) - did not prefer to lag behind their sister organization- the army. To begin with, 
the PAF was able to establish the Shaheen [eagle (in air)] Foundation (SF) in 1977 under the 
Charitable Endowment Act 1890. It had a seed money of Rs. 5 million. Under the Zia-led 
military rule, the SF established the following: a) Hawk Advertising (1977) - an advertising 
agency; b) Airport Services (APS) (1982) - an airport service company; c) Shaheen Knitwear 
(1980)- a knitwear factory; d) Shaheen Aerotraders (1988) - a trading company to supply 
hardware  and  required material to PAF.
70
 The financial details of these economic ventures 
during this period are not available. Yet what can be argued is that the establishment of SF 
and its subsidiaries‟ were a product of politics of the principal military. 
Similarly, the navy was also able to establish its welfare organization called Bahria [sea 
(navy)] Foundation (BF) in January 1982 under the (in)famous Charitable Endowments Act 
of 1890. The BF- with navy its controller- had its own welfare funds of Rs. 3 million to start 
with. In the same year the BF established its Falah Trading Company. In addition, the 
Foundation started its housing scheme in 1986 along with agent judiciary and civil 
bureaucracy.
71
 In this regard, political power was instrumental for the state land acquisition.  
                                               
68 http://www.fauji.org.pk/fcc/briefhistory.html 
69 http://www.awt.com.pk/bs.php?id=14&sec_id=5 
70 http://www.shaheenfoundation.com/ 
71 http://www.bahriafoundation.com/ 
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Last but not least, in 1977 the Rangers
72
was able to take control of fishing and other 
resources in some four lakes in Sindh. This action had an extremely negative impact on the 
local fishing community who was dependent on these sources to earn livelihood. In this 
particular case  
strengthening the monitoring of bordering areas was used an excuse to exploit 
opportunities to generate funds. The Rangers, which is headed by an army maj.-
general, leased out fishing in these lakes to private contractors at the cost of excluding 
the local fishing community and depriving them of their livelihood. Because the 
Rangers monopolized the grant of fishing licenses, the catch was sold at lower prices 
than previously, depriving the community of their rights. This was done in violation 
of the provincial government‟s Fisheries Ordinance 1980. Subsequently the Rangers 
took control of another 20 lakes in the province, and this too ultimately led to a 
conflict between the Rangers and the fishing community. The intrusion of the Rangers 
threatened the livelihood of hundreds of fishermen living in about a dozen big villages 
and thousands of small settlements on the 18,000 km coastline of Sindh and 
Baluchistan.                                                                                        
                                                                                                    (Siddiqa 2007:148-149)  
Besides, the individualization of the economic benefits also continued under the military rule. 
For instance, housing scheme was initiated by the three services for their retired personnel. 
For this purpose, nominal deductions- from Rs.200 to Rs. 1,000 per month- were made from 
the salary of all officers during their service. As a result, before or after retirement, they were 
entitled for a house or an apartment. Indeed the army officers could join the scheme after ten 
years of service with the deductions to be made during the remainder of their service.  
Apparently the scheme was part of military professionalization- that the personnel would 
have more peace of mind. Yet the measure aimed at re-definition of the extent of the rent 
owed by the nation to officer cadre for providing security.‟ (ibid 2007: 149-150). Finally, the 
senior officers, approximately 43 between 1977-1997, were permitted to import luxury cars 
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 The Pakistan Rangers are a paramilitary force under the control of the Ministry of Interior, Government of 
Pakistan. In 1995, the Pakistan Rangers got divided into two parts: Pakistan Rangers Punjab headquartered in 
Lahore; and Pakistan Rangers Sindh headquartered in Karachi. Its primary task included boarder security and 
assistance to civil administration to maintain law and order. Besides, it claims to combat terrorism also. See: 
http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=141. 
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ohne duty. In addition, military officers held top positions, both permanently and 
contractually, in the civil bureaucracy. For example, 
in mid-1982, 18 out of 42 Pakistani ambassadors posted aboard came from the 
military (fifteen of them belonged to the Army). During 1980-85, 96 Army officers 
were inducted into the selected cadres of Central Superior Services on permanent 
basis, while 15 were re-employed on contracts…[Moreover] Special attention is[was] 
given to the improvement of the conditions of the ex-servicemen. A ten percent quota 
of civil jobs was reserved for them.  
                                                                                                       (Rizvi 2000:257-258) 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began by explaining the change in principal in the post-breakup period. In this 
respect, it was maintained that a defeated and demoralized military rationally chose to return 
to its barracks in order to avoid further damage to its institutional makeup. However, the 
military was able to strategically interact with a section of politicians in order to preserve its 
purely institutional interests such as the release of 90000 personnel from Indian custody.  
Bhutto-led politicians, on their part, saw in the military‟s weaknesses their strengths; hence, 
their agency and rationality allowed their preferences to prevail and the country‟s 
principalship was assumed by Bhutto-led politicians. Little wonder then, Bhutto was able to 
become Pakistan‟s first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator as well as president- the 
posts which were instrumental to enhance his and his party‟s political position vis-à-vis 
political opponents and other agents such as the judiciary, civil bureaucracy and the military. 
 
Moreover, during the period prior to the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, Bhutto was 
able to take many a policy measure under the informal rules of the games- the interim 
constitution is a case in point. Hence, Mujib was released; top industrialists, who were his 
rivals, were put on an existing control list; anti-Bhutto journalists were arrested; basic 
industries were nationalized under the Economic Reform Order 1972; Land Reforms 
Regulations was enacted in March 1972; colleges and schools were nationalized in April 
1972 and Federal Security Force- a paramilitary organization- was established in 1972. 
Importantly, where Bhutto became Pakistan‟s president under the informal rules of the game, 
the governorship of NWFP and Balochistan went to NAP-JUI. This fact explicitly marks, on 
the one hand, politicians‟ agency and, on the other, their rationality in terms of preferring 
their own rather than the larger interests, for the subsequent political developments further 
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corroborates this assumption. For example, the confrontational politics between Bhutto‟s PPP 
and the leadership of NAP-JUI resulted in the loss of Balochistan‟s chief ministership and 
governorship for the latter. In this respect, the former, in pursuance of its nationalization 
agenda, attempted to make inroads in NAP-JUI‟s constituencies. The latter, on its part, 
rationally confronted these measures. Consequently, the consensus on informal rules got 
relaxed due to divergence of preference between Bhutto and ANP-JUI. Hence, the latter 
opted to resign in NWFP in order to register its protest over Bhutto‟s new alliance with QML. 
However, the NAP leadership was put behind bars on stated charges of anti-state activities. 
 
Nevertheless, the rational opposition, in order to pressurize Bhutto politically, gave more 
preference to agitational than participatory politics, for, in case of new elections, the chances 
for smaller parties to electorally confront PPP were minimum. Therefore, the former 
demanded restoration of true democracy in terms of formal rules of the game. Rational 
Bhutto, in order to safeguard his interests, opted to strategically interact with the opposition 
with the effect that both sections of politicians were able to formalize rules of the game in 
terms of the 1973 Constitution. Importantly, Bhutto was able to assume the country‟s prime 
ministership for the next five years- indeed the president also belonged to his party. 
Moreover, all martial law orders/regulations were validated and their initiators got 
indemnified. The opposition, however, was satisfied to have brought Bhuttoism under the 
law. Hence, in the post-1973 Constitution period, politics of interests was primarily rule-
oriented- declaring Ahmedis non-Muslims is a case in point. 
 
On the foreign policy front, Bhutto government was able to negotiate with India the release of 
POW at Simla in July 1972. Two years later, the prime minister was successful at hosting the 
Second Islamic Summit Conference at which Bangladesh was recognized as an independent 
and sovereign state. Moreover, as a reaction to India‟s nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1974, the 
PM vowed to pursue this goal too. Thus, Bhutto, due primarily to political reasons, remained 
unable to normalize Pakistan‟s relations with India on the pattern of Simla agreement. 
Importantly, the leader of the principal himself allocated considerable amount as defense 
expenditure to the military in order to appease the latter as well as the opposition and the 
general public.  
 
However, since mid-1972 Bhutto had attempted to bring the military under the 
politicians/civilian control. In this respect, he was able sack army chief Gul Hasan and air 
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chief Rahim respectively. The latter, however, accepted ambassadorship, offered by Bhutto, 
in Europe- this further consolidates the study‟s assumption that the military‟s leaders saw to 
their own interests. In addition, Bhutto was able to introduce changes in the military‟s 
command and control structure- the DCC is a case in point. Importantly, the PM ordered the 
agent military to carry out military operations against the anti-state elements- the Baloch 
nationalists- in Balochistan. However, the underlying objective of the Balochistan operation 
was more political than strategic. In this respect, the PM made a rational choice to, on the one 
hand, tactically concentrate the military‟s forces in the country‟s remotest region, and, on the 
other hand, teach his political opponents a blue lesson. 
 
Besides the military, the PM was also able to modify the so called cadre system of the civil 
bureaucracy. In this respect too, the reform measure was initiated during the period of 
informal rules of the game. The primary objective behind this action was to, on the one hand, 
accommodate PPP-affiliates through „lateral entry‟ in the bureaucratic services and, on the 
other, make the bureaucracy do the principal‟s bidding more effectively. As regards the 
principal‟s policy towards the judiciary, it was comparatively less compelling. However, the 
third and fourth constitutional amendments- an indicator of politics under the rules- curtailed 
the courts‟ jurisdiction and limited its powers related to especially contempt of court and 
judges‟ transfer. The Bhutto government took these measures in view of the institution‟s 
history of political alliances, pro-military verdicts, appointments and promotions.  
 
Overall, the above-mentioned measures were, as the chapter posited, reminiscent of implicit 
oversight whereby the principal through carrot and stick policy attempted to ensure its control 
over the agents. The latter, especially the military, rationally compromised in light of the 
situation since its topmost priority was to restore its image nationally and improve its 
institutional capacity to fight regionally. Little wonder then, the institution bore with the 
principal‟s interference. For example, Bhutto ably appointed Zia-ul-Haq as new army chief in 
March 1976 by superseding six generals. The former perceived the new army chief as 
apolitical, pliant and hence harmless to the government.  
 
Importantly, by almost the middle of his government‟s tenure, PM Bhutto opted to practically 
sideline the socialism-oriented persons from within his party- the PPP. As a result, landed-
interests were accommodated due to politico-electoral reasons. The rational alliance with the 
former showed that Bhutto- himself a big land-owner- remained unable to affect a 
 238 
meaningful change in the socio-economic structure of the society. Thus, the chapter noticed 
that the government‟s land, labor, education and heath etc., reforms were criticized by the 
opposition and the affected section of the populace.  In order to reduce the political damage 
to his person and party, Bhutto came up with a follow-up reform package especially land in 
1976/77. However, by then the opposition politicians, being able to unite under Pakistan 
National Alliance (PNA) for rational reasons, chose to confront Bhutto electorally.  
 
The scheduled elections were held in March 1977. The PPP won the majority of seats. 
However, the PNA, having refused the results, alleged government of massive rigging. In 
order to further pressurize Bhutto, the opposition alliance resorted to agitational politics.  
Rational Bhutto, on his part, attempted to negotiate with the PNA in the crucial post-election 
period- declaring Friday a holiday is a case in point. However, the PNA-led agitational 
politics transformed into confrontational politics with the result that Bhutto, while asserting 
his control over the agent military vis-à-vis the intriguing opposition, opted to declare martial 
law- though under the constitution- in the country‟s major cities in April 1977- the Army Act 
was also amended that enabled military action with retrospective effect. At this critical 
juncture of Pakistan‟s civil-military relations, a section of opposition politicians called upon 
the military to shirk- indeed air marshal-cum-politician Asghar Khan wrote letters in this 
respect. However, despite these developments, Bhutto continued preferring negotiations with 
the PNA. The crucial phase of negotiations was going on in the first week of July when the 
military struck down in terms of staging a coup and imposing martial law. Subsequently, 
Bhutto was put under „protective‟ custody; the 1973 Constitution was abrogated; national and 
provincial assemblies were dissolved; and political activity was banned.  
 
In his coup/martial law proclamation, the military‟s leader, General Zia-ul-Haq, cited 
problems of law and order and economy as the primary reasons for the coup. In addition, 
democratization and securitization were cited as complementary factors. Since no claim can, 
logically, be taken as granted, the chapter, in its later half, conducted an analytic narrative of 
the coup. In this respect, four conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, 
democratization and securitization, were identified, on the basis of a coding system, in the 
coup-text. Moreover, the study observed positive correspondence between coup and each of 
the conceptual variables. Thus, in order to verify this positive co-relation, the model-inspired 
empirical explanation was carried out. As a result, it was shown that the positive relationship 
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of coup with each of the conceptual variables was empirically unfounded. Rather, it was 
maintained that such factors/reasons were an indication of attempts at self-legitimation. 
 
Importantly, the analysis reverted to the model formally so as to explain this phenomenon. 
Thus, quite contrary to the stated reasons/causes, it was, with the help of the causal model, 
posited that the July coup was a function of the military‟s agency- its inherent capability to 
get things done. Being a rational actor, the military, having calculated cost and benefits of the 
coup-action, preferred shirking to working (agency A). In other words, the study maintains 
theoretical distance towards the existing structural, path-dependent, generalist, instrumentalist 
and conspiracy accounts, for they failed to explain the occurrence of the coup. For example, 
if the military was in „control‟ of Pakistan‟s politics and the state, then there should have 
been no coup at all. Or if the coup was structurally determined, then why did it not occur in, 
for example, 1974, 1976 or pre-election 1977? Similarly, the US‟s policy, post-Afghan Jihad, 
towards the military regime is enough to refute conspiracy theories.  
 
Moreover, the study maintained that the coup, being rational in nature, was political in 
character, for it was primarily aimed at capturing political power. In other words, as per the 
study‟s model, the coup was staged to assume Pakistan‟s principalship. However, the 
principalship was instrumental to facilitate military‟s economic interests- the establishment of 
Shaheen and Bahria foundations are a case in point.  Thus, the assumption of political power 
and maximization of economic interests as a dominant actor, contextually, marks the 
military‟s rationality in terms of its preferring its own to larger interest- hence agency B.  
However, in the post-Zia period, as the chapter noticed, the rational military had a strategy to 
deal with the agents, especially politicians. The next chapter will apply the same model, 
analytic approach to explain post-Zia civil-military relations. 
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Chapter 6 
Actors and Agency: Explaining the Civilian Circularity 
This chapter seeks to explain the so called phenomenon of civilian circularity as suggested by 
the existing literature. This perspective has the tendency to view civil-military relations 
during this period from the perspective of the „troika‟ whereby the prime minister, president 
and army chief determine the contours of politics and the state. Moreover, the legitimists, 
who believe that the military went back to barracks post-Zia, tend to justify the military‟s 
indirect intervention on account of politicians‟ incompetence, corruption etc. In addition, the 
structuralist and path-dependent works believe in structural military domination and 
institutionalized military „control‟ respectively. 
 
Quite contrary to the existing literature, the first part of the chapter maintains, in light of the 
model, that in the post-Zia period the rational military opted to remain in politics as the 
principal actor since its preference had prevailed vis-a-vis politicians regarding the country‟s 
foreign/defense policy and particularly domestic policy in terms of establishing a pro-military 
caretaker set-up and influencing the holding of 1988 general elections. Though the elections 
were rigged, Benazir Bhutto was able to form a government at the centre. Her political 
opponent, Nawaz Sharif, was able to become chief minister of Punjab. Being a rational agent, 
Bhutto moved cautiously. She chose to avoid confrontation with the principal and its agent, 
the president- Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Moreover, the FP/DP remained an exclusive domain of 
the military. Though a few issues related to army promotions surfaced between her and the 
military, the manner her elected government was dismissed, in 1990, by the agent president- 
who acted in strategic understanding with the principal- was quite anti-democracy and anti-
political forces.  
 
The Sharif government, which took charge as result of the 1990 elections, also remained an 
agent of the principal military for the former had little role to play as regards the making and  
implementation of Pakistan‟s foreign/defense relations. Moreover, Sharif, like Bhutto, took a 
rational course towards domestic policies especially the military‟s economic activities. 
Importantly, the mainstream leadership failed, due to divergence of preferences, to put up a 
united challenge to (the office of) the president in terms of repealing 58(2)(b)- the 
constitutional provision at  president‟s disposal to dismiss government(s) discretionally. 
Nevertheless, Sharif, like Bhutto, did assert his agency when it came to the appointment and 
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promotion of military officers/personnel. Also, his relations soured with the president. 
Consequently, his government was dismissed through 58 (2)(b) in 1993. Surprisingly, the 
country‟s Supreme Court unprecedently restored his government. However, rationality 
prevailed and both President Ishaq and PM Sharif opted to leave as a result of (covert) 
military intervention.   
 
In its second half, the chapter analyses the Bhutto government which returned to power 
following the 1993 elections. Since the principal retained its political clout, Bhutto‟s focus 
remained on prolonging her stay in power. For this purpose, she was able to bring a PPP-
man, Farooq Khan Leghari, in the presidency. However, both Sharif and Bhutto remained 
unable to constitutionally undo the Eighth Amendment due to political differences. 
Moreover, the PM‟s relations soured with the judiciary. Ironically, after almost two years, the 
president tended to be indifferent to Bhutto government‟s concerns. Hence, the latter‟s 
government stood dissolved by the agent president who saw to his own than party or national 
interests. The chapter posits that contextually it was impossible for the president to 
operationalized 58(2)(b) without the principal‟s support which, in turn, seeks to weaker 
political institutions. 
 
In its final part, the chapter critically analyzes the second Sharif government which came to 
power after the 1997 elections. Contextually, rational Sharif, having learned from his past 
experiences, decided to assert civilian control over the military politically-electorally. Thus, 
though he did not question the principal‟s economic ventures, he was able, primarily due to 
the heavy-mandate, to repeal 58(2)(b). This development is emphasized by the chapter since 
it marks the politicians‟ agency and rationality vis-à-vis the dominant actor- the military. 
Moreover, Sharif was also to divide the officer cadre  by retiring the army chief General 
Jehangir Karamat However, the chapter maintains that the military did not stage a coup at this 
point of time rationally for the political cost would been too high. Instead, it adopted a wait-
and-see policy. Importantly, Sharif-military relations further deteriorated when the latter took 
a different stance over the Lahore Declaration. The chapter explains, with the help of its 
causal model, that the Kargil war was as rational move by the principal military to politically 
weaken the prime minister. In the post-Kargil period, the latter was sacked in a military coup 
d‟état.  A conclusion, at the end of the chapter, summarizes the entire arguments. 
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6.1 Back to Barracks: Rationality Prevails 
In the immediate post-Zia context, the military had a few choices: a) it could have imposed 
martial law; b) it could have gone back to barracks and sincerely allow the politicians to 
decide their as well as country‟s fate; c) it could have hold the promised elections under the 
constitution and then return to barracks as principal. Contextually, the first choice entailed 
more cost than benefits given the dissolution of the assemblies and a section of shirking 
politicians; the second choice meant its death at its own hands-  a sincere disengagement or 
withdrawal from politics might have deprived the military of the principalship; the third  
choice, if enacted, would have brought more benefits than cost. 
 
Box 6.1  General Zia’s Death and the Military 
 
General Zia‟s sudden death had caused panic in the army [military]. The country was 
without a president and an army chief. It was prudent on the part of the [military] 
institution to show confidence in Mirza Aslam Beg who made a good decision not to 
impose martial law. 
 
A retired Colonel expressed these views with the author in Rawalpindi in April 2008. 
 
 
What the above informs is that the rational military went for the third choice. However, quite 
contrary to the existing accounts it did never go back to barracks; rather it turned its back to 
barracks and preferred to face the non-military actors in the capacity of principal with 
coercive means at the disposal to deal with the shirking elements if and when necessary. 
Therefore, immediately after its man‟s death, the organization‟s top brass assembled to show 
confidence in General Beg as the new chief of army staff.  
 
Moreover, the military strategically interacted with the chairman of the senate- who basically 
belonged to agent bureaucracy- to assume the country‟s acting presidentship since the 
constitution had a provision for it. In addition, elections were vowed to be held as per 
schedule. Besides, the country‟s foreign/defense and economic matters remained an exclusive 
domain of the GHQ. What all this suggests is that the military‟s preference prevailed 
regarding domestic and especially defense/foreign policy (Hussain 2010). 
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6.2 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Civilian Circularity 
This section shall briefly explain the manner, if not mechanism, by which electoral politics 
was rationally operationalized by actors especially the principal military to pursue their 
respective interests. The main objective here is to highlight the analytical weaknesses in the 
existing literature which, while believing in the military‟s absolute political power, seriously 
compromises not only agency and rationality of both the military and non-military actors but 
also context. Moreover, the section would analyze why the principal strategically interacted 
with the president to get the governments dismissed.  Also, it shall be explained why the 
politicians failed to empower the parliamentary institutions and establish democratic norms. 
 
6.2.1 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Bhutto Government (1988-1990) 
As is the characteristic of democracy that elections are viewed as a means to gain political 
power, so were they looked at by Pakistani politicians. The People‟s Party had already started 
low-scale agitational politics since Benazir Bhutto- daughter of hanged Bhutto- landed in the 
country in April 1986. On the other hand, however, the non-PPP parties were struggling to 
form a united challenge to Bhutto. The principal, on its part, saw through it. It opted to 
strategically engage with a section of politicians to possibly keep PPP out of the parliament if 
not power. 
The ISI chief and his deputy, Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed…reportedly geared up the IJI 
[Islami Jamhoori Itehad] with threats that Bhutto would roll back the nuclear 
programme and damage the planned jihad against Indian occupation of Kashmir. 
Sharif acknowledges the forces behind the formation of the IJI in terms of political 
needs, „it was the need of the hour that all the critical forces get together and fight 
elections jointly…I think the alliance did well.‟ 
                                                                                                                                                (Nawaz 2008:412) 
 
What the quote highlights is that the personalistic politicians also accorded more preference 
to their own than larger interests and were able to form an anti-PPP alliance called IJI- Islami 
Jamhoori Itehad (Islamic Democratic Front). Nevertheless, when the electoral results came 
out, they stunned not only the IJI but also the military (see Table 25 on the next page): 
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Table 25 1988 Elections: Party Position 
 Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan FATA Islamabad Total 
No. of seats 115 46 26 11 8 1 205 
PPP 52 31 9 1 - - 93 
IJI 45 - 8 2 - - 55 
JUI -FR - - 3 4 - - 7 
JUI-D - - 1 - - - 1 
PAI 3 - - - - - 3 
PDP 1 - - - - - 1 
ANP - - 2 - - - 2 
NPP-K 1 - -- - - - 1 
MQM - 13 - - - - 13 
BNA - - - 2 - - 2 
Independents 12 2 3 2 8 1 27 
 Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan. 
 
As the Table shows, the PPP, despite pre-poll rigging, was able to emerge as the single 
largest party in the National Assembly, though not in a position to form government on its 
own. Also, in the provincial elections, the PPP maintained overall lead over the IJI. However, 
unlike in the NA, it failed to form majority in the Punjab. The post-election situation was 
critical for every actor. The IJI had to win over fifty seats to taste relative power. Since the 
former struggled to constitute enough strength to form government at the centre, PPP‟s (wo) 
man had to be „appointed‟ by the president who,  being an  acting one, had an interest to 
prolong his stay in the office. Importantly, the principal wanted a weak, if not a pliant, 
government which abstains from meddling with its exclusive domain i.e. foreign/defense 
policy.  
 
As mentioned above, the IJI remained contextually unable to form a majority; therefore, it 
had to confine itself at the provincial level excluding Sindh. In this respect, though the 
military did try to factionalize the PPP in terms of engaging Amin Faheem, its efforts bore 
little fruit. On her part, Bhutto, as a result of her strategic interaction with the military, chose 
to assume the premiership. Importantly the former had a desire, if not design, to replace the 
„supper-bureaucrat‟ president with a PPP-man, but momentarily thought it rational not to 
create an issue since the president had good ties with the principal. Thus, it was in this 
context where the military was already a dominant actor in Pakistan‟s politics that Bhutto 
became Prime Minister on 2 December 1988. Having assumed the PM office she politico-
electorally allied with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who, on the same day with support from 
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the PPP, got elected for the next tenure. In this regard, Bhutto sided with the president to 
possibly win him over since he was, under the constitution, authorized to dissolve the 
government at his discretion. However, this move of hers was perceived negatively by her old 
MRD allies whose candidate for the presidency was defeated.  
 
Provincially, the PPP was able to form a coalition government with the MQM in Sindh; 
however, the chief minister belonged to PPP. In NWFP, PPP-ANP formed government which 
soon witnessed the withdrawal of the latter: however, the PPP‟s CM was able to hold on. In 
Balochistan, a complex and fragile coalition of PPP-IJI-Independents formed government, 
with chief minister from the IJI. In the Punjab, with comparative ease the IJI was able to form 
government under her own CM- Nawaz Sharif. Having fulfilled the tasks of government(s) 
formation 
The first major step of Benazir Bhutto‟s government related to the release of hundreds 
of political prisoners who were sentenced to various lengths of rigorous imprisonment 
by the previous Martial Law government. Similarly, cases against political exiles 
were withdrawn, which encouraged many of them to return to Pakistan. The 
government released various categories of woman prisoners, old prisoners and child 
prisoners, and generally commuted the death sentence of convicts into life 
imprisonment. It also withdrew rustication order against 400 university students. The 
government liberalized the media policy to cover the opposition‟s political activities 
through television and radio, first time ever in Pakistan‟s history. 
                                                                                                                     (Waseem 1994:441) 
 
As regards country‟s foreign relations, the PM, in order to gain more strategic space, 
attempted to assert her position vis-a-vis the principal military. In this respect, she was able to 
host SAARC annual conference and became its chairperson. Moreover, Bhutto sought to 
normalize Pakistan‟s relations with India.  
 
Box 6.2 The Foreign Policy remained under the Military 
 
Benazir Bhutto signed some accords with India as a sign of Pakistan‟s positive gesture 
towards Delhi. I think the military should not have objected to that as the late President 
Zia-ul-Haq had himself initiated that process for whatever reasons. The important 
thing, however, is that she was not in a position to make any significant changes in the 
country‟s foreign policy.  
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A senior PPP-P politician opined during a conversation with the author in February 2008. 
 
 
Interestingly, it was not the military itself but the IJI- with a section of authoritative clergy in 
its fold- which, in order to politically pressurize the government, started charging the PM of a 
sell-out to India. Indeed, a few clergymen labeled Bhutto‟s cultural policy as un-Islamic. In 
addition, the government-opposition relations soured when the Punjab‟s chief minister chose 
to disobey the federal government‟s orders with respect to appointments and transfers in the 
agent bureaucracy. In addition, the dissolution of the Balochistan Assembly, on 15 December 
1988, further complicated the situation for the IJI had blamed federal government for this. 
However, the matter was settled by the agent judiciary which unprecedentedly gave a verdict 
that the CM, in the absence of a majority of the total members of the assembly- not a majority 
of those on the floor and voting-  had no power to advice the governor to dissolve the 
assembly. In addition, during this period, the judiciary was faced with a constitutional 
question as to what was the status of the state sans the (caretaker) prime minister for more 
than six months. 
73
 
 
Hence, the Supreme Court, which was afforded an opportunity to clean its past in the post-
martial law period, was able to consider  
this matter in „Federation of Pakistan vs. Muhammad Saifullah Khan‟ and held that 
the office of the prime minister was necessary at all times…and that the President 
should have appointed a prime minister to head a caretaker cabinet. It was also 
observed that the absence of the prime minister from a caretaker cabinet altered the 
character of the Constitution from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system 
of government and was tantamount to violation and breach of the essential features of 
the Constitution which the courts could neither countenance nor condone. 
                                                                                                                           (Khan 2002:716) 
 
The judgment led to further complexities with respect to appointments during the stated 
period. The judiciary again had to take the pain to clarify the issue. Nonetheless, the 
seemingly series of problems for Bhutto government continued. Each time it had to tread the 
political path rational since the competitive actors also possessed these qualities. Not 
                                               
73  This question, as the previous Chapter mentioned, pertained to the state of affairs after the death of President 
Zia-ul-Haq, whereby no (caretaker) Prime Minister was appointed by the (acting) President- the head of the state 
under the 1973 Constitution. 
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surprisingly then, the anti-PPP rational politicians were able to unite themselves under the 
Combined Opposition Parties (COP) to possibly replace the federal government from within 
the National Assembly. For this purpose, they instigated a motion of no-confidence against 
the PM. Subsequently, both sides strove to win over enough members to succeed. Thus, as 
results of actors‟ agency and rationality, nine defections of personalistic politicians- six from 
COP and three from the government, took place The latter, however, was able to survive the 
move on 1 November 1989. However, Bhutto bore price in terms of accommodating the 
defectors in the cabinet accordingly. 
 
Nevertheless, the dilemma of survivability lingered. Bhutto struggled to maintain a prime 
ministerial decorum vis-à-vis the constitutionally empowered president and the principal 
military with whom the president had a history of strategic interaction in the capacity of 
agent- Ishaq entered into the corridors of power post-1977 coup. Moreover, the president was 
aware of Bhutto‟s pronouncements to undo the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the former 
never missed any opportunity to further cut the PM to size- the issue of appointments of 
military chiefs and superior court judges is case in point. In this respect, the president had a 
preference for cold-storage of files coming from the PM secretariat.  
 
 In addition, being faced with an empowered president, challenging opposition and the 
principal military, which had a penchant to keep FP/DF its exclusive domain, Bhutto had a 
very limited and risky set of choices. Had she opted to remain low politically, the competitive 
actors would have undone her government within a matter of weeks if not days. Therefore, as 
a rational actor, having calculated the cost- for advice she had has ex-military officers as 
advisors- the prime minister attempted to confront the president regarding the appointments 
and promotion of military officers/personnel. PM Bhutto, by this move, wanted to appoint 
pliant officers at the top of the institution. However, the agent president, a rational being 
himself, backfired, with the principal‟s support. The former claimed that the authority to 
appoint military officers lay with him under the constitution.  
 
No wonder then, the time to pay the price had arrived when the Beg-led military decided to 
take the PM on due to latter‟s excessive interference in not only defense/foreign policy, 
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domestic military preferences- Sindh is a case in point- but also matters related to 
appointments, replacement and promotions etc.
74
  
 
Box 6.3 PM Bhutto attempted to assert her Position vis-à-vis the Military 
 
Prime Minister Bhutto had started to intervene in the internal affairs of the 
military. She had a different approach on Afghanistan as well. With president, 
she too had bad relations…Even the opposition parties were not happy with her 
policies. 
 
A retired Brigadier told the author in an interview in Rawalpindi in April 2008. 
 
 
What can be deduced from the afore-mentioned is that, as a result of strategic understanding 
between the agent president and the principal, Bhutto government was seen as a political 
liability. Thus, the president having operationalized 58(2)(b) dissolved the National 
Assembly, on 6 August 1990, on stated  charges of corruption, failure to maintain law and 
order, bringing harm to the country‟s integrity, meddling with civil services and the judiciary 
etc. As a result, the PM and her cabinet ceased to hold office forthwith. The provincial 
assemblies were dissolved later on. The fate of these stated charges shall be explained later in 
the study but here it is suffice to ask: why did not the president order an inquiry, if not set up 
a commission, to probe the similar of the military regime under Zia? 
 
To summarize, though Benazir Bhutto committed many a political mistakes- the hiring of ex-
military officers is one of them- it is beyond one‟s comprehension how an elected 
government, with a majority in the National Assembly, could be sacked in such an arbitrary a 
manner. Moreover, quite contrary to existing legitimist accounts it is posited that the 
president acted in a strategic understanding with the principal military. How could a 
president, with no political constituency, no coercive force of his own, act alone in a country 
with a history of coups and martial laws? Nevertheless, the sacking of Bhutto government 
highlights agency and rationality of the principal military which wanted to further weaken the 
political/parliamentary institutions and democratic norms in the country. Because, the 
weaknesses of politicians and/or political institutions imply, at the end of the day, the 
political strength of the principal military. 
 
                                               
74 Bhutto was able to replace DG-ISI, Hamid Gul, with a retired Lt. Gen. Shamsur Rahman Kallue. 
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6.2.2 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Sharif Government (1990-1993) 
Having dismissed the Bhutto government, unlike his predecessor, President Ishaq Khan chose 
to appoint a caretaker cabinet headed by Prime Minster Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi- the leader of 
the opposition and a former PPP loyalist- at federal and provincial levels. Interestingly, the 
majority of cabinet members belonged to either the opposition or were openly anti-PPP. 
Same came true of caretakers chief ministers- all opposed to Bhutto‟s PPP. Moreover, the 
agent judiciary especially the Supreme Court
75
 preferred to hold the order of dissolution. 
Nonetheless, to run the state under the constitution, fresh elections were allowed to be held in 
October 1990. The anti-PPP parties again decided to contest under the label of IJI. However, 
PPP, in order to stage the comeback electorally, was also able to ally with others and contest 
the elections under the banner of PDA (Peoples Democratic Action). Ultimately, the National 
Assembly results were as under: 
                                                              
Table 26 1990 Elections: Party Position 
Parties Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan FATA Islamabad Total 
IJI 91 3 8 2 - 1 105 
PDA 14 24 5 2 - - 45 
MQM - 15 - - - - 15 
JUI - - 4 2 - - 6 
ANP - - 6 - - - 6 
PNP - - - 2 - - 2 
JUP-N n3 - - - - - 3 
PKMAP - - - 1 - - 1 
JWP - - - 2 - - 2 
Independents 6 4 3 - 8 - 21 
 114 46 26 11 8 1 206 
Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan. 
 
As is obvious from the Table, the IJI won massively. However, the PDA did not accept the 
results and alleged that the president and the ISI (military) along with the caretaker set-up had 
played a conspiracy to keep the PDA especially the PPP, out of parliament. Indeed, the latter 
pointed to the fact that there was a massive pre/post poll rigging.
76
 Moreover, the so called 
Mehran Bank Scandal further substantiates the above.
77
 However, the president deemed it 
                                               
75 A full bench of the Peshawar High Court had, in response to a writ petition, declared the dissolution order 
unconstitutional and directed that the NWFP Assembly and Cabinet stand restored. However, the Supreme 
Court set aside this otherwise historic judgment by a majority judgment of her own (see Khan 2002:731-732). 
76 See The PDA‟s White Paper on the 1990 Elections. 
77
The Mehran Bank scandal, revealed on 24 March 1994 with the arrest of its president, Younus Habib, exposed 
the widespread level of financial corruption. Rs 5 billion was siphoned off, according to the press reports, from 
Habib and Mehran Banks. The amount was paid to senior politicians from both the PML-N and the PPP, the 
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rational neither to order an inquiry into the financial corruption related to the Mehran Bank 
nor call for re-elections. Nevertheless, as president of the IJI, Nawaz Sharif was able to form 
government in the centre. Provincially, in Punjab, IJI had a clear majority to form 
government; in Sindh, a coalition government of IJI-MQM-Independents got formed. In 
NWFP, IJI-ANP was able to ally, and in Balochistan JUI was able to form a coalition 
government. 
 
Having assumed the office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, being himself an industrialist- 
Ittefaq Foundries is a case in point- had a preference for maximizing the returns not only for 
himself and his alliance partners but also the constituency he was electorally inclined to. 
Therefore, his government started, domestically, with the introduction of an economic policy 
in terms privatization, free movement of foreign exchange and investment-friendly 
atmosphere. In this respect, following measures were taken: a) issuance of Economic Reform 
Ordinances, August 1991-April 1992; b) passage of Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 
1992. As regards operationalization of these policies, the Sharif government was able to 
privatize/denationalize, industrial units and banks both in the private and public sectors. This 
process of privatization was carried out through the establishment of a Privatization 
Commission which provided ample opportunity for its functionaries and privileged parties to 
make money. For example, 
 the cartels were busy devising ways and means to take over certain industries so as to 
retain a monopoly within a particular sector. For instance, a number of cement 
industries were acquired by the same group by bedding through Calicon Pvt. Ltd… 
Under the bidders‟ plan, companies A and B did not comply with the letters of intent 
forwarded to them by the Privatization Commission in accordance with a pre-planned 
procedure and forfeited their deposits, company C was [thus] enabled to purchase the 
unit for a very low price. In some cases, the sale price was even lower than the 
commercial value of the land on which the unit was built. It is common knowledge 
that the cartels made windfall profits following divestiture of cement factories.  
                                                                                                                           (Khan 2002:743) 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
former army chief General Aslam Beg, and a number of provincial politicians. The discrepancy was exposed 
when the Mehran Bank failed to produce the money deposited by ISI in its account (Amin 1995; also Nawaz 
2008:433-434). 
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While the government was busy in improving the economic lot of her clientele if not the 
country, the opposition under Bhutto was criticizing the former for privileging certain 
sections at the expanse of the poor. Also, politically, Ms Bhutto started blaming the PM for 
entering into an alliance with the principal and its agent president. Bhutto, on her part, wanted 
the Eighth Amendment to be repealed. Moreover, the opposition also chose to attack the 
president for issuing „references‟ against Bhutto. Nevertheless, the Sharif government paid 
more attention to the judiciary than the opposition. In this regard, the former was able to get 
12
th
 Amendment passed in July 1991 to create „courts parallel to the constitutional hierarchy 
consisting of the High Courts and the Supreme Courts.‟ The country‟s higher courts had no 
control over the function of a special court established under this amendment. Though the 
judiciary, on its part, saw to it in term of a judgment which called upon the separation of the 
executive form the judiciary (Khan 2002:749-751), the government, with such measures, 
wanted to, on the one hand, contain the judiciary, and, on the other hand, get speedy justice 
since the normal proceedings especially of lower judiciary was seen time-consuming.  
 
However, the real challenge to Sharif government came from the foreign policy front in the 
wake of the Gulf War. As explained earlier, since the principal military had a penchant for 
FP/DP exclusivity, it took a different policy stance on Pakistan‟s involvement in the US-led 
coalition. The former was opposed to it due to her own strategy vis-à-vis the US post-Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. The elected government had its own preferences; it, on the one 
hand, wanted to appease the US to possibly further her economic opportunities in the wake of 
nuclear sanctions, and on the other, appreciate the poplar sentiments especially its electoral 
constituency. Ultimately, however, the principal‟s preference prevailed for the confrontation 
cost for Sharif would have been higher than the intended benefits. But, this policy-divergence 
helped further damage the civil-military relations.  
 
Since the military‟s leader, General Beg, was about to expire his tenure, he had a choice 
either to stage a coup to teach the prime minister, who attempted shirking though 
unsuccessfully, a lesson or let the coming chief to settle the score. Hence, contextually, at this 
point, the principal‟s political position was already intact since the president was even 
physically weaker against the military to disobey.  Rationally then, there was no need to 
topple the government which had just seen the daylight. Importantly however, the 
appointment issue created a rift between the PM and the President since the former deemed it 
his right to have the final say in this respect. Regardless, the second choice was enacted by 
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the military and Lt.-Gen. Asif Nawaz became the COAS. The new chief acted rationally and, 
resultantly, no coup occurred. Besides, quite ironically the new chief of the military 
institution attempted to normalize country‟s relations with India (Nawaz 2008:447). 
 
Nonetheless, the military‟s relations with the Sharif government started to sour again when 
the former opted for a military operation against the ethnicist MQM which was in alliance 
with Sharif in Sindh. The politics of operation proved politically costly for the PM. Also, the 
opposition resorted to agitataional politics to further weaken the government. Moreover, the 
sudden death of COAS- he died of heart attack in January 1993- further worsened the PM-
President relations due to their preference-divergence over the appointment issue. Sharif had 
a different plan in mind. However, the principal‟s preference prevailed in terms of showing 
confidence in General Abdul Waheed Kakar as its new leader. The appointment-issue, 
however, again mattered for the PM who wanted to assert his position. This led to further 
bitterness in PM-President relations. 
 
Moreover, there was news of Sharif‟s plans to repeal 58(2)(b) in order to appease the 
opposition especially the PPP. Therefore, in order to strategically pressurize the agent 
president, Sharif vowed to openly take the former on in his television and radio address to the 
nation on 17 April 1993. In strategic understating with the principal, the rational but agent 
president, while giving more weightage to his own interests than national interests, dismissed 
the Sharif government the very next day:  charges stated were more or less the same as of 
1990 dissolution. Accordingly, the assemblies were dissolved and a caretaker administration 
under an anti-Sharif Prime Minister, Balakh Sher Mazari, took charge.  
 
To summarize, Nawaz Sharif, from the platform of IJI, was able to form government in the 
capacity of an agent of the principal military. The former retained its exclusive control over 
Pakistan‟s foreign/defense policy. Hence, when the prime minister, out of his own political 
interests, showed his priority to ally with the US-led coalition for the Gulf War, the 
principal‟s choice diverged and Sharif had to comply with, though rationally. Moreover, even 
on domestic issues the PM ran into trouble not only with the agent president but also the 
military. Thus, when Sharif, in a strategic move, attempted to repeal the provision which 
constitutionally had empowered the president, the latter, with military‟s support, toppled his 
government. The dismissal of Sharif government explicitly marks military‟s agency, which 
chose to punish shirking Sharif through the medium of presidency.  It is, thus, maintained that 
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the primary reason for dismissal was military‟s rationality: having viewed Sharif as a 
potential shirker, the principal got his government topple for the prolongation of the Sharif 
government would have initiated a process of strengthening the parliamentary institutions and 
democratic norms vis-à-vis the principal military. 
 
6.2.3 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Bhutto Government (1993-1996) 
In the post-dismissal period, paradoxically, the president invited Bhutto- whom he had 
charged of corruption etc., in 1990 - to sit on the cabinet. Interestingly, the offer was accepted 
by Bhutto who also had her spouse appointed as federal minister. However, the reasons to 
strategically engage each other were rational. On his part, the president, in strategic 
understanding with the military, wanted to give the impression to the general public that since 
the opposition leader„s husband had joined the caretaker set-up,  the latter should not be 
viewed partisan as well as anti-mainstream politicians/parties and democracy. Benazir 
Bhutto, in her calculus, wanted to tactically vigilant of the electioneering process along with 
appeasing both the president and the principal.  
 
Nonetheless, while the caretaker government was busy highlighting Sharif‟s misdeeds, the 
Order of Dissolution was challenged in the Lahore High Court by the Speaker of the 
dissolved National Assembly. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif also filed a constitutional petition in 
the Supreme Court in this regard. Meanwhile, the PPP was able to politically damage the 
Punjab government where Sharif‟s CM was replaced with a Bhutto-man. On the other hand, 
the SC heard the case on daily basis and finally decided, on 26 May 1996, in Sharif‟s favor 
by a majority of ten to one. As a result, the dissolved NA, sacked PM and his cabinet got 
restored with immediate effect and the appointment of the caretaker government was held to 
be of no legal effect.  
 
However, the verdict was not accepted by Bhutto and her aides in political terms. They 
argued that why the same court did not restore the PPP government in a similar case a few 
years ago? (Waseem 1993:52). However, on the other hand constitutional expert read it as a 
milestone in an agent judiciary‟s chequered history (Khan 2002:759). What can be deduced 
from the Supreme Court‟s verdict is that the judiciary possessed both agency and rationality. 
Hence, in the present context where the president was already taken on and was about to 
retire, if not re-elected, she chose to stand by the elected government in order to primarily 
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improve its institutional prestige. After all no heaven was to fall if her judgment was 
overruled since it was a norm in the country. 
 
In the post-restoration period, the federal (Sharif) government was able to bring no-
confidence motion with the help of defectors against the Punjab‟s Chief Minister who, in turn 
was rational enough to advice the governor to dissolve the assembly. Simultaneously, the 
NWFP assembly also met with the similar fate. This created a constitutional chaos. The 
matter was, therefore, referred to High Courts. The Lahore High Court judged the dissolution 
to be unlawful whereas the Peshawar High Court upheld it respectively. In Punjab‟s case, 
interestingly, a few hours after the judgment, the anti-Sharif governor again dissolved the 
assembly. To this, the federal (Sharif) government opted to take the administrative control in 
its hands after having passed a resolution in the parliament. However, the president did not 
accept it since it was not sent for his consent. This led to another constitutional crisis. Sharif‟s 
side again restored for judicial rescue. 
 By this time, the army‟s continuing behind-the-scene role emerged on the 
scene…COAS cancelled his visit to Somalia, along with other countries, ostensibly 
due to the brewing crisis in the country…Already military units were patrolling the 
area in the vicinity of the Presidency and the Parliament House. 
                                                                                                                       (Waseem 1993:54) 
 
Thus, as a result of strategic interaction and understanding among the PM, president and the 
principal, the two agents rationally decided to leave their respective offices than to stay on. 
Arguably, the president was not a challenge for the military since he was constituency-less 
and gun-less too. But, he had three choices contextually: a) to resign strategically; b) to leave 
disgracefully; c) if none of the two, then commit suicide. However, when pressed upon, he 
rationally preferred life over death. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif had choices too; his 
government was restored and he could have continued since the Supreme Court had already 
decided in his favor. Why then did he advise the president to dissolve the judicially restored 
National Assembly? 
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Box 6.4 PM Sharif’s Resignation was a Rational Decision 
 
Actually the political situation had become too instable. There were earlier defections 
in the party. The opposition was also calling for elections. Moreover, in case Nawaz 
Sharif had decided not to leave the office, then there was likelihood of a military 
takeover.   
 
Interview with Mohammad Pervaiz Malik, Secretary Finance PML-N and a Businessman. 
Lahore: 17 March 2008. 
 
 
What the afore-mentioned suggests is that the PM being surrounded by anti-Nawaz Sharif 
forces represented by Junejo faction of the PML, the president, the four provincial chief 
ministers, the PPP as well as the 8-prty alliance (NDA), made a rational decision to confront 
these actors electorally rather than governmentally (Waseem 1993:52). Moreover, in case his 
party formed simple if not two-third majority, he would have an opportunity to either try to 
negotiate the repeal of Eight Amendment since it was also PPP‟s agenda or put his candidate 
for the presidency since Ishaq Khan was to retire after six months if not re-elected. Suppose 
Sharif had opted to carry on, then logically in that hostile environment there would have been 
a few choices for the principal military: a) it would have used the intelligence agencies to 
possibly defect MNAs from Sharif‟s party to formally send  him home ; b) it would have had 
Ishaq Khan carried on and re-operationalize 58 (2)(b); c) in case the case had been referred to 
the judiciary and the agent had preferred to shirk, then there would haven been a high 
probability of a military coup d‟état since this would have meant a significant reduction in the   
principal‟s control of the agents.  
 
However, since factually the military had chosen to openly intervene in this episode, it 
marked her agency for it was, within a short span of less than three months, capable of 
strategically and tactfully forcing shirking Sharif and the troublesome president to leave. 
Moreover, military‟s intervention in politics bespoke its rationality: it was necessary to end 
the vicious political instability which, if prolonged, could have negative impact on the growth 
of her economic ventures.  
 
Thus, in the post-dissolution period, a new caretaker government was formed under the 
auspices of the principal. No wonder then, three of the four governors belonged to the 
military; agent „civilian officers‟ were appointed as CMs to influence the elections results.  
Importantly, the caretaker prime minister was an economist- Moeen Qureshi- who was 
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expected to attract FDI and help the principal, if not the country, grow economically. In this 
respect, his government issued an economic reform packaged based on a lassie faire 
economy. Subsequently, to meet the economic deficiencies, Qureshi rolled back Sharif‟s 
policies i.e. Yellow Cab Scheme, and came up with economic, political and administrative 
reforms. For example, the caretaker government 
submitted the list of politicians who were bank defaulters to the Election 
Commission…the list carried the names of over 300 politicians who had borrowed 
over Rs. 23 billion…The Pakistan Banking Council issued the list of 
defaulters…[who] owed Rs. 60 billion to the banks while Rs. 1.56 billion had been 
written off as of 30 June 1993. Almost all the prominent political figures from the 
major political parties were included in the list, along with serving or retired civilian 
bureaucrats, military officers as well as industrialists and businessmen. 
                                                                                                                               (ibid 1993:65) 
                                
However, Nawaz Sharif‟s name was not published whereas Benazir, her mother, and husband 
could not escape the list. The PPP desperately condemned it. On his part, Sharif condemned 
PM Qureshi for a sell-out to the IMF and World Bank. In addition, the authoritarian clergy 
doubted his Muslim and Pakistani credentials. Despite this, the government took care to hold 
elections in October 1993. Following are given the NA results: 
 
Table 27 1993 Elections: National Assembly Results 
Parties Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan FATA Islamabad Total 
PPP 47 33 5 1 - - 86 
PML-N 52 10 10 - - 1 73 
PML-J 6 - - - - - 6 
IJM - - 2 2 - - 4 
ANP - - 3 - - - 3 
PIF - 1 2 - - - 3 
BNM-H - - - 1 - - 1 
BNM-M - - - 1 - - 1 
JWP - - - 1 - - 1 
MDM 1 - 1 - - - 2 
NDA 1 - - - - - 1 
NPP - 1 - - - - 1 
PKMAP - - - 3 - - 3 
PKQP - - 1 - - - 1 
Independents 5 1 1 1 7 1 15 
 112 46 25 11 7 1 202 
  Source: Election Commission of Pakistan. 
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As the Table shows, the nation had, in a relatively fair election, given a split mandate. 
Therefore, both the mainstream parties opted to buy over the smaller parties and the 
independents to form government especially at the centre. Ultimately, the PPP-PML-J was 
able to form governments at the centre and in the Punjab. In NWFP, ANP-PML-N entered 
into a coalition whereas in Sindh the PPP had formed a majority government. In Balochistan, 
the PML-N in alliance with smaller parties helped an independent to lead the coalition. 
Importantly, having assumed premiership Benazir Bhutto had a political distaste for pro-
principal presidency. Therefore, in order not to get re-victimized by 58 (2)(b) she was able to 
help PPP-man, Farooq Ahmad Leghari, got elected as president. By the standards of 
Pakistan‟s politics, this was a major development for it entailed far-reaching implications for 
country‟s civil-military relations. Ironically, however, despite many vows both Bhutto and 
Sharif, due to their diverging preferences, failed to repel the Eight Amendment which would 
have permanently benefited the politicians. 
 
Nonetheless, having assumed the office Bhutto paid attention to economy since that was one 
of the stated reasons for her 1990 dismissal. Moreover, being a politician she wanted to 
improve not only her own but also her respective constituency‟s fortune. She took certain 
measures on this front. For instance, her government opted   
to seek direct foreign investment in infrastructure projects; Energy, oil exploration, 
telecommunications, road construction and development of ports and airfields. 
Simultaneously, her government ventured to privatize the utilities and banking sector 
…[also the] government boasted of singing of Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUS) of worth 22 billion dollars of investment…with foreign firms…however, 
during 1994-1995 an investment of only 0.5 billion was registered. The ground work 
for some projects was started- for example, ICI [International Chemical Industries] 
put up 500 million dollars chemical plant in Punjab, South Korea‟s Hyundai 
established 800 million dollars oil refinery, 2.6 billion dollars Ghazi Brotha hydro-
electric power project was finalized with foreign investors. However, Consolidated 
Electronic Power Asia (CEPA)‟s much publicized thermal power project at Keti 
Bendar, worth 7 billion dollars ran into serious difficulties. All said and done Benazir 
Bhutto‟s government was able to attract an investment of about 1.5 dollars by 1996, 
but it fell short of the promise and expectations that it had aroused. 
                                                                                                                       (Shafqat 1997:246) 
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In addition, her government‟s privatization and tax collection program- the IMF had 
emphasized it along with decrease in defense expenditures- generated less capital to relive the 
already poor sections of the society. Hence, the overall economic non-performance was 
primarily due to resource-constraints. However, Bhutto government contextually had other 
choices. For example, the government, the core being land-based, did not prefer to reform the 
land which could have initiated a process of retributive justice for the poor peasants and 
tenets, at least. Besides, the industrialists- Sharif was part of it- and the merchant classes etc., 
also view the tax program negatively for it hurt them economically. Therefore, in order to 
safeguard their interests, the opposition chose to criticize the government for economic 
mismanagement and corruption related to the privatization especially of energy sector. 
 
As regards her relations with the military, the only concern, as explained above, would have 
been the induction of PPP-president. However, the rational Bhutto, with a strategy of her 
own, chose to appease the principal by not questioning its economic enterprises. Had the 
government interfered into military‟s business activities the consequences would have been 
negative with the possibility of winning over the president and/or of in-house change through 
defections, for Pakistani politicians, by and large, had looked to their own than party or 
national interests. Or the possibility of a military coup d‟état was also likely in that scenario 
whereby despite prioritizing personal interests, the politicians had failed to devise any 
oversight regime/mechanism let alone the repeal of Eighth Amendment.  
 
Having taken a carrot-approach vis-à-vis the military the Bhutto resorted to stick-approach 
towards the judiciary and the opposition. In this respect, the NWFP government was made 
dysfunctional through a presidential proclamation which subsequently helped- through 
defections- PPP to bring down her rival. The dismissed CM, Sabar Shah, challenged the 
proclamation in the Supreme Court which decided the matter in his favor constitutionally. 
Similarly, the Punjab CM was sacked as a result of another presidential proclamation. The 
Lahore High Court, when asked her opinion, judged it to be unlawful. It was in this context 
that after the retirement of much disliked CJ Nasim Hasan Shah, Bhutto was able to 
supersede Justice Saad Saood Jan, who recreantly declined to appoint PPP-loyalists as SC 
judges, and appointed Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as the chief justice, with the hope that the latter 
would judicially support her government- Justice Shah had previously dissented in two cases 
related to Bhutto. Interestingly, the superseded Justice, while preferring his own interest, 
chose to work rather than shirk.   
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Last but not least, the tussle with judiciary went on when the former, in order to protect its 
interests, was able to direct the government to appoint permanent chief justices to the High 
Courts. This attitude of the apex court would have taken the air out of Bhutto‟s calculus in 
term for a pliant judiciary. After all, from the judiciary‟s perspective, it was a political rather 
than a military government.  
 
On the foreign/defense policy front, Bhutto government, as per its policy of non-inference in 
the principal‟s domain, strategically allied with the latter. Hence, the latter allied with the US 
to procuring weapons- the issue of F-16s is a case in point- which would have further 
improved her institutional standing vis-à-vis the agents if not India. In this regard, the repeal 
of Brown Amendment was hailed as a success both by Bhutto and the military for different 
reasons: the former politicized it for her political purposes; the latter deemed it instrumental 
for military modernization. Moreover, on Afghanistan, especially on the issue of Taliban, the 
civil government also chose to toe the military‟s line (Nawaz 2008:474). Nevertheless, 
despite Bhutto‟s pro-principal strategy especially regarding FP/DP, her 
 administration was shaken by the news that the army intelligence had uncovered a 
plot in September by 1995 involving 40 army officers, including Major General 
Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi…to overthrow the government and the senior leadership of 
the army [military]. The aim was to capture and eliminate the military leadership 
during a high-level meeting at GHQ on 30 September and declare Pakistan an 
orthodox Islamic State. Abbasi was the man who had been removed from his 
command in Kargil area of Kashmir by General Asif Nawaz and given a non-
operation desk role at GHQ after having undertaken an unauthorized and costly foray 
into Indian held territory in 1990…When the news of the attempted coup got out, 
Abbasi was court martialed and sentenced to jail. 
                                                                                                                             (ibid 2008:477) 
 
What the quote informs is that the civil government were viewed as a liability by (a section 
of) the military. Also, it highlights problems of professionalism within the principal due to its 
practical engagement with politics and economy. In addition, it points to the penetration of 
authoritarian clergy in, at least, a section of the military which claimed to be the most 
disciplined institution in Pakistan.  
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However, the real challenge came to Bhutto from the president who was primarily a PPP-
man. Though having assumed the office President Leghari had resigned from the party as a 
gesture of political neutrality, this neutrality started withering due to divergence of prioritizes 
between the PM and the President regarding appointments of new army chief and higher 
courts judges. Moreover, Leghari kept Bhutto warning of corruption and misconduct. To add 
insult to injury, in September 1996 the murder of Benazir‟s brother, Murtaza Bhutto, 
furthered helped widen the chasm. Why did the PPP-picked president decide to turn against 
it? 
 
Box 6.5 Bhutto-Leghari Differences  
 
I think power factor played important part. The failure of PPP to repeal the 8
th
 
Amendment would have given him self-confidence. Besides, he was a politician…he 
had certain differences over [ministerial] portfolios with Benazir even during her first 
government. Finally, after the killing of Benazir‟ brother he sided with the 
establishment than Bhutto and her husband which further worsened their relations. 
 
A senior journalist, who works with a private TV channel, informed the author during a 
conversation in Islamabad in April 2008. 
 
 
„Against this background and in the light of the deteriorating situation, Leghari and Karamat 
began to see eye to eye (but separately) on the case against Bhutto‟ (Nawaz 2008: 485).  
Ironically, the opposition- Sharif included- saw eye to eye with the president. The former met 
with him and urged him to sack the government. Thus, it was in this context that on 5 
November 1996 the president by invoking the 58 (2)(b) dismissed the Bhutto government on 
stated charges of corruption, misconduct etc. The provincial assemblies got dissolved 
accordingly. 
 
In summary, having assumed premiership in the capacity of agent, Bhutto, having learned 
from her past experiences, opted to strategically engage with the principal. Thus, the former 
opted not to question and interfere in the latter‟s areas of activity i.e. businesses, 
foreign/defense policy. However, to avoid being politically pressurized and/or arbitrarily 
dismissed by president, she ably brought PPP-man in the presidency. Nonetheless, due to 
diverging preferences in terms of maximizing own interests, Farooq Leghari chose to oppose 
Bhutto. In this regard, the president acted in strategic understanding with the principal for the 
former had neither army nor political force to confront Bhutto on his own. Moreover, as is 
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already analyzed, the principal military saw further disorganization of political actors and 
institutions in the dismissal. After all, „the MI [military intelligence] was keeping tabs on the 
prime minister.‟ (Nawaz 2008:482) 
 
6.2.4 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Sharif Government (1997- 12 Oct. 1999) 
In the post-dissolution period, the dismissed PM along with her husband was placed under 
protective custody; the PM was released later on. Soon, a caretaker government under Prime 
Minister Meraj Khalid, a founding member of PPP, was sworn in. His cabinet included 
among others old friends and cronies of the president; the veteran foreign minister- 
Sahabzada Yaqub Khan- represented the principal as regards FP/DF; to attract FDI Shahid 
Javed Burki, who was also on Qureshi‟s cabinet, got appointed as chief economic advisor. In 
addition, a retired judge chose to be part of it. Besides, to clean the country of corruption, the 
Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, was promulgated whose jurisdiction was extensive. 
 
Though morally this action was appreciable, it came under severe criticism for it favored the 
incumbent president and governors. Moreover, the idea of appointing a judge, retired or 
serving, as Chief Ehtesab (Accountability) Commissioner was ill-conceived. In addition, as a 
rejoinder to the accountability process, the caretaker government, in order to purify the 
political system of corrupt politicians, amended the elections laws. Despite their symbolic 
significance, these measures were inadequate since the implementation and monitoring 
mechanism remained defective (Khan 2001: 803-804). Hence, as the inherent inefficacy of 
such measures speaks for itself, they were primarily politically motivated in order to 
influence the electoral process which was underway. The president‟s reconciliatory approach 
towards Sharif and the resignation of the federal law minister, Fakharuddin G. Ibrahim, the 
judge-member of the cabinet, are further evidences in this regard.  
 
Last but not least, Bhutto got also apprehended at the hands of the agent judiciary whose 
chief had developed a liking for „partisanship and „press statements‟.  
When Benazir challenged the order of the dissolution of the National Assembly, his 
[chief justice] attitude was clearly hostile. He returned her petition twice on flimsy 
procedural grounds…He pulled out old cases pending against the validity of the 
Eighth Amendment and fixed them ahead of the dissolution. On all previous 
occasions, the cases of dissolution of assemblies were heard by all available judges of 
the Supreme Court of Pakistan but this time he constituted a Bench of only seven 
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judges, keeping a number of senior judges out of the bench. Such maneuvers resulted 
in the dismissal of the petition only four days before the general elections… 
                                                                                                                 (Ibid: 809-810) 
 
As the quote shows, the judiciary had acted on partisan lines for rational reasons. On the hand 
hand, she wanted to settle the score with the sacked prime minister who had, during her 
tenure, developed sour relations with the former, and on the other, she, in strategic alliance 
with the principal, did not want the political institutions to develop to such an extent where 
they could pose any challenge to the interests of hers as well as the principal. The nature and 
character of the caretaker set-put further substantiates this argument. Nonetheless, the general 
elections were held, on 3 February 1997, in which the PPP opted to participate for its absence 
would have impacted its electoral and political standing negatively. The NA results are given 
in the Table below: 
Table 28 1997 Elections: Party Position 
 NA PP PS PF PB 
PML-N 134 212 15 31 5 
PPP 19 2 36 4 1 
HPG 12 0 28 0 0 
ANP 9 0 0 28 0 
BNP 3 0 0 0 9 
JUI-F 2 0 0 1 6 
JWP 2 0 0 0 6 
NPP 1 0 3 0 0 
PPP-SB 1 0 2 0 0 
BNM 0 0 0 0 2 
PDP 0 1 0 0 0 
PKMAP 0 2 0 0 2 
PML-J 0 2 0 2 1 
UNA 0 0 1 0 0 
Independents 19 21 15 11 8 
 202 240 100 77 40 
 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan 
 
As the Table shows, Nawaz Sharif‟s PML-N was able obtain a heavy mandate. Hence, he 
faced little difficulty to form a coalition government at the federal level with ANP and 
MQM-A. At the provincial level, the PML-N entered into collations with ANP and MQM-A 
in NWFP and Sindh respectively. In the Punjab Sharif‟s brother, Shahbaz Sharif, formed a 
majority government quite easily. However, in Balochistan a multi-party coalition was 
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formed under Akhtar Mengal. The PPP decided to sit on opposition benches. The former 
wasted no time to charge the caretaker administration of rigging the election (PILDAT 2008). 
 
Having assumed the office as heavily-mandated prime minister, Nawaz Sharif decided to 
chalk a cautious but rational path vis-à-vis the principal and pro-principal president who was 
able to appoint his crony as governor of Punjab. Being victimized by the (office of) president 
in the past, Sharif would have no desire to meet the same fate again. The PPP of Bhutto, on 
its part, had most recently felt the pain caused by 58 (2)(b). No wonder then, with a 
commonality of political interests, their preferences converged in terms of passage of 
Thirteen Amendment in April 1997. The amendment deprived the president of the 
constitutional prestige to dissolve assemblies discretionally. No longer could he appoint 
chiefs of armed forces as well as provincial governors.  
 
Undoubtedly, from Pakistan civil-military relations perspective, this was a major 
development which certainly had tiled the constitutional balance of power to the 
parliamentary form of government. Moreover, it marked, quite contrary to the existing 
literature, agency and rationality of politicians who despite being agent of the military had 
chosen to shirk and thus affect the rules of the game defended jealously by the latter. This 
action of the agent politicians must have caused serious concerns in the GHQ since the 
instrument of destabilizing the political governments was history. Therefore, in the absence 
of such a mechanism the military‟s rational choices were as follows: a) it could have staged a 
coup to punish the shirking agent- but the post-coup political cost of this action would have 
been greater since the government was popularly elected; b) it could attempt through its 
intelligence apparatuses to cause defections- the chances of which were limited in the 
presence of heavy-mandate; c) it had the choice to strategically compromise with the status 
quo and adopt a wait and see policy. Contextually, the rational military operationalized the 
third choice. 
 
However, Sharif, on his part, seemed to be in a hurry. In order to further stabilize the tenure, 
if not functioning, of the parliament and provincial assemblies, his government was bale to 
pass Fourteenth Amendment to put an end to defections which was an instrument in the hand 
of personalistic politicians to maximize their politic-economic returns. However, one 
negative aspect of it was that dissension, the hallmark of parliamentary democracy, became 
almost impossible. Not only this, the government, in order to, on the one hand, belittle 
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Bhutto‟s legacy, and on the other, politically harass if not victimize the opposition,  replaced 
the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner with the Ehtesab [Accountability] Cell run by Sharif‟s 
confidant- Saif-ur-Rahman.  The government claimed that the uncovered 
certain foreign exchange accounts of Benazir, Zardari, and other members of the 
Bhutto family in Britain and in Switzerland. It also uncovered properties purchased by 
Benazir and Zardari in their own names or in the names of their frontmen. Benazir 
[however] had the audacity to deny this in one breath and admit it, somehow, in 
another. She moved the courts in foreign countries to lift injunctions against the 
operations of these accounts. 
                                                                                                                                                   (Khan 2002:820) 
 
Last but not least, Sharif government‟s relations with judiciary, from early on, started to 
worsen due to sever differences over the establishment of „special courts‟, appointments of 
judges, suspension of Fourteen Amendment,  contempt of court etc. The personalistic chief 
justice Sajjad Ali Shah was able to win the initial round of the battle but what came in the end 
was a bone-breaker. In this regard, the process started with the Quetta Bench of the SC 
entertaining a petition against the CJ and culminating in the storming of Supreme Court 
(building) by pro-government elements on 28 November 1997. The CJ called for military 
rescue but to no avail, for the rational military had no design to become partisan in this case. 
Importantly, without PM‟s permission, the only choice for intervention was through a coup 
d‟état which it did not prefer at this point of time since the government enjoyed heavy-
mandate. In addition, the military‟s agent, judiciary, stood divided: the Sajjad-Bench had 
suspended the Thirteen Amendment to ostensibly ally the president and the principal; 
instantly the rival Bench put it in abeyance. Later, the SC upheld it.  
 
Hence, the rational actors involved in the game of power-politics preferred a rational end to 
the game in terms of notification of Justice Ajmal Mian as the new CJ on 23 December 1997. 
However, the gains of Sharif were higher since his preference prevailed in this case. Besides, 
during this episode the PM-President relations also got soured and the latter, after having 
failed to seek rescue from the GHQ, opted to resign in the face of impending impeachment. 
After all, there was no 58 (2)(b) at his discretion. Leghari was thus replaced with Justice 
(retd) Muhammad Rafiq Tarar- a friend of the Sharifs. 
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Nevertheless, the Sharif government took a moderate stance as regards the economic front. In 
this regard, his old vision of privatization was operationalized, though in a different context. 
Importantly, Sharif, in the post-Thirteen Amendment period, chose a carrot-policy towards 
military‟s economic enterprises. As regards the foreign/defense policy of Pakistan, the 
government, as a result of strategically interactive understanding, shared a convergence of 
preference with the principal. Had the government chose to interfere in functioning, if not 
making, of the FP/DF there was a high probability of a backlash. Hence, the prime minister 
took a politico-constitutional stance towards the civilian control of the military and therefore 
abstained from authoritarian measures.  
 
Little wonder then, Islamabad‟s stance on Afghanistan remained more or less the same. 
However, the testing time for both the principal and the agent came in May 1998 when India 
tested her nuclear weapons. The military believed in a military approach; the politicians had a 
liking for a political response since they had a constituency to appease if not held accountable 
to. For the political government there was also a risk of international sanctions which would 
have socio-economically, if not politically, delegitimized the government. On the other hand, 
any such measure would have no political impact on the principal which operated with its 
back to barracks. However, after more than two weeks‟ calculation, the strategic interaction 
between the two actors helped produce the outcome: Pakistan too went nuclear. Both military 
and the Sharif government claimed the action. Nonetheless, the cost was to be paid by the 
common man- as shall be explained in detail in the next chapter- when Japan and the USA 
applied nuclear-sanctions. Arguably, this act of nuclearization further boasted the military‟s 
morale and its military policy vis-à-vis Hindu enemy. Hence, Kashmir came in the limelight 
and defense expenditures got increased with agent‟s approval. 
 
As explained above, the PM had a strategy of his own to deal with the principal. Therefore, in 
post-nuclear period when the military was politically claiming all credit, Sharif, in order to 
minimize the impact, attempted to deploy the troops domestically in terms of patrolling the 
GT [Grand Trunk] road, enumerating the „ghost schools‟ and helping the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) monitor its customers‟ electricity meters (Nawaz 2008: 
497). Though this fact marks politicians‟ agency who, despite being in disadvantageous 
position, attempted to control the principal, such measures, at best, indicate the civilians‟ 
politically selective oversight since there was no effort to institutionalize any oversight 
regime/mechanism.  
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Moreover, the civil-military relations witnessed a critical point when the matter of new army 
chief‟s appointment, a prerogative of the prime minster under the Thirteen Amendment, 
surfaced. Serious differences emerged between the PM and the leader of the principal who 
had only two months of tenure left. Hence, the only choice, in order to confront the shirking 
Sharif‟ move, was to stage a coup d‟état. But given Sharif post-nuclear comparative 
popularity and heavy-mandate, it seemed a risky business as it entailed more cost than 
intended benefits. Therefore, the rational military went with her wait and see policy. 
Consequently, the PM was able to get the serving arm chief, General Karamat, retired. This 
fact further marks politicians‟ agency of affecting change if and when it helps maximize their 
benefits.                                                                                             
After Karamat‟s departure, Sharif had a choice of five leading candidates. The senior-
most Lt. Gen. Ali Quli Khan…Next in line was Ali Quli‟s course mate, Khalid 
Nawaz…The next two [were], Lt. Gen. Salahuddin Tirmizi and Lt. Gen. Pervez 
Musharraf…On 7 October 1998, Sharif chose Musharraf to be the new army chief, 
replacing Karamat. Ali Quli and Khalid Nawaz sought early retirement after being 
superseded, following a tradition of the Pakistan Army [military]…Sharif settled on 
Musharraf, a Mohajir from North India and therefore not likely to have strong tribal 
or clan affiliation in the army [military]. 
                                                                                                                        (Nawaz 2008:500) 
 
From the above the following could be deduced; a) the military acted rationally as General 
Karamat preferred retirement than a coup; b) despite the act of supercession the seniors 
(officers) preferred retirement than partisanship against junior Musharraf- this further 
consolidates our assumption which treats military as an institution; c) the PM, in order to 
establish political control over the military, played politics with the latter by appointing a 
junior in the hope of a  pliant leader of the principal.  
 
Nevertheless, having assumed the formal charge, General Musharraf chalked out a policy for 
his institution; strangely enough, during his meeting with the corps commanders there was no 
mention of any planned actions in Kashmir especially in Kargil and/or of Kashmir as a 
serious concern (Nawaz 2008: 501). However, on his part, Sharif was able to talk to India 
when he invited Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Pakistan in a move to 
observe nuclear non-proliferation. However, as the principal-agent relationship was at its low 
ebb, the COAS General Musharraf bothered not to receive the Indian PM at the Lahore 
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airport. This move of the military would have alarmed PM Sharif. Nonetheless, the two states 
were able to sign Lahore Declaration, on 21 February 1999, which recognized the Kashmir 
issue peripherally. Strangely however, a few months after the signing of the Lahore 
Declaration, the two states were engaged in a war in Kargil- this shall be explained in more 
detail in the next Chapter. In the post-war period, relations between the principal military and 
agent but shirking Sharif further deteriorated to the extent that the former staged a coup, on 
12 October 1999, to oust the latter from political power- the next chapter would explain it 
further.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter was to explain civilian circularity as is propagated by 
structuralist, legitimist and path-dependent accounts. Quite contrary to the existing narratives, 
the present study, with the help of its model, sought an analytical explanation of civil-military 
relations, in the post-Zia period. In this respect, it was maintained that the rational military 
did not go back to barracks. Rather, it chose to stay on in politics as the principal. However, it 
rationally made a tactical move in terms of allowing the politicians to participate in elections- 
the latter, however, were not allowed to interfere in country‟s foreign/defense policy. Had 
General Beg-led military opted to remain in politics overtly after Zia‟s death, the political and 
economic cost- primarily to the military‟s businesses- of this choice would have been higher 
than the intended benefits.  
 
Hence, elections were allowed to be held in 1988. Importantly however, the principal was 
able to strategically interact with a section of politicians who, with the blessings of the 
former, rationally formed IJI against Benazir Bhutto. Despite this, the latter was able to form 
a government at the centre. However, her political rival, Nawaz Sharif of the IJI, became the 
chief minister of Punjab. In other words, the Bhutto government had limited political choices. 
Moreover, she had to strategically interact with the principal which had developed, over the 
years, an anti-PPP mindset. Though Bhutto chalked out a rational course, her say in 
Pakistan‟s foreign/defense policy was next to nothing. Nonetheless, almost in the middle of 
her tenure she attempted to assert her premiership in terms of meddling with military 
appointments and promotions. However, before Bhutto could make any meaningful change 
vis-à-vis the principal, her government was dissolved, in 1990, by President Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan who operationalized 58(2)(b) in strategic understanding with the principal. The stated 
charges included corruption, misconduct etc. The opposition politicians welcomed her 
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dismissal for it provided them with another politico-electoral opportunity to test their 
strength. 
 
Elections were held in the same year under the auspices of a pro-principal caretaker 
government. As a result, Sharif was able to form a government at the national level and 
Bhutto chose to sit in the opposition. The military, in its capacity of principal, was the 
watchdog. Being a rational actor with experience of working with the military, Prime 
Minister Sharif initially opted not to interfere in the military‟s matters especially FP/DP and 
military‟s economic activities. His focus remained on reviving the country‟s economy in 
strategic collaboration with IFIs. However, almost in the middle of its tenure the Sharif 
government started developing differences, apparently constitutional in nature, with the 
president over the appointment and promotion of military officers.  
 
In this respect, Sharif‟s calculus aimed at strategically interacting with that part of the officer 
cadre who in the former‟s perception was less harmful to his government- the Bhutto episode 
was a case in point. However, Sharif‟s rational move brought more cost than benefits. The 
principal military viewed it as an open interference in its internal matters. Moreover, the 
rational president also saw in Sharif a potential shirker. Indeed, the latter politically vowed to 
repeal the Eighth Amendment which would have constitutionally tilted the balance of power 
in favor of the prime minster. However before Prime Minster Sharif could affect any change 
in the political system of Pakistan, President Ishaq in strategic understanding with the 
military opted to dissolve his government by operationalizing 58 (2(b) in 1993. A caretaker 
government was set up to take charge. 
 
Interestingly, Sharif went to court and, quite ironically, the agent judiciary restored his 
government. However, the apparently ironic verdict of the apex court was rational in nature 
as it aimed at improving its institutional image in this specific political situation in which the 
president had already become controversial politically, if not legally. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court‟s judgment had implications for the agent president and not necessarily the principal 
military which was already reaping political benefits from the PM-President encounter. Little 
wonder then, in the post-restoration period, when their mutual differences resurfaced the 
principal provided the PM with choices; either to make peace or face the music. The rational 
Sharif saw more benefits in leaving the office for the opposition was already calling for mid-
term elections. However, to appease Sharif and dissociate itself from a controversial 
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president, the principal sought his resignation also.  A new pro-principal caretaker 
government assumed responsibilities including holding the general elections. 
 
As a result of the 1993 elections, Benazir Bhutto was once again able to form a government 
at the centre. Having learnt from her past experiences, rational Bhutto took a calculated 
course of action. Instead of overtly interfering in the military‟s matters, she was able to bring 
PPP-man, Farooq Ahmed Leghari, in the presidency. However, she remained unable to bring 
the opposition on board to repeal the Eight Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. Also, 
Bhutto could not establish control over the country‟s foreign/defense policy. It remained an 
exclusive domain of the principal military. Importantly, as during her previous stay in office, 
this time also she opted not to question- in parliament, at least- the military‟s economic 
ventures. However, Bhutto‟s relations with the judiciary soured over the issue of judges‟ 
appointment. Moreover, ironically President Farooq Leghari chose to differ with PM Bhutto 
over policy matters. The death of the prime minister‟s brother further added insult to injury. 
Hence, being confronted with an unfriendly opposition, the president and the principal, 
Bhutto‟s set of choices was limited. Contextually, she signaled at impeaching the president in 
order to politically stabilize her government. However, before the PM could move in this 
direction her government was dismissed, in November 1996, by the president who saw more 
benefits in a strategic alliance with the principal. A pro-principal caretaking administration, 
with the responsibility to hold elections, took charge.  
 
As a result of the 1997 elections, Nawaz Sharif was able to head the government in 
Islamabad. Like Bhutto, Sharif devised a rational course of action vis-à-vis the military. The 
latter‟s economic activities were treated as a non-issue. The foreign/defense policy was also 
considered to be the military‟s sphere. However, the PM chose to deal with the dominant 
actor politically. In this respect, Sharif was able- his heavy-mandate was an added advantage- 
to get his-man, Justice (retd) Rafiq Tarar, elected as Pakistan‟s president. Importantly, the 
58(2)(b) was repealed in terms of Thirteen Amendment. These Sharif-led developments were 
perceived as indicators of shirking by the military since Sharif had amended the rules of the 
game meaningfully. Moreover, the PM‟s efforts to interfere in military appointments and 
promotions bore fruit and, army chief, Jahangir Karamat, sought retirement and later Pervez 
Musharraf got superseded. However, from the military‟s perspective, Sharif‟s successes 
added to his failures since the institution chose to deal a heavy-mandated prime minster 
tactfully. Hence, a coup at this point of time would have been politically more costly.  
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Last but not least, Sharif, on his part, continued with his incremental policy of controlling the 
principal military. His next move was to invite, against the military‟s wishes, India‟s Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Pakistan in early 1999. Though the two states were able to 
sign the Lahore Declaration, the strategic implications of Hindu enemy‟s visit were grave. 
Little wonder, a few months after the visit, a war broke out between India and Pakistan in 
Kargil.  Sharif was bewildered for he was not taken on board. However, the damage to his 
political legitimacy was done when the opposition in particular and public in general blamed 
Sharif, not the military, for withdrawal. Moreover, the Kargil-differences further widened the 
gulf between the PM and the GHQ. Consequently, having perceived the growing military 
distrust, Sharif opted to replace Army Chief Pervez Musharraf- the leader of the principal 
military. However, this move of the PM was timely met with a coup d‟état in October 1999- 
the next chapter shall explain this in detail. 
 
To summarize, the phenomena of civilian circularity is rational rather than structural in 
nature. The four dismissals mark the military‟s agency and rationality for it never wanted 
political forces to take the strategic ground away from the principal. However, the politicians, 
on their part, gave more preference to their respective private rather than national interests. 
Hence, they failed to unanimously chalk out a strategy to replace the military as principal. 
Nevertheless, the sacking of elected prime ministers at the behest and, by the principal, 
demonstrated that the military- and presidents for that matter- also saw it as being in their 
own rather than national interests.  
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Chapter 7 
Military Agency Revisited: CMR under General Musharraf 
In its first three sections, the chapter seeks to explain the fourth military coup d‟état, which 
are divided into sub-sections accordingly. In this respect, while re-capping the crux of the 
previous chapter, the chapter begins by briefly describing the nature and dynamics of civil-
military relations in 1999 especially during the post-Kargil period. Since relations between 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and principal military‟s leader- General Pervez Musharraf- 
were at a low ebb, the former, while exercising his constitutional prerogative, rationally chose 
to replace the latter with another military man who in Sharif‟s calculus was easier to get 
along with. However, this shirking move of Sharif was thwarted by the Musharraf-led 
military which sacked the popularly elected prime minister through a coup on 12 October 
1999. The 1973 Constitution was abrogated; the assemblies were dissolved and the country 
was put under martial law. 
 
Importantly, the military attempted to justify the coup-action on the basis of problems of law 
and order and economy. Moreover, it took upon itself the task to democratize and securitize 
the country- the coup/martial law text is a point of departure and reference in this respect. 
Logically and morally, since no claim to truth can be taken for granted, the chapter, therefore, 
tends to explain this phenomenon with the help of study‟s deductive model. In this respect, 
applying the method and approach of analytic narrative, the chapter analyses this fourth coup 
in terms of a combination of working/shirking and own/larger interests or agencies A and B- 
which are also the explanatory variables of the study. Hence, the analysis begins with the 
identification of conceptual variables in the coup-text. Of the variables, law and order, 
economic, democratization and securitization are observed to have a positive correspondence 
with coup/martial law. However, in order to judge the veracity of this positive 
correspondence, the chapter empirically explains each correspondence accordingly. As a 
result, it is found that there exists a negative relationship between coup/martial law and the 
rest of the conceptual variables.  
 
Therefore, the analysis then reverts to the model formally. With the help of the model‟s 
independent variables, the chapter maintains that the coup was caused by the military‟s 
agency. Moreover, it is posited that the coup is rational in nature and political in character. In 
 272 
addition, the chapter, while testing one of the study‟s hypotheses, maintains that political 
principalship was instrumental to facilitate the military‟s economic interests.  
 
Having explained the fourth coup, the chapter then- in its next three sections- seeks to explain 
the fifth coup that occurred on 3 November 2007. Before attempting to explain it formally, 
the chapter provides the contextual background to the coup. In this respect, the Musharraf-led 
military‟s attempts at preserving its political power are emphasized. Moreover, the agency 
and rationality of politicians is also highlighted, for they saw to their own interests by 
strategically interacting with the principal military. However, the hurdle in the way to 
formalization of political power by the military comes, quite surprisingly, from the agent 
judiciary which had a tendency towards shirking even before November 3 by questioning the 
military and its political allies‟ political as well as economic activities.  The coup, the chapter 
describes, takes place in this context. However, quite coincidently, the military‟s leader, 
General Pervez Musharraf, attempted to justify the coup on account of problems related to 
security, economy and governance. Also, democratization was invoked as a complementary 
factor. Moreover, the Musharraf-led military explicitly blamed the judiciary for its 
„increasing interference‟ in government‟s affairs.  
 
As done previously, the chapter takes the coup-text as point of departure and reference. 
Subsequently, five conceptual variables are identified in the text; namely, securitization, 
economic, law and order, democratization and coup/martial law, and, to keep uniformity of 
style the earlier sequence of variables is maintained. Furthermore, a positive relationship is 
observed between coup/martial law and each of the conceptual variables. However, in order 
to determine the empirical worth of these positive correspondences, the chapter examines this 
coup also in the form of an analytic narrative.  
 
As a result of the model-inspired empirical explanation, the chapter is able to find a rather 
negative relationship between coup/martial law and the rest of the variables. Therefore, the 
analytic narrative, while formally relying on the model‟s agencies A and B, attempts to 
explain the fifth coup from the agency perspective; namely, the coup is as a result of the 
military‟s inherent capability to affect change. The change that it affected on November 3 
was rational in terms of preserving its hold over political power. In other words, the rationally 
enacted coup was staged to protect the military‟s political principalship which was being 
questioned by the shirking judiciary. However, the coup-action highlights the military‟s 
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political weakness as well, for it failed to re-negotiate the rules of the game with the shirking 
agent- it faces the political implications of its choice in the post-coup period. Nevertheless, 
the chapter posits that the military is able to maintain its overall principalship, for it is able to 
maximize its economic interests as an independent actor.   
 
7.1 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Fourth Coup 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the civil-military relations were at its low ebb when 
India‟s Prime Minister visited Pakistan in February 1999. Though the two states were 
somehow able to melt the ice, the Pakistani military opted to drive the nail into the coffin of 
normalization.  The latter 
produced a plan to take advantage of the winter months, when India normally lowered 
its guard at the LOC, to infiltrate at five points into what they effectively called „No 
Man‟s Land‟, the areas that were not occupied by the other side, and set up bunkers or 
stone shelters called „sanghars‟ at about 108 spots along the 480 km front. The 
Mujahideen would offer a cover for these operations…as far as the need to bring the 
prime minister on board is concerned, local actions, such as Kargil, are within the 
purview of the local commanders and stayed within the army‟s chain of command. 
There was no need…to openly bring the prime minister into the plan.  
                                                                                                            (Nawaz 2008:513) 
 
The question that arises in light of the foregoing is why Sharif was not taken on board:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, when the clandestine operation transformed into India-Pakistan war in the summer 
of 1999, the situation got out of hand of its planners. Indeed, they were surprised to witness 
India retaliating with her air force in that mountainous region. As a result, the stated aim of 
internationalization of Kashmir issue by the principal remained a desire. Ultimately, the 
Box 7.1 The Military objected to Sharif’s Peace Measures towards India 
 
Fauj [the military] had its traditional position towards India. They did not like 
Nawaz Sharif meeting Vajpayee in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif wanted to develop 
good relations with India in order to resolve the bilateral issues politically. This 
was the reason they [military] made their own plan to thwart the government‟s 
peaceful efforts.  
 
Interview with Mohammad Pervaiz Malik, Secretary Finance PML-N and a 
Businessman. Lahore: 17 March 2008. 
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military‟s strategic and general public‟s concerns were perceived by the PM to be politically 
costly. Hence, Sharif, in order to reduce the political cost of the war, saw a way-out in terms 
of seeking third-party mediation. 
 
Therefore, he chose to draw the international community especially the US, which had its 
own stance of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, into the matter to possibly prevent the 
two states from further escalation with a probability of resort to nuclear weapons. 
Consequently, one sees that the two rational states took the international input seriously and 
preferred de-escalation and subsequent end to the war. However, the status quo prevailed 
over Kashmir.  
 
Box 7.2 The Kargil Operation was a Military and Diplomatic Failure 
 
The Kargil like the Gibraltar operation was a total disaster. It seemed they the 
[military] did not plan it either. The military remained unable to gain international 
diplomatic support as regards [the] Kashmir [issue]. Thus, it was a diplomatic failure. 
In fact, there was heavy loss of personnel and weaponry which should have shocked 
the GHQ. 
 
Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Analyst. Heidelberg: 1 July 2009. 
 
 
Interestingly, the inability of the Pakistan military to achieve its stated goals in the Kargil 
operation was publicly recognized by none else but one of the planners of the operation- 
(Late) Lt. Gen. Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani. Gen Kiyani, in a rare show of dissidence over 
matters private to the principal, called for the establishment of Kargil commission to bring 
those responsible for the fiasco to book
78
. Nevertheless, the fall-outs of Kargil persisted as 
regards civil-military relations in Pakistan. The Kargil war was cognized differently by the 
principal and Sharif. For example, „ Musharraf kept hearing stories that Sharif was looking to 
replace him as army chief and perhaps even move him upstairs to CJCS [Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff]‟ (Nawaz 2008: 525).  His calculus proved correct when, on 12 October 1999, 
Prime Minister Sharif- constitutionally empowered to appoint armed forces chiefs- opted to 
replace COAS Pervez Musharraf with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin. When the replacement got 
announced on the state media, Musharraf was about to arrive home from Sri Lanka. 
However, before the leader of the principal landed in, his institution had struck the same day: 
                                               
78 Interview of (Late) Lt. Gen Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani by Dr Shahid Masood in his Geo-TV program Meray 
Mutabiq on 2 June 2008. Available from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tK_WAtLcu5s&feature=related 
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the country had witnessed its fourth successful coup and the shirking Sharif government was 
dismissed; the PM was placed under house arrest; the 1973 Constitution was abrogated.
79
  
 
Moreover, the principal issued, on 14 October, a Proclamation of Emergency followed by a 
Provisional Constitutional Order- new rules of the game. Interestingly, under the newly 
imposed rules the leader of the principal chose to become Chief Executive (CE) of Pakistan 
rather Chief Martial Law Administrator. In addition, the agent judiciary, while preferring 
working and its own interests, took a fresh oath. Importantly, the CE, like his predecessors, 
addressed the nation to plead the case: 
 
Box 7.3 Excerpts from General Musharraf’a Address to the Nation,8017 Oct. 1999 
Today, we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled…state institutions 
lie demolished, provincial disharmony has caused cracks in the federation...the few at 
the helm of affairs in the last government were intriguing to destroy the last institution 
of stability left in Pakistan by creating dissention in the ranks of the armed forces of 
Pakistan… I shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy, 
but to a true one…The Constitution is but a part of the nation therefore I chose to save 
the nation…This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed 
forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to 
pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan. 
…our aims and objectives shall be: 
1. Rebuild national confidence and morale. 
2. Strengthen the federation, remove inter provincial disharmony and restore 
national cohesion. 
3. Revive the economy and restore investor confidence. 
4. Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice. 
5. Depoliticise state institutions. 
6. Devolution of power to the grass roots level. 
7. Ensure swift and across the board accountability. 
…Last year, we were compelled to respond to India's nuclear tests in order to restore 
strategic balance in the interest of our national security and regional peace and 
stability…We shall continue our unflinching moral, political and diplomatic support to 
our Kashmiri brethren in their struggle to achieve their right of self-determination…our 
                                               
79 Though the Musharraf-led military claimed that the 1973 Constitution was only „put in abeyance‟, it was, in 
author‟s view, abrogated and replaced with the PCO as new rules of the game. Moreover, the article 6 of the 
1973 Constitution, as mentioned earlier in the study, considers any such action an act of „high treason‟.  
80 General Musharraf addressed the nation briefly on 13 October 1999. In this address he explicitly pointed to 
problems related to governance, economy and security if not democracy. Since the General, as vowed, was able 
to re-address the nation at length on 17 October, therefore the study prefers to rely on this address- the 
coup/martial law text. Available from: http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/07/10/address-nation-7-
point-agenda/ 
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armed forces are fully equipped and ready to defend our national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity…[italics mine].                                                                                                                            
 
 
As every military regime faces legitimacy crisis so did the one in case. Therefore, the 
judiciary was interacted to take fresh oath under the PCO in January 2000. Quite surprisingly, 
the apex court of the country was divided on the issue.  Consequently,  
the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Saiduzzman Siddiqui refused to take oath. His 
standpoint was that the military regime had given solemn undertaking to the judiciary 
that it would not interfere with its independence and it would be allowed to function 
under the constitution. On his refusal to take oath, he was virtually put under house 
arrest until 11. A.M. on 26 January 2006 so that he might not influence those judges 
who were willing to take  the oath…Only seven judges of the Supreme Court took 
oath and the most senior amongst  them, Irshad Hassan Khan was appointed the Chief 
Justice. Two judges of the Lahore High Court, three judges of the Sindh High Court 
and two judges of the Peshawar High Court were not given oath and thus they ceased 
to hold the office. None of the judges of the High Courts refused to take oath 
voluntarily. 
                                                                                                               (Khan 2002:935) 
 
As the quote shows, CJ Siddiqui along with other judges chose not to take oath under the 
PCO. A few others, however, preferred to work and hence the military was able to achieve its 
objective. Nevertheless, it raises the question as to what caused shirking by a section of 
otherwise agent judiciary. 
 
Box 7.4 The Judiciary allied with the Military 
 
It was a unique stand on the part of the Chief Justice who had a point to protest 
since the courts were assured of no interference in their functioning. He would 
have hoped that the other judges especially of Supreme Court and High Courts 
would follow suit. A few did. The majority took oath under the PCO 
[Provisional Constitutional Order]. 
 
A High Court Advocate expressed these views with the author in Karachi in April 
2008. 
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What the above-mentioned suggests is that despite commendable resistance from the CJ and 
a few other judges the majority saw to their personal rather than institutional, if not national, 
interests. It also corroborates the study‟s assumption of judiciary being the agent of the 
principal. No wonder then, the pro-principal judiciary opted to judicially legitimize the 
regime. In this respect, it gave a verdict in April 2000 in which Nawaz Sharif was judged 
guilty of hijacking the PIA plane which carried General Musharraf. Sharif was awarded the 
sentence of life imprisonment. However, his co-accused got scot-free. Importantly, having re-
activated the doctrine of state necessity, the Supreme Court of Pakistan judged the coup valid 
on 12 May 2000. Moreover, it empowered the Chief Executive to amend the constitution at 
his discretion. Interestingly, the removal of Musharraf was also judged invalid despite the 
fact that it was not the real issue before the SC.  
 
Thus, what can be summarized in light of the above is that the Musharraf-led military was 
able to stage coup successfully on 12 October 1999. It remained the principal since its 
preference had prevailed. Importantly, the military, as a result of carrot and stick policy, got 
its coup legitimized from the agent judiciary.  
 
7.2 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the military was judicially legitimized. However, 
since the legitimizing institution- from the present study‟s perspective as well as empirical 
evidence given above- was an agent of the military, its judgment therefore cannot be taken 
for granted. Thus, in the following sections, the study tends to conduct an analytic narrative 
of this coup in order to explain the reasons/causes of its occurrence and the impact it had on 
Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. The analytic narrative, as done in preceding chapters, is a 
combination of agencies A and B; namely, working/shirking and own/larger interests 
respectively. The primary purpose of the analysis shall be to test the study‟s hypotheses, 
which contain the jist of its core question and central puzzle. 
 
To begin with, the following conceptual variables are identified in the coup/martial law text: 
A = state institutions lie demolished; [to] Ensure law and order (law and order 
variable) 
B = we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled; [to] Revive the 
economy and restore investor confidence (economic variable) 
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C = I shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy, but to 
a true one; Devolution of power to the grass roots level (democratization variable) 
D = we were compelled to respond to India's nuclear tests in order to restore 
strategic balance in the interest of our national security and regional peace and 
stability; our armed forces are fully equipped and ready to defend our national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity (securitization variable) 
E= This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed forces 
have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the 
way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan (policy variable) 
 
Based on the text above, the main causal relations observed are: 
1. The state‟s civil institutions- except the armed forces- are demolished by the 
previous government. Consequently, the law and order situation had deteriorated. 
Thus, the coup was staged and martial law declared to ensure law and order: 
A         +           E (positive relationship)  
2. Pakistan‟s economy has worsened to the extent that „investors‟ have lost their 
confidence. Hence, the military intervened to make Pakistan grow economically:  
B         +           E (positive relationship) 
3.  The previous government could only introduce „sham democracy‟. The military 
shall bring „true democracy‟ even to the „grass roots level‟ : 
C         +           E (positive relationship) 
4.  A strategic balance is established through nuclear weapons vis-à-vis India. The 
military is capable and vigilant to  defend Pakistan‟s sovereignty:  
D         +           E (positive relationship) 
 
The following observations can be drawn in light of the above: 
 The October coup and consequent martial law is justified by General Musharraf-led 
military on accounts of problems of law and order and economy.  
 Law and order and economic problems are cited as the major reasons/causes due to 
their  extremely  negative effects on the state and the society;  
 The need to democratize the country is also prioritized along with governance and 
economy. 
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 Securitization is regarded and cited as a natural function of the military. However, it is 
complementary in nature. 
 The coup/martial law is viewed and projected by the military as a solution-package to 
the stated problems. 
 The military has the capability and determination to achieve the stated objectives. 
 
                                            
As the afore-mentioned shows, there exists positive correspondence between coup and each 
of the conceptual variables. Therefore, it seems necessary to analyze this positive relationship 
empirically, though within the formwork of the model, in order to determine its status. Such 
an explanation shall also help to test the posed hypotheses. Hence, each of the following four 
sections deals with each variable accordingly. 
 
7.2.1 Law and Order Variable 
General Pervez Musharraf-led military attempted to legitimize the military coup d‟état on the 
basis of deteriorating law and order situation in the country. The former blamed Nawaz 
Sharif government in this respect. However, in order to stand legitimized, the military under 
Musharraf has to undergo a statistical test. To begin with, the study has enumerated murders 
per million population- since riots are not mentioned in the official record- during the Sharif 
government and military regime - see the Table below. 
             
Table 29 Murder per Million Population 
  Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1998-99, 2008 
 
Year Murders per million pop. Pop. (million) 
1997 68 137.132 
1998 73 140.629 
1999 65 144.215 
2000 60 148.132 
2001 63 151.480 
2002 61 154.903 
2003 59 158.404 
2004 60 161.984 
2005 58 165.816 
2006 59 169.398 
2007 61 173.057 
 280 
Having conducted a statistical analysis of murders per million population from 1997-1999, 
the  murders-trend- see the Figure below- that the statistical data has provided is going in 
Sharif‟s favor. The trend of murders is gradually and consistently going downward when 
compared with that of its counterpart. Thus, it is posited, on the statistical ground, that the 
law and order variable cannot be invoked by the military minds to legitimize the October 
coup. 
 
Figure 4 Trend: Murders per Million Population 
 
 
 
In addition, in order to see whether General Musharraf-led military was able to solve the 
problems of law and order, as claimed in his first address to nation, the present research 
attempts to judge the military‟s performance on this front statistically. In this respect, a 
cursory look at the Figure 4 above makes one believe that the trend of murders from 2001 to 
2003, and from 2004 to 2005 is going downward also. Therefore, the military takeover stands 
justified at the end of the day. However, a deep reading of the Figure shall also make it clear 
that the military badly failed to maintain law and order in 2000- which is a crucial year from 
the study‟s perspective of governance. Moreover, despite relative downward murders-trend 
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during the above-mentioned years, the sharp upward trend from 2005 onwards is a clear 
indication of low governance. Interestingly, these empirical findings should further 
corroborate the reporting of events of medium/large scale acts of terrorism which Pakistan 
unprecedently witnessed during the Musharraf-led military rule- this shall further be 
explained later in the Chapter. 
 
Thus, in light of the ongoing statistical analysis of murders per million population and the 
resultant murders-trend, it is safely concluded that the military (rule) led by Musharraf 
terribly failed to solve the acclaimed issues of law and order. Hence, this conceptual variable 
cannot, by any means, be invoked to legitimize the coup action of 12 October 1999. 
 
7.2.2 Economic Variable 
Under this variable the task would be twofold. On the one hand, the study shall attempt an 
empirical analysis of Pakistan‟s economy in the pre-coup period in order to see whether the 
claimed deterioration of economic situation caused the coup. On the other hand, the aim shall 
be to explain whether the military under Musharraf can legitimize its direct intervention in 
politics on the basis of improved economic indicators.  
 
To begin with, the economic context of the October coup was almost different from, for 
instance, the 1977 coup when the country was practically outside the gambit of IMF-led 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs). However, the 1990s was a different case. Moreover, 
this decade was severally affected by the so called bad luck factor in terms of low rate of 
remittances - see the Table below.  
 
Table 30 Key Economic Indicators: 1990-2003 
 GDP 
growth 
rate 
Agriculture 
growth 
rate 
 
Manufacture 
growth 
rate 
Inflation 
(CPI) 
Population 
below 
Poverty 
Line 
Remittances 
in US$ 
million 
1990-91 5.6 5.0 6.3 12.7 22.11 1,848 
1991-92 7.7 9.5 8.1 10.6  1,467 
1992-93 2.1 -5.3 4.4   9.8  1,562 
1993-94 4.4 5.2 4.5 11.3  1,445 
1994-95 5.1 6.6 2.5 13.0  1,866 
1995-96 6.6 11.7 3.7 10.8 31.00 1,416 
1996-97 1.7 0.1 -0.1 11.8  1,409 
1997-98 3.5 4.5 6.9 7.8  1,489 
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1998-99 4.2 1.9 4.1 5.7  1,061 
1999-00 3.9 6.1 1.5 3.6     983 
2000-01 2.2 -2.7 8.2 4.4 32.60 1,086 
2001-02 3.4 -0.1 5.0 3.5  2,389 
2002-03 5.1 4.1 7.7 3.3  4,236 
 Source: Zaidi. 2005. 
 
As the Table shows, the remittances dropped to a considerable low in 1998/99 and 1999/00 
due to political choice made in an interactive strategic process by the principal military and 
Sharif to go nuclear in May 1998. In addition, the subsequent freeze on the Foreign Currency 
Accounts (FCAs) further compounded the economic situation. Little wonder then, the 
Pakistan Economic Survey 1998-99, published in the pre-coup period, accepted the true 
impact the year 1998 had on the country‟s economy. Interestingly however, the Annual Repot 
of the State Bank of Pakistan, published in the post-coup period- indeed in December 1999- 
also observed that the 1998 was the „most difficult year for Pakistan‟s economy‟ (Zaidi 
2005:359-363). The overall estimated short term cost- the Glenn Amendment is a case in 
point- the nuclear choice brought to the economy is given below. 
 
Table 31 Economic Cost of Nuclear Blasts 
SHORT RUN (First Year) 
• Lower Gross Domestic Product by Rs. 12 billion* 
• Lower real per household income annually by Rs. 400* 
• Lower consumption expenditure by Rs. 17 bullion 
• Lower employment by 80, 000 
• 16,000 more educated unemployed 
• 2,000,000 more persons below the poverty line 
• 400,000 additional malnourished children 
                   *Valued at constant process of 1980-81 
                   Source: Zaidi. 2005. 
 
 
Despite all this, in pure economic terms the year 1998/99 presented an altogether different 
picture.  Zaidi wrote  
Although both the State Bank of Pakistan Annual Report of 1998/99 and the Pakistan 
Economic Survey of the same year believe that this year was one of the most 
„difficult‟ in Pakistan‟s history, it was certainly not one of the worst, in terms of 
economic indicators. In fact, as [Table 30 shows] that in terms of GDP growth, 
1998/99 was far better than the two previous years and the three subsequent years, 
although no one will deny that after 1998, the situation did deteriorate on account of 
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developments of 1998. In fact, the growth rate for 1998/99 was only marginally lower 
than the average for the preceding eight years 1990-98. Although the May 1998 
nuclear tests did have major consequences on the economy…the economy prior to 
1998, cannot be claimed to have been doing very much better…This, we argue, was 
on account of the policies implemented on the advice of the IMF and World Bank, 
especially at a time when the debt from the 1980s, had become quite severe.  
                                                                                                                   (ibid:359-363) 
 
Thus, with the help of the afore-mentioned, the ongoing is concluded as follows: a) the pre-
1998/99 economic indicators were not worst ; b) the nuclear-decision- in which the principal 
military played an important role- brought heavy economic cost to the country‟s economy; c) 
in pure economic terms, despite the „nuclear-related‟ sanctions the GDP growth was better 
than the two preceding years; d) the Annual Report of the State Bank of Pakistan, published 
under the Musharraf-led military in December 1999, also verified the economic hardships the 
country faced post-May 1998. Therefore, in light of these empirical evidences, it is 
maintained that the economy-deterioration thesis, as propagated by the coup-making 
institution, is basically baseless a justification for the October coup. 
 
Regardless, following is an attempt to see whether Pakistan‟s economy did better under the 
military rule. To begin with, the economic situation deteriorated rather than registering any 
positive signs during the year 2000/01- see Table 32 on the next page. However, the situation 
started to gradually reverse after the 9/11. In fact, on 23 September 2001, due to its 
geostrategic interests the US preferred to waive the key sanctions against both India and 
Pakistan. Consequently, it became easier for the regime to negotiate with the IMF, the WB 
and the Paris Club- with later the process was in place since the Sharif days. Anyhow, by 
December 2000, a fresh round of rescheduling was initiated with the commercial and 
sovereign creditors. In addition, a Stand-By Agreement was signed with IMF in November 
2000. Importantly, in January 2001, the Paris Club and other bilateral and commercial 
creditors agreed to restructure debts worth US$ 1.8 billion. 
However, the earlier debt rescheduling was minuscule compared to the $ 12.5 billion 
that took place in December 2001. Not only was this amount far larger than any such 
rescheduling in the past, more importantly, it was the terms of this agreement which 
set it apart…Consequently, this provided an implied debt reduction  without having a 
HIPC [Heavily Indebted Poor Country] status…Basically , the entire bilateral debt of 
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consortium countries has been rescheduled , and this rescheduling has been for a 
longer period than in the past; Official Development Assistance (ODA) debt, which is 
68 per cent of the total rescheduled , will be repayable after 35 years, with 15 years‟ 
grace period, and  non-ODA debt is to be repaid over a 25 years  period , with a five 
year grace period  for other loans. Moreover, there has been a „re-profiling of the debt 
in such a way that it takes into consideration the country‟s capacity to pay. This 
rescheduling allows relief of between $ 1.2-1.5 billion annually in payments of debt 
servicing on external debt during the years 2001-05. 
                                                                                                                                     (ibid:368) 
 
Besides, as a consequence of military‟s rational alliance with Washington, the remittances, 
especially from the US, registered a huge increase in 2002/03. Nevertheless, despite this 
significant rescheduling, Pakistan made substantial payments in the form of debt servicing to 
its creditors. For instance, US$ 6.3 billion -equivalent to more than half of export earnings- 
was paid in 2001/02.  
 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the economic performance prior to the release of foreign aid 
and consequent remittances was abysmal as the GDP growth in percentage stood at 2.0 and 
3.1 in 2000-01 and 2001-02 respectively. However, due to the aid inflows and remittances- 
the so called good luck factor- the growth rates during 2003-06 period looked attractive as the 
Table below shows. 
 
Table 32 Key Economic Indicators: 2003-2008 
 FY 03 FY 04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 
Targets Actual 
          percent      
Real GDP (at factor cost)* 4.7 7.5 9.0 5.8 6.8 7.0 5.8 
Agriculture 4.1 2.4 6.5 6.3 3.7 4.8 1.5 
Major crops 6.8 1.7 17.7 -3.9 8.3 4.5 -3.0 
Manufacturing 6.9 14.0 15.5 8.7 8.2 10.9 5.4 
Large-scale 7.2 18.1 19.9 8.3 8.6 13.0 4.8 
Services sector 5.2 5.8 8.5 6.5 7.6 7.1 8.2 
Consumer price index (FY01=100) 3.1 4.6 9.3 7.9 7.8 6.5 12.0 
Sensitive price indicator (FY01=100) 3.8 6.0 11.1 7.8 9.4 - 14.2 
Broad money (M2) 18.0 19.6 19.1 15.1 19.3 13.5 15.5 
Reserve money 14.5 15.5 17.6 10.2 20.9 - 21.6 
Private sector credit 18.2 34.3 34.4 23.5 17.3 - 16.5 
Exports (f.o.b.) 22.2 10.3 16.9 14.3 3.2 13.1 13.2 
Imports (c.i.f.) 18.2 27.6 32.1 38.8 6.9 5.8 30.9 
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Official liquid FE reserves**(US$) 10,769 12,389 12,598 13,122 15,646 - 11,399 
                                                                                As percentage of GDP 
Total investment 16.8 16.6 19.1 22.1 22.9 23.8 21.6 
National savings 20.8 17.9 17.5 18.2 17.8 18.8 13.9 
Tax revenue 10.1 9.8 9.6 9.8 10.2 10.2 10.0 
Total revenue 14.9 14.1 13.7 14.0 14.9 13.2 14.3 
Budgetary expenditure 18.6 16.4 17.0 18.2 19.2 17.5 21.7 
Budgetary deficit 3.7 2.3 3.3 4.2 4.3 4.2 7.4 
External current account balance 4.9 1.8 -1.4 -3.9 -4.8 - -8.4 
Total debt (inc. explicit liabilities) 80.1 71.4 65.8 59.5 57.9 - 60.7 
a) Domestic debt 38.0 35.1 32.8 30.1 29.9 - 30.6 
b) Foreign debt 39.5 34.4 31.3 28.2 27.0 - 29.0 
c) Explicit liabilities 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 - 1.1 
* During FY08 sectoral share in GDP were as follow: agriculture (29.9 percent), industry (25.9 percent), and 
services (53.2 per cent) 
** Foreign exchange reserves include CRR/SLR on FE=25 deposits 
Note: Targets are based on Annual Plan, Trade policy and Annual Budget Statement for FY08 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan81  
 
Though the Table above shows some positive macroeconomic indicators, primarily due to 
foreign aid and remittances, it was nonetheless clear to impartial observes that    
the boom of 2003-6 rested on weak foundations; it could not be sustained unless a 
number of structural reforms were undertaken. The structures that need to be built or 
demolished altogether were created over a long time and a number of vested interests 
had developed around them to protect them from being changed. There were a 
number of weaknesses in the economy that needed the urgent attention of the 
policymakers in Islamabad. The most glaring of these was that the boom rested 
mostly on consumption and not on investment…The economic story would have been 
a success if the rate of growth in per capita income in 2003-6 cold be sustained over a 
reasonable period of time; if significant reductions were occurring in the incidence of  
poverty; if policymaking in Islamabad had been thoroughly institutionalized; if 
economic decision-making had been decentralized to lower tiers of government that 
were closer to the people and if capacity had been created at these levels to deliver 
services and development to the people.                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                           (Burki 2007:29-30) 
 
Additionally, the regime‟s economic managers methodologically- as regards poverty 
incidence- chose  economically a bad year as the base and a good year as the end point to 
drawn rosy conclusions (Economic Survey of Pakistan 2008/09:196). Importantly, during this 
                                               
81 www.sbp.gov.pk 
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entire period, the budget remained in deficit. Moreover, the external and internal debt loomed 
large on the national exchequer.  
 
Besides, in 2006-07, only 0.70 million employment opportunities were created; the bulk of 
which was created in the rural areas (0.62 million) compared to only 0.08 million in the urban 
areas. This indicated a weaker labor market situation especially in the urban areas of 
Pakistan. Importantly, the inflation touched double figure during FY 07/08.  
A review of price trends of essential items during 2007-08 indicates that the major 
portion of food inflation during this period stemmed from the hike in the prices 
consumed by the poor household such as wheat, flour, rice, edible oil, vegetables and 
pulses. Since April 2007, the economy has witnessed over 200 percent increase in the 
price of palm oil; and an increase of 150 percent in wheat prices, while over 100 
percent increase in the price of oil in the international market. 
                                                                                          (Economic Survey 2008-09:195; 2007-08:203) 
 
Thus, in light of the above-mentioned quantitative facts it is posited that the economic 
situation, by and large, does not bode well for the military‟s claims with respect to enhancing 
Pakistan‟s economy. Instead, they point to an extremely poor and vulnerable economy 
structurally as well as non-structurally i.e. the uncertainty of foreign aid inflows and 
remittances etc. Hence, the ongoing analysis helps to conclude that the stated positive 
correspondence between economic variable and coup is empirically unfounded. 
 
7.2.3 Democratization Variable 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, having got judicial legitimacy the regime decided to 
democratize the county. In this respect, the first potent indicator of democratization came 
when   
In the early hours of December 10th, Mr Sharif was taken from his dungeon in a 16th-
century fort and, along with 17 members of his family and 22 containers of 
belongings…put on an aircraft to exile in Saudi Arabia. The general has thus been 
seen to be more merciful than an earlier coup leader, Zia ul Haq, who in 1979 hanged 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the prime minister he had deposed…According to a Pakistani 
army spokesman, Mr Sharif has paid for his freedom by agreeing to hand over 80% of 
the family‟s known assets in Pakistan and promising not to come back for at least ten 
years. The “ransom”, if you can call it that, includes $5m in cash, five factories, 
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several houses and 24 hectares (60 acres) of land…As a result, though, the armed 
forces‟ stock is at rock bottom. Those who had hoped they would clean up Pakistan 
and usher in decent democracy feel betrayed. Protests across the land are loud and 
clear. 
                                                                                                                  (The Economist 2000)  
 
What can be deduced from the above-mentioned is that rationality prevailed on the two sides. 
The military, already suffering from legitimacy deficit, saw it rational to let  Sharif go since 
his presence or his (military) trial would have brought more political, if not legal-moral, 
complexities; rational Sharif, on his part, preferred alive than a dead Bhutto. Moreover, the 
exiled PM stood on a good-pitch since his wife, Kulsoom Nawaz, had surprised not only the 
regime but also the anti-PML-N forces by leading the party.  
 
However, the military‟s intelligence apparatuses were also showing their agency in terms of 
baiting the personalistic politicians from especially Sharif‟s party. Again rationality mattered; 
a section of PML-N chose to defect and form „like-minded‟ group which later emerged a 
proper political party- Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) or PML-Q. It was led by 
Chaudhris of Gujrat- Shujaat Hussain and his cousin Pervez Elahi. In addition, the military 
resorted to institutional measures to strengthen its hands. In this respect, a National 
Accountability Bureau (NAB)
82
 was established to arrest, punish and importantly disqualify 
the guilty to holding public office and contest elections. The chief beneficiary of the 
NABization was the PML-Q whose members were cleared of corruption. 
 
Moreover, the Q-League was favored in terms of non-institution of case against its members, 
disqualification of strong opposition candidates through the Accountability Courts and 
dropping/freezing cases against those succumbed to pressure to join the Q-League. Moreover, 
24 PPP and 33 PML-N politicians were being investigated and tried by the NAB in August 
2002- barely a month before the general elections. However, none of politicians from the Q-
League was put on trial. Interestingly, the courts acquitted, during 2002, forty individuals- 
politicians included- who were wrongly accused by NAB- see Table 33 on the next page, in 
this respect. 
 
                                               
82  The National Accountability Bureau was established on account of The National Accountably Ordinance, 
1999. The NAB was headed by a serving Lieutenant General Muhammad Amjad. 
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Table 33 Status of Investigation against Politicians (2002) 
  Source: Waseem 2006:58 
  
In addition, another intuitional measure was taken by the principal when it established a 
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), run by a retired Lt. Gen., in November 1999. Its 
stated fundamental goal was to bless Pakistan with „good governance‟. For this purpose, the 
NRB came up with a Local Government Plan (LGP) 2000 under which non-party local 
bodies election were held and the new Local Government system got placed on 14 August 
2001. The plan introduced major structural changes in the distract bureaucracy;  for instance 
the incumbent Deputy Commissioner was belittled into District Coordinating Officer (DCO) 
who was required to report to the district nazim (roughly mayor) directly. Why did the 
military regime come up with the LGP? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the foregoing informs the Musharraf-led military, in order to politico-electorally 
legitimize itself was able to utilize the local bodies for a presidential referendum to be held in 
April 2002. This was a planned move to avoid the implications inherent in the Syed Zafar Ali 
Shah case since Musharraf had assumed the office of president after having removed 
President Rafiq Tarar on 20 June 2001. No wonder then,  
Musharraf‟s campaign was taken up by a majority of the 250,000 councilors and 
nazims of the local government. The Punjab government‟s approval of a hefty sum of 
Rs. 3.5 million for only two public rallies was an indication of the money poured into 
 Authorized Completed Under Process Closed 
Punjab 135 39 58 38 
Sindh 90 46 42 2 
NWFP 29 15 4 10 
Balochistan 23 12 6 5 
Rawalpindi 33 5 19 9 
Total 310 117 129 64 
Box 7.5 The Objectives of the Local Government Plan (LGP) 
 
The Local Government Plan had two main objectives to achieve: One, it aimed 
to localize politics since the political parties were more organized and 
mobilized at the provincial level; two, it wanted to tame the civil bureaucracy 
especially the DMG [District Management Group] due to the very fact that it 
was a DMG officer in Karachi who refused to side with Musharraf when he 
was on board PIA. So, it was a punishment.  
 
A 31 year old mid-level officer of District Management Group recorded his views of 
Pakistan‟s civil bureaucracy in Islamabad in April 2008. 
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that effort…[also] public and private transport vehicles were impounded in the cites to 
bring people to the rallies…The campaign …was also unprecedented in terms of the 
visible involvement of the military officers…the corps commanders openly graced 
Musharraf‟s [military] campaign meetings…Initially Musharraf [himself] attended the 
public meetings in uniform. 
                                                                                                                          (ibid 2006:78-79) 
 
The opposition- PPP-PML-N-MMA (Mutahida Majlis-e Amal) - opposed the regime even on 
this front and challenged the 2002 Referendum Order in the agent Supreme Court which 
ultimately decided in Musharraf‟s favor. The latter was also able to be benefited by the 
political support of a section of politicians- of PML-Q, PTI, MQM, PML-F, PAT, NAPP, 
GDA, Millat (Nation) Party
83
 etc.- during the course of court‟s proceedings as well as 
canvassing.  
 
Finally, the referendum approached and General Musharraf, a sole-candidate, was arbitrarily 
declared winner in a exercise about which The Economist commented as follows: 
Lauded in the West for backing America‟s war on terror, and admired at home for 
taking on both corrupt politicians and extremist mullahs while avoiding dictatorial 
excess, General Pervez Musharraf must have thought that he would sail through this 
week‟s referendum on his assumed presidency, and use it to cement himself into 
power. On April 30th the electorate duly granted the general a five-year presidential 
term. As bogus political exercises go, this one was a corker. The poll was conducted 
without the benefit of an electoral register, identity cards were not obligatory and the 
usual polling stations were supplemented by tens of thousands of makeshift extra 
ones: in railway stations, offices, on street corners, in hotels. The official figure of 
97.5% in favor is probably reasonably accurate. The real test of the president's 
popularity was the turnout. The opposition maintains that as few as 5% may have 
voted. The government was claiming a figure of more than 50%, which no one 
outside it finds remotely credible. Reporters found polling station after polling station 
all but deserted. 
                                                                                                      (The Economist 2002) 
                                               
83  The Millat (Nation) Party was established by former President of Pakistan, Farooq Ahmed Leghari. 
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Moreover, the regime promulgated the Political Parties Order (PPO) 2002 to apparently 
regulate the conduct and function of the parties. The political parties under the PPO were 
obligated to frame a constitution, hold inner-party elections every four year, and submit 
details of nature and sources of finances annually to the EC. In addition, the Legal 
Framework Order 2002  
further amended Article 63. The new law provided that a person would be disqualified 
if he/she was: convicted by a court on the charge of corrupt practices or misuse of 
power and authority; had been dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired from 
service of federal, provincial or local government or a corporation on the grounds of 
misconduct or moral turpitude; had been held responsible for having written off or 
defaulted on payment of a loan of an amount of Rs. 2 million or more, or payment of 
government dues or utility charges of an amount of Rs. 10, 000 or more…The 
selective implementation of this law violated the spirit of the Constitution. It was 
pointed out after the elections that almost 40 per cent of the elected people had been 
implicated in provable financial crimes as defaulters, including Prime Minister Jamali, 
the Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat and the Minister for Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA), Aftab Ahmad Sherpao. Apparently, the law did 
not affect them. 
                                                                                                                     (Waseem 2006:104) 
 
 
As is obvious from the foregoing that the PPO and LFO were arbitrarily designed instruments 
to depoliticize the political parties especially PPP and PML-N along with their leaders 
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. More importantly, the LFO- a comprehensive set of new 
rules of the games- arbitrarily amended the Constitution- this was also violative of Supreme 
Court‟s May 2000 judgment. It, once again, turned the political system of the country from 
parliamentary to presidential. Hence, the president, the leader of the principal military, added 
five more years to his presidentship and empowered himself to nominate and dismiss the 
elected PM and the cabinet and dissolve parliament. Furthermore, the LFO gave the 
military‟s man powers to appoint service chiefs and justices of the superior but agent courts. 
Last but not least, it established the already delayed National Security Council (NSC) which 
Generals Zia and Karamat had proposed.  
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Thus, what one can conclude in light of the foregoing is that the arbitrary promulgation of 
legal-constitutional instruments in terms of PPO and especially the LFO was a strategy of the 
principal to, on the one hand, achieve desired results in the upcoming elections and one the 
other, bargain with the elected parliament to get the martial law acts and orders indemnified- 
the NSC is a case in point. Its arbitrary establishment, undoubtedly, reflected the principal‟s 
intention and aim to constitutionally institutionalize its rule. Yet it also marked the inherent 
political weakness of the principal in the body politic of Pakistan. After all, its ultimate 
approval rested on the preferences of the politicians a section of which had previously 
opposed it.  
 
Interestingly, despite the regime‟s cordial relations with Western governments in terms of 
rational collaboration over the war on terror, the severe criticism of the regime‟s anti-
democratic measures by the former was commendable
84
. Indeed, their democratic-moral 
stance was capitalized by the opposition which chose to organizationally reform itself- for 
instance, the PPP, to avoid the PPO-wrath, transformed into PPP-P (Parliamentarians). 
Nevertheless, the anti-regime political parties preferred participatory politics to gain enough 
political space to challenge the principal from within the parliament. Therefore, they took 
part in the October 2002 elections which were rigged in all respects. Following are given NA 
results: 
Table 34 2002 Election: National Assembly Results 
Party         Seats   
 General Women Minorities Total 
PML-Q 92 22 4 118 
PPP-P 63 15 2 80 
MMA 47 12 2 61 
PML-N 15 3 1 19 
MQM 13 3 1 17 
NA 13 3 0 16 
PML-F 4 1 0 5 
PML-J 2 1 0 3 
PPP-S 2 0 0 2 
FATA 12 0 0 12 
Independents 1 0 0 1 
Others* 8 0 0 8 
Total 272 60 10 342 
* Others include one seat each for BNP, JWP, PAT, PML-Z, PTI, MQM-H, PKMAP and PPP-SB 
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan 
 
                                               
84 Human Rights Watch World Report 2002. Available from:  http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/asia9.html 
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As the Table informs the electorate gave a mixed-mandate. The PPP-P and PML-N despite 
their top leadership in exiled, remained able to pose a challenge to the PML-Q. The MMA, 
which grossly benefited from the absence of PML-N and anti-Americanism, came as an 
electoral novelty. Nonetheless, the process of rigging continued in the post-poll period 
whereby rules of the game were hurriedly relaxed to accommodate Zafrullah Jamail, who had 
served as CM in the past, to possibly assume premiership. Moreover, the intelligence 
apparatuses were utilized to obtain defections and bait the independents to be able to form a 
pro-principal civilian government. Therefore, as a result of strategic interaction between the 
principal military and a section of working politicians- 10 PPP-P men changed loyalties at the 
critical juncture-, a civilianized regime came in the limelight under „one-vote-majority‟ prime 
ministership of Jamali on 21 November 2002. His guardian-party, the PML-Q, entered into a 
coalition with MMA-MQM in the centre. In the Punjab, the PML-Q had enough majority to 
form its own government. In Sindh, MQM-PML-Q was able to join ranks. In NWFP and 
Balochistan MMA remained at the forefront.  
 
Not unsurprisingly then, the opposition benches were occupied by vociferous PML-N and 
PPP-P. In this respect, the Newsline commented  
Barely six months after the elections, the parliament is in crisis, paralyzed in a dispute 
over the legitimacy of Musharraf‟s presidency and the contentious Legal Framework 
Order. Day after day, the National Assembly resounded with chants of “Go 
Musharraf, go,” from the opposition members, who drowned out the government 
benches, creating an unprecedented spectacle in the house. They stood thumping their 
desks with leather files, shouting: “No to the illegal amendments.” The rumpus 
invariably forced the Speaker to adjourn the session after a few minutes. The 
opposition‟s decision not to let a president in military uniform address the joint 
session of parliament has blocked any serious parliamentary business... But there are 
no signs of any breakthrough. General Musharraf has firmly refused to give up his 
powers or quit his position as army chief, while an increasingly defiant opposition is 
clearly in no mood to soften its position on the issue. 
                                                                                                                (Newsline 2003) 
 
In the following months, however, intra-coalition divergences of preferences over the issue of 
LFO and uniformed president became intensive. The MMA, in order to maximize itself 
politico-economically, opted to pressurize the PML-Q leadership (Hussain 2003). The 
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president, on his part, gave vent of imposing presidential rule in case the working politicians 
attempted to shirk. 
 
However, rationality prevailed at the end of day and their preferences converged in terms of 
passage of 17
th
 Amendment. The Friday Times‟ editorial is insightful in this regard: 
After one fitful year of stop-go threats and negotiations, General Pervez Musharraf 
has finally obtained the consent of most members of Parliament to be president of 
Pakistan. In exchange, the MMA has got his agreement to give up the post of army 
chief within the year. He has compelled the MMA to agree that the LFO was a part of 
the constitution. But the MMA has forced him to dilute his discretionary powers as 
president. He has secured a formal degree of longevity for his cherished local bodies 
system. In the bargain, the MMA has ensured that the judges of the superior courts 
(those who supported General Musharraf) will not serve a day longer than their 
original tenure. And so on. The net result is that the yearlong LFO-deadlock in 
parliament is over. 
                                                                                                  (The Friday Times 2004) 
 
However, when the deadline of 30 December 2004 approached, the uniformed president and 
the leader of the principal accorded more preference to uniform than the parliament. He chose 
to back off. Interestingly, his political allies also backed off; they opted for power and 
privileges than parting for the sake of their people. Moreover, in October 2007 when the 
president urged upon them to re-elect him they rationally did the job one way or the other. 
However, the military man‟s re-election from the almost expired assemblies was challenged 
in the country‟s Supreme Court- this shall be explained later in the chapter.  
 
To summarize,  the military regime‟s efforts in terms of arbitrarily promulgation of PPO and 
LFO, rigged referendum and October elections, usage of intelligence apparatuses to 
coercively cause defections,  legislation of LFO, violation of the 17
th
 Amendment and re-
election from expired assembles  are empirical evidences  to posit that the above-stated 
efforts at democratization were  infact conscious attempts at  de-democratization. Thus, it 
points to negative correspondence between the two variables; namely, coup and 
democratization. Moreover, the former highlights agency and rationality of the principal 
military which accorded more preference to its own interests. Also, the analysis marks 
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agency and rationality of a section of politicians that preferred working to shirking to accrue 
political and economic benefits.  
 
7.2.4 Securitization Variable 
As explained in the last chapter, Pakistan and India had fought a war in Kargil which came to 
an end in late summer 1999. By any stranded of war studies, it was a limited war initiated by 
Islamabad with the aim to paradoxically localize the conflict militarily and internationalize it 
diplomatically. However, the objectives remained unfulfilled. Importantly, the two countries 
agreed to withdraw their troops to pre-war position. Also, there was a pronounced 
commitment by the two sides to observe the sanctity of LOC and international boarder. 
Therefore, this evidence is enough to maintain that in pre-coup and post-Kargil period
85
 there 
was no external security threat to Pakistan from anywhere. Similarly, there is lack of any 
evidence of any internal security threat to the state of Pakistan. Importantly, if evidence is our 
guide, then there is also absence of any post-coup external/internal security treat. Had there 
been any the principal military would have been fighting it than legitimizing its coup. 
 
Instead, history witnessed the visit of General-COAS-President Musharraf to Agra (India) in 
July 2001. The way the military tried to normalize with India in the post-coup period is an 
obvious indication of its political approach towards the (re)solution of bilateral issues. Here, 
an important point which surfaces is: what is the moral, if not strategic, ground then to 
criticize, if not degrade, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif when they tried to normalize with 
New Delhi? Regardless, Musharraf- led military‟s position over Kashmir also registered a 
sea-change. The uniformed president of Pakistan time and again propagated a beyond-UNO 
approach over the issue. In the words of a Pakistani international law expert 
Musharraf appears to be a man in a great hurry. He seems to believe that now is the 
time for a deal on Kashmir favorable to Pakistan, as India is destined to become a 
global player before long. He does not trust future generations or the forces of history 
to deliver a verdict favorable to Pakistan or Kashmiris. Under him, Pakistan also 
appears to suffer from some kind of ennui on Kashmir, as if the burden of struggle for 
the Kashmiris‟ right of self-determination has been too exhausting to continue. 
Perhaps these factors explain Musharraf‟s numerous gratuitous concessions to India, 
particularly on UN resolutions. They also seem to inspire his latest offer to surrender 
                                               
85 The 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military stand-off was direct consequence of a militant attack on India‟s 
parliament on 13 December 2001. Nevertheless, it never led to any armed conflict between the two states. 
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claim on Kashmir in return for large autonomy. In this backdrop, India deserves to be 
commended for conducting a relentless and ruthless campaign to bring Pakistan to its 
knees. The question is whether history will remember Musharraf conducting the 
Kargil misadventure twice. 
                                                                                                                             (Hussain 2006)  
 
What can be asked in light of the above is why the politicians are singed out when it comes to 
India-Pakistan relations? Why the former is labeled as anti-state elements whereby the 
military‟s leaders are projected as diehard nationalists? Nonetheless, it was in the post-coup 
or precisely post-9/11 period that the unprecedented internal security threat to the state of 
Pakistan emerged at the hands of none others but the military-created militants of the 1980s. 
Ironically, the militants decided to take their very masters on when the latter rationally allied 
with the US-led coalition against terrorism post 9/11. Following is an excerpt from President-
General Musharraf‟s address to the nation in this respect: 
 
Box 7.6 Excerpts from President-General Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,  
12 January 2002
86
 
 
As you would remember, ever since I assumed office, I launched a campaign to rid the 
society of extremism, violence and terrorism and strived to project Islam in its true 
perspective. In my first speech on October 17, 1999, I had said and I quote; “Islam 
teaches tolerance, not hatred; universal brotherhood, not enmity; peace, and not 
violence. I have great respect for the Ulema and expect them to come forward and 
present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which are exploiting 
religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith”. After this, I initiated 
a number of steps in this regard. First, in the year 2000, I started interacting with the 
Taliban and counseled them to inculcate tolerance and bring moderation in their ways. 
I also told them that those terrorists who were involved in terrorist acts in Pakistan and 
seeking refuge in Afghanistan should be returned to us. Unfortunately, we did not 
succeed. [italics mine]                                                                                                           
 
 
The text is self-evident of the military‟s failure to bring terrorists and religious extremists to 
book. Moreover, in certain areas- Swat and Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) are cases in point- it 
seemed that the principal was politicizing the human tragedies- the politics of Red Mosque 
shall be explained later in the chapter. The question that a majority of the victimized and 
terrified Pakistanis frequently asked was: why the modernizing military preferred inaction 
                                               
86 http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/04/01/address-12-january-2002/ 
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over action when the militants were wreaking havoc in, for instance, Swat and Islamabad- the 
capital? Pervez Hoodbhay, a physicist by training, vehemently commented that 
the state has retreated before the Taliban in Swat. It did not do the things it could have 
easily done. It could have applied a helicopter, of which we have many, with a 
direction-finder [system] to locate even the mobile FM radio station of the Taliban. Or 
the army could have used a jammer for this purpose. After all, ducks are traced 
through „triangulation‟. As a scientist, I am at loss why radio transmitter of max.100-
200 watts could not be traced and jammed. I think it depends on motive and intention 
which was not there. 
87
 
 
Moreover, the internal security situation was less than stable in the FATA region. 
Importantly, people in the metropolitans such as Lahore came under constant terrorists 
attacks- often suicide ones. Interestingly, the military and its intelligence apparatuses i.e. ISI, 
was also targeted along with the police and other civil departments -see the Table below.                     
 
 Table 35 Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: 2003-2007 
Year Civilians Security 
Force 
Personnel 
Terrorists/ 
Insurgents 
Total 
2003 140 24 25 189 
2004 435 184 244 863 
2005 430 81 137 648 
2006 608 325 538 1471 
  2007* 937 455 1041 2433 
            * Data till October 2007                                                                                                                                                                        
          Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal88  
 
 
As the Table shows the principal military, which had vociferously claimed to securitize the 
nation, remained unable to provide security to the civilian population if not its own personnel. 
Therefore, in the light of the foregoing explanation it is posited that the securitization variable 
is empirically unable to mark positive correspondence with the coup. 
 
 
                                               
87  Hoodbhay shared his views in a television program called Capital Talk on 23 February 2009.  The views 
were expressed in Urdu except the terms used. Therefore, they are transcribed by the author. The program video 
is available from: http://www.awaz.tv/playvideo.asp?pageId=2407 
88
 www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm          
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7.3 Military Agency: Causing the Coup 
As the preceding sections make it empirically evident that the October coup could not be 
ascribed to any of the conceptual variables since the positive correspondence was empirically 
unfounded. In other words, the answer to the coup-cause is still at large, for even the 
structural, conspiratorial, path dependency-historical institutionalism and generalist 
perspectives remain unable to explain the phenomenon empirically and theoretically- as was 
explained in Chapter 2. For instance, if the military was structurally dominant in politics then 
why did it take the pains to stage coup, abrogate the constitution, publicize new rules of the 
game, attempt factionalization, hold referendum and elections to seek popular legitimacy, 
negotiate indemnity with the politicians etc?   
 
In addition, the Milbus hypothesis, empirically, is also unable to explain the coup and 
consequent direct military intervention in politics. Instead, it helps complicate the matter. For 
instance, if the military was already doing Milbus sans any accountability by the politicians 
why did it feel the need to sack the incapacitated agent? Interestingly enough, had the 
military become an independent socio-economic class as well as a part of the ruling elite, as 
this thesis postulates, then why did it punish the same class in terms of sacking, arresting, 
beating and often forcibly exiling its fellow comrades- Sharif‟s person is a case in point?  The 
same comes true to the path-dependent and generalist rhetoric. As regards the conspiracy 
theories, they got little empirical to support their claim- indeed President Clinton‟s visit to 
South Asia should be an eye-opener to conspiracy theorists.   
 
Thus, quite contrary to the existing body of literature it is posited that the October coup was a 
result of military‟s agency.  Having calculated the shirking politicians‟- and for that matter 
other agents, namely, civil bureaucracy and the judiciary- strengths and weakness, the 
rational military saw to its own interests and preferred to stage coup, thus marking her 
agency. In other words, the coup was rational in nature which aimed at capturing the political 
power from the PM/shirking politicians to be able to politically deal with the shirkers in 
terms of re-negotiating rules of the game which had been being amended 
constitutionally/formally in favor of the politicians. Under the amended rules of the game the 
PM, or better the politicians, had constitutional prerogatives to appoint the services chiefs. In 
this respect, the military institution rationally perceived the shirking politicians a potential 
threat to their long term political and economic interests. This development was a serious 
politico-constitutional blow to the military which, as is already empirically explained, was 
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able to maintain her principalship institutionally, strategically and economically. Besides, the 
additional aim of the coup was to depoliticize the political and parliamentary institutions i.e. 
political parties, legislature etc., for the strength of the military , as explained in Chapter 6, 
lies in the weaknesses of political institutions and actors. 
 
Thus, the coup characterized political interests of the principal military which, while 
preferring its own to larger/national interests, abrogated the constitution, sacked an elected 
prime minister, dissolve assemblies and issued its own rules in terms of Provisional 
Constitutional Order. Nevertheless, as per our hypothesis, the act of coup highlights 
military‟s political weakness rather than strength. For had it been politically dominant  then it 
would have been able to resolve the matters politically in terms of strategically interacting 
with the shirking section of agent politicians- as indeed the former was able to do when the 
then PM Sharif and President Ishaq, after the former‟s restoration by the judiciary, chose to 
resign, though rationally.  
 
Last but not least, the assumption of direct political power, as hypothesized, further facilitates 
military‟s economic interests. However, in order to test this hypothesis, the following section 
empirically explains the linkage between political power and the military‟s economic 
interests. 
 
7.3.1 Maximizing Economic Interests 
Having staged a successful coup d‟état the military was not only able to further consolidate 
its principalship but also protect and promote its economic interests sans any fear of 
accountability. To begin with, the Army Welfare Trust was able to launch its Askari 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) Project in 2002
89
. The project aimed to provide safe, 
efficient and reliable CNG to its valued customers. Also, in the same year, the AWT‟s bank- 
Askari Bank Ltd.- boasted of declared assets worth Rs. 70 billion approximately. Its non-
performing loans (NPL) stood around 4 percent of the total NPL of private-sector banks. 
Moreover, the AWT‟s leasing and insurance companies also recorded positive turnover due 
primarily to the support provided by the Askari bank which, in turn, got financial support by 
the army along with armed clientele. The Bank also provided financial help to businesses in 
the finance sector which included SF‟s insurance business. Moreover, the AWT ventured in 
                                               
89 http://www.awt.com.pk/bs.php?id=31&sec_id=14. 
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small-scale enterprises in terms of the Blue Lagoon restaurant and a marriage hall. These 
projects were opened on state land (Siddiqa 2007:156-158) In addition, the Trust was able to 
set up the Askari Education Board (AEB) to conduct examinations for its educational 
institutions. The AEB and the military-run educational institutions are elitist in nature and run 
parallel to state-run Urdu-vernacular medium educational system and the madrasa education. 
 
Besides, the AWT acted as military-sponsored realtor. The Trust enjoyed along with the 
Navy‟s BF two housing schemes in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi/Islamabad each. 
Moreover, the Trust was entrusted with „grabbed land‟ worth Rs. 4 billion by the military 
regime led by Pervez Musharraf. Last but not least, the AWT was accused of land grabbing 
(4,000 acres) by the villagers of Niazian, Hummak, Sihala and Dhok Kanial- all fall in the 
administrative district of Islamabad. Indeed, the affectees filed a writ petition in the 
Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High Court. 
Interestingly, the High Court decided the case in the AWT‟s favor, upholding the 
acquisition as being „in the national and defense interests of the country‟. This is an 
odd judgment considering that the AWT is registered as a welfare foundation and 
claims to be operating in the private sector. This was a case of the army using its 
authority to benefit a private venture and a select group of officers at the risk of 
harming the interests of the general public. The Supreme Court, however, overturned 
the High Court‟s decision and asked the AWT to compensate the villagers. While 
these villagers had the sense and the will to move the superior court, there are many in 
cases in the country where the military had not paid any compensation.  
                                                                                                                 (ibid 2007:199) 
 
Overall, the AWT ran 41 independent projects; out of all it enjoyed shareholdings in about 13 
projects whereas the rest were owned by it completely. Importantly, only five of these 
projects were listed with the stock exchange. Nevertheless, the Trust boasted of possessing 
assets worth Rs.50 billion (US$862.1 million) and employing around 5,000 ex-services men 
(ibid 122).  
 
As regards the Frontier Works Organization, it was able to further expand its business 
activities. Since the organization undertook a huge number of multi-dimensional projects, 
therefore the analysis sticks to a few major ones. To being with, in 2004 the FWO was able to 
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form its own subsidiary- LAFCO- mandated to make private-sector partnership for the 
construction of a 115.5 km Lahore-Sheikhupura-Faisalabad dual carriageway. 
Reportedly, the partnership was necessary to facilitate successful bidding for the 
project. The FWO did not have all the equipment to prove that it could undertake the 
project on its own, and hence it partnered with a few big domestic construction 
companies including the Habib Rafique group and Sacchal Construction. This 
partnership also indicates that by 2004 the military companies had become more 
confident of their role in the economy and their acceptability by other domestic 
players in business. 
                                                                                                                                      (ibid:171) 
 
This project was inaugurated by President-General Musharraf on 11 November 2006 and the 
stated construction cost stood at Rs. 6100 millions. Furthermore, the Organization undertook 
the construction of 124 km D.I.Khan-Mughalkot Road in March 2000. The project got 
completed in June 2007 at the cost of Rs. 2,297 millions. On 26 November 2000, Musharraf 
inaugurated the construction project of Barian-Nathiagali-Abbotabad-Road with a „price tag‟ 
of Rs. 1.5 billion. President-General Pervez Musharraf was also called upon to inaugurate the 
650 km Makran Coastal Highway project on 16 December 2004. The project cost Rs. 
7720.30 million.
90
 
 
In addtion, in the post-earthquake „rehabilitation‟ period, the FWO got engaged in the so 
called Earthquake Damaged Road Projects- indeed three projects with estimated cost of Rs. 
4.833 billion. In Balochistan in April 2006, a 68.73 km road project- Gwadar-Pleri-Jiwani-
Gabd Section- stared at the estimated cost of Rs. 2487.034 million; this project was awarded 
by the NHA to the Organization. Importantly, the FWO was able to get Torkham-Jalalabad 
Road Project from the National Highway Authority (NHA) in May 2005. The agent PM 
Shaukat Aziz and Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, jointly inaugurated this 75 km road 
project on 13 September 2006. With respect to Iran, the Construction of Lakpass Tunnel- 180 
meter in length with an approach road of 5.05 km- was undertaken by the FWO in June 2006 
at the estimated cost of Rs. 932.153 million. Besides the road construction projects, the army-
led FWO also engaged in the projects of construction of embankment and concrete structures 
                                               
90 http://fwo.com.pk/others.php?page=2&type=brochure. 
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(bridges) from Khanewal to Raiwind. The length of this track was 256 km. The work 
commenced on August 2006 at the estimated cost of Rs. 760.274 million.
91
 
 
Similarly, the National Logistics Cell was influential enough to acquire state land in Malir, 
Karachi. It also purchased railways land for the construction of a commercial place in 
partnership with a Qatar-based private investor. Moreover, the Cell engaged, since 1999, in 
the „tolling operations‟ in „partnership‟ with the NHA.  The latter‟s council (NHC)92 was 
previously headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In July 2001, the provisions of 
the NHA Act, 1991 were amended by the GoP [the principal military] and the NHC 
was re-constituted. The revised composition [included among others]…A 
Professional in the field of Highway Construction and Management (nominated by 
the President) [and]…A Professional in the field of Finance & Accounts (nominated 
by the President). 
                                                                                                                   
Interestingly, despite the re-constituted composition according to which the Minister for 
Communications (GoP) was to be its „president‟, the NHC(A) was, indeed, headed by a 
retired Maj.-General. Also, since 2003 the NLC started „tyre re-treading‟ plant named 
Polymers. The NLC polymers claimed to have manufacturing facilities that „specializes in 
automotive rubber and plastics products‟. 93 
 
As mentioned before the AWT had invested in education sector too. Similarly, the Bahria 
Foundation invested in the same sector. Indeed, the Foundation was able to get passed the 
Bahria University Ordinance in February 2000 which helped it to establish a university – 
Bahria University whose BoG‟s chairman is the serving admiral of PN- and a chain college 
across the country. Furthermore, the BF along with the AWT ran two housing schemes in 
each of the big cities of Lahore, Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi. This project was a joint-
venture with a private investor. Therefore, the navy came up with its independent scheme- 
anchorage. Interestingly, the Bahria scheme used navy‟s logo and blue emblem which were 
legally prohibited. Importantly, the basis for the housing schemes was provided by the 
Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society Ltd which was taken over and „converted‟ 
into an authority directly controlled by the army. Interestingly, the takeover was carried out 
                                               
91 http://fwo.com.pk/others.php?page=2&type=brochure. 
92 http://www.nha.gov.pk 
93 NLC Report 2009. Available from: http://www.nlc.com.pk/website.nsf/publication.html 
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through a Presidential Order issued by President-General Pervez Musharraf. The Presidential 
Order became a part of the constitution through the 17
th
 Amendment (Siddiqa 2007:159,194). 
 
Last but not least, the FF and SF also continued with their respective economic activities. For 
instance, the latter was able to establish its university- Air University- in 2002. The chairman 
of its BoG is the serving air chief marshal.
94
 Overall, the organization ran about 14 
independent projects none of which was listed with the stock exchange. Moreover, its 
claimed assets stood at Rs.2 billion (US$34.4 million). The FF, on its part, also continued 
with its expansionist agenda. For example, it enjoyed the ownership of a „farm‟ in Nukerji 
(Sindh). The 2,498 acres farm is located in the vicinity of its sugar mills and is instrumental 
to experiment new verities of sugar cane. The FF, overall, took pride in running around 25 
independent projects of which only fertilizer and cement factories were listed with the stock 
exchange. Its total declared assets amounted to Rs. 9.8 billion (US$169 million) (ibid:119-
124). 
 
Besides the afore-mentioned construction, manufacturing, transportation and tolling, real 
estate etc., enterprises, the principal military also continued engaging in state-land 
acquisition, often coercively. For instance, the army‟s attempts, in 2001 in Okara farms, to 
change the system of contract from share-cropping to rent-in cash vis-à-vis the poor peasants 
led to a violent conflict between the armed and armless parties. As a result, eight innocent 
people lost their lives. Moreover, in 2003, according to a parliamentary debate the army 
arbitrarily converted some camping grounds into golf courses. In Nowshera in NWFP, land 
used for „firing range‟ was transformed into a citrus farm. In addition, in 2005, the MoD 
acquired 1,165 acres of land at lower price of Rs.40 per square yard for „official purposes‟. 
Later, 1,085 acres got allotted by the federal government in the same area at Rs. 150 per 
square yard. This land acquisition was meant for the construction of military headquarters as 
well as officers‟ residences, schools and markets etc. In more or less the same manner, the 
PN arbitrarily took land of poor villagers and a floating jetty along with its land in Mubarik 
and Yunisabad in Sindh respectively (Ibid:177). 
 
In addition, the military especially its top brass continued with its policy of state land 
„conversion‟ for personal-private purposes. For instance, in 2000  
                                               
94 http://www.au.edu.pk/board_of_governor.aspx 
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the army gave a 1,200 sq yd plot in Lahore Cantonment to its two top generals, Lt.-
General Khalid Maqbool and Lt.-General Mohammad Amjad. While Maqbool was 
subsequently made governor of the Punjab, Amjad got a job as head of the National 
Accountability Bureau, and later as MD of the FF. According to a report submitted by 
the MoD to the senate in 2003, about 78,292 sq yd or 16.3 acres (a total of 130 
residential plots) were given to an equal number of officers in different cities in the 
period from October 1999 to 2003. The locations included the cities of Karachi, 
Lahore and Rawalpindi, and smaller towns such as Kharian and Jhelum. The officers‟ 
ranks varied from full general to captain…However, these figures do not show the full 
extent of the land grab in Lahore. The cantonment area, which up until the early 
1980s comprised a large segment of army training grounds and firing ranges, has 
almost entirely been converted into a residential area… [Also] the award of rural and 
urban properties added to the worth of the senior generals. As a result a typical maj.-
general is worth Rs. 10 million (US$172,000) and a lt.-general Rs. 50 million 
(US$860,000). However, as a result of the involvement of senior generals in real 
estate development such as  Lt.-General Zarrar Azeem…the typical value of a senior 
general has escalated to Rs. 100 million (US$1.72 million). 
                                                                                                                   (ibid:188-189) 
 
Last but not least, Lt.-General Tauqeer Zia, corpse commander Mangla and the chairman 
Pakistan Cricket Control Board (PCCB), was able to transfer certain portions of Karachi 
National Stadium to Karachi Cantonment Authorities for „further transfer to senior officers‟. 
This move brought quick economic returns- barely an investment of Rs.0.6 million 
(US$100,000) brought a profit of Rs.15 million (US$258,000) in a period of less than 90 
days. Importantly, President-General Pervez Musharraf himself bought a farmland worth 
approximately Rs.40 million (US$690,000) in Islamabad. Also, Musharraf owned around 
eight properties including 2,000 sq yd of land in DHA (Karachi), a 1,200 sq yd plot ( 
Morgah, Rawalpindi), a 900 sq yd plot (Peshawar), 600 sq yd (Eastidge, Rawalpindi), 12,00 
sq yd (Gwadar, Balochistan) and 50 acres of agricultural land (Bahawalpur). In sum, the total 
estimated worth of his disclosed assets was around Rs.600 million (US$ 10.34 million) by 
2005 (ibid:190-193). 
 
Thus, in light of the foregoing it is suffice to maintain- indeed in the support of our 
hypothesis- that the post-coup direct assumption of political power by the military was 
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instrumental to maximize its economic interests more confidently and without any threat of 
accountability. The analysis also showed that during this period a section of agent politicians 
rationally, and not structurally, allied with the principal military to accrue economic benefits. 
 
7.4 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Fifth Coup 
As is obvious from the last section, the military was ably maintaining its principalship: it was 
engaged in the economy as an independent actor; it was institutionally modernized as 
compared with the state‟s other institutions. Importantly, it was politically powerful vis-à-vis 
the agent politicians a section of which was rationally collaborating with it. Moreover, there 
was no threat to either its economic or political interests from the other two agents- the civil 
bureaucracy, which as is mentioned  before, was punished in terms of reform measures, and 
the judiciary which had judicially legitimized the coup.  
 
Nevertheless, the actors in politics normally base their action on preferences which are the 
outcome of inherent human interests. As far as the cognition of interests and the realization 
and formation of preferences/choices is concerned, the rational actor(s) is usually able to take 
into consideration the relevant information vis-à-vis the concerned actor(s). Often, in today‟s 
world of technological advancement, the strategy of the concerned actor could be perceived 
through a strategically interactive process if not comprehensively made to know. However, 
this may not be the same as regards the outcome of human actions or policies. Given the 
multiplicity of intervening variables, it may contextually be difficult, if not altogether 
impossible, to determine an action‟s outcome. In other words, in politics there are, at times, 
political situations where the consequences of a certain choice-based act could be unintended.  
 
If the inferential output of the above-mentioned is assumed as a point of reference and 
departure, then the significance and impact of certain actions by the military under Musharraf 
could be analyzed. To begin with, the regime having taken an egoistic view of itself in terms 
of a modernizer opted to capitalize the innovative aspect of communicational technology. As 
explained earlier in the chapter, it invested in media business to make profit. No wonder then, 
Pakistan witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of privately owned TV channels and even 
FM radio station. This media-promotion move of the military had political dimension too. 
The principal had a strategy to publicize the positives of its principalship- the increase in 
women‟s seats, the separate electorate, its cultural policy etc. Regardless of the former‟s 
performance on the screen, the reception of this telecast by the common man was altogether 
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different since the opposition and civil society organization left no stone unturned to turn the 
military‟s positives into negatives. To add insult to injury, the ineffective economic policies 
of the regime fell short of the mark. Therefore, there is a high probability that the affected 
sections of society would have accorded one more choice to their respective set to confront 
the regime given an opportunity.  
Surprisingly, the opportunity came as one of the indented consequences of the military‟s 
action: media proliferation. It so happed that on 9 March 2007 the principal called on the 
chief justice of the agent Supreme Court in its headquarters and ordered him to resign in the 
best interests of the principal. The Newsline wrote  
It was supposed to be a typical commando action: flatten the target with 
overwhelming speed and force, allowing zero response time. But like most such 
planning, simulated in excited imagination in isolation from slippery realities, it all 
went wrong. Terribly wrong.  Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry, though shell-shocked and shaken, held his ground in the intimidating 
environment of General Pervez Musharraf‟s camp office…Then Prime Minister 
Shaukat Aziz was brought in by the president‟s military secretary to add to the effect 
of the incredible demand of resignation and to show that everyone- government, 
military, intelligence agencies- wanted him to step down…Sources close to him have 
told Newsline that Justice Chaudhry simply wanted to get out of the camp office, 
which he described as a “temporary jail”…Indeed the media strategy for the 
anticipated resignation was planned on the assumption that the chief justice was 
history. An obsequious Justice Chaudhry meeting the mighty General Musharraf 
wearing khaki (the ultimate statement of his power) was filmed by government-
controlled television and the official photographer, and then released to the 
media...Once out of the confines…he [CJ] made a few calls to his close lawyer 
friends at the Supreme Court Bar and the Lahore Bar telling them that a coup against 
him was unfolding…Chief Justice Chaudhry, who was supposed to be resting in 
oblivion, is swooning in the glory of a savior with the kind of spontaneous backing 
and support from the public that can easily be the envy of many an elected leader. 
                                                                                                                (Newsline 2007) 
What can be deduced from the foregoing is: a) the principal,  in a blatant show of its power, 
ordered the agent CJ to resign; b) the state media was placed to capture the proceedings; c) 
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the CJ- who, interestingly,  had taken oath under the PCO- shirked and registered his, if not 
his institution‟s, agency; d) the privately owned media, in order to make profit, chose to 
sensationalize the story; e) the  economically affected and de-securitized people chose to 
rationally, not structurally, capitalize the opportunity in terms of agitational politics and sided 
with the  lawyers‟ community which, in the presence of political parties‟ deactivation, 
emerged as a potential social force. Despite this show of power, however the question that 
arises is why did Musharraf, the leader of the principal, feel the need to arbitrarily remove the 
CJ? 
 
Nevertheless, in the post-9 March period, Pakistan observed some unprecedented 
developments. The chief justice of a traditionally agent judiciary was accorded a hero‟s 
welcome wherever he went. For instance, his caravan took 26 hours from Islamabad to reach 
Lahore- normally it hardly takes three hours. The CJ opted to selectively address the 
country‟s bars in order to create awareness of „rule of law‟ among not only his lawyers 
community but also the masses. The private media also allied with the CJ due to both 
material and non-material factors. What role did the media play in Pakistan‟s politics 
especially after the event of 9 March? 
 
Box 7.7 The Reasons behind Chief Justice Chaudhry’s Dismissal 
The Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had somehow started to take suo 
moto to provide relief to especially the lower strata of the society. We do not 
know how this change of behavior occurred since he was among those judges who 
had taken oath under the PCO; perhaps he might have come to know the poor‟s 
plight through media. Anyways, he judged many issues in favor of the country: for 
example, cancellation of the Steel Mills privatization, the New Murree Project, the 
Golf Club plan in Islamabad on a public park. Moreover, he did take notice of 
police‟s high-handedness and missing persons. In each of these cases, the non-
parliamentary forces were involved to further grow economically, but sadly at the 
expense of the nation. However, despite all this, the most important factor behind 
his dismissal was his remarks about duality of office which Musharraf enjoyed at 
will. The latter [thus] sacked him. 
A 30 year old young journalist, experiencing in electronic journalism, expressed these 
views with the author in Lahore in March 2008. 
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Box 7.8 The Contextual Constraints on the Freedom of the Media 
Up till the advent of 21
st
 century [the] media in Pakistan has been serving the 
interests of the government, both military and democratic [civilian]. With the 
spread of private media channels the accountability of politicians and 
bureaucrats has been made possible to some extent…[It] is playing a significant 
role in making the public opinion and highlighting the popular perception. The 
Media‟s popularity lies in its outright crispy opposition to the government so 
public awareness is in progress regarding the constitutional development, 
political insight and institutional reforms in the country. [Despite this, it] has to 
bear the pressure of ideology, popular mindset of the masses- particularly in the 
case of religious issues and social taboos-, interests of the state, foreign 
countries (like Saudi Arabia) and market forces.  
Interview with Abdur-Rauf, Senior Journalist, Anchor and Director Infotainment, GEO 
TV. Lahore: 10 September 2009. 
 
As the above-mentioned informs, the media had emerged as an important factor at the 
political scene of Pakistan. However, it has yet to assume the role of an influential political 
actor on its own. Moreover, suppose it assumes such a character(istics) in the future, even 
then its credentials would be suspected due to its political affiliations with specific politicians 
and political parties. In addition, theoretically, what maximum media, both print and 
electronic, can do in Pakistan‟s context is to provide people with a variety of perspectives on 
a variety of issues. It is, hence, up to a common man whether, as a rational actor, (s)he takes 
its input into consideration or otherwise. In other words, the narratives of public opinion 
formation and governments dismissals by the media is a structural construct which 
dangerously compromises the actors‟ agency and rationality. 
Nonetheless, the media opted to cover the CJ‟s visits and address to primarily maximize its 
economic returns. The masses, on their part, prioritized to side with CJ in the hope that if 
restored he would deliver more to them. The political parties allied with their cause 
politically. Importantly, a section of lawyers, which belonged to specific political parties, had 
a political reason to affiliate with its community. However, it was, as shall be explained later, 
primarily a legal cause which was taken as a larger interest by a variety of actors who 
strategically got united and posed a serious political and legal challenge to the principal 
military. The latter, on its part, accorded more weightage to a military rather than a political 
approach to the problem. It started a crackdown of the very media which it claimed to have 
planted. Apparently, the Musharraf-led military was unhappy the way the private channels 
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covered simultaneously the merry-making of Musharraf in Islamabad and mayhem in 
Karachi on 12 May
95
. However, the underlying factor was to stop the media from projecting 
the judiciary‟s cause. The Newsline commented  
General Musharraf now stands isolated. The May 12 events have been a major blow 
to whatever was left of the government‟s legitimacy. There are now widespread 
demands for Musharraf to hang up his uniform and give up power. Hedging his bets 
on the support of the military and the continued embrace of Washington, the president 
has refused to bow out. Instead, he has decided to use coercion to suppress dissent. 
The restrictions on private TV channels to air live programmes and talk shows are just 
the beginning. There is a strong indication of the government imposing a state of 
emergency to prevent protests and political rallies.  
    (Newsline 2007) 
It was not just one magazine which took a critical note of military‟s encroachment on the 
media. The country‟s other independently minded media groups also opted to criticize the 
regime on empirical grounds. For example, The Friday Times observed  
President Pervez Musharraf has taken three steps in one week which suggest the 
unraveling of his regime. He has tried to gag the media by a new ordinance so that the 
truth doesn‟t get out, a reversal of a long standing good policy that had earned him 
high marks. He has roped in his corps commanders to signal that the army stands 
behind him, a veiled threat that he had consciously chosen not to make earlier because 
he didn‟t want to drag the army into everyday mundane politics. And he has called a 
meeting of the National Security Council to send the signal that his decisions have the 
sanction of state security…The PEMRA [Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory 
Authority] ordinance is obnoxious. It imposes pre-censorship, a device reminiscent of 
martial law eras.  
                                                                                                  (The Friday Times 2007)        
However despite the regime‟s anti-media and anti-democracy measures, the journalists and 
lawyers‟ community had a preference for agitational politics. In this regard, they suffered 
even physical punishment but they were, by and large, to stand united in the face of military 
authoritarianism supported by personalistic politicians who, on their part, faced a political 
                                               
95
  34 people were killed and over 100 injured in riots in Karachi on 12 May 2007. 
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dilemma. If they continued to ally with the military then the cost was high since the common 
man took a collectivist view of it; if they shirked, there cost was a higher cost to pay since the 
opposition especially PML-N was already taking it on. Contextually, the working politicians 
prioritized the continuation of alliance with the principal in order to possibly thwart GHQ‟s 
negotiations with self-exiled Benazir Bhutto- indeed Sharif was also pursued in this respect. 
Yet, the policy-differences between working politicians especially  PML-Q and the military 
started to surface especially over the issue of Lal Masjid which was besieged by the religious 
extremists- an objective indicator of authoritarian clergy‟s influence- during the first half of 
July 2007. The besiege of Lal Masjid raised many questions; for example, why was the 
military not able to securitize the seat of its own political power? 
 
Nevertheless, the military resorted to military means to end the siege when the extremists 
started attacking and killing the latter‟s personnel. Hence rationality prevailed. Thus, the 
latter having calculated the political cost of confrontation with journalists-lawyers-opposition 
politicians decided, on 20 July 2007, to restore the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry. At last, his suo motes were thought to be less costly than his off-bench addresses 
and (long) marches. 
Little wonder then, in the post-restoration period, the process of suo-motes got re-activated, 
for  the regime along with civilian face had failed to provide any sort of socio-economic relief 
to the common man- this shall be explained later in the chapter.  Importantly, the case of suo-
motes  is significant in more than one respect: first, it marks the judiciary‟s agency- it was 
able to shirk; secondly, the judiciary and the opposition politicians,  and civil society for that 
matter, accorded more preference to the larger than own interest; thirdly, being a rational 
actor it was able to link its own interests, as political parties and politicians often do, to a 
Box 7.9 The Cost of ‘Strategic Depth’ Strategy 
The military views- at least since the Zia days- a section of clergy instrumental for 
the application of its „strategic depth‟ strategy. However, the cost is born by the 
common man. The Lal Masjid is one such example. It was prolonged to politico-
strategically sabotage the Chief Justice issue…I myself was not allowed to launch 
my book in the Islamabad Press Club; the aim of the saboteurs was the same: to 
make a story out of it. They, at the end of the day, failed on both counts. 
Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Analyst. Heidelberg: 1 July 2009. 
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larger and/or national one whose politico-legal implications were negative for the principal 
military and its allied section of agents.  
Nonetheless, the military minds had a strategy of their own to deal with the restored CJ in the 
post-restoration period. Hence, they opted to adopt a policy of non-implementation of 
Supreme Court‟s orders- the agent civil bureaucracy was instrumental in this respect. In this 
regard, an interesting case could be the SC‟s verdict which allowed exiled Nawaz Sharif to 
return to Pakistan. What fate the Supreme Court‟s verdict and Sharif met with can be gauged 
from The Economist‟s following observation:   
Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister of Pakistan, landed in Rawalpindi on 
September 10th with his head bowed in prayer and his supporters erupting around 
him. He was back from a seven-year exile to challenge Pervez Musharraf, an army 
coupster who had toppled and imprisoned him. “Go, Musharraf! Go!” screamed his 
retinue as Mr Sharif‟s plane rumbled to a halt. But four hours later it was Mr Sharif 
who was on the move. In the airport‟s VIP arrivals lounge he was charged with 
corruption, arrested and deported to Saudi Arabia. 
                                                                                                      (The Economist 2007) 
Obviously, the disgraceful and illegal treatment meted out to Sharif indicated the death of any 
attempt at negotiations with him or his party. Therefore, Musharraf‟s diplomatic team turned 
seriously to Ms Bhutto. For this purpose, the old rivals- BB and Musharraf- were able to 
secretly negotiate the political future of theirs, if not the country, in Dubai. Arguably, the role 
of Riyadh/Dubai and Washington, in this regard, is of facilitation since the contours of 
diplomacy are determined by the domestic political variables. After all, why could not the 
Arabs and Americans make Sharif or Benazir return to Pakistan in, for instance, 2004, 2005, 
or pre-9 March 2007? Nonetheless, the BB-Musharraf negotiations were relatively 
successful. The latter issued a National Reconciliation Order (NRO) on October 5- a day 
before the presidential election- to remove corruption, misconduct and related charges against 
Bhutto among others. The former‟s political support was provided to Musharraf when PPP 
preferred non-resignation from assemblies. Moreover, the support of old working politicians 
came handy in this respect. 
Regardless of the acclaimed electoral legitimacy from the assemblies, the presidential 
election was still to obtain judicial legitimacy as the conduct of the „controversial‟ exercise 
was challenged before the shirking CJ Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Meanwhile, the 
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operationalization of NRO helped pave the way for Benazir‟s return to Pakistan on October 
18. The following day she would have felt the difference between 1986 and 2007‟s Pakistan 
when she barely escaped a terrorist attack which took the lives of more than 172 people. 
Interestingly, Bhutto, in her Reconciliation (2009), accused the Musharraf-led military for the 
failure of promised security. However, on the other hand, legal scrutiny for Musharraf‟s 
election seemed a slow-go for the principal who had a traditional distaste for legality and 
constitutionality. Moreover, the opposition politicians were demanding the holding of 
parliamentary elections as promised in November. 
The principal military contextually had a few choices: a) it could have hold general elections 
to defuse the criticism, but post-election scenario seemed alarming since Bhutto, a seasoned 
politician, would have become more demanding ; b) Musharraf, as leader of the principal, 
could have stepped down, but this would have shown the military‟s political weakness; c) it 
could have removed the shirking CJ again and replaced it with a pliant one, but given the 
lawyers‟ activism it would  have added to the problem; d) being principal with coercive 
power at its disposal, it could have staged a coup to punish the shirking agents along with 
new rivals the like of media(men) and the lawyers. All choices involved cost.  
However, the principal probably saw more benefits in choice d. Instead of patiently waiting 
for the Supreme Court‟s verdict, the Musharraf-led military chose to use military means: it 
staged a coup on November 3, 2007.  The military declared it an „emergency- see Box 7.10 
on the next page. However, the media viewed it differently. The Newsline observed 
It took the entire legal and political community eight years to come to terms with the 
consequences of his 1999 coup and, even then, the scars that the constitutional 
deviation left on the system were too deep to ignore. Now that he [Musharraf-led 
principal] has held the constitution in abeyance, once again, and virtually imposed 
martial law, the legal tangle that this has created will take a long time to sort out.  
[italics mine] 
                                                                                                                (Newsline 2007)                                                                                                                    
Nonetheless, with the martial law imposed, the assemblies, which had re-elected Musharraf 
as president a few weeks ago, were dissolved. However, unprecedentedly in Pakistan‟s 
judicial history, on the same day, a seven-member bench- including CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry- of 
the Supreme Court unanimously judged the military‟s action invalid. 
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However, their action brought the wrath of the principal with the effect that they were 
punished: equally unprecedentedly, sixty shirking judges of the higher courts were arrested 
and thus mentally, if not physically, tortured.  
However, a section of judiciary rationally preferred its own to larger interests and thus allied 
with the military. Therefore, the latter was able to announce and claim a new chief justice- 
Abdul Hameed Dogar. However, the political parties, the civil society organizations and even 
the international community morally, if not legally, refused to accord acceptance to such 
arbitrary measures- as the coup-text shows above- taken by the principal. 
 
                                               
96
 General Pervez Musharraf addressed the nation at night after having issued the proclamation. The address- 
which lasted around 45 minutes - was primarily delivered in Urdu. The address highlighted the problems of law 
and order, security and economy at length. This section was delivered in English. The text of proclamation and 
the address is available from http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/06/02/musharraf-3-nov-
emergency/. The study, for the sake of comprehension, have relied on both the texts.  
 
 
Box 7.10 Excerpts from General Musharraf’s Proclamation and the Address96 to 
the Nation, 3 November 2007 
 
a)…there is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of 
terrorist attacks including suicide bombings, IED [Improvised Explosive 
Device] explosions, rocket firing and bomb explosions…posing a grave threat 
to the life and property of the citizens…there has also been a spate of attacks 
on state infrastructure and on law-enforcement agencies…[However] some 
members of the judiciary are working at cross purposes with the executive and 
legislature…there has been increasing interference by some members of the 
judiciary in government policy, adversely affecting economic growth…the law 
and order situation in the country as well as the economy have been adversely 
affected…the Constitution provides no solution for this situation…the situation 
has been reviewed in meetings with the prime minister, governors of all four 
provinces, and with Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chiefs of the 
Armed Forces, Vice-Chief of Army Staff and Corps Commanders of the 
Pakistan Army…I, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, 
proclaim Emergency throughout Pakistan…I, hereby, order and proclaim that 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance. 
This Proclamation shall come into force at once. 
b)… I had to take this action in order to preserve the democratic transition 
which I initiated eight years back… It is this third stage that is being subverted 
today. And it is this third stage which I want to complete with all my conviction. 
[italics mine]                                                                                                    
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7.5 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup 
As is obvious from the text, General Musharraf cited problems of security, law and order and 
economy to necessitate the coup. Moreover, he claimed that the country was democratizing 
under his-led military rule. However, since this process was adversely affected by the 
interference of shirking judiciary, therefore the military would re-start the project of 
democratization. In order to critically explain these stated reasons/causes of the coup, the 
following sections tend to conduct an analytic narrative of the coup.  The primary objective 
of the exercise shall be to test the posed hypotheses of the study.  
 
To begin with, the conceptual variables identified in the above-given coup/martial law 
proclamation are the following: 
A =…there is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of 
terrorist attacks including suicide bombings, IED explosions, rocket firing and bomb 
explosions…posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens…there has 
also been a spate of attacks on state infrastructure and on law-enforcement agencies                                                                            
(securitization variable) 
B = there has been increasing interference by some members of the judiciary in 
government policy, adversely affecting economic; the economy have been adversely 
affected; (economic variable) 
C = the law and order situation in the country…[has] been adversely affected; (law 
and order variable) 
D = I had to take this action in order to preserve the democratic transition which I 
initiated eight years back… it is this third stage which I want to complete with all my 
conviction. (democratization variable) 
E = Emergency [coup/martial law] (policy variable) 
 
Based on the text, the main causal relations observed are: 
1. Pakistan is facing (religious) extremism with the effect that terrorist attacks including 
suicide bombings have paralyzed public life. The civil administration has failed to 
provide security to the people. Therefore, in order to securitize the country the  
military had to declare martial law: A         +          E    (positive relationship)  
2. The country‟s economy is „adversely affected‟ by „increasing interference‟ of a 
section of judiciary in government policy. Hence, the military staged coup to  remove 
such irritants and improve economic situation for the masses: B         +           E  
(positive relationship) 
3. The „increasing interference‟ by a section of the judiciary has extremely negative 
impact on the functioning of law-enforcement agencies i.e. police. As a result, the law 
and order situation has deteriorated to an extent that the writ of the state is at risk. 
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Therefore, it was necessary to take control of the  state and establish its writ in terms 
of improved law and order:  C         +          E    (positive relationship) 
4.  The principal military, since October 1999, was working on a project of 
democratization. However, this process was hampered by the interference of a few 
from the judiciary. Therefore, it was imperative to remove that section through martial 
law in order to resume the project of democratization. Indeed its „third stage‟ shall be 
completed : D         +           E    (positive relationship) 
 
The following observations can be drawn in light of the above: 
 The November coup/martial law is justified by General Musharraf-led military on the 
basis of securitization, problems related to economy as well as  law and order; 
 Securitization, economic and law and order problems are cited as the major 
reasons/causes due to their adverse effects on the state if not the society;  
 Democratization is cited  as complementary  reason/cause of the coup; 
 The military views the coup/martial law as the only way to deal with such  paralyzing 
problems; 
 The principal military has the capacity and determination to fulfill these tasks. 
 
Having stated the empirical evidences for the coup/martial law  as cited by military‟ leader, 
General Pervez Musharraf, the following four sections shall attempt to explain empirically as 
well as theoretically the claimed positive correspondence between coup and each of the 
conceptual variables. In this regard, the study tends to carry on with its earlier sequence of 
variables to maintain uniformity of style. Hence, law and order rather than securitization is 
the subject of the next section. 
7.5.1 Law and Order Variable 
As is mentioned in previous four analytic narratives, each military coup maker and the 
consequent martial law regime invoked problems of law and order, though without giving 
any definition and indicators of the phenomenon, to ostensibly legitimize the coup and the 
military rule. Nevertheless, to academically acknowledge or otherwise a coup action and the 
military rule what we did in the four analytic narratives was to present a statistical analysis of 
the murders and riots per million population and then concluded a trend of murders and riots 
accordingly. Importantly, if one re-looks at the findings of law and order variable under the 
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AN 4, it becomes empirically clear that the Musharraf-led principal military had failed to 
maintain, let alone improve, the law and order situation as inherited from the Sharif 
government. Interestingly, the thesis‟s statistical findings are corroborated by the coupster 
who had himself , in his November 3 proclamation and the follow-up address to the nation, 
admitted that the problems of law and order still hanged on. One wonders then why did the 
leader of the principal, on 3 November 2007, become oblivious to a similar resort to a similar 
claim on October 13 and 17, 1999? Is it an indication of short memory or long-term strategy? 
This shall be explained later in the Chapter. 
 
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned empirical evidences are suffice to maintain that the 
attempts at self-legitimation by Musharraf-led military, on November 3, are totally baseless 
and preposterous. Moreover, in order to see whether the problems of law and order got solved 
post-November coup, the study conducted, while operationalizing Mitra‟s conception of 
governance, a statistical analysis of murders per million population for the coup year, namely, 
2007. 
97
 
 
The findings, as presented in Figure 5 on the next page, speak for themselves. Noticeably, the 
murders‟ trend is sharply going upward from 2006. Importantly, there is a significant increase 
in the number of murders per million population- as is reflected by the Figure- in the year 
2007. This empirical fact points to the prevailing problems of law and order in Pakistan as 
per our conceptualization. Moreover, the Figure, on the next page, statistically refutes the 
claims of the principal military under Musharraf that it was capable of maintaining, if not 
improving, relative law and order. Thus, on the basis of this empirical/statistical evidence, it 
is posited that law and order variable falls short of qualifying as cause of the November coup. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
97 The fifth coup d‟état, as is already mentioned in the study, was staged on 3 November 2007 by the Musharraf-
led principal military. Though General Pervez Musharraf was succeeded as army chief by General Ashfaq 
Parvez Kayani on 28 November 2007, the overall principalship- as per the present study‟s model- of the military 
remained unaffected by this change of command. Hence, in order to statistically explain the state of law and 
order in the post-coup period, the study includes 2007, and excludes 2008 from the analysis due to the 
following.  As a result of February 2008 elections, politicians/civilians were able to form government- much to 
the chagrin of the military- in the center as well as the four provinces. Thus, constitutionally it was the civil 
governments which were obligated to maintain law and order through the police etc. 
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Figure 5 Trend: Murders per Million Population 
 
7.5.2 Economic Variable 
 As is already mentioned, this time around too, the deteriorating economic situation of the 
country was cited by the principal military to self-legitimize the coup-action on November 3.  
However, the resort to the economic variable is logically and factually unfounded since it was 
the General-President himself who, as leader of the principle military, had supervised the 
country‟s economy since October 1999. Empirically even, the military rule despite excessive 
vows failed to improve the key economic indicators of the economy as is explained earlier in 
this Chapter. 
 
Moreover, as explained under economic variable in case 4 the financial year 2007/08 covered 
the period till April 2008. Therefore it seems statistically, if not morally, inappropriate to 
explain and analyze the FY2008/09 under Musharraf since he resigned in August 2008 as 
president and importantly the budget for FY 2008/09 was initiated by the newly elected 
civilian government led by PPP-P. Nevertheless, the Musharraf-led military was certainly 
responsible for the fate of the economy pre-2008/09 budget. In addition, if the trickle downs 
are a guide, then the gist of negatives of and on the economy under the military rule can be 
tasted from the State Bank of Pakistan‟s Inflation Monitor of August 2008. It stated  
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Inflationary pressures strengthened in the economy with CPI inflation (YoY) soaring 
to reach 25.3 percent during August 2008 compared to 6.5 percent in the same month 
last year. Both food and non-food groups of CPI contributed in this upsurge in 
headline inflation. Food inflation (YoY) remained persistently high and was recorded 
at 34.1 percent compared to 8.6 percent in August 2007. This rising trend was mainly 
led by increase in the prices of some key food commodities such as coriander seed 
powder (130 percent), pulse masoor (130 percent), rice irri (121 percent), wheat (76 
percent), and maida (68 percent). Similarly, non-food inflation (YoY) also increased 
significantly reaching 18.7 percent in August 2008 compared to 4.9 percent during the 
same month last year. Amongst the various components of CPI non-food group, 
transport & communication, house rent index (HRI) and fuel & lighting sub-group 
witnessed significant increase in inflation (YoY) during August 2008 compared to the 
same month last year. Other measures of inflation i.e. wholesale price index (WPI) 
and sensitive price indicator (SPI) also showed strong growth during the month under 
review.
98
 
 
As the quote shows the country‟s economic situation further worsened under General 
Musharraf‟s presidentship during the post-coup period. Thus, the empirical evidences points 
to negative relationship between economic variable and the coup. 
 
7.5.3 Democratization Variable 
As mentioned previously, general elections were supposed to be held in November. However, 
in the immediate post-coup period they were postponed indefinitely. Later, it was stated that 
they would be held as scheduled. However, on 8 November 2007, Musharraf announced that 
the election would be held by 15 February 2008. Again, there was a change in the date and it 
was stated that the elections may be held on or before 9 January 2008. Interestingly, this date 
was also withdrawn and the COAS instead suggested 8 January 2008 as the election day. 
Why did the regime play topsy- turvey regarding the holding of elections and then settled for 
January? 
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 http://www.sbp.gov.pk/publications/Inflation_Monitor/2008/index2.htm 
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Box 7.11 The Military attempted Defections in the Mainstream Political Parties 
 
It showed that the [military] junta had no liking for democracy. The January 
schedule was actually politically-motivated: the military wanted to give enough 
time to its old allies, for example PML-Q, to campaign under her auspices. 
Moreover, it wanted to cause defections in the mainstream political parties 
during this period.  
 
Interview with Mohammad Pervaiz Malik, Secretary Finance PML-N and a 
Businessman. Lahore: 17 March 2008.  
 
 
As the above informs the military and its pre-coup allies saw more benefits in a renewed 
political alliance. No wonder then, the working politicians and their parties were given 
official support during canvassing. On their part, the opposition parties especially PPP-P 
pointed to regime‟s bias towards PML-Q and MQM. However, the PPP-P itself was criticized 
for the NRO. Hence, to improve her rating, Benazir opted to politically ally with the CJ and 
the lawyers‟ community. Interestingly, Sharif, who was not allowed to enter Pakistan in 
September, was able this time to participate in the election campaign in late November.  The 
prime factor behind his sudden arrival was political, however. The regime, after having 
developed serious political differences with Bhutto post-October 18, saw in Sharif a potential 
rival to Bhutto. The former rationally expected in the post-poll period either a hung 
parliament- thus easy to manipulate- or a scenario in which strategic interaction with Sharif 
was possible vis-à-vis PPP-P. Sharif, on his part, walked rationally too. He tried to avoid 
giving any pro-GHQ impression to his political rivals by criticizing the November 3 action. 
Also, his party along with JUI and TI supported the lawyers‟ cause to the extent that Sharif 
along with the partner-parties announced to boycott the elections. 
 
However, before the elections got boycotted, they were postponed again. The cited reason 
was the tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27 in Rawalpindi- coincidently 
the city where his father was hanged, and Pakistan‟s first prime minister was shot dead. The 
PPP-P accused the regime for failure of security. The military put it on Baitullah Masud. 
Importantly however, Benazir herself in Reconciliation, which she was writing simultaneous 
to her election campaign, pointed towards elements from within the military and its political 
allies as potential threat to her life.  
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Besides, on the same day, unknown individual opened fires at PML-N members also. Thus, 
in  light of the foregoing what can be argued is: a) the military regime failed to allay Bhutto‟s 
security concerns- indeed Sanger‟s account99 has consolidated it ; b) the local civil 
bureaucracy especially the police also failed to fulfill its primary task; c) there was a plan to 
terrify the mainstream political parties and their recently returned leadership. Little wonder 
then, the elections got rescheduled for 18 February 2008. Problems of law and order were 
cited by the principal military as the main reason for postponement. Was the military justified 
on this count? 
 
Box 7.12 The Military’s anti-PPP-P Mindset 
 
The real reason to postpone the elections was to deprive People‟s Party from 
sweeping the polls since the tragic death of Benazir Bhutto had generated a 
sympathy-wave for the PPP[-P]. The military did not like anti-establishment 
[military] party to form government and pose challenge to it.  
 
A senior member of the PPP-P recorded this in February 2008. 
 
 
As the above informs the primary reason to postpone the election was politico-electoral. 
Interestingly however, the justification for postponement was even empirically unfounded. 
Since Benazir and PPP-P is traditionally associated with Sindh, the law and order would have 
been a local phenomenon. One wonders why the people of NWFP and Balochistan, where the 
PPP-P had fared poorly in the October 2002 elections, should create law and order problems 
for the sake of People‟s Party. Nevertheless, despite the loss of their leader, the PPP-P, under 
the co-command of Bhutto‟s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, decided to take the „revenge 
democratically‟.100 The PML-N, also, changed its mind at the eleventh hour and rationally 
preferred participatory to agitational politics. However, the JI, TI and the lawyers opted for 
boycott for different reasons. Finally, the elections were held on 18 February. Following are 
given the results: 
 
                                               
99
  Sanger, David. 2009. The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power. 
New York: Harmony Books.   
100 This refers to a phrase, „Democracy is the best revenge‟ coined and used quite often by late Benazir Bhutto. 
The post-Bhutto PPP-P maintains it as a politico-electoral slogan. 
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Table 36 The 2008 Elections: Party Position 
 
 Party NA PP PS PF PB 
 PPP-P 88 77 66 18 7 
 PML-N 66 102 0 4 0 
 PML-Q 38 64 10 4 17 
 MQM 19 0 36 0 0 
 ANP 10 0 2 29 2 
 BNP-A 1 0 0 0 5 
 MMA 5 2 0 8 5 
 Others 41 39 11 16 10 
 Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan 
 
 
As the Table shows, it was a mixed-mandate. In fact, there were incidents of pre/post poll 
rigging (PILDAT 2008). The boycotting parties pointed to the alleged regime‟s support to 
PML-Q which had, despite being criticized in the media for being king‟s party, emerged as 
the third largest party. Importantly, the lawyers refused to accept the very validity of this 
electoral exercise since it was conducted under the martial law. The mainstream parties, on 
their part, were able to maintain a cautious stance in this respect. They wanted not to give the 
principal an opportunity to call for a fresh mandate and thus spoil their chances of tasting 
relative power after so long.  However, the military, on its part, was open to use even her 
intelligence apparatuses to cause defections especially in the Bhutto-less People‟s Party. To 
some extent, its efforts bore fruit when Makhdom Amin Faheem, a veteran PPP-P politician, 
publicly presented himself as the People‟s Party candidate for premiership. 
 
However, Asif Zardari, to many‟s surprise, turned out to be a politician: he was able to 
outsmart not only Mr Faheem but also the leadership of the PMLs. On his part, General-
President Musharraf did try to show his authoritarian skills by delaying the parliament‟s 
session in the hope of winning over either a section of PML-N or PPP-P to form government 
with the Q-League- a party of working politicians. The principal, however, remained unable 
to achieve the attempted goal. Quite contrary to its calculus, the PML-N and PPP-P rationally 
collaborated with each other with the effect of forming a coalition government at the centre 
and the Punjab. Interestingly, General Musharraf, in his capacity of Pakistan‟s president, 
opted to administer oath to the shirking politicians from PML-N and PPP-P. The latter, 
during the televised oath-ceremony, had tied black belts to their arms as a symbol of non-
recognition of the Musharraf-led military rule. The military, however, acted rationally. It saw 
less politico-strategic cost in handing the political authority to politicians. Had it remained 
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adamant to its November 3 mentality, the political, if not economic cost, would have been 
greater for the military institution in the wake of agitational politics led by the lawyers. Little 
wonder then, General Musharraf resigned as president on 18 August 2008.  
 
To sum up, the series of elections postponement, physical harassment of political leadership, 
regime‟s support to specific parties, pre-at-post poll rigging, boycott of the elections by 
lawyers and certain political parties, attempts at defections, delaying the parliamentary 
session are objective indicators of de-democratization rather than democratization. Therefore, 
this variable empirically does not carry a positive correspondence with the coup d‟état. 
 
7.5.4 Securitization Variable 
The state‟s writ, as explained under law and order section, was challenged by the religious 
extremists who even resorted to suicide tactics to achieve their objectives. In the post-coup 
period, the internal threats to person and property continued to increase. Especially the 
security situation worsened in Swat where Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi 
(TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad had vehemently demanded the proclamation of Sharia. 
Moreover, his son-in-law Maulvi Fazlullah, on his part, continued applying terror-techniques 
to forcibly impose Sharia. The gravity of the situation could be gauged by the following 
account by a Swati intellectual: 
Swatis ask why Sufi Muhammad was not kept in check by those who facilitated his 
rise; why was Fazlullah not tackled when he had been condemned by his society and 
was running a lone propaganda project; why did the intelligence agencies fail to 
predict Fazlullah‟s behavior and movement; why, even at a later stage, did the state 
not take notice of the public burning of CD shops and TVs…Further, why has the 
security apparatus failed to cut the militants‟ supply lines; how come random 
journalists can talk to Fazlullah but security forces are unable to track him down; and 
if the state‟s helplessness is genuine, how was the administration able to successfully 
hold general elections in Swat.
101
 
                                                                           
Moreover, the situation in Federally Administered Tribal Areas was no different where a 
collaborative alliance between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda had virtually established a state of 
their own. In addition, the terrorists were able to penetrate into the metropolitans of Pakistan 
                                               
101 Daily Times 2009.  
 322 
and started targeting both civilian and security forces- the attack on Musharraf‟s person in 
July 2007 is a case in point. The year 2008 (see Table below) also witnessed the worst 
terrorist attacks in which the number of civilian casualties was higher than the security 
personnel.                                                  
Table 37 Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: Nov 2007 to Aug 2008 
  Month Civilians Security Force 
Personnel 
Terrorists/ 
Insurgents 
Total 
November 293 94 341 728 
December 293 48 97 438 
January 88 111 455 654 
February 182 33 30 245 
March 137 26 41 204 
April 80 25 16 121 
May 61 30 37 128 
June 149 31 38 218 
July 
August 
82 
339 
71 
124 
250 
784 
403 
1247 
    Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal 102 
 
                      
What the afore-mentioned suggests is that the securitization in Swat/Malakand and FATA 
remained chaotic. Importantly, the Pakistan state remained unable to establish its writ in the 
tribal areas. The state‟s failure with respect to securitization was highlighted by the 
independently minded media, civil society groups and opposition parties. The latter blamed 
the Musharraf-led military rule for selling Pakistan‟s sovereignty to the US. In this respect, 
the „drone attacks‟ were cited as an empirical evidence. Interestingly, the democratic forces‟ 
criticism was further consolidated by a public statement of former COAS Aslam Beg. Beg 
opined that the drones were operated from within Pakistan (Beg 2008). In a nutshell, what, 
therefore, can be deduced from the foregoing is that the military remained unable to 
securitize its population from (internal) threats since empirically external threat was non-
existent. Thus, the stated positive correspondence between this variable and coup/martial law 
is empirically negative. 
 
7.6 Military Agency: Causing the Coup 
As the preceding sections have explained none of the conceptual variables empirically could 
be related to November coup. Hence, this situation of non-answerability of coup causes leads 
                                               
102 www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm 
 323 
us to the model in terms of its explanatory variables, namely, working/shirking (agency A) 
and own/larger interests (agency B). Thus, since the existing body of knowledge on 
Pakistan‟s civil-military relations as well as the stated/cited justification by the military 
empirically remains unable to explain the coup phenomenon, it is therefore posited that the 
November coup and consequent martial law was a result of military agency- capability to 
affect change. Being a rational and principal actor, the military opted to stage the coup in 
order to safeguard its own than larger/national interests. Hence, the coup is rational than 
structural in nature.  
 
However, the coup was political in character since its primary objective was to maintain hold 
over the political power and let it not slip into the hands of shirking agents especially the 
judiciary, which was able to accord more preference to a larger than own interest, and 
generally politicians. Importantly, the clues to political character of the coup was provided by 
the army chief General Pervez Musharraf himself in his 3 November proclamation and the 
address to the nation. He said  
Then came the Presidential elections- a month ago. The procedure was adopted 
according to the Constitution and the Law…But some references were filed, 
especially against me, in the Supreme Court. That is no problem. It is fine. A matter 
of Law. But then a seven member bench was formed. Then after a while it was turned 
into a nine member bench and then it was turned into an eleven member bench and 
the case keeps on dragging interminably without a decision. Then the Presidential 
elections happened in which I was fortunate enough that the assemblies gave me 57% 
of the vote…But the case is still dangling. The vote was counted. The unofficial result 
was announced but we cannot notify because the case is there. Now the case is going. 
No decision is forthcoming. It inches along. Now one gentleman [SC‟s judge] wants 
to go to his daughter‟s wedding. So let‟s delay it even more! As if the entire nation, 
stuck in a strange state of hopelessness and uncertainty, can just keep hanging on 
indefinitely. Even the Prime Minister examined this grave situation and sent me a 
written analysis that there is a great deal of difficulty for the government to function 
in this situation.
103
   
 
                                               
103 http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/06/02/musharraf-3-nov-emergency/ 
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The above-mentioned makes it crystal clear that the general-president as leader of the 
principal military was obsessed with political power and the „reference‟ in the Supreme Court 
was considered both a hurdle, insult and, as per our hypothesis, a constraint on its political 
space. Thus, the coup was calculated to disallow the agent judiciary to attempt to hold the 
principal accountable. Importantly enough, the imposition of consequent martial law was 
instrumental from the military‟s perspective to re-negotiate the principal‟s principles- rules of 
the game- in terms of issuance of a PCO under which a section of the higher judiciary 
rationally took oath on the coup-day. Additionally, the politico-strategic message of the coup 
and the martial law was more extensive in nature and character. In this regard, it targeted the 
political actors i.e. politicians, political parties etc., with long-term goal of de-politicization of 
political/parliamentary institutions in Pakistan. 
 
However, despite this claimed show of strength the coup-action was, as hypothesized, a sign 
of political weakness of the military. Had it been politically strong then the contours of 
politics would have been (re)settled within the parliament if not the camp office.  In addition, 
in the post-coup period the principal military was able to maximize, due to its overall 
principalship of Pakistan‟s state i.e. determination of foreign/defense policy etc. its economic 
interests. Since this is one of the hypotheses of the study, therefore the following section 
deals with it in details.  
 
7.6.1 Maximizing Economic Interests 
As was mentioned earlier in the thesis, the nature of military‟s economic activities is 
secretive.  The following is deemed insightful in this respect: 
After every ten years the military comes [in politics]. With American money and 
danda [coercion], it can move on. Politicians cannot do like this. The military also 
plunder (lootmaar): land is transformed into cantonments; commission is taken on 
weapons procurement- all sort of things are done. However, since the military does it 
under some rules, the files are kept secret. Either we [journalist/civilians] are afraid of 
it [military‟s danda] or we are unable to locate such documents.104 
 
                                               
104 These views were expressed by Najam Sethi in a TV program Tonight with Najam Sethi (15 January 2010).  
Since the program‟s language was Urdu, transcription except italicized terms is done by the author. The 
program‟s video is available from: http://www.dunyanews.tv/play_program_video_eng.php?id=6953&pid=1844 
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As the quote shows, it is extremely difficult even for a journalist to locate and document the 
extent of the military‟s economic ventures. Little wonder then, the present study also faced 
difficulty in this respect. The attempt to access the data was further hampered by the 
following: a) in the post-publication of Military Inc (2007). the institution had become not 
only more protective and secretive but also more authoritarian- often threatening physically; 
b) the post-9 March the lawyers‟ movement and the media‟s investigative approach have 
further helped the  military to  keep distance from the questioning civilians.  
 
Nevertheless, to understand and explain the positive relationship between the military‟s 
politics and furtherance of economic interests the study, in the absence of any authentic 
research article/paper or book on this period, tends to rely on the military-orientated 
organizations‟ online sources. Though this material overall presents a rosy picture of the 
military‟s economic ventures, it is the only source which can help one understand and explain 
the extent of its penetration in Pakistan‟s economy, politics and the state.  
 
To begin with, the Frontier Works Organization was lately engaging in a variety of projects 
of which only a few were mentioned under the fourth coup‟s analytic narrative. During the 
period under analysis, around a dozen projects of different nature started as Table 38 shows 
on the next page.             
 
Overall, the FWO was involved in the following projects: roads (44), airfields (2), bridges 
(1), optical fiber (1), dams/irrigation (5), infrastructural development (12), railways (2), 
tunnels (1) and miscellaneous (7). These projects were supposedly „sponsored‟ by NHA, PR, 
CDA, DHA, GHQ etc. Moreover, the Organization was able to acquire 8 more projects which 
pointed to its agency and rationality. In addition, in 2007 the FWO‟s consolidated income 
from operations, as Figure 6 highlights on page 327, stood at Rs. 13,649 million.        
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Table 38 The FWO’s On-going Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Source: FWO Online Brochure; n.d.105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
105
 http://fwo.com.pk/others.php?page=2&type=brochure. 
 
 
 
Cost  
(Rs Million) 
Start Date 
Kachhi Canal 6657.213 Nov-07 
Construction of Lai Expressway and 
Flood Channel Project 
2182.838 
 
Jan-08 
 
Construction of Multipurpose Link 
Road at PAF Qadri Skardu 
9.300 Mar-08 
Widening and Improvement of Road 
120' Wide Beach Avenue-II, Phase-VIII, 
DHA Karachi 
219.815 Apr-08 
Construction of Lind Road between 
Khayaban-e-Ittehad and KPT 
Interchange & Misc Projects 
29.359 Apr-08 
 
 
Construction of Main Boulevard at 
Mehfooz Shaheed Garrison Lahore 
255.217 Apr-08 
Rehabilitation of Convoy Road 
Rawalpindi Cantt 
150.000 
 
May-08 
Karakoram Highway Maintenance 160.00 Jul-Jun each 
year 
Recarpetting of Secondary Runway 
End-33 at PAF Qadri Skardu 
35.534 May-08 
Construction of Hostel for Rehman 
Baba School at Afghanistan 
951.549 May-08 
Construction of Naeb Amin Ullah Khan 
Logari Hospital at Logar Afghanistan 
1077.508 May 08 
Construction of Roads, Walkways, 
Water Supply, Sewerage, Storm & 
Drainage (Package-III) at NUST New 
Campus Sector H-12, Islamabad 
120.854 Jun-08 
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Figure 6 The FWO’s Consolidated Income (2007)   
 
 
Source: FWO106 
 
Similarly, the NLC is involved in a variety of projects worth Rs. 32 billion. Currently, its 
engineering and construction task force is more than 3,000 individuals. Moreover, it 
transports more than 74,000 BBLs/crude per day with a fleet capacity of 1,500 vehicles of, 
for instance, Mercedes-Benz and Renault kind. In addition, the Cell takes pride in „6 modern 
container scanning sites across the country‟. Also, it is operating 25 Toll Plazas on the 
National Highway (N-5: Peshawar-Lahore section), the Indus Highway (N-55) and at 
Nokundi (N-40). 
 
Besides, the AWT also continued with its economic ventures. For instance, its Askari Bank 
(AB), in its quarterly report of March 2009, boasted of „operating profit‟ of Rs.1, 2.98 million 
as well as increase in the number of branches from 150 to 204 from 2008 to 2009 
respectively.
107
 Also, the Askari Leasing Limited claimed total assets of Rs.12, 3 billion in 
2008. 
 
The Fauji Foundation, on its part, was able to remain in business as well. The extent of its 
economic ventures can be gauged from the operations of its subsidiaries. For instance, the 
                                               
106  http://fwo.com.pk/ 
107 Askari Bank Quarterly Report 2009. Available from http://www.askaribank.com.pk/financialstatement.php# 
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Fauji Fertilizer Company‟s claimed Profit after Tax (PAT) stood at- as the Figure shows 
below- Rs. 5,604 million.  
         
 Figure 7 Fauji Fertilizer Company: Profit after Tax 
 
 
          Source: Fauji Foundation.108 
 
Similarly, the Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Limited (FFBL) claimed to have PAT margin of Rs. 
Rs. 2,540 million in 2007. In addition, during the same year the Fauji Cement Company 
Limited (FCCL) enjoyed Rs. 646 million as PAT. The company, however, had registered a 
slowdown in profit-making when compared with the preceding year. Moreover, in 2008, the 
Fauji Oil Terminal & Distribution Company Limited (FOTCO) claimed to have earned 
Rs. 322 million as profit after tax. The company  
consists of an all weather jetty capable of berthing 75,000 DWT vessels, two pipelines 
of 36-inch and 30-inch dia for handling of HFO, Diesel and Crude Oil and three 
marine loading arms. Plans are underway for setting up another jetty of 9 million tons 
capacity for meeting Pakistan‟s additional handling requirements.109 
 
In addition, the Mari Gas Company‟s PAT stood at Rs. 683.89 million during the year 2006-
07. Very much like its sisters organizations, the Foundation Gas boasted of „65 distributors 
supplies LPG to approximately 366,250 domestic and 11225 commercial consumers‟. Its 
total assets valued Rs.746 million during 2006-07. Similarly, the Fauji Corn Complex, Fauji 
Cereals and Fauji Security Services‟ claimed total assets stood at Rs. 696 million, Rs. 135 
                                               
108 http://www.fauji.org.pk/Webforms/Home.aspx?Id=142 
109 see www.fotcoterminal.com 
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million and Rs. 45 million during 2006-07 respectively. Moreover, the FF‟s Overseas 
Employment Services‟ total assets amounted to Rs. 16 million during 2007-8. Currently, the  
assets of the Fauji Group (which include those of the Associated Companies) are over 
PKR 121 billion (USD 2 billion). The total value of Fauji Foundation‟s shareholding 
in its associated companies has a market value in excess of c. USD 750 million, while 
the companies represent 3.3% of the total market capitalization at the Karachi Stock 
Exchange.
110
 
 
Last but not least, the Shaheen Foundation also did not lag behind. Currently, the SF is doing 
business in a) aviation i.e. Shaheen Air, Air Eagle, SAPS; b) trade and services i.e. Shaheen 
Insurance, Shaheen Aerotraders, Shaheen Knitwear, Shaheen Medical Services, Shaheen 
Rent-A-Car, Shaheen Fuel Filling Stations; c) real estate i.e. Shaheen Complex Lahore, 
Shaheen Complex Karachi, Shaheen Housing Scheme Projects in Peshawar and Islamabad; e) 
Media i.e. Hawk Advertising; f) educational services i.e. Air University, Shaheen Schools 
System. Since the SF is comparatively a smaller organization and there is dearth of data   it is, 
therefore, impossible to present a picture of its financial status. Same is the case with BF as 
regards the current extent of its economic activities and financials. However, with respect to 
individual economic pursuits the perception of the country‟s intelligentsia i.e. lawyers,  
journalists etc., is regarded as a point of reference given the non-availability of data about the 
military‟s state land acquisition in a highly fine-tuned manner. In this respect, the following is 
quite insightful:   
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  www.fs.com.pk/fauji.htm 
 
Box 7.13 The Military’s Economic Activities are criticized in the Public 
It has now become public, thanks to the lawyers‟ movement and the media 
that the military is engaged in land acquisition- the land which belonged to 
the people. I remembered the banner which the lawyers hoisted in Rawalpindi 
in the wake of CJ‟s removal. It read „Ae watan ke sanjeele genrailo, saaray 
raqbay tumhare liye hain [O‟ smart generals of the land, all land is for you!]. 
This kind of criticism is unprecedented in Pakistan‟s history. [italics mine] 
A former ambassador of Pakistan made this observation in March 2008. 
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Thus, what can be, in light of the foregoing, maintained is that the military remained a major 
economic actor in Pakistan ever after the November 3 coup.  The coup and consequent 
martial law was instrumental to further maximize its economic interests. In other words, the 
political developments such as the lawyers‟ movement and elections etc., could not influence 
the military‟s engagement in economic activities meaningfully. Empirically, this fact further 
corroborates this study‟s assumption that the military is able to preserve its overall 
principalship of Pakistan‟s state due primarily to its agency and rationality. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
The chapter began by contextualizing the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations 
since the Kargil war which was planned by the military for rational reasons. In this regards, 
the chapter empirically and theoretically explained that the war was waged by the Musharraf-
led military to, on the one hand, politically weaken the prime minster, and on the other hand, 
assert the military‟s principalship especially regarding the making and operationalization of 
the country‟s foreign/defense policy. Hence, the war thwarted the peace process initiated by 
the Lahore Declaration signed between India and Pakistan in February 1999. Moreover, in 
the post-Kargil period Prime Minister Sharif, in order to safeguard his political interests, 
opted to constitutionally replace the army chief, Pervez Musharraf, with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin on 
12 October 1999. However, before the newly appointed army chief could assume charge 
formally, Prime Minister Sharif was sacked through a coup on the same day. Subsequently, 
the 1973 Constitution was abrogated, the assemblies were dissolved, the PM was put under 
house arrest and political activity was banned. In other words, Pakistan was run under new 
rules of the game- the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) is a case in point.   
 
However, the Musharraf-led military attempted to justify the action. In this respect, in the 
coup/martial law proclamation the problems relating to governance and economy were cited 
as main factors. The Sharif government was blamed for the failure. Moreover, the former was 
held responsible for introducing a „sham democracy‟. Therefore, the military intervened in 
politics to democratize and improve law and order and the economic situation. In addition, it 
was vowed that Pakistan would be securitized, for it is the primary responsibility of the 
military institution. Importantly, the principal military was able to seek judicial legitimacy 
from the agent judiciary. The commendable refusal of Supreme Court‟s Chief Justice 
Saiduzzman Siddiqui to take oath under the PCO, however, remained insignificant, for his 
colleagues rationally opted to take not only a fresh oath but also to legitimize the martial law 
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by invoking the infamous doctrine of necessity. Moreover, the agent judiciary empowered the 
Chief Executive- the military‟s leader- to amend the constitution at his discretion. 
Interestingly, the removal of Musharraf was also judged invalid despite the fact that it was 
not the issue before the apex court. Besides, Sharif was judged guilty of hijacking the PIA 
plane that was carrying General Musharraf from Colombo to Pakistan- whereas the co-
accused got scot-free. 
 
Nevertheless, since the military had, at first, attempted to self-justify the coup-action and later 
got judicial legitimacy, it becomes imperative, logically and morally, to explain this 
occurrence objectively. For this purpose, the chapter analyzed the coup in the form of an 
analytic narrative which was seen as a combination of working/shirking and own/larger 
interests- or agencies A and B. In order to formally conduct the analytic narrative, the 
chapter, as a point of departure and reference, identified, through a system of coding, five 
conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization, securitization and 
coup/martial law. Furthermore, positive correspondence was observed between each of the  
four variables and the coup. Moreover, it was observed that the military took upon itself the 
responsibility to accomplish these tasks. Remaining within the model‟s framework, the 
chapter then moved on to empirically explain each positive correspondence in order to see 
whether the military‟s claims were justified or not. 
 
To begin with, the chapter quantitatively/statistically showed, quite contrary to the stated 
claim by the Musharraf-led military, that the law and order situation was better under the 
Sharif government. This is done with the help of data that demonstrate that the trend of 
murders per million population was sharply decreasing at the time of the coup and during its 
preceding year. Moreover, during the military rule the problem of governance lingered on 
with the effect that from 2005 onwards the same figures reveal a trend that is steadily going 
upward. Thus, it was concluded that the positive correspondence between law and order and 
the coup could not be established quantitatively/statistically.  
 
As regards the economic variable, it was also found on the basis of quantitative data, that the 
key economic indicators pointed to relative economic sustainability and that too in the wake 
of nuclear-related sanctions. Interestingly, the military under Musharraf was though able to 
project high growth rate in key sectors of the economy, the underlying factors for this 
military-led developments were foreign in nature: namely, foreign aid- that was a result of the 
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military‟s rational strategic alliance with the US regarding terrorism- and remittances which 
were also positively impacted by the alliance over war on terror. Moreover, despite projected 
high growth rates, the social sector remained neglected; poverty-related issues remained 
unsolved- indeed evidence pointed towards an increase in corruption and in the „parallel 
economy‟. In light of this empirical evidence, the chapter established a rather negative 
relationship between economic variable and the coup. 
 
Similarly the chapter found, with the help of empirical data, that the project of 
democratization failed to achieve the stated objective of transforming Pakistan from a sham 
to a true democracy. Instead, the initial ban on political activity, a highly controversial and 
controlled presidential referendum, espionage over political forces, NABization of shirking 
politicians- and favors to working PML-Q-, rigged October 2002 elections and importantly 
unconstitutional attempts at re-election from the existing assemblies, which had almost 
completed their tenure, by the General-President was sufficient empirical evidence of a 
negative relationship between the democratization variable and the October coup. Last but 
not least, Pakistan witnessed the worst violence caused by terrorist attacks in its recent 
history. Indeed, the phenomenon of suicide bombings was quite unprecedented with the 
effect that the military‟s leader, General Pervez Musharraf, was targeted more than one time. 
Moreover, the military regime was severely criticized by the opposition politicians and civil 
society organizations for selling out the country‟s (external) sovereignty to the US in terms of 
permitting the latter to use and launch „drone attacks‟ on Pakistani territory and the 
borderland areas. Hence, in light of the foregoing, the chapter posited that the securitization 
variable‟s positive relationship with the coup is also empirically unfounded.  
 
Having exposed the negative correspondences between coup and the other conceptual 
variables drawn from the coup-proclamation, the analytic narrative then reverted to the 
model‟s explanatory variables in order to explain this puzzling phenomenon. Quite contrary 
to the existing body of knowledge on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations, the study posits that 
the coup was a result/effect of the military‟s agency- that the latter, being a rational actor, was 
able to stage a coup in order to maximize its political and economic interests. In other words, 
distancing itself from structural, generalist, instrumentalist, path-dependent and conspiracy 
accounts the chapter, on the basis of its agency model, maintains that the coup was rational in 
nature and political in character. It is demonstrated that the primary objective of the coup-
action was to safeguard the military‟s political role at the expense of the Sharif-led shirking 
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politicians who, in the pre-coup period, were able to transform their own interest into a larger 
one, in terms of amending the formal rules of the game- the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is a case in point. The foregoing, in other words, marks the model-based 
agencies A and B whereby the rational military, while preferring its own interests- and 
importantly expecting working from the agents-, is capable of punishing the shirking section 
of politicians who were, in turn, able to prioritize larger but diverging interest as far as the 
military was concerned. Had the Sharif-led politicians preferred working to shirking- as 
indeed they did in the 1990s- and not attempted to seek larger interests in terms of violating 
and amending the rules of the game, there would have been,  according to the model, no 
military coup d‟état. 
 
Thus, by staging a coup, the principal military, which had exclusively dominated the 
foreign/defense policy of the country along with engagement in economic activities without 
any oversight mechanism, was able to take the political control of state in its own hands too. 
However, the assumption of political power unconstitutionally, undemocratically, illegally 
and immorally by the Musharraf-led military caused serious damage to the ensuing 
democratic process. Importantly, the coup-event exposed the military‟s political weakness 
rather commonly held strength for had it been politically in „control‟ of politics if not of the 
state, then there was no need to sack an elected PM, dissolve assemblies and abrogate the 
constitution. In addition, as per its hypothesis, the study empirically demonstrates that the 
direct assumption of political power was instrumental to facilitate the military‟s economic 
interests.   
 
In the post-coup period, the military‟s politics and economic activities went, by and large, 
smoothly in strategic interaction with a section of politicians who, while seeing to their own 
political and economic interests, opted to working with the military. Moreover, the judiciary, 
as mentioned before, also remained an agent. However,  quite surprisingly, a section of the 
latter-  indeed the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry- opted 
to shirk by according more preference to larger than purely institutional interests. The 
Supreme Court‟s judgments on the Steel Mill case, „missing persons‟ etc., are evidence of 
this. Hence, in this specific context, the military‟s leader sought to, on 9 March 2007, seek 
the agent judiciary chief‟s (justice) resignation, and that too in the General Headquarters. To 
the principal‟s surprise, the Chief Justice (CJ) stuck to shirking. The former struck back by 
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„suspending‟ the latter. Consequently, quite to the suspended Chief Justice‟s surprise, his 
colleagues and importantly the lawyers‟ community chose to side with him.  
 
Moreover, a majority of opposition politicians, a considerable number of civil society groups 
and the private media opted to join the „lawyer‟s movement‟ for a variety of rational reasons. 
However, contextually, they were able to maintain a unique balance between their own and a 
larger cause: restoration of CJ Iftikhar and an end to military rule. The rational military, in the 
wake of agitational politics, chose to ultimately restore the CJ so that the political, if not 
economic, cost remained bearable. The restored Chief Justice of Pakistan, however, 
continued to shirk by preferring larger to own interest- the judgment in favor of exiled Sharif 
is a case in point. Importantly, the CJ-led apex court opted to take a judicial note of 
Musharraf‟s re-election. The case was pending in the Supreme Court when the Musharraf-led 
military chose to not only sack  but also arrest the CJ along with sixty judges through a 
military coup d‟état on 3 November 2007. Consequently, martial law was imposed.  
 
In order to self-legitimize the coup/martial law, General Musharraf pointed to problems 
related to security, the economy, governance and democratization. In explicit terms, the 
judiciary was blamed for its „increasing interference‟ in the government‟s affairs, thus 
„adversely affecting‟ its functioning. The chapter, in order to explain the stated 
factors/causes, conducted an analytic narrative of this fifth coup. In this regard, the point of 
departure was the identification of five conceptual variables- securitization, economic factors, 
law and order, democratization and coup/martial law- whereby the coup was observed to 
have positive correspondence with each of the remaining variables. Therefore, the chapter 
took each positive correspondence for a model-based empirical analysis so as to determine 
the worth of the military‟s claims to legitimacy. 
 
As a result, it was concluded, on the basis of empirical data, that the law and order situation- 
regardless of the pre-coup failure on this count- further deteriorated; the economic situation 
further worsened as, for instance, inflation touched double-digits; the securitization process 
remained paralyzed since the terrorist attacks as well as „drone attacks‟ continued; and the 
democratization project suffered from delay-tactics, lack of physical security for the 
mainstream politicians, pre/post poll rigging etc. In other words, the study did not find any 
positive correspondence between coup/martial law and the rest of the conceptual variables. 
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Therefore, in order to explain the coup-occurrence, the analytic narrative reverted to a formal 
application of the model. 
  
In light of the study‟s causal model, it was posited that the November coup was a result of the 
military‟s agency- its inherent capability to get things done. As a principal of its agents, the 
rational military, in order to protect its political interests- and economic interests for that 
matter- opted to stage a coup in order to capture the political initiative from shirking agents 
such as opposition politicians and especially the judiciary. The latter, quite unprecedentedly, 
was able to not only see the larger interest, but also to hold ground in the face of military 
might. Moreover, through the coup the rational military sought to re-negotiate the rules of the 
game which had been violated by the shirking judiciary, and to do so in a way that protected 
its overall principalship of the country. In addition, the peripheral aim of the coup and 
consequent martial law was to further damage the political process- the delaying of elections 
is a case in point- as well as the country‟s political institutions for, as mentioned earlier in the 
study, the strengths of the military lay in its agents‟ weaknesses especially that of the  
politicians and judiciary.  
 
The chapter, as per the study‟s hypothesis, argued that the staging of a coup highlights the 
military‟s political weakness. Had it been politically in control of its agent judiciary if not of 
Pakistan‟s politics and the state, there was no rational need to sack and arrest judges, to delay 
and rig elections and most importantly, to transfer political authority to politicians. This is 
however, the usual story as portrayed by path-dependent and structuralist accounts. Besides, 
as hypothesized, the chapter found that the military‟s economic interests were further 
facilitated during the period under study.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
The primary objective of this research was to explain why the military intervenes in 
Pakistan‟s politics. This core question of the thesis, by its very nature, pointed to two 
different aspects of military intervention: first, what are the objectives/aims that the military 
want to obtain by intervening in the country‟s politics? Second, is the military intervention a 
result of structure or agency- the central puzzle of the study? 
  
As regards the first aspect of the question, the study has, having scientifically highlighted 
theoretical as well as empirical weaknesses in the existing accounts on Pakistan‟s civil-
military relations and the state, demonstrated- with a reasonable degree of certainty- that the 
military has intervened, both overtly (coups) and covertly in the capacity of the principal- in 
Pakistan‟s politics for its own interests which are primarily political in nature. Moreover, it is 
maintained that the military used its political power as an instrument to maximize its 
economic interests as an independent actor. With regards to second aspect of the question, the 
present study has, quite contrary to the existing strcturalist, legitimist, path-dependent, 
generalist, instrumentalist and conspiracy works on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations, 
maintained that it is the military‟s agency- its capability to get things done-, not structure 
and/or culture, which causes a coup. 
 
These conclusions are underpinned by references to both qualitative and quantitative 
findings, through an in-depth investigation of a developing state/transitional society- 
Pakistan. The case selection was motivated by the phenomenon and practice of military 
intervention in Pakistan. The latter though has drawn considerable scholarly attention, the 
existing accounts, one way or the other, demote actors, agency, rationality and context. 
Moreover, the matrixes and models, which some of these accounts rely on, are limited in 
nature and scope. In addition, the case of Pakistan with respect to military intervention and its 
possible causes(s) has been overlooked by such works. 
  
Thus, the present study endeavored to build its own model of civil-military relations 
grounded in the assumptions of agency theory and rational choice-neo institutionalism. In this 
respect, it assumes that the actors i.e. the military, civil bureaucracy, politicians and judiciary, 
are inherently capable of making things happen (agency). Moreover, it is assumed that the 
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actors are inherently rational with a clear conception of costs and benefits, and that they given 
the choice(s) tend to maximize their interests i.e. politico-economic (rational choice). In 
addition, the study assumes actors to be institutions with their own institutional values and 
interests, and with the ability of playing a bridge role between society and the state in terms 
of articulating the former‟s interests and initiation of policies. Nevertheless, the context of 
Pakistan‟s case is kept central to the model. 
 
The model is further enriched by its marriage to the method of analytic narratives (AN). The 
analytic narratives‟ proposal involves choosing a puzzle, then building a model and finally 
evaluating the model through comparative studies and testable generalization that the model 
generates. The method of AN favors parsimonious models. All narratives got to have an 
anchor(s) that are explicit in order to make it easier for critique and challenges to be made 
than in more configurative accounts. In addition, the method of analytic narratives relies on 
the assumptions of rational choice theory. Importantly, this method differs from other meta-
narrative and qualitative analyses such as modernization theorists etc., when it comes to 
locating and exploring mechanisms that shape the strategic interaction between and/or among 
actors, their preferences and subsequent actions. 
  
As the foregoing has marked the analytical capabilities of the AN method, this study 
therefore chooses to utilize it. In this respect, with the help of primary i.e. interviews, coup 
text(s), reports etc., and secondary sources i.e. books, journal articles etc., the aim is to 
understand and explain the central actors‟ interests, preferences, their evaluation of 
alternatives, the information they possessed, the expectations they formed, the  strategies 
adopted. The pieces are put together, using the technique of process tracing in order to 
construct an analytic narrative that accounts for the particular outcome of interest: shirking or 
working (agency A), and preferring own interest to larger i.e. national, interest (agency B). 
Extracting the processes that produce the outcomes of interest captures the essence of the 
narrative. 
  
As is mentioned above the interviews are used as primary source of information in order to 
qualitatively explain the variables in a given unit of observation. In total 35 semi-structured 
interviews with the elite i.e. military personnel, civil bureaucrats, politicians, and other 
stakeholders i.e., industrialists, lawyers etc., were conducted. The method adopted for 
interviews was that of the „snowball system‟ given a relatively small sample-size, political 
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complexities, status and time constraints on the key respondents. All contacts with 
interviewees were established personally. They were called before hand to check their 
availability. On the appointed day, before the start of the interview the respondent was 
briefed about the general assumptions and aim of the study. Furthermore, care was taken to 
conduct interviews in a suitable environment. A majority of interviewees were found to be 
self-confident and expressive. At times and where relevant, awareness was shown about their 
past writings, actions or decisions in order to communicate a level of professionalism.  
 
The interviews were partly standardized and mostly open-ended. The advantages of an open 
approach, arguably, outweighed the disadvantages due to the fact that the Pakistani elite tends 
to fluctuate, stretch, and exaggerate during conversation. Moreover, an ideal and rigid 
questionnaire was deemed to be helpful in trying to understand the level and degree of the 
elite and stakeholders‟ opinion of civil-military relations. All interviews but one, were 
conducted in person with the help of a guideline. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes 
to 2 hours. 30 out of the 35 were mostly conducted in English; the remaining 5 were 
conducted in Urdu in which the author of this study is fluent. One interview was completely 
tape-recorded with the permission of the respondent; two were partially tape-recorded since 
the recorder broke down due to technical faults. Nevertheless, handwritten notes in each case 
were carefully taken and were elaborated upon from memory right after the interviews. In 
addition, all of the interviews were properly transcribed. 
 
The interview results were analyzed at an aggregate level, in the form of a number of clusters 
which were related to the issue areas formulated in the questionnaire. The clusters were: a) 
political system of Pakistan; b) dynamics of civil-military relations; c) role of religion in 
politics; d) contemporary politics and the state. Furthermore, three types of codes as 
distinguished by Aberbach, Chesney and Rockman were used for the purpose of this 
research. In this respect, Manifest coding items involve direct responses to particular 
questions such as: is there any difference between civilian and military domestic or 
security/foreign policy? Similarly, Latent coding items deal with the characteristics of replies 
which were not explicitly called for by the questions themselves; an example of this is the 
insights about the justification of use of force to topple a civilian government. „Global coding 
items‟ are responses in which the coder makes judgments from the interview(s) transcripts 
about the general traits and styles. Examples are: inferences with respect to the political 
framework of the interviewee, or about preferences concerning a given issue. Quite naturally, 
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a move from „manifest‟ to „latent‟ involves a reduction in certainty. On the other hand, an 
interpretative approach becomes essential for an understanding of mindsets. Therefore in this 
case, latent and global coding items were used. Finally, given the type of coding, it made 
little sense to present the findings in terms of quantitative precision. Rather, they were 
ordered plausibly. Finally, besides the primary reliance on qualitative analysis, the study also 
used quantitative material, to construct a narrative, which was handled in two different but 
practical ways. On the one hand, to possibly determine the cause of a given coup, the law and 
order variable (Mitra 2006) was specifically accorded a statistical treatment.  
 
Besides an overall introduction of which the above forms a part, this dissertation comprises 
seven chapters. The theoretical foundation of the research was built-up in Chapter 1 which 
began with the introduction of the central puzzle posed by this study, namely, whether it is 
structure or agency which draws the military in and out of politics. This was followed by the 
core question which asked why the military intervenes in Pakistan‟s politics. To explain this 
question and solve the puzzle, the study kept itself within the field of comparative political 
science and selected five cases of military coup d‟état. These cases, for methodological 
reasons, were assumed as five analytic narratives of coups. Furthermore, coup d‟état was 
assumed to be the dependent variable whereas shirking/working (agency A) and own/larger 
interests (agency B) were taken as explanatory variables to analytically explain each coup 
narrative.  
 
Having defined the main puzzle, core question, variables and analytic narratives the chapter 
critically reviewed the major existing literature on civil-military relations theory in order to 
design a theoretical framework for the study. With this in mind, different theoretical 
paradigms were termed and categorized into sociological perspectives, comparativist 
literature, structural thought and actor-oriented work respectively. Each of these categories 
was analyzed critically. To begin with, the sociological perspectives as presented by 
Huntington and Janowitz sought to look at the civil-military nexus from the societal, and not 
necessarily at the political/institutional dimension. Regarding the question of military 
intervention and civilian control of the former, these works heavily emphasized the 
importance of subjective/normative factors i.e. „subjective civilian control‟. However, 
Huntington though introduced and applied the concept of „objective civilian control‟, it could 
not exclude the ideological factor to maintain a balanced relationship between the praetorian 
and the civil. Importantly, despite its pioneering position within the domain of CMR theory, 
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these sociological perspectives were even criticized on empirical grounds; that they remained 
unable to predict the nature, patterns and importantly dynamics of civil-military relations 
especially in the USA. 
 
The comparativist literature, on its part, tended to take a cross-national/cultural view of civil-
military relations and especially military intervention. The exponents of this literature i.e. 
Finer, Nordlinger, Perlmutter etc, also relied more on the cultural rather than purely on 
institutional and political factors. Moreover, this literature, while aiming at a comparative 
analysis of different cross-national cases, seriously compromised contextuality. For example, 
it is very difficult to understand, from the perspective of comparative politics, how a 
contextually different case from Latin American can be compared with that of the Middle 
East.  
 
The critical review of comparativist literature was followed by a similar review of structural 
theories of „civilian control‟ over the military. The theorist, Michael Desch (1999), attempted 
to explain the question of civilian control over the military from primarily a structural-threat 
perspective, using cross-national cases for this purpose. Nevertheless, despite the significance 
of this structural thought, the chapter described, with the help of tables, that this theory could 
not be applied to the Pakistani case on empirical grounds, since Pakistan did not fit into 
Desch‟s model/theory.  
 
Having made a critical review of the structural thought, the chapter then examined actor-
oriented- or the agency theory of civil-military relations. The agency of CMR, as postulated 
by Peter Feaver (2003), is grounded in a rationalist framework. As a point of departure, it 
starts with a critical analysis of pioneering works, especially of Huntington and Janowitz, on 
the subject of military intervention and/or civilian control of the former. Moreover, this 
theory explicitly gives due attention to actors, their interests, preferences/choices, and 
subsequent actions/outcomes. In other words, the agency theory while not demoting non-
material factors relies on material factors in order to understand and explain the complexities 
inherent in civil-military relations. In addition, since the actor-oriented work appreciates the 
rationality and agency of actors, it helps to explain CMR almost on a daily basis. Therefore, 
due to its emphasis on actors, choices, rationality etc., Feaver‟s theory was deemed highly 
useful for the puzzle and core question of the present research.  
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However, since Feaver‟s work is primarily specific to the US case, it became apparent that its 
application to the case of Pakistan was limited due to critical empirical differences between 
them. Hence, the need for modifying its otherwise useful assumptions was seriously felt. 
Therefore, the chapter, in its later part, contextualized and rationalized the agency theory‟s 
assumptions vis-à-vis Pakistan. In this respect, the analysis identified four actors- politicians, 
civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military-, specified their interests in political and 
economic terms and importantly, categorized the four actors into either principal and/or 
agents contextually, over a span of about six decades of Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. 
Furthermore, with the help of the foregoing, an agency model of Pakistan‟s civil-military 
relations was designed. The model, grounded in the agency theory, incorporates the above-
mentioned four actors, their (politico-economic) interests, preferences in terms for 
working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) - the explanatory variables.  
 
The deductive model is both context-specific and causal in the sense of explaining coup-
causation as it occurs in a certain context whereby the four actors strategically interact with 
each/one (an)other  for rational reasons. More precisely, when the military is an agent, it 
stages a coup, while marking agency A in terms of shirking, to achieve political interests- i.e. 
political power- which, in turn, is used as an instrument to facilitate economic interets- hence 
agency B in terms of preferring own to larger interests. However, when the military is the 
principal, itself a result of its agency and rationality, it stages coups, again registering its 
agency, to protect its political and economic interests. Here, it rationally chooses to stage a 
coup in order to disallow a section of shirking agents, either politicians or judiciary, to sustain 
its shirking in terms of preferring a larger interest which is, by its very nature and character, 
antithetical to that of the military. Finally, having designed the model, the chapter then 
attempted to ground the study‟s hypotheses in the causal model in order to test them. Six 
hypotheses were generated and each corresponds, one way or the other, to the main puzzle 
and to the core and, secondary questions of the study.  
 
As regard the existing literature on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations, Chapter 2 undertook it 
critically. In this respect, the literature was divided into six sections and categorized as the 
legitimist point of view, conspiracy theorists, the generalist accounts, the instrumentalist 
work, the structuralist literature and the path-dependent perspective respectively. The first 
section of the chapter looked at the legitimist point of view. The legitimists- Khan, 
Huntington, Rizvi, Cheema- believe that Pakistan‟s political institutions remained unable to 
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grow democratically. The politicians, by and large, were incompetent too. Instead, it views 
the military as a modernizing force. Therefore, it was quite natural on the part of the military 
to takeover in such an institutional vacuum. Furthermore, since India had viewed Pakistan as 
its chronic enemy and had fought a war with Pakistan in Kashmir in 1947-1948, it was 
imperative, on the part of the military, to administer political obligations for the security of 
the state and the society.  Hence, the military‟s intervention in politics is not viewed as a 
problem by these accounts. Rather, coups d‟état and military rule is legitimized on account of 
the country‟s weak political institutions, politicians‟ incompetence and external security 
threat. Nonetheless, this point of view suffers from theoretical as well as empirical 
weaknesses. For example, despite its uni-focal over-emphasis on the inherent weaknesses of 
political institutions, there is no mention whatsoever of the factors which might have left 
political intuitions weaker. Moreover, despite its rhetorical stress on the external security 
threat, the legitimists have failed to name which institution of the state was supposed to 
perceive the threat and on what grounds.  
 
In the second section, the chapter took a critical view of the so called conspiracy theory. The 
term referred to such accounts (Ali 1970, 1983) on Pakistan‟s politics, democracy etc., that 
had a tendency to posit, without any evidence, that no domestic change in Pakistan‟s politics 
can occur without support from the outside- by external actors/factors especially the US. In 
addition, the conspiracy theory had an internal dimension whereby a section of politicians 
conspires with the military to affect any change in Pakistan‟s political system. However, 
besides making a case of Pakistan‟s politics without evidence, the conspiracy theory lacks 
internal consistency. For instance, following the breakup of Pakistan, Bhutto was assumed to 
be a weak partner and the military to be a strong master. However, this conception and 
construction of the Bhutto-military relationship ignores, on the one hand, the demoralization 
and unpopularity of the military‟s officer cadre, and on the other hand, the electoral standing, 
if not popularity, of Bhutto in the post-1971 period. In addition, the conspiracy theory is 
highly essentialist in nature in that it demotes the value of context and the significance of 
agency and rationality. 
 
The generalist accounts- for instance, of Jalal and Kukreja- were analyzed in the third section. 
These accounts have a tendency to describe and understand Pakistan‟s civil-military relations 
from a rather general perspective in terms of first selecting multiple domestic, regional and 
international variables and then understanding the phenomenon of military intervention by 
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operationalizing them. Moreover, these accounts were found to have a comparative ambition 
whereby Pakistan, Bangladesh and India were studied, with the help of a „composite‟ model- 
which contained a variety of variables-, comparatively. The military intervened in Pakistan‟s 
politics on account of the stated variables. However, there is no mention of a single- or two- 
particular variable which might have caused a coup/intervention, for example, in 1958 or 
1977.  
 
In other words, a generality of a variety of variables is prescribed in order to understand the 
phenomenon. However, as mentioned above, these accounts, despite their informative nature, 
severely suffer from a lack of theoretical as well as empirical rigor. The proposed model, 
which, for the most part, is grounded in imported concepts such as „praetorian polity‟ and/or 
„reactive militarism‟, suffers from explanatory capability to explain which factor causes 
military coup and how. Importantly, though the generalist accounts posit that a combination 
of various variables compelled the military to takeover, they are silent as to why the military 
takes the pain to intervene in the first place. Besides, these accounts give an explicit 
impression of carrying structuralist as well as conspiratorial overtones. 
 
Having conducted a critical review of the generalist accounts, the chapter then attempted a 
similar review of the instrumentalist work in the fourth section. This work (Cohen 2004) 
looked at the Pakistan‟s military from the lenses of Washington‟s geostrategic interests in the 
South Asia region especially during the Cold War period. Despite its pioneering position 
within the domain of CMR-literature on Pakistan, the account focused primarily on the 
sociological aspects of military organization. In others, the question of military intervention 
falls outside the purview of the instrumentalist work.  
 
The structuralist literature came up for a critical review in section five of the chapter. The 
exponents i.e. Alavi, Waseem, Siddiqa, of this literature exclusively focus on the socio-
economic and political structure of the colonial state and the society. Since structural 
accounts are conceptually grounded in Marxian conception of reality, they overwhelmingly 
attempt to locate and understand the existence, collaborative instinct and potential and socio-
economic and political significance of classes within and around the British India state. 
Accordingly, three classes, namely, indigenous bourgeois, landed-feudal and metropolitan 
bourgeois, were identified, which viewed and treated the state as instrumental to maximize 
their returns. In addition, since the colonial state is viewed as an interventionist force in terms 
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of its modernizing capability, the indigenous bourgeois and the land-feudal entered into a 
structural relationship with the civil-military bureaucracy, the functional face of the state, in 
order to access and link itself with the metropolitan bourgeois. 
 
Moreover, the structuralists argued that a section of the indigenous bourgeois- the salariat- 
resorted to protest and participatory politics in order to secure and maximize their socio-
economic interests vis-à-vis Hindus and strategic British.  The movement for Pakistan was, in 
substance and form, a salariat movement according to this literature. Hence, when British 
India was divided, the post-colonial state of Pakistan inherited the colonial state in terms of a 
civil-military bureaucracy and importantly the classes from the colonial to the post-colonial 
state and the society. In other words, there is qualified difference between the two states since 
the classes and the civil-military bureaucracy remained intact. Furthermore, the structuralist 
position does not view military intervention and constitutional/legal issues related to „rule of 
law‟ as valid problems since, structurally, Pakistan observed „qualified stability‟ and a 
continuation of the rule of law on account of its being an „overdeveloped state‟. In addition, 
most recently, one exponent of structural school of thought on Pakistan‟s politics/CMR 
argues that the military had, socio-economically, morphed into a military class due to its 
engagement in military businesses (Milbus). Therefore, the focus of studies on Pakistan‟s 
military ought not to be on how the military intervened in politics, economy and the society 
but rather how it should vacate the corridors of power. 
 
Nonetheless, despite its informative character regarding the nature and functions of different 
classes in the colonial and post-colonial state, the structuralist literature, by and large, suffers 
from conceptual as well as empirical weaknesses. Conceptually, it has remained unable to 
distinguish between the nature, character and functions of the state and the classes (society). 
Moreover, the literature is devoid of any criterion to conceive and construct a class. In other 
words, it has ignored the inter/intra class dissimilarities and differences. Hence, context and 
individual rationality and agency are seriously compromised. Also, the structuralists‟ concept 
of the overdeveloped state is both conceptually and empirically invalid: conceptually, the 
state is, in a Marxian context, equated with the civil-military bureaucracy, thus ignoring , on 
the one hand, an institutional distinction between the civil bureaucracy and the military, and 
on the other, between the state and society. Empirically, the literature excluded the political 
institutions functional within British India- for instance, political parties, legislative councils 
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etc. One wonders on what criterion a civil-military bureaucracy-based state is termed 
„overdeveloped‟ and that too in the presence of the state‟s political apparatuses.  
 
As regards the post-colonial state of Pakistan, the structuralists‟ reasoning of structural 
transformation of the colonial-state into the post-colonial is additionally 
conceptually/logically flawed since it ignores the significance of context, agency and 
rationality. Importantly, this line of reasoning tends to give the impression that politicians and 
political institutions are inherently weak and incompetent to run the affairs of the state. In this 
sense, there is no fundamental difference between a structural and legitimist point of view. 
Equally illogical, empirically unfounded and thus misleading is the structuralists‟ concept of 
„qualified stability‟ and „continuum‟ of the rule of law, because these concepts seriously 
undermine the contested legality, constitutionality and morality of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism (of the 1950s) and military interventions.  
 
Last but not least, the conception of a military class is also problematic. Firstly, it lacks an 
explicit criterion to judge- or statically measure- which section of the military organization 
falls within the military class. Secondly, if income and engagement in the Milbus is the basis, 
then, from this logic, the population below the officer cadre does not form part of the military 
class since it is the officer cadre which accrues most of the politico-economic benefits.  
Thirdly, since the concept of military class is an addition to Alavi‟s class thesis, one wonders 
what makes the military a different class from the indigenous bourgeois or the landed, feudal 
classes. Besides, the structural literature, by and large, shifts the focus away from civil-
military relations to the haves and have-nots. 
 
In the final section, the chapter critically analyzed the path dependency-historical 
institutionalist perspective on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. The major themes covered 
by this work includes the colonial legacy in terms of Muslim separatism, the military 
institution, (pre-post partition) threat perception and importantly, institutionalization of these 
values and patterns (path) in the state of Pakistan. Having institutionalized the external threat- 
primarily from India- this account posited that the military was „brought‟ in to politics by the 
state‟s psychological insecurity. Thus, when brought in, the military never left. Instead, it 
established „control‟ over the civilians and emerged as a „parallel state‟.  
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Despite its significance in terms of applying the assumptions of path dependency and 
historical institutionalism, the account suffers from conceptual and empirical shortcomings. 
To begin with, like the structuralists, it assumes the structure of the colonial state and takes its 
inheritance by Pakistan‟s state, as a given. Importantly, it fails to describe how and, by 
whom, the threat perception was perceived. In addition, like the legitimists, this work tends to 
implicitly legitimize the military‟s intervention in politics on account of, firstly, an 
institutionalized external threat perception and, secondly, path dependency. In addition, the 
proponent of this work has ignored the causes of military coups. In other words, context, 
agency and rationality are under-appreciated. Ironically, the work, while attempting to 
explain the military‟s control over its civilians, lacks any definition and indicators of the 
concept. Finally, equally problematic is the concept of a parallel state due to its lack of 
conceptual and empirical rigor.  
 
Since the existing structuralist and legitimist accounts had over-emphasized the structural 
transformation of the colonial state‟s institution into that of independent Pakistan, it was 
deemed necessary to critically analyze the impact, if any, of structure on the construction of 
the state in Chapter 3. In this regard, the study, with the help of its deductive model, 
categorized actors into four groups, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the 
military. Furthermore, with the support of empirical data, politicians were assumed to have 
been the principal actor at Partition- till October 1951- constitutionally, legally, electorally 
and morally. The other three actors were delegated powers, as is the practice of modern 
states, as agents. Also, these four actors were assumed capable of getting things done (agency 
A) and rationalizing their preferences in terms of their own rather than larger interests 
(agency B).  
 
Quite contrary to the structuralists thesis of an „overdeveloped state‟ (Alavi 1988), it was 
posited that the political leadership of Pakistan, instead of compelled by the structural 
constraints, had certain interests and strategies as regards the construction of the state in 
terms of institutions such civil bureaucracy and the military. Hence, though the former 
rationally retained the nomenclature of the so called pre-colonial civil-military bureaucracy, 
the latter was thoroughly overhauled in terms of reorganization of personnel, ranks etc. 
Importantly, where needed new offices/departments were established by the principal. Thus, 
it was maintained that the overdeveloped state was, from a Marxist perspective, equated with 
the civil-military bureaucracy despite the fact that the latter remained an agent of the British- 
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the civilian section of the British Indian state. Undoubtedly, Pakistani politicians, though in a 
different context and for different purposes, also treated the civil bureaucracy and the military 
not so differently- the latter remained an agent.  
 
In addition, the chapter exposed crucial weakness in the legitimacy thesis, which believes that 
the military intervened in politics due to external (i.e. the Indian) threat perception, on logical 
and empirical grounds. In this respect, it was maintained that the legitimists fail to explain 
which institution(s) perceived the threat, for without a perceiver a threat cannot be 
constructed and hence military intervention cannot be justified. This study attempted its own 
analysis of the crucial early years of Pakistan‟s history and, with the help of the model, 
explained that it was the principal politicians who perceived the external threat and then 
rationally constructed strategies to deal with the situation. In this regard, the first India-
Pakistan war (1947-48) in and over Kashmir is cited as a case in point whereby the principal, 
having judged the matter, ordered the agent military to engage India militarily. The latter, 
instead, preferred to shirk twice, revealing its agency and rationality.  
 
Paradoxically, however, the principal abstained from punishing the agent meaningfully for 
example by devising an oversight regime/mechanism. However, in the post-war period, the 
principal did appoint, from its perspective, an apolitical Commander-in-Chief in order to 
prevent future shirking. Besides, having realized the consequences of agitational politics of 
the authoritarian clergy, the principal politicians chose to appease not only the clergy but also 
the general masses. In this regard, the Objectives Resolution (1949) was passed in the 
Constituent Assembly. However, contrary to the existing literature on the impact of the 
Resolution on Pakistan‟s state, it was posited here that the aims of this Objectives Resolution 
were political rather than purely religious, instrumental as it was for the political leadership in 
resolving future difference with the religious authorities.   
 
Moreover, the chapter, with the help of its casual model, explained the change that took place 
in the principal in October 1951. It was posited, in this regard, that in the post-Liaqaut period 
the agent civil bureaucracy‟s preference for shirking prevailed in terms of assuming the office 
of the Governor-General undemocratically, if not immorally. The explanation emphasized the 
importance of the bureaucracy‟s inherent agency to affect this change to maximize its 
political and economic benefits. Also, the working agency and rationality  of politicians- both 
Muslim Leaguers and the general opposition- were pointed out, for they accorded more 
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preference to their own rather than larger, party and/or national, interests. In the changed 
political context of Pakistan‟s state, judiciary and the military worked as agents. 
 
In its last part the chapter emphasized the strategic interaction between the principal, 
politicians and the military whereby each actor engaged the other for rational reasons. For 
example, in 1954 a section of politicians opted to repeal those sections of the constitution 
which empowered the Governor-General to dismiss governments at his discretion. However, 
before this smart politico-legal move could take root, the agent judiciary chose to undo it, for 
the cost of confronting the principal would have been greater. Hence, the judiciary looked to 
benefits i.e. non-transfer, pay and pension, prolongation of tenure etc. Moreover, the military 
chose to work with the principal bureaucracy in order to accrue politico-economic benefits, 
especially military aid and hardware from the US. The former, on its part, strategically 
interacted with the latter to not only appease it but importantly use it in extreme situations i.e. 
the maintenance of law and order. 
 
Overall, the chapter maintained that politicians, due to their preference for own interests, 
failed to devise any oversight regime/mechanism and/or to put up a politically united 
resistance to the principal bureaucracy. Thus, the latter, in October 1958, due to a 
commonality of interests and convergence of priorities with the agent military, opted to 
dismiss PM Noon‟s ministry. Importantly, the country was put under martial law as a result 
of a successful coup. 
 
The October coup, the consequent martial law, its constitutional, legal and moral basis, its 
reasons and consequences for the state were explained in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. The 
chapter began by explaining the first successful coup staged in Pakistan‟s political history. 
Since the coup and the consequent martial law was formally declared, on 7 October 1958, by 
President Iskander Mirza- the leader of the principal civil bureaucracy- this itself posed a 
puzzle which the study looked at theoretically and empirically. In this respect, it was posited 
that Mirza issued the coup/martial law proclamation in a strategic interaction with the agent 
military. The former‟s aim was to secure and prolong his-led bureaucracy‟s principalship vis-
à-vis shirking politicians especially from East Bengal. However, the rational military, having 
calculated the costs and benefits, chose to sack Mirza within weeks after the formal 
declaration of martial law and thus, assumed the principal position. The civil bureaucracy, 
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with no coercive means at its disposal, could not resist this change. Strangely, a section of it 
chose to ally with the military. So did a section of politicians.  
 
As regards the reasons/causes of this coup Mirza, in his address to the nation on 8 October 
1958, pointed to factors such as the deteriorating law and order situation, worsening 
economy, the need for a true democratic/constitutional rule and the security of the state. 
Mirza‟s reasoning was supported by General and CMLA Ayub Khan the following day. 
Importantly, in the post-Mirza period the above-mentioned justification continued to hold. 
Interestingly, the analysis noted that the legitimist, path-dependent and structuralist accounts 
tend to legitimize the coup one way or the other. Therefore, the study took the coup as an 
analytic narrative of a combination of working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interest 
(agency B).  
 
To conduct the narrative, the chapter used the coup/martial law text as a point of departure 
and reference. With a system of coding, conceptual variables were identified; namely, law 
and order, economic factors, democratization, securitization, coup/martial law. The first four 
variables were theorized accordingly since the coup was already conceptualized in Chapter 1. 
Moreover, the analysis noticed a positive correspondence between each of the four variables 
and coup/martial law. Since the cited/stated reasons/causes could not be justified on their 
own, it was thought imperative to empirically and theoretically analyze the positive 
correspondence between the occurrence of the coup and the identified conceptual variables. 
 
Hence, with the help of qualitative/quantitative data, it was maintained that the law and order 
situation was relatively better as compared to post-coup years.  Had it deteriorated to the 
extent claimed, it was the Mirza-led principal which was responsible for this failure. 
Therefore, the study found no logical, empirical and moral reasons to put the county under 
martial law. Even the Ayub-led principal military could not maintain orderly rule for the 
statistical analysis pointed to a larger number of murder and riots in the final years of the 
Ayub-led military rule- indeed this was, from the military‟s perspective, one of the main 
reasons behind the second military coup. As regards the economic situation in the pre-coup 
period, it was posited that though key economic indicators pointed to a slowdown in 
economic growth, it was the principal bureaucracy which should have accepted responsibility 
rather than declare martial law. Nonetheless, the new principal did attempt to modernize 
Pakistan but the growth indicators it projected, were primarily based on foreign aid- which 
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was also affected negatively by the 1965 war. Importantly, the military‟s economic policies 
helped increase the rich-poor gap and particularly, cross-regional inequality, with the result 
that the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan opted for agitational politics.   
 
With respect to democratization, the chapter explained that measures such as referendum and 
the Basic Democracies‟ system were meant primarily to depoliticize the political forces 
especially at the provincial level. Though, a section of politicians strategically allied with the 
principal in this project of democratization, there were also those who chose to shirk for their 
own rational reasons. Similarly, the stated purpose of securing Pakistan from threats 
remained a distant dream- given the ongoing military operations in Kashmir and consequent 
war with India, in 1965. Moreover, the West Pakistan-concentrated defense measures during 
the war further alienated the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan, with the effect that they 
began to lose faith in the state- the Six-Points are a case in point. 
 
Having explained the empirically negative correspondence between the conceptual variables 
and the coup/martial law, the analysis reverted to the causal model for an alternative 
explanation. Quite contrary to the existing body of knowledge- the legitimists, structuralists, 
conspiracy theorists, path-dependents etc. - the chapter posited that it was the military‟s 
agency (the inherent capability to make things happen), which resulted in the coup. More 
specifically, being a rational actor the military made a calculation of costs and benefits of the 
action and chose to shirk and replace the civil bureaucracy as principal (agency A). In other 
words, the coup was rational rather than structural- or conspiratorial- in nature. Moreover, it 
was political in character for the primary aim was to capture political power in order to 
negotiate the rules of the game, on the military‟s own terms, with other actors concerned; a 
section of which, preferring its own to larger interests, strategically allied with the military. In 
addition, political power was used as an instrument by the principal military to maximize its 
own economic interests (agency B). In a nutshell, the 1958 coup was an outcome of agencies 
A and B.  
 
Having explained the October coup, the analysis returned to the narrative of the Ayub-led 
military‟s final year- a time where his regime faced agitational politics led by the shirking 
politicians of both wings of the country. It was maintained that the primary reason behind 
public uprisings against military rule was the latter‟s lack of preference for re-negotiating the 
rules of the game with shirking politicians such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib-ur-
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Rahman. Instead, the principal chose to stage another coup on 25 March 1969. As its leader, 
General Yahya Khan, in his maiden address to the nation the following day, cited worsening 
law and order and the falling economy as primary reasons/causes of this action. The need to 
democratize and securitize the state were stated as complementary factors to self-legitimize 
the event. Quite interestingly, the study founded that the legitimist accounts also tended to 
legitimize it. The structuralists and path-dependent works, on the other hand, compromised 
the context and causes respectively. Moreover, the military remained unable to provide 
conceptual basis for its statements regarding law and order and/or worsening economy. 
 
Therefore, the study preferred to conduct an analytic narrative of this second coup as well. In 
this respect, in the coup/martial law text conceptual variables, namely, law and order, 
economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law were identified. It was 
observed that there existed a positive relationship between coup/martial law and each of the 
rest. Hence, it was deemed necessary to empirically- while remaining within the framework 
of the model- explain not only the positive correspondence of these conceptual variables but 
also the status of cited claims by the military.    
 
With respect to law and order, the following was maintained: a) the claim that the country 
was facing a serious law and order problem was illogical and immoral since the military, 
which had attempted to justify its 1958 intervention on this aground, had failed to accomplish 
this task under the Ayub-led rule; b) the Yahya-led military rule also failed to maintain law 
and order despite resort to a military operation in East Pakistan. On the economic front, the 
regime‟s arbitrary economic approach helped increase poor-rich and cross-regional 
inequality. Similarly, though the martial law administration was able to promulgate  its rules 
of the game- martial law regulations/orders are cases in point- and hold general elections, no 
meaningful change was let to happen by the principal who, while preferring its own interests, 
chose not to hand over political power to the representatives of majority Bengalis. The former 
was strategically supported by a section of West Pakistan-based politicians who also saw to 
their personal interests. The non-transfer of authority politically further alienated more than 
half of the country‟s population. To cap it all, the project of securitization in terms of the 
military operation in East Pakistan to cover up failures related to law and order, economy and 
democracy, was a complete disaster: it paved the way for the state‟s physical disintegration in 
December 1971.  
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Having explained the negative correspondence between conceptual variables, the analysis 
then centered around the model in terms of applying its explanatory variables, namely, 
working/shirking and own/larger interests to explain dependent variable- coup d‟état. In this 
respect, the analytic narrative continued as an approach. Thus, it was posited that the coup 
was a result of military agency- being a rational actor the military was able to affect change.  
Hence, in the specific context of late 1960s when the Ayub-led military rule was seriously 
challenged by the shirking politicians, the former, in order to preserve its principalship, chose 
to stage the coup. The coup was thus rational than structural/conspiratorial in nature. 
Moreover, it was political in character since the primary objective was to control the political 
situation from military‟s perspective. Moreover, it enabled the military to re-negotiate the 
rules of the game with the agents especially politicians. 
 
Most importantly, the military, having retained its principalship, used its political clout to 
further its economic interests. However, since the county‟s political situation was unstable- 
especially in East Pakistan and due primarily to the principal‟s political and economic 
policies, the extent of economic ventures remained limited. The chapter concluded that the 
Pakistani state disintegrated due to the principal military‟s preference for its own rather than 
national interests. Though a section of agents strategically allied, for their own interests, with 
the military as regards the military operation in the East, the ultimate power, however, lay 
with the former. Had preference been accorded to the national/larger interest in time, there 
was a high probability of Pakistan staying united. The breakup of the state increased the costs 
for the military to continue its principalship.  
 
Thus, in the post-partition period the dynamics of civil-military relations were quite different.  
Chapter 5 began by explaining the change in principal in the post-breakup period. In this 
respect, it was maintained that a defeated and demoralized military rationally chose to return 
to barracks in order to avoid further damage to its institutional makeup. However, the military 
was able to strategically interact with a section of politicians in order to preserve its purely 
institutional interests such as the release of 90,000 personnel from Indian custody.  Bhutto-
led politicians, on their part, saw in the military‟s weaknesses their strengths; hence, their 
agency and rationality allowed their preferences to prevail and the country‟s principalship 
was assumed by the Bhutto-led politicians. Little wonder then, Bhutto was able to become 
Pakistan‟s first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator as well as president- the posts 
 353 
which were instrumental to enhance his and his party‟s political position vis-à-vis political 
opponents and other agents such as judiciary, civil bureaucracy and the military. 
 
Moreover, during the period prior to the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, Bhutto was 
able to take many a policy measure under the informal rules of the game i.e. the interim 
constitution. Hence, Mujib was released; top industrialists, who were his rivals, were put on 
an existing control list; anti-Bhutto journalists were arrested; basic industries were 
nationalized under the Economic Reform Order 1972; Land Reforms Regulations was 
enacted in March 1972; colleges and schools were nationalized in April 1972 and Federal 
Security Force- a paramilitary organization- was established in 1972. Importantly, where 
Bhutto became Pakistan‟s president under the informal rules of the game, the governorship of 
NWFP and Balochistan went to NAP-JUI. This fact explicitly marks, on the one hand, 
politicians‟ agency and, on the other, their rationality in terms of preferring their own rather 
than the larger interests, for the subsequent political developments further corroborates this 
assumption. 
 
For instance, the confrontational politics between Bhutto‟s PPP and the leadership of NAP-
JUI resulted in the loss of Balochistan‟s chief ministership and governorship for the latter. In 
this respect, the former, in pursuance of its nationalization agenda, attempted to make inroads 
in NAP-JUI‟s constituencies. The latter, on its part, confronted these measures. 
Consequently, the consensus on informal rules got relaxed due to divergence of preference 
between Bhutto and ANP-JUI. Hence, the latter opted to resign in NWFP in order to register 
its protest over Bhutto‟s new alliance with QML. However, the NAP leadership was put 
behind bars on stated charges of anti-state activities. 
 
Nevertheless, the opposition, in order to pressurize Bhutto politically, gave more preference 
to agitational than participatory politics, for, in case of new elections, the chances for smaller 
parties to electorally confront PPP were minimum. Therefore, the former demanded 
restoration of true democracy in terms of formal rules of the game. Bhutto, in order to 
safeguard his interests, opted to strategically interact with the opposition with the effect that 
both sections of politicians were able to formalize rules of the game in terms of the 1973 
Constitution. Importantly, Bhutto was able to assume the country‟s prime ministership for the 
next five years- indeed the president also belonged to his party. Moreover, all martial law 
orders/regulations were validated and their initiators got indemnified. The opposition, 
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however, was satisfied to have brought Bhuttoism under the law. Hence, in the post-1973 
Constitution period, politics of interests was primarily rule-oriented- declaring Ahmedis non-
Muslims is a case in point. 
 
As regards foreign policy, Bhutto government was able to negotiate with India the release of 
POW at Simla in July 1972. Two years later, the prime minister was successful at hosting the 
Second Islamic Summit Conference at which Bangladesh was recognized as an independent 
and sovereign state. Moreover, as a reaction to India‟s nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1974, the 
PM vowed to pursue this goal too. Thus, Bhutto, due primarily to political reasons, remained 
unable to normalize Pakistan‟s relations with India on the pattern of Simla agreement. 
Importantly, the leader of the principal himself allocated considerable amount as defense 
expenditure to the military in order to appease the latter as well as the opposition and the 
general public.  
 
However, since mid-1972 Bhutto had attempted to bring the military under the 
politicians/civilian control. In this respect, he was able to sack army chief Gul Hasan and air 
chief Rahim respectively. The latter, however, accepted ambassadorship, offered by Bhutto, 
in Europe- this further consolidates the study‟s assumption that the military‟s leaders saw to 
their own interests. In addition, Bhutto was able to introduce changes in the military‟s 
command and control structure- the DCC is a case in point. Importantly, the PM ordered the 
agent military to carry out military operations against the anti-state elements- the Baloch 
nationalists- in Balochistan. However, the underlying objective of the Balochistan operation 
was more political than strategic. In this respect, the PM made a rational choice to, on the one 
hand, tactically concentrate the military‟s forces in the country‟s remotest region, and, on the 
other hand, teach his political opponents a blue lesson. 
 
Besides, the PM was also able to modify the so called cadre system of the civil bureaucracy. 
In this respect too, the reform measure was initiated during the period of informal rules of the 
game. The primary objective behind this action was to, on the one hand, accommodate PPP-
affiliates through „lateral entry‟ in the bureaucratic services and, on the other, make the 
bureaucracy do the principal‟s bidding more effectively. As regards the principal‟s policy 
towards the judiciary, it was comparatively less compelling. However, the third and fourth 
constitutional amendments- an indicator of politics under the rules- curtailed the courts‟ 
jurisdiction and limited its powers related to especially contempt of court and judges‟ 
 355 
transfer. The Bhutto government took these measures in view of the institution‟s history of 
political alliances, pro-military verdicts, appointments and promotions.  
 
By and large, the above-mentioned measures were, as the chapter posited, reminiscent of 
implicit oversight whereby the principal through carrot and stick policy attempted to ensure 
its control over the agents. The latter, especially the military, rationally compromised in light 
of the situation since its topmost priority was to restore its image nationally and improve its 
institutional capacity to fight regionally. Little wonder then, the institution bore with the 
principal‟s interference. For example, Bhutto ably appointed Zia-ul-Haq as new army chief in 
March 1976 by superseding six generals. The former perceived the new army chief as 
apolitical, pliant and hence harmless to the government.  
 
Importantly, by almost the middle of his government‟s tenure, PM Bhutto opted to practically 
sideline the socialism-oriented persons from within his party. As a result, landed-interests 
were accommodated due to politico-electoral reasons. The rational alliance with the former 
showed that Bhutto- himself a big land-owner- remained unable to affect a meaningful 
change in the socio-economic structure of the society. Thus, the chapter noticed that the 
government‟s land, labor, education and heath etc., reforms were criticized by the opposition 
and the affected section of the populace.  In order to reduce the political damage to his person 
and party, Bhutto came up with a follow-up reform package especially land in 1977. 
However, by then the opposition politicians, being able to unite under Pakistan National 
Alliance (PNA) for rational reasons, chose to confront Bhutto electorally.  
 
The scheduled elections were held in March 1977. The PPP won the majority of seats. 
However, the PNA, having refused the results, alleged government of massive rigging. In 
order to further pressurize Bhutto, the opposition alliance resorted to agitational politics. 
Bhutto, on his part, attempted to negotiate with the PNA in the crucial post-election period. 
However, the PNA-led agitational politics transformed into confrontational politics with the 
result that Bhutto, while asserting his control over the agent military vis-à-vis the intriguing 
opposition, opted to declare martial law- though under the constitution- in the country‟s 
major cities in April 1977- the Army Act was also amended that enabled military action with 
retrospective effect. At this critical juncture of Pakistan‟s civil-military relations, a section of 
opposition politicians called upon the military to shirk- indeed air marshal-cum-politician 
Asghar Khan wrote letters in this respect. However, despite these developments, Bhutto 
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continued preferring negotiations with the PNA. The crucial phase of negotiations was going 
on in the first week of July when the military struck down in terms of staging a coup and 
imposing martial law. Consequently, Bhutto was put under „protective‟ custody; the 1973 
Constitution was abrogated; national and provincial assemblies were dissolved; and political 
activity was banned.  
 
In his coup/martial law proclamation, the military‟s leader, General Zia-ul-Haq, cited 
problems of law and order and economy as the primary reasons for the coup. In addition, 
democratization and securitization were cited as complementary factors. Since no claim can, 
logically, be taken as granted, the chapter, in its later half, conducted an analytic narrative of 
the coup. In this respect, four conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, 
democratization and securitization, were identified, on the basis of a coding system, in the 
coup-text. Moreover, the study observed positive correspondence between coup and each of 
the conceptual variables. Thus, in order to verify this positive co-relation, the model-inspired 
empirical explanation was carried out. As a result, it was shown that the positive relationship 
of coup with each of the conceptual variables was empirically unfounded. Rather, it was 
maintained that such factors/reasons were an indication of attempts at self-legitimation. 
 
Importantly, the analysis reverted to the model formally so as to explain this phenomenon. 
Thus, quite contrary to the stated reasons/causes, it was posited that the July coup was a 
function of military agency. Being a rational actor, the military, having calculated cost and 
benefits of the coup-action, preferred shirking to working (agency A). In other words, the 
study maintains theoretical distance towards the existing structural, path-dependent, 
generalist, instrumentalist and conspiracy accounts, for they failed to explain the occurrence 
of the coup. For example, if the military was in „control‟ of Pakistan‟s politics and the state, 
then there should have been no coup at all. Or if the coup was structurally determined, then 
why did it not occur in, for example, 1974, 1976 or pre-election 1977? Similarly, the US‟s 
policy, post-Afghan Jihad, towards the military regime is enough to refute conspiracy 
theories.  
 
Moreover, the study maintained that the coup, being rational in nature, was political in 
character, for it was primarily aimed at capturing political power. In other words, as per the 
study‟s model, the coup was staged to assume Pakistan‟s principalship. However, the 
principalship was instrumental to facilitate military‟s economic interests- the establishment of 
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Shaheen and Bahria foundations are a case in point.  Thus, the assumption of political power 
and maximization of economic interests as a dominant actor, contextually, marks the 
military‟s rationality in terms of its preferring its own to larger interest- hence agency B.   
 
However, in the post-Zia period the military had a strategy to deal with the agents, especially 
politicians. Contrary to the existing narratives, Chapter sought an analytical explanation of 
civil-military relations, in the post-Zia period. In this respect, it was maintained that the 
military did not go back to barracks. Rather, it chose to stay on in politics as the principal. 
However, it made a tactical move in terms of allowing the politicians to participate in 
elections- the latter, however, were not allowed to interfere in country‟s foreign/defense 
policy. Had General Beg-led military opted to remain in politics overtly after Zia‟s death, the 
political and economic cost of this choice would have been higher than the perceived 
benefits. 
 
Hence, elections were allowed to be held in 1988. Importantly however, the principal was 
able to strategically interact with a section of politicians who, with the blessings of the 
former, formed IJI against Benazir Bhutto. Despite this, the latter was able to form a 
government at the centre. However, her political rival, Nawaz Sharif of the IJI, became the 
chief minister of Punjab. In other words, the Bhutto government had limited political choices. 
Moreover, she had to strategically interact with the principal which had developed, over the 
years, an anti-PPP mindset. Though Bhutto chalked out a rational course, her say in 
Pakistan‟s foreign/defense policy was next to nothing. Nonetheless, almost in the middle of 
her tenure she attempted to assert her premiership in terms of meddling with military 
appointments and promotions. However, before Bhutto could make any meaningful change 
vis-à-vis the principal, her government was dissolved, in 1990, by President Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan who operationalized 58(2)(b) in strategic understanding with the principal. The stated 
charges included corruption, misconduct etc. The opposition politicians welcomed her 
dismissal for it provided them with another politico-electoral opportunity to test their 
strength. 
 
Elections were held in the same year under the auspices of a pro-principal caretaker 
government. As a result, Sharif was able to form a government at the national level and 
Bhutto chose to sit in the opposition. The military, in its capacity of principal, was the 
watchdog. Being a rational actor with experience of working with the military, Prime 
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Minister Sharif initially opted not to interfere in military‟s matters especially FP/DP and the 
military‟s economic activities. His focus remained on reviving the country‟s economy in 
strategic collaboration with IFIs. However, almost in the middle of its tenure the Sharif 
government started developing differences, apparently constitutional in nature, with the 
president over the appointment and promotion of military officers.  
 
In this respect, Sharif‟s calculus aimed at strategically interacting with that part of the officer 
cadre who in the former‟s perception was less harmful to his government. However, Sharif‟s 
move brought more cost than benefits. The principal military viewed it as open interference 
in its internal matters. Moreover, the president also saw in Sharif a potential shirker. Indeed, 
the latter politically vowed to repeal the Eighth Amendment which would have 
constitutionally tilted the balance of power in favor of the prime minister. However before 
Prime Minister Sharif could affect any change in the political system of Pakistan, President 
Ishaq in strategic understanding with the military opted to dissolve his government by 
operationalizing 58 (2(b) in 1993. A caretaker government was set up to take charge. 
 
Interestingly, Sharif went to court and, quite ironically, the agent judiciary restored his 
government. However, the apparently ironic verdict of the apex court was rational in nature 
as it aimed at improving its institutional image in this specific political situation in which the 
president had already become controversial politically, if not legally. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court‟s judgment had implications for the agent president and not necessarily the principal 
military which was already reaping political benefits from the PM-President encounter. Little 
wonder then, in the post-restoration period, when their mutual differences resurfaced the 
principal provided the PM with choices; either to make peace or face the music. The rational 
Sharif saw more benefits in leaving the office for the opposition was already calling for mid-
term elections. However, to appease Sharif and dissociate itself from a controversial president 
the principal sought his resignation also. A new pro-principal caretaker government assumed 
responsibilities including holding the general elections. 
 
As a result of the 1993 elections, Benazir Bhutto was once again able to form a government 
at the centre. Having learnt from her past experiences, Bhutto took a calculated course of 
action. Instead of overtly interfering in military‟s matters, she was able to bring PPP-man, 
Farooq Ahmed Leghari, in the presidency. However, she remained unable to bring the 
opposition on board to repeal the Eight Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. Also, Bhutto 
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could not establish control over the country‟s foreign/defense policy. It remained an 
exclusive domain of the principal military. Importantly, as during her previous stay in office, 
this time also she opted not to question, in parliament at least, the military‟s economic 
ventures. However, Bhutto‟s relations with the judiciary soured over the issue of judges‟ 
appointment. Moreover, ironically President Farooq Leghari chose to differ with PM Bhutto 
over policy matters. The death of the prime minister‟s brother further added insult to injury. 
Hence, being confronted with an unfriendly opposition, the president and the principal, 
Bhutto‟s set of choices was limited. Contextually, she signaled at impeaching the president in 
order to politically stabilize her government. However, before the PM could move in this 
direction her government was dismissed, in November 1996, by the president who saw more 
benefits in a strategic alliance with the principal. A pro-principal caretaking administration, 
with the responsibility to hold elections, took charge.  
 
As a result of the 1997 elections, Nawaz Sharif was able to head the government in 
Islamabad. Like Bhutto, Sharif devised a rational course of action vis-à-vis the military. The 
latter‟s economic activities were treated as a non-issue. The foreign/defense policy was also 
considered to be the military‟s sphere. However, the PM chose to deal with the dominant 
actor politically. In this respect, Sharif was able to get his-man, Justice (retd) Rafiq Tarar, 
elected as Pakistan‟s president. Importantly, the 58(2) (b) was repealed in terms of Thirteen 
Amendment. These Sharif-led developments were perceived as indicators of shirking by the 
military since Sharif had amended the rules of the game meaningfully. Moreover, the PM‟s 
efforts to interfere in military appointments and promotions bore fruit and, army chief, 
Jahangir Karamat, sought retirement and later Pervez Musharraf got superseded. However, 
from the military‟s perspective, Sharif‟s successes added to his failures since the institution 
chose to deal a heavy-mandated prime minster rationally. Hence, a coup at this point of time 
would have been politically more costly.  
 
Last but not least, Sharif, on his part, continued with his incremental policy of controlling the 
principal military. His next move was to invite, against the military‟s wishes, India‟s Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Pakistan in early 1999. Though the two states were able to 
sign the Lahore Declaration, the strategic implications of Hindu enemy‟s visit were grave. 
Little wonder, a few months after the visit, a war broke out between India and Pakistan in 
Kargil. Sharif was bewildered for he was not taken on board. However, the damage to his 
political legitimacy was done when the opposition in particular and public in general blamed 
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Sharif, not the military, for withdrawal. Moreover, the Kargil-differences further widened the 
gulf between the PM and the GHQ. Consequently, having perceived the growing military 
distrust, Sharif opted to replace Army Chief Pervez Musharraf- the leader of the principal 
military. However, this move of the PM was timely met with a coup d‟état in October 1999. 
 
In its final Chapter, the study attempted to contextualize the nature and dynamics of civil-
military relations since the Kargil war which was planned by the military for rational reasons. 
In this regards, the chapter empirically and theoretically explained that the war was waged by 
the Musharraf-led military to, on the one hand, politically weaken the prime minister, and on 
the other hand, assert military‟s principalship especially regarding the making and 
operationalization of the country‟s foreign/defense policy. Hence, the war thwarted the peace 
process initiated by the Lahore Declaration signed between India and Pakistan in February 
1999. Moreover, in the post-Kargil period Prime Minister Sharif, in order to safeguard his 
political interests, opted to constitutionally replace the army chief, Pervez Musharraf, with Lt. 
Gen. Ziauddin on 12 October 1999. However, before the newly appointed army chief could 
assume charge formally, Prime Minister Sharif was sacked through a coup on the same day. 
Consequently, the 1973 Constitution was abrogated, the assemblies were dissolved, the PM 
was put under house arrest and political activity was banned.  
 
However, the Musharraf-led military attempted to justify the action. In this respect, in the 
coup/martial law proclamation the problems relating to governance and economy were cited 
as main factors. The Sharif government was blamed for the failure. Moreover, the former was 
held responsible for introducing a „sham democracy‟. Therefore, the military intervened in 
politics to democratize and improve law and order and the economic situation. In addition, it 
was vowed that Pakistan would be securitized, for it is the prime responsibility of the military 
institution. Importantly, the principal military was able to seek judicial legitimacy from the 
agent judiciary. The commendable refusal of Supreme Court‟s Chief Justice Saiduzaman 
Siddiqui to take oath under the PCO, however, remained insignificant, for his colleagues 
rationally opted to take not only a fresh oath but also to legitimate the martial law by 
invoking the infamous doctrine of necessity. Moreover, the agent judiciary empowered the 
Chief Executive- the military‟s leader- to amend the constitution at his discretion. 
Interestingly, the removal of Musharraf was also judged invalid despite the fact that it was 
not the issue before the apex court. Besides, Sharif was judged guilty of hijacking the PIA 
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plane that was carrying General Musharraf from Colombo to Pakistan- whereas the co-
accused got scot-free. 
 
Nevertheless, since the military had, at first, attempted to self-justify the coup-action and later 
got judicial legitimacy, it becomes imperative, logically and morally, to explain this 
occurrence objectively. For this purpose, the chapter analyzed the coup in the form of an 
analytic narrative which was seen as a combination of working/shirking and own/larger 
interests- or agencies A and B. In order to formally conduct the analytic narrative, the chapte 
identified, through a system of coding, five conceptual variables, namely, law and order, 
economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law. Furthermore, positive 
correspondence was observed between each of the four variables and the coup. Moreover, it 
was observed that the military took upon itself the responsibility to accomplish these tasks. 
The chapter then moved on to empirically explain each positive co-relation in order to see 
whether the military‟s claims were justified or not. 
 
To begin with, quite contrary to the stated claim by the Musharraf-led military, it was 
statistically showed that the law and order situation was better under the Sharif government. 
Moreover, during the military rule the problem of governance lingered on with the effect that 
from 2005 onwards the same figures reveal a trend that is steadily going upward. Thus, it was 
concluded that the positive correspondence between law and order and the coup could not be 
established statistically. As regards the economic variable, it was found on the basis of 
quantitative data, that the key economic indicators, during the Sharif government, pointed to 
relative economic sustainability and that too in the wake of nuclear-related sanctions. 
Interestingly, the military under Musharraf was though able to project high growth rate in key 
sectors of the economy, the underlying factors for this military-led developments were 
foreign in nature: namely, foreign aid- that was a result of military‟s strategic alliance with 
the US regarding terrorism- and remittances which were also positively impacted by the 
alliance over war on terror. Moreover, despite projected high growth rates, the social sector 
remained neglected; poverty-related issues remained unsolved- indeed evidence pointed 
towards an increase in corruption and in the „parallel economy‟. In light of this empirical 
evidence, the chapter established a rather negative relationship between economic variable 
and the coup. 
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Similarly the chapter posited, with the help of empirical data, that the project of 
democratization failed to achieve the stated objective of transforming Pakistan from a sham 
to a true democracy. Instead, the initial ban on political activity, a highly controversial and 
controlled presidential referendum, espionage over political forces, NABization of shirking 
politicians- and favors to working PML-Q-, rigged October 2002 elections and importantly 
unconstitutional attempts at re-election from the existing assemblies- which had almost 
completed their tenure- by the General-President was sufficient empirical evidence of a 
negative relationship between the democratization variable and the October coup. Last but 
not least, Pakistan witnessed the worst violence caused by terrorist attacks in its recent 
history. Indeed, the phenomenon of suicide bombings was quite unprecedented with the 
effect that the military‟s leader, General Pervez Musharraf, was targeted more than one time. 
Moreover, the military regime was severely criticized by the opposition politicians and civil 
society organizations for selling out the country‟s (external) sovereignty to the US in terms of 
permitting the latter to use and launch „drone attacks‟ on Pakistani territory. Hence, in light of 
the foregoing, the chapter posited that the securitization variable‟s positive relationship with 
the coup is also empirically unfounded.  
 
Having exposed the negative correspondences between coup and the other conceptual 
variables drawn from the coup-proclamation, the analytic narrative then reverted to the 
model‟s explanatory variables in order to explain this puzzling phenomenon. Quite contrary 
to the existing body of knowledge on Pakistan‟s civil-military relations, the study posits that 
the coup was a result/effect of the military‟s agency- that the latter, being a rational actor, was 
able to stage a coup in order to maximize its political and economic interests. In other words, 
distancing itself from structural, generalist, instrumentalist, path-dependent and conspiracy 
accounts the chapter, on the basis of its agency model, maintains that the coup was rational in 
nature and political in character. It is demonstrated that the primary objective of the coup-
action was to safeguard the military‟s political role at the expense of the Sharif-led shirking 
politicians who, in the pre-coup period, were able to transform their own interest into a larger 
one, in terms of amending the formal rules of the game. The foregoing, in other words, marks 
the model-based agencies A and B whereby the rational military, while preferring its own 
interests- and importantly expecting working from the agents-, is capable of punishing the 
shirking section of politicians who were, in turn, able to prioritize larger but diverging 
interest as far as the military was concerned. Had the Sharif-led politicians preferred working 
to shirking- as indeed they did in the 1990s- and not attempted to seek larger interests in 
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terms of violating and amending the rules of the game, there would have been,  according to 
the model, no military coup d‟état. 
 
Thus, by staging a coup, the principal military, which had exclusively dominated the 
foreign/defense policy of the country along with engagement in economic activities without 
any oversight mechanism, was able to take the political control of state in its own hands too. 
However, the assumption of political power unconstitutionally, undemocratically, illegally 
and immorally by the Musharraf-led military caused serious damage to the ensuing 
democratic process. Importantly, the coup-event exposed the military‟s political weakness 
rather commonly held strength for had it been politically in „control‟ of politics if not of the 
state, then there was no need to sack an elected PM, dissolve assemblies and abrogate the 
constitution. In addition, as per its hypothesis, the study empirically demonstrates that the 
direct assumption of political power was instrumental to facilitate the military‟s economic 
interests.   
 
In the post-coup period, the military‟s politics and economic activities went, by and large, 
smoothly in strategic interaction with a section of politicians who, while seeing to their own 
political and economic interests, opted to working with the military. Moreover, the judiciary, 
as mentioned before, also remained an agent. However,  quite surprisingly, a section of the 
latter-  indeed the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry- opted 
to shirk by according more preference to larger-than-purely institutional interests. The 
Supreme Court‟s judgments on the Steel Mill case, „missing persons‟ etc., are evidence of 
this. Hence, in this specific context, the military‟s leader sought to, on 9 March 2007, seek 
the agent judiciary chief‟s (justice) resignation, and that too in the General Headquarters. To 
the principal‟s surprise, the Chief Justice (CJ) stuck to shirking. The former struck back by 
„suspending‟ the latter. Consequently, quite to the suspended Chief Justice‟s surprise, his 
colleagues and importantly the lawyers‟ community chose to side with him.  
 
Moreover, a majority of opposition politicians, a considerable number of civil society groups 
and the private media opted to join the lawyers‟ movement for a variety of rational reasons. 
However, contextually, they were able to maintain a unique balance between their own and a 
larger cause: restoration of CJ Iftikhar and an end to military rule. The rational military, in the 
wake of agitational politics, chose to ultimately restore the CJ so that the political, if not 
economic, cost remained bearable. The restored Chief Justice of Pakistan, however, 
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continued to shirk by preferring larger to own interest- the judgment in favor of exiled Sharif 
is a case in point. Importantly, the CJ-led apex court opted to take a judicial note of 
Musharraf‟s re-election. The case was pending in the Supreme Court when the Musharraf-led 
military chose to not only sack  but also arrest the CJ along with sixty judges through a 
military coup d‟état on 3 November 2007. Consequently, martial law was imposed.  
 
In order to self-legitimize the coup/martial law, General Musharraf pointed to problems 
related to security, the economy, governance and democratization. In explicit terms, the 
judiciary was blamed for its „increasing interference‟ in the government‟s affairs, thus 
„adversely affecting‟ its functioning. The chapter, in order to explain the stated 
factors/causes, conducted an analytic narrative of this fifth coup. In this regards, the point of 
departure was the identification of five conceptual variables- securitization, economic factors, 
law and order, democratization and coup/martial law- whereby the coup was observed to 
have positive correspondence with each of the remaining variables. Therefore, the chapter 
took each positive correspondence for a model-based empirical analysis so as to determine 
the worth of the military‟s claims to legitimacy. 
 
As a result, it was concluded, on the basis of empirical data, that the law and order situation- 
regardless of the pre-coup failure on this count- further deteriorated; the economic situation 
further worsened as, for instance, inflation touched double-digits; the securitization process 
remained paralyzed since the terrorist attacks and „drone attacks‟ continued; and the 
democratization project suffered from delay-tactics, lack of physical security for the 
mainstream politicians, pre/post poll rigging etc. In other words, the study did not find any 
positive correspondence between coup/martial law and the rest of the conceptual variables. 
Therefore, in order to explain the coup-occurrence, the analytic narrative reverted to a formal 
application of the model. 
 
In light of the study‟s causal model, it was posited that the November coup was a result of the 
military‟s agency- its inherent capability to get things done. As a principal of its agents, the 
rational military, in order to protect its political interests- and economic interests for that 
matter- opted to stage a coup in order to capture the political initiative from shirking agents 
such as opposition politicians and especially the judiciary. The latter, quite unprecedentedly, 
was able to not only see the larger interest, but also to hold ground in the face of military 
might. Moreover, through the coup the rational military sought to re-negotiate the rules of the 
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game which had been violated by a shirking judiciary, and to do so in a way that protected its 
overall principalship of the country. In addition, the peripheral aim of the coup and 
consequent martial law was to further damage the political process- the delaying of elections 
is a case in point- as well as the country‟s political institutions for, as mentioned earlier in the 
study, the strengths of the military lay in its agents‟ weaknesses especially that of the 
politicians and the judiciary.  
 
The chapter, as per the study‟s hypothesis, argued that the staging of a coup highlights the 
military‟s political weakness. Had it been politically in „control‟ of its agent judiciary if not 
of Pakistan‟s politics and the state, there was no rational need to sack and arrest judges, to 
delay and rig elections and most importantly, to transfer political authority to politicians.  
This is however, the usual story as portrayed by path-dependent and structuralist accounts. 
Besides, as hypothesized, the chapter found that the military‟s economic interests were 
further facilitated during the period under study.  
 
Hypotheses Revisited 
As a result of the model-guided explanation of Pakistan‟s CMR, it seems not inappropriate to 
revisit, though briefly, the study‟s hypotheses. To begin with, the core hypothesis, namely,  
Military intervenes in politics because of its inherent agency, and not culture, identity, 
religion, conspiracy, „structure‟ or threats. It is a rational institution which attempts coup(s) 
after having calculated the costs and benefits of the exercise. The coup-attempt marks more 
politico-economic benefits than cost (H 1), is corroborated by the model-led empirical 
analysis. Thus, military intervention is a function of military agency and rationality. 
Moreover, the thesis maintains that the military intervention- both direct and indirect- is 
primarily caused by its political interests (H 2).  In a post-coup period, the thesis has posited 
that the military utilitizes its political space to maximize its economic interests (H 3).  
 
As the above shows, as a result of a coup (intervention), the military, as per the study‟s causal 
model, assumes the principal position. In order to maintain its principalship, it applies a 
carrot-and-stick approach vis-à-vis agents, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy and the 
judiciary. The latter, as rational actors, normally prefer working in order to maximize their 
respective political and economic interests. However, the military stages a coup d‟état when 
its political space is perceived to be constrained by non-military actor(s) - politicians, civil 
bureaucracy and judiciary (H 4).  The aim of such an exercise is to politically enable itself to 
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(re)negotiate the rules of the game with other stake holders i.e., politicians, bureaucrats, 
judges (H 5). However, quite contrary to the existing accounts on Pakistan‟s civil-military 
relations, the present research has explained, both conceptually as well as empirically, that a 
coup is a marker of the military‟s political weakness rather than strength (H 6), for had the 
military been „structurally‟ powerful and/or followed a certain „path‟ there was then no need 
to take the pain to stage a coup and then (re)negotiate rules of the game with agent but 
rational actors.  
 
To sum up, what can be argued, in view of the above, is that all of the study‟s hypotheses 
hold on empirical ground. However, since they are tested in a specific context of Pakistan‟s 
CMR, they cannot necessarily come true to another case/context. Nevertheless, there is no 
logical and moral constraint on a researcher to try to test either of them in another case where 
the military tends to intervene in domestic politics, quite frequently. 
 
Contribution of the Study 
This research contributes something new to all the three vital aspects of social science 
research: theoretical, empirical and methodological. Theoretically, the study has built an 
agency model of Pakistan‟s civil-military relations. The model proposes that military 
intervention in politics is a function of military agency and rationality. In this respect, a 
combination of working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) was 
grounded in the model in terms of explanatory variables.  
 
Methodologically, quite unprecedentedly the thesis married the method of analytic narratives 
(AN) to its causal model, whereby each coup was assumed an analytic narrative. Moreover, 
primary data, both qualitative and quantitative, was used to mark the extent of the military‟s 
economic interests. In addition, Mitra‟s theory of governance was applied, in each coup‟s 
AN, to address the question of law and order. Empirically, in this regard primary data of 
murders and riots was used.  
 
Finally, the study, having contextualized and rationalized civil-military relations in Pakistan, 
maintains that there is a context-oriented flow in the principal-agent relationship (see Figure 
8 on the next page). This points to, in unequivocal terms, to agency and rationality of the four 
actors the military being one. Besides, the present research posits that military intervention in 
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politics can be (cross-nationally) explained by taking the military‟s agency and rationality 
into account. 
 
Figure 8 Flow of Principal-Agent Relations in Pakistan (1947-Present) 
 
 
 
Source:  This is the author‟s own depiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 368 
Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Talking Points for an Interview 
 
                 
1.         Political System of Pakistan 
1.1 How do you define Pakistan‟s political system? 
1.2 Do you think Pakistan is a constitutional state? 
1.3 How do you look at the country‟s parliamentary history? 
1.4 Do you think there is a separation of powers between the executive, legislature and 
       the judiciary? 
1.5 What role politicians and political parties have been playing over the decades? 
2.          Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations 
2.1 What is the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan? 
2.2 What are the important factors in the determination of civil-military relations? 
2.3 What role the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan has been playing? 
2.4 Is civil bureaucracy an important actor? 
2.5 Is the civil bureaucracy financially corrupt? 
2.6 What is the relationship between civil bureaucracy and the military? 
2.7 What sort of relations the judiciary has with civil bureaucracy and the military? 
2.8 Is judiciary financially corrupt? 
2.9 What brings the military in Pakistan‟s politics? 
2.10 Has the military become a political actor? 
2.11 Has the military emerged as an economic actor? 
3.           Role of Religion in Politics  
3.1 What is an Islamic state? 
3.2 Do you think Pakistan is an Islamic state? 
3.3 How do you look at the Objectives Resolution and the Islamic Provisions in the  
       three constitutions – 1956, 1962 and 1973? 
3.4 Are religious groups including religious political parties important actors? 
3.5 Do you think there is a military-mullah nexus in Pakistan? 
3.6 What is the role of religion in the civil-military relations in Pakistan?    
4.           Contemporary Politics and the State 
4.1 What are the implications of military rule for regional security? 
4.2 Has the military rule brought economic prosperity to the country? 
4.3 What implications the military rule has for the federation of Pakistan? 
4.4 Are political parties and politicians important? 
4.5 How do you see the future of the lawyers‟ movement? 
4.6 Is there any causal relationship between the phenomenon of suicide blasts and the military rule? 
4.7 How do you look at the February 2008 elections? 
5.         Other Questions 
5.1 Does civil society exist in Pakistan? If yes, then what is the future of the civil society? 
5.2 What could be the best solution(s) for Pakistan‟s political problems in your opinion? 
5.3 Is there any message that you want to share with? 
5.4 What readings would you like to suggest? 
5.5 Which further interview partner(s) would you suggest? 
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Appendix B 
 
                          
 
1) Sample Interview Transcript 
 
 
Name: Hamid Khan  
Designation:  Senior Vice President Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), member Pakistan Bar 
Council and Former President Supreme Court Bar Association 
Place: Lahore 
Date: 20 March 2008 
Language: English 
Duration: 90 min.  
 
 
Q: How do you look at Pakistan‟s political system? 
 
A:  I think Pakistan has not been able to evolve a political system over the years. We are still 
in a process of evolving a political system which should be close to a parliamentary form of 
government, where the parliament is strong and other constitutional institutions are 
competent.  
 
Q: How do you interpret the Objectives Resolution (1949)? Do you think it stipulates 
Pakistan an Islamic state? 
 
A: No. It does not say so. I think it is [Pakistan] a modern democratic state which is 
envisaged by the Objectives Resolution. The mere fact, which it mentions, that sovereignty 
belong to Allah [God] and that it should be exercised by the chosen representative, means 
that we [it] wanted to have a parliamentary democratic system in Pakistan; which is a modern 
system of democracy…Therefore we are a Muslim state, and not an Islamic state as many of 
our political actors have tried to define it. 
 
Q: How do you look at the politics of the Fifties? Do you agree with Dr Mohammad Waseem 
and scholars like him who thinks there was a „gang of four‟ at that time in Pakistan, which 
virtually ran the country‟s affairs? 
 
A: I am not in agreement with that. I think it was much deeper than that. They only 
represented the initial formation of a political establishment in Pakistan; which had decided 
to rule the country and defeat the democratic forces in Pakistan. Their objective was to 
promote undemocratic forces in the country which could rule it undemocratically and 
unconstitutionally. The persons that you mentioned in the „gang of four‟ were a symbol of the 
anti-democratic actors. I think the list is extensive. I would include Justice Munir, the landed-
feudals of the time and the founders and members of the Republican Party into it as well. So, 
the problem is much deeper than those four persons. They just happened to be at the surface.  
 
Q: If the landlords, the bureaucrats and the military were in an alliance or formed an 
oligarchy at best, as you have pointed out, then why did the military stage the coup d‟état in 
1958?  
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A: Actually there was tug of war among these forces. Though the bureaucrats and the 
landlords were in an alliance yet they had difference of interests. The important point is that 
they were backed by the military in the 1950s. The latter had come to the conclusion: if we 
are backing and sustaining these undemocratic forces, then why not take the set up- I would 
not call it a system- on and assume power directly. In other words, it was a coup against the 
undemocratic forces.  
 
Q: The factors you mentioned pertain, in my view, to the relationship between different 
actors in the pre-coup period. My question is: what did the military want to achieve by 
staging the coup? Did it want to achieve any political goal?  Or did it had any other kind of 
objective?  
 
A: I think it was more than mere political interests. Actually it had international backing. 
However, it does not mean that there was no power struggle between the military 
establishment and the civil bureaucracy. They were engaged in a power game as I mentioned 
already. The military was able to win it. However, after quite some time, the civil 
bureaucracy joined hands with the military to play second fiddle. In fact, during and after the 
martial law imposed by Generals Ayub and Yahya Khan, the civil bureaucracy played the 
role of a junior partner. The shots were called by the senior partner: the military.  
 
Q: Since the military had intervened in politics having abrogated the 1956 Constitution, how 
was then it able to stand the test of the day?  What were the issues which it may have faced 
legally or constitutionally?  
 
A: As I mentioned already the military had no serious problems from the civil bureaucracy. 
But, the politicians especially whose political interests were compromised by the coup and 
later on the martial law, were seriously concerned about the fateful event. Not only this, a few 
from among the lawyers also had legal reservations about the act of coup and the consequent 
martial law rules and regulations. The martial law- or [technically] the Laws (Continuance in 
Force) Order- was challenged in the Supreme Court. It was headed by Justice Munir who had 
in the mid-Fifties given a biased verdict in favor of the then dictator, Governor-General 
Ghulam Mohammad. 
 
The question before the Supreme Court was if the Lahore High Court‟s writ had abated under 
the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order [Clause (7), Article 1]. The case is famously known 
as the Dosso Case in legal circles, if not the corridors of power. In his judgment Justice 
Munir maintained that a successful revolution or coup is an internationally recognized legal 
method to change a constitution. Therefore, the martial law had created a new law-creating 
organ. I think Justice Munir made an arbitrary judgment. Interestingly, he relied on Hans 
Kelsen [General Theory of Law and State] to make a case. Not only this, the Chief Justice 
decided hurriedly to legitimize the martial law. In my opinion, there was no need on the part 
of the Supreme Court to decide its cases while entering into question of the validity of the 
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order since even before the imposition of martial law, there 
were appeals pending before the [Supreme] Court. These appeals were heard a few days after 
the martial law. Clearly, it shows that the Court dragged the validity of the Order into a 
controversy. It did not wait until someone could directly challenge the very validity of the 
martial law [Laws (Continuance in Force) Order]. 
 
Q:  So, you do not subscribe to the Chief Justice‟s reasoning? 
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A: Absolutely not! I have certain reasons not to agree with the resultant Order. As I have just 
mentioned, it was based on an imported theory grounded in the European legal experiences; 
the legal practices and experiences which had no relevance whatsoever with the case at hand. 
Moreover, the proceedings of the Court regarding the case were stretched to consciously 
favor the regime. Most significantly, the Chief Justice Munir‟s legal reasoning deprived the 
people of Pakistan of their fundamental human rights. It also, by the way, did disfavor to the 
country‟s High Courts in terms of curtailment of their writ jurisdiction. 
 
Q:  What about the coup staged by the Yahya-led military? Was it legally justified? 
 
A: How could a coup d‟état be a legally valid action? Yahya Khan‟s coup was attempted at 
the very edifice of constitutionality and legality. Yahya Khan did the same. The 1962 
Constitution, which had actually empowered Ayub Khan arbitrarily, was abrogated. A 
Provisional Constitutional Order [PCO] was promulgated by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator [CMLA]. As was the case with the Ayub Khan‟s martial law, this time around 
too the courts were not allowed to make any judgment, issue any decree, order etc., against 
the CMLA or his appointees.  
 
Legally, the matter was not referred to the courts during the period 1969-1971. However, it 
did come before the Supreme Court in what now is called Asma Jilani Case [1972]. 
Retrospectively, the martial law was judged illegal, and Yahya Khan was termed a usurper. 
The important point of the Case was that it invalidated the assumptions of the Dosso Case. 
But, it is also a matter of fact that the Supreme Court did not have the inclination to take the 
matter up during the military rule. 
 
Q:  How do you read the 1973 Constitution? Do you think it was a consensual document? 
 
A: It was a consensual document: all the political parties had participated in the process of its 
passage by the [National] Assembly. However, one may object the legitimacy of the 
assembly since it was based on the pre-breakup electoral process in which Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto‟s Peoples Party and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman-led Awami League had won majority of 
seats in West and East Pakistan respectively. The fact of the matter, however, is that the post 
break-up assembly subsequently got legitimacy since the almost all the political parties 
accepted it, sat on its floor, and negotiated the pros and cons of the new constitution- 1973. 
Perhaps the reason why the political parties and the politicians agreed to accord legitimacy to 
the assembly was the retrospective conviction in the pre-Partition Constituent Assembly 
(1946) which was primarily elected for the whole of India. At Partition in 1947, the 
Assembly was divided also. In 1972, the situation was quite similar to 1947. The politicians 
and their parties benefited from the past and, in post-partitioned Pakistan, did to assembly 
what politicians had done to the 1946 Assembly. I think it was a way to sort things out and 
move forward. 
 
Q: But what do you think of the relationship between the politicians especially Bhutto and 
the military? 
 
A: Since the results of 1971 elections, there emerged a triangle of power. The actors were: 
Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib. Of the three, Bhutto sided with General 
Yahya to get rid of not only Mujib but also East Pakistan. It was not a one-sided love. The 
military establishment had the same towards East Pakistan and its leadership especially 
Mujib. In other words, what we can say is that there was collaborative relationship between 
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the military and Bhutto as far as East Pakistan and Sheikh Mujib was concerned. This 
relationship remained intact up till the fall of Dhaka. From then onwards, however, the 
collaborative relationship got changed to confrontational. The burden of responsibility lay on 
both sides. Bhutto saw in the military a potential threat to his rule. The military 
establishment, on its part, viewed Bhutto a threat to its rule. However, for the time being, 
Bhutto had an advantage over a defeated and demoralized army [military]. 
 
Q:  How do you look at politics under Bhutto?  
 
A:  Bhutto assumed power in peculiar circumstances: the country had broken up. Bangladesh 
was a reality; the military was demoralized; the economic situation had worsened extremely. 
As per his promises to his primary constituency- the poor section of the population- Bhutto 
was initially able to deliver re-distributive justice to them relatively. My point is not that 
every poor got richer; however, he got something material to satisfy his basic human needs. 
However, the relative relief to the poor came, overall, at the cost of the middle classes, to 
which belonged country‟s civil bureaucracy, the military and lawyers. They were certainly 
disenchanted by his policies be that administrative or economic. On the other hand, the 
landlords, the class he himself belonged to, also prospered- certainly not all of them 
especially his opponents.  
 
Q:  If Bhutto was favorite of the poor, as you described, why then he was deposed by another 
General? 
 
A: As I have already mentioned, due to his politics or better policies, Bhutto had, to the end 
of his tenure of five years, distanced the middle class. Moreover, his nationalization policy 
further brought resentment from the industrialist class. Therefore, it was quite natural that at 
the 1977 polls these classes had different and divergent options. Having perceived this, 
Bhutto had no other option but to rig the elections. As a result of massive rigging, even of by-
elections, he attempted to gain political legitimacy. However, this was not to be the case since 
the aggrieved section was already taking to the streets. I think they led a genuine political 
movement against Bhutto.  
 
Q: But how did the military come in the picture? 
 
A: The military, by and large, is a part and parcel of Pakistan‟s middle classes. It was also 
hurt by his policies. Interestingly, the opposition political parties, instead of urging Bhutto to 
announce and hold fresh and free elections, were calling the military to remove Bhutto from 
the scene, and thus clear way for them. This attitude of the politicians would have encouraged 
the men in khaki. However, the generals should have been planning by April at least- since a 
coup cannot be attempted in a void. The military should have observed the popular mood and 
demand. Unfortunately, the politicians the like of Asghar Khan were openly inviting the 
military to take over. Little wonder then, in July 1977- a few months after the [rigged] 
elections- General Zia-ul-Haq, a pious man but by no means innocent, struck back.  
 
Q: How do you look at General Zia and the military politics during the 1980 generally? 
 
A: The politics in the 1980s revolved around Zia. He remained the central most figure during 
this entire period. He fought the Afghan Jihad; he had a tough stance against India; he 
collaborated with the Americans who got penetrated in Pakistan‟s politics unprecedently; he 
allied with the religious forces. Very importantly, there took place a transformation in the 
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country‟s political system whereby the military happened to dominate the system in ways and 
manner not know before. Moreover, the part of the transformation was that through the 
military, especially its intelligence agencies, the foreign forces, having interests in our region, 
also got entered into our political system in an unprecedented way.  
 
Q: What about the judiciary during this period? Did it uphold the legal and constitutional 
principles? 
 
A: The judiciary remained a partner of the military establishment during this period. 
Unfortunately, it remained unable to hold the ground in the face of military rule this time 
around too. When the question of the legality and constitutionality of the imposed martial law 
came before the Supreme Court in what is now famous as The Nusrat Bhutto Case, the 
Supreme Court validated the coup and martial law rules and regulations [Laws (Continuance 
in Force) Order, 1977] in the name of „state necessity‟.  
 
Q: Why was Bhutto hanged? What role did the judiciary play in it? 
 
A: I think Bhutto was perceived to be a potential personal threat by General Zia-ul-Haq. 
Therefore, he was arrested in a murder case retrospectively. The role of the judiciary 
especially the apex court remained dubious during the entire course of proceedings. The fact 
of the matter is that Maulvi Mushtaq, the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, had 
personal antipathy towards Bhutto. So, the prejudicial process of proceedings started from the 
very beginnings. At later stages, the Supreme Court‟s Chief Justice was replaced with a 
favorable one. Moreover, there were obvious breaches of law in terms of non-treatment of 
Bhutto‟s transfer application which were moved both in High Court and the Supreme Court. 
There were other instances as well; one of it was that the retiring member of the Bench, 
despite the existing norm of continuing in the capacity of ad hoc judge, was not recalled. 
Ultimately, the final judgment in the Appeal was divided: three judges in favor of Bhutto 
whereas four judges held the judgment given in the Appeal. So, Bhutto was hanged due to a 
difference of one vote.  
 
 
Q: What is your take on the Eighth Amendment? 
 
A: The origins of the [in]famous Eighth Amendment lay in the Provisional Constitutional 
Order enforced in late March 1981. Indeed, it served as constitution of the country since it 
was upheld by the Lahore High Court- which showed the judiciary was still toeing the 
establishment‟s line. The next blow to legal and constitutional norms came in March 1985 
when the 1973 Constitution was amended with the help of what now is known as Revival of 
the Constitution [Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order (RCO)]. The RCO was actually 
used as a device by the Zia-led military establishment to accrue maximum concessions from 
the politicians and their parties. I think it served as a bargain mechanism between the 
democratic forces and the non-democratic actor. However, at the end of the day, the military 
was successful in its efforts; it got the very essence of the 1973 Constitution amended in its 
favor. The martial law rules, regulations and orders along with the issuing authorities were 
indemnified. Moreover, Pakistan was no longer a parliamentary democracy constitutionally. 
As a result of the passage of the Eighth Amendment, the presidential form of government was 
incorporated in the corpse of the constitution 
 
Q: Why, in your opinion, did the politicians do so? 
 374 
A: As I have [already] mentioned, the RCO was promulgated to put the demanding 
politicians in a perplexing situation. As they were going with the Movement for the 
Restoration of Democracy [MRD], and revival of the original constitution was one of their 
main demands as a basis of any democratic process, the military establishment saw through 
it. Therefore, as a result of negotiations, both sides believed in give and take, for political 
reasons. What the politicians gained, at the end of the day, was the relative restoration of 
democratic process in terms of lifting of the martial law.  
 
Q: Do you think the 1990s was a decade of democracy? 
 
A:  I do not see [it] so. Though we see that civilian governments were formed, we also know 
that they were dissolved by the president who without an iota of doubt, did so on the behalf 
of the military establishment.  In this respect, interesting evidence is the sacking of Nawaz 
Sharif‟s first government [1990-1993] by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The sacked prime 
minister sought judicial rescue. The Supreme Court of the country, quite to the surprise of the 
president or the military establishment for that matter, restored the sacked assemblies and the 
government. However, we see that despite this restoration, which in itself was a rare 
judgment from a judiciary which had previously endorsed the martial laws, both Nawaz 
Sharif and President Ishaq had to leave their respective office. It was because the real power 
lay with the military which had played the role of an arbiter in the country‟s political system. 
Therefore, I do not agree to the view that the 1990s was really a decade of democracy.  
 
Q: Agreed that the president toed the military line, but how do you evaluate President Farooq 
Ahmed Leghari who was appointed [to the Office of President] by Benazir Bhutto? Why did 
he then sack his benefactor? 
 
A: President Farooq Leghari is, very much like the Supreme Court‟s decision to which I have 
just referred, an interesting reading. Actually, in Pakistan‟s politics almost everyone looks to 
his [or her] interests. Benazir Bhutto got him appointed as president because she did not like 
to be victimized by Ghulam Ishaq once again- her government was also dismissed by 
President Ishaq in 1990. Therefore, it seems quite perfect that she brought her man in the 
presidency which had practically become a palace of intrigues. Farooq Ahmed Leghari, on 
his part, also wanted power. So, quite naturally he agreed to assume the office. He, in my 
view, should be happy to know that the 58(2) (b) still lay with him since it was not excluded 
from the constitution by either Sharif or Bhutto. In fact, they had different views on it. Thus, 
during the course of time, differences emerged between the prime minister and the president; 
especially the killing of Mir Murtaza, Benazir‟s brother, further brought disharmony between 
the two.  Bhutto had plans to remove him possibly through an impeachment. However, before 
she could do so the 58(2)(b) was operationalized by  President  Leghari and Bhutto 
government stood dissolved on stated charges of corruption, mismanagement of the economy 
etc. 
 
Q: So, you think military was not involved in it? 
 
A: Not to the extent it was involved during her first dismissal. There was no need for 
arbitration since the duel between the prime minister and the president was already benefiting 
the military establishment. They should have amused at her removal.  
 
Q: Do you think the Thirteenth Amendment was a positive development as far as 
constitutionalism was concerned? 
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A: Of course, it was. The Thirteen Amendment was significant in more than one way. It 
empowered the Office of Prime Minister vis-a-vis the Office of President; it authorized prime 
minister to appoint the three services chiefs- an important and at times thorny issue. 
Moreover, it provided a hope to the people of Pakistan that the country was struggling to 
strengthen the parliamentary institutions. However, it was also unfortunate that during Nawaz 
Sharif‟s second term in office the apex court- the Supreme Court- was attacked by hooligans 
who had  not unknown affiliations with  the ruling party.  
 
Q: What was the primary motive behind this Amendment? 
 
A: The main factor that should have played its role in the passage of the said Amendment 
was realization on the part of the prime minister that without amending the constitution in 
favor of the prime minister it was almost impossible to avoid tension with either the 
constitutionally empowered president or the military establishment; Nawaz Sharif, given his 
heavy mandate, was quite confident to obtain this objective.  
 
Q:  Why was the [October] 1999 coup staged? What was the main reason? 
 
A:  There in no single factor which might have caused the 1999 coup when Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif was arbitrarily removed from his office by General Pervez Musharraf. I think 
the way and manner the PM had dealt with the military establishment- he had sought 
resignation from General Jahangir Karamat; he had a few generals to appoint Musharraf as 
the new army chief; he had differences with the military establishment over the operation in 
Kargil- should have caused deep concerns in the GHQ [General Headquarters]. In other 
words, it was a cumulative process of a variety of factors which ultimately led to his sacking. 
However, the immediate reason was the appointment of General Ziauddin as the new army 
chief. This decision of the prime minister to replace General Musharraf, urged the institution 
of the military to take action against Nawaz Sharif. In other words, it was institutional 
reaction against the prime minister.  
 
Q: Was the coup justifiable then? 
 
A: I did not mean so. I just pointed out the reasons including the immediate one. As regards 
its justification, there are different ways and level to read it. Obviously, the sacking of Nawaz 
Sharif satisfied his political opponents. It was then no wonder that members of some political 
parties were seen disturbing sweets in the streets of major cities. However, an important fact 
in the aftermath of the coup was that a good number of lawyers protested against this illegal 
and unconstitutional act by General Pervez Musharraf.  Moreover, with the passage of time 
the rejoicing elements also came to realize the extent of damage done to democracy by the 
martial law.  
 
 
Q: What role did the judiciary play as regards the question of legality of the martial law? 
 
A: When the military establishment had taken charge of the country on 12 October 1999, 
Pakistan was virtually standing in a legal vacuum. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a 
Proclamation of Emergency was issued which designated General Musharraf as Chief 
Executive of the country. This Proclamation was practically the law of the land. However, on 
October 14, 1999, a Provisional Constitutional Order was promulgated which further 
improved upon the Proclamation of Emergency. The PCO did the two important damages as 
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in fact all PCOs had done in the past: one, it restricted the courts‟ jurisdiction; two, it 
encroached upon the fundamental human rights of the people of Pakistan.  
 
The judiciary witnessed all this. However, it was allowed to function without taking a fresh 
oath PCO. This would have sent a positive signal to the courts, especially the higher courts 
that in the course of time legal matters would be sorted out. However, when the case was 
filed in November 1999 against the very legality of the October coup by Syed Zafar Ali 
Shah- a PPP man who was member of the suspended National Assembly- tough time awaited 
the judges especially of the Supreme Court because they now had to judge the coup on purely 
legal basis.  
 
Nevertheless, in December, 1999 a five-member Bench of Supreme Court was constituted to 
hear the appeals filed against the act of coup. The Bench was headed by Chief Justice Saeed-
uz-Zaman Siddiqui and had Justice Mohammad Bashir Jahangiri, Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid, 
Justice Abdur Rehman Khan and Justice Wajeeh-ud-Din Ahmed on it as  members. The 
proceedings took time as is normal in litigations. The military establishment had no patience 
for this. Perhaps they also were uncertain of the mental makeup of the members of the Bench 
since they were not required to take oath. Therefore, on 26 January 2000 the members of the 
superior judiciary were required to take a fresh oath under the PCO. Interestingly, the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court along with five other judges of the apex court in addition to 
seven judges of the High Courts [two from Peshawar High Court; two from Lahore High 
Court; and three from Sindh High Court], in an unprecedented manner, refused to take oath 
under the PCO. Subsequently, they were retired prematurely. This act of the judges was 
commendable in all respects. However, it is a fact that the remaining seven judges of the 
Supreme Court along eight two High Courts judges took oath under the PCO. The 
reconstituted court validated the martial law on the basis of the doctrine of „state necessity‟. 
However, to save face they called upon the Chief Executive to hold general elections by 
October 2002. This was the overall picture of the role played by the judiciary with respect to 
the validity of the coup.  
 
 
Q:  How do you comment the accountability measures taken by General Musharraf since he 
claimed to clean the country of corrupt elements? 
 
A: Initially, claims were made in this respect: a National Accountability Ordinance was 
issued in 1999 which subsequently became the basis of the National Accountability Bureau 
[NAB]. The NAB was aimed to achieve one of the objectives, namely, accountability- as was 
stated in the Seven-Point agenda of General Pervez Musharraf. Many statements were made 
in the press by the General and his associates with respect to accountability, democratization, 
improvement of the country‟s economic conditions etc. However, very soon the real face of 
the regime became visible. It was quite unpleasant to see corrupt politicians- including 
investigated to be corrupt by the NAB- assuming ministerial posts under Musharraf. Not only 
this, the Chief Executive replaced President Rafiq Tarar, through an Order; later, he got his 
presidential tenure extended for next five years through a highly controversial referendum. 
The same came true to the country‟s economic conditions. So, overall I do not see any 
structural improvement in the political system of Pakistan. In fact, it started to deteriorate 
since his [Musharraf] policies brought more foreign influence to the country. For instance, 
the US was provided bases in Balochistan in order to fight the War on Terror. In addition, the 
suicide attacks started under him. Finally, the drone attacks too are his gift to Pakistan.  
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2) Sample Interview Transcript 
 
 
Name: Mr. Abdur-Rauf  
Designation: Senior journalist/Anchor/Director infotainment, GEO TV Pakistan 
Place: Lahore 
Date: 10 September 2009 
Duration: 75 min.  
Language: English 
 
Q: What is the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan?  
A: For the praetorian nature of our society and historical significance of armed forces in 
power-politics and weak civil institutions the ruler type military presents itself as the 
dominant institution that has to control the state. Moreover, it assumes the role of arbiter type 
[military], from time to time, to rationalize its dominant role as a social arbitrator that steps 
into the governance to correct the imbalance created by the democratic leadership.  
Q: What are the important factors in the determination of civil-military relations?  
A: Unwillingness to accept the role of political leadership in coping with the key state issues; 
lack of military‟s independent political organization, the concept of the time limit for army 
rule, a low level of national consciousness, fear of civilian retribution and concern for army‟s 
[military] consolidation as the most supreme institution are some factors that determine civil-
military relations in our country.  
Q: Are the political parties and politicians important actors?  
A: On key issues like Kashmir and defense budget political parties can play merely a 
symbolic role. They are important to present Pakistan as a state that is not ridden with 
totalitarianism. The democratic face of the state is shown through the political actors. 
Politicians are important in that they of late didn‟t accept the totalitarian approach of a 
military ruler and launched a strenuous movement against him. Political parties, anyway, are 
representative of the people of Pakistan and people have always put confidence in them.  
Q: What role the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan has been playing historically?  
A: [Civil] Bureaucracy has been plundering the country instead of working out efficient 
mechanism to serve the nation. In collaboration with corruption mafia and commission mafia 
bureaucracy has been serving their own interests whether it is civil bureaucracy or military 
bureaucracy. The top brass of the bureaucracy avail of all the perks and privileges at the cost 
of the rights of lower strata. They keep people their slaves mentally by keeping them unfed, 
uneducated and unhealthy. Bureaucracy is now serving the interests of capitalist world in 
letting the market forces use our markets for selling their goods.  
Q: Is civil bureaucracy still an important actor politically?  
A: It is important as the political leadership is generally unaware of the technicalities, 
mechanism, policies that are underway to cater to the needs of the people. It is civil 
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bureaucracy that actually influences the political forces to devise mechanism to start different 
projects, though in a way that serves their interest. There is no system of accountability in 
bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are supposed to be affiliated with different political groups and 
their key positions in various governments serve the interests of their sphere.  
Q: What is the relationship between civil-bureaucracy and the military historically?  
A: Civil and military bureaucracy has been serving the interests of their class instead of 
consolidating their institutions. The elite of both military and civil bureaucracy are one as far 
the key national issues are concerned. There has been a power struggle between them in the 
pre-Ayub era but after the Afghan war military bureaucracy has become more powerful. Civil 
bureaucracy is not generally at daggers drawn with the military bureaucracy, thanks for the 
dominance of particular elite.  
Q: What role the judiciary has been playing historically?  
A: Judiciary has been supporting the military rulers of late but in the immediate past it has 
achieved a position of glory after it said NO to a military ruler who is supposed to be the 
most powerful person in the country. Earlier some key players from judiciary have been on 
cross roads with the democratic rulers but both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif influenced 
the institution as did military rulers. Judiciary interpreted the laws in favor of military rulers 
though it has reached up to a code of ethics now.  
Q: What sort of relations the judiciary has with civil bureaucracy and the military?  
A: With military its role has been submissive and subdued, but it has dominated the civil 
bureaucracy though not to the extent that it could make a difference. Suo Moto tradition in 
vogue is a strong expression of this dominance.  
Q: Is judiciary financially corrupt?  
A: Judiciary, on the whole, is corrupt but news about its corruption is not made public for 
keeping its image intact; otherwise it is easier to buy a judge (particularly from lower courts). 
Corruption of judiciary lies in siding; protecting and giving legal cover to the accused. Legal 
cover has been given to the overriding of the constitution by military dictators as well and 
this happened in higher courts. Judiciary is being revamped these days.  
Q: What is the nature of different religious groups in Pakistan?  
A: There are different religious groups with altogether varying ideologies, motif and line of 
action. Some are politically active and their ideology is based on consolidation of Ummah by 
occupying the throne in the state. Some have been militants in the past but they have now 
„taken a right course‟ by declaring themselves social workers. These parties are involved in 
sectarian violence; religious fanaticism and outright preaching of religion. They are involved 
in the persecution of their fellow countrymen with a different religious background. On 
sectarian level they have been killing one another in the past. A religious party [Jamaiat 
Ulma-e-Islam] is supposed to be the most influential group for Taliban as most of the Taliban 
have received education in their madarrasas. Religious parties are fed by foreign countries 
that correspond to their respective ideological affiliation held by these religious groups. Some 
religious groups preach Islam irrespective of caste, creed and political attachment.  
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Q: Are religious groups (including religious political parties) politically important?  
A: Some religious groups had developed into political parties before the advent of Pakistan 
and these are political legacies of those political parties. Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-i-
Hind are two of them. Jamat-e-Islami has been in power partly during Musharraf era under 
the banner of MMA and it has been very important during Zia era. Afghan war is supposed to 
be fought by this religious group in collaboration with Pakistan army [military]. Jamaiat 
Ulma-e-Islam has been very influential as it represents the Deobandi school of thought. 
Taliban of Pakistan are also Deobandi in general. Even today Jamiat Ulmai-e-Islam (F) is 
partner in the coalition government of PPP[-P].  
Q: What is the role of religion in the civil-military relations in Pakistan?  
A: Civil and military establishment upholds the ideology of Islam and state is run under the 
banner of this ideology though the ideology has never compelled them to distribute powers 
and privileges to the lower strata in the country. The symbolic importance of ideology is 
anyway upheld by both of them.  
Q: What brings the military in Pakistan‟s politics?  
A: Capability of intelligence agencies to influence; threaten and bribe the politicians; Indian 
factor; the power to manipulate by the dint of power and money; the weakness of democratic 
structure in the country; the vested interests of political leadership; the eroded democratic 
institutions in the country and lack of political will to thwart military intrusion bring military 
in to politics.  
Q: Has military become a political actor?  
A: Military has become a big corporate sector. It has put huge investment in development 
projects; financial institutions, services sector and real estate. Even if army institutions fail, 
they are fed by civil institutions like Army Welfare Trust [AWT] was rejuvenated by civil 
institutions when it was going to the dogs. NLC [National Logistics Cell] has replaced 
Railway cargo effectively. With the power of money and traditional military discipline it 
easily manipulates in politics.  
Q: What are the implications of military rule for the regional security?  
A: Different regions are facing tribulation and agony for the too much interference and 
decisions made by military- like Baloch and Swati people accuse military of their grievances.  
Q: Has the military rule (both present and past) brought economic prosperity in the country?  
A: The prosperity brought about by military is not far reaching as billions of dollars have 
been given by the US to pursue its own interests in the region and that is why the inflow of 
capital in the country brought opportunities but the country had to give back eleven dollars 
for every one dollar gained so far. The Military has opened up new vistas in the realm of 
services sector but no industry has been developed and no means of production have been 
exploited by the military. Job opportunities have been given in private sector but 
infrastructure for local industry has not been resorted to. Right after the Musharraf 
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government, the economic crisis loomed large and it was for the artificial blockade of the 
crisis in the country. A lot of sectors were privatized for peanuts in the country.  
Q: What implications the military rule has for the federation of Pakistan?  
A: Federation has become weaker as the people in all the provinces affiliate themselves with 
the regional groups that lay their foundation on ethnic and provincial basis. People are against 
establishment that works on the behalf of the centre.  
Q: Is there any causal relationship between the phenomenon of suicide blasts and the military 
rule?  
A: Suicide blasts started during the military regime and rose to its peak all along the military 
rule. Musharraf‟s crackdown against Red Mosque in Islamabad ignited the suicide bombers 
that allegedly had affiliation with their fellow religionists.  
Q: Does civil society exist in Pakistan? If yes, what is the future of the civil society?  
A: Civil society is a pressure group and it has recently launched a movement against a 
military ruler in collaboration with lawyers and has achieved its target. Civil society is 
composed of educated people but their approach towards life is somehow elitist as they never 
talk about the injustice of free market economy; uneven development, under-globalization 
and squeezing market for the poor.  
Q: What could be the best solution(s) for Pakistan‟s political problems, in your view?  
A: Redistribution of wealth; reallocation of resources; long term approach to exploit the 
resources of the country; less dependence upon foreign aid; minimum military role on 
political decisions; less obsession with the Indian factor and march towards the development 
of infrastructure in the country are solutions for our political problems.  
Q: How do you look at Pakistani media over the decades?  
A: Up till the advent of 21
st
 century [the] media in Pakistan has been serving the interests of 
the government, both military and democratic [civilian]. With the spread of private media 
channels the accountability of politicians and bureaucrats has been made possible to some 
extent…[It] is playing a significant role in making the public opinion and highlighting the 
popular perception. The Media‟s popularity lies in its outright crispy opposition to the 
government so public awareness is in progress regarding the constitutional development, 
political insight and institutional reforms in the country. [Despite this, it] has to bear the 
pressure of ideology, popular mindset of the masses- particularly in the case of religious 
issues and social taboos-, interests of the state, foreign countries (like Saudi Arabia) and 
market forces.  
Q: Do you think the media- both print and electronic- was free under Ayub, Z.A. Bhutto, and 
Zia?  
A: During all these three eras media served the interests of the ruling party. In Bhutto‟s age 
there was a reaction against the suppressed voice of the people so media resorted to the 
hitherto neglected intellectuals, analysts and literary people.  
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Q: How do you look at the media‟s role post-9 March 2007?  
A: The media is playing a significant role in making the public opinion and highlighting the 
popular perception. The media‟s popularity lies in its outright crispy opposition to the 
government so public awareness is in progress regarding the constitutional development; 
political insight and institutional reforms in the country.  
Q: Do you think Pakistan‟s media is free from any sort of pressures from any sort of actors?  
A: No. Media has to bear the pressure of ideology; popular mindset of the masses 
(particularly in the case of religious issues and social taboos), interests of state; foreign 
countries (like Saudi Arabia) and market forces.  
Q: How do you see the future of the country?  
A: Brightness of future is conditional. Reliability on its resources; strict check and balance on 
the money that travels into and out of the country; long term planning for developing 
infrastructure; sound policies for trade routes; contentment of the people living in the far 
flung areas; non-intervention of military elite and pursuit of economic prosperity are to be 
focused otherwise the state cannot be kept intact forcibly.  
 
3)  Sample Interview Transcript 
 
 
Designation: A civil bureaucrat from the Ministry of Commerce 
Place: Islamabad 
Date: 29 April 2008 
Duration:  45:45 min  
Language: English 
 
 
Q: Today is 29 of April 2008, and I have with me [a civil bureaucrat, who works] in the 
Ministry of Commerce. Thanks for your time. [0:1] 
 
A: Welcome… 
 
Q: How would you like to define Pakistan‟s political system in general? [0:37] 
 
A:  First of all I think, we have to decrease the military‟s role in Pakistani politics. Because 
wherever you see the political system as an emerging force, you would find that there is 
(always) a trial and error process. The country‟s forces like the military, bureaucracy give 
them a space and opportunity to groom. For example, we have whole of the US history and 
United Kingdom‟s history (pause), that we see they pass through very critical phases during 
the kingship in the United Kingdom whereby the political forces continued their personal 
development. They challenged the authority of the king, and even at one time they beheaded 
Charles I. In the same way, if we look at the American history, they challenged the British 
supremacy and then the political parties emerged with the passage of time, and they got 
strong. But unfortunately in Pakistan if we look at the history since inception…Pakistan was 
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achieved through a classical nationalist movement headed by a few westernized elite like our 
founder Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah , and other political leaders like Liaquat Ali 
Khan and some other famous leaders [Ispahani etc]. They exploited the religious sentiments 
of the people. Jinnah wanted to give the Muslims of India an independent land free from 
Hindu domination and the British Raj [domination]. 
 
Q: Sorry to interrupt you, what you really want to say is the political parties like Muslim 
League was very weak from the very beginning. Is it weakness of the political forces which 
provided opportunity to extra-parliamentary force which led [themselves] in politics? [2:55] 
 
A: Exactly. Pause. One thing that I want to tell you is [that] Pakistan was achieved as an 
ideological state. Our founder got the religious support from the different sections of the 
society, like different clerics…most of the clergy was behind the nationalist movement of the 
Quaid. But immediately after the creation of Pakistan if we look, the clergy went to the other 
side, and there was polarization of politics. And, some people wanted Pakistan to be a 
theocratic state; but some liberal elements wanted Pakistan to be a more democratic Islamic 
state. Right. And, since inception (when) the polarization emerged and when the vacuum 
[got] created, because when these [two] forces, the liberal forces, the feudal forces and the 
clergy [they] become polarized (pause), the army [military] saw (that) it is their duty to save 
Pakistan‟s ideological boundaries. And, once in his speech at Quetta Quaid-e-Azam 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah suppressed Mr. Ayub as the [latter] wanted to be in the politics of 
Pakistan. He [Jinnah] categorically denounced the role of military. A military which was 
recruited  by the British from present day Pakistan- from [Rawal]pindi, Chakwal, and Jhelum 
regions…when they saw vacuum they got into the politics on  the (very) first day when Ayub  
was inducted as  defense minister  in the cabinet of Mohammad Ali Bogra. 
 
Q: You are right from your perspective. My question is what was that which led to the 
fragmentation of religious clergy, civil bureaucracy and politicians under Jinnah? Because it 
was the same Jinnah who, as you mentioned, was in control of this whole coterie of forces,  
for example Muslim League, civil bureaucracy [etc.]. But what was that which made these 
forces after the creation of Pakistan to fall like house of cards? [5:10] 
 
A: Well said. Stanley Wolpert said about the Quaid [Jinnah] that some leaders create nations, 
some leaders create countries. But Jinnah did both. And the reason for that is whole of 
political leadership was united, but [due to] untimely death (of the Quaid) led to polarization 
in the Pakistani politics  
 
Q: Right. What you really want to say is there was lack of leadership?  [6:11] 
 
A: Y[es] exactly, [there is a] lack of leadership. If we compare it with India, we (see) that 
Nehru ruled for approximately twenty years after the creation of Pakistan [and India]. And he 
gave, I think, direction to the Indian politics. And secondly, [in today‟s Pakistan], before 
Partition the present day Pakistan had no political roots. Because the Congress in India had its 
roots right into the masses. They appealed and gave consciousness to the people that it‟s your 
right and you should go ahead for your rights: you should protest; you should boycott. 
 
Q: I got your point in a comparative perspective. So, what I really want to know from your 
side is, in the absence of leadership, why did the Pakistani masses in the „50s not react to the 
coming of extra-parliamentary forces, or even parliamentary forces such as politicians? 
Though there was a Constituent Assembly if not a parliament, still it [Constituent Assembly] 
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was there. But why Pakistani masses did not come to streets and demand the emergence of a 
new leadership?   [6:59] 
 
A: Right. If we look t the early years of partition we will find the masses who were already 
living in the contemporary Pakistan had no political consciousness…they were direct[ly] 
under the subjugation either of feudal lords or Hindu- economic system . They didn‟t have so 
much awareness for their rights. Secondly, people who were politically conscious migrated 
right from India but they got involved in their own settlement issues. That‟s why they 
couldn‟t protest against the extra-parliamentary forces. They had to take care of their own 
square meal, that‟s why they didn‟t actively participate in the political system. And, pause… 
 
Q: May be lack of organization among unions like the trade union (was a factor)? [8:44] 
 
A: Y[es] exactly. You can say that Muslim League didn‟t have so much deep roots in the 
present day Pakistan  
 
Q: Right. You mentioned that it was primarily the structure which influenced Pakistani state 
and society from the very beginning and the example you cited was the recruitment of 
military from the three districts (of British India), and then the officers at the top further 
intensified the process of the of extra-parliamentary forces coming into politics. So, once they 
were there, what was that which led them not get out of it [politics]?  [9:01] 
 
A: You are talking about the army and the forces that kept them in politics for such a long 
time?  
 
Q: Of course. Are there any factor, any reasons, and any interests?  [10:06] 
 
A:  I have some logical answer to this question. As I mentioned earlier the British army was 
recruited from Northern Punjab [of today‟s Pakistan]. These people got emerged as defenders 
of the ideological boundaries of Pakistan. Because from the very first day they were 
inculcated that you are the real defenders of the motherland, and this psychology forced them 
to think that [these] politicians are corrupting the state of Pakistan – corrupting the 
ideological boundaries of Pakistan. They [the military] thought politicians had vested 
interests in politics. They were not professionals. They were not mature enough to lead a new 
state into some direction. They [the military] thought themselves to be genius because they 
had training under the British [military values and institutions]. In that sense, that superiority 
complex enforced them to political maneuvering  
 
Q:  So, were they successful in achieving these objectives as being savior of the nation? 
[11:43] 
 
A: No, not at all. Pakistan army [military] is not a savior of the nation. Actually, they proved, 
I think, to be the Armageddon for this nation. Because once they entered into politics, they 
initiated their corporate interests. And once their corporate interests surfaced, they wanted to 
remain in politics to save their corporate interests. Second, the geostrategic position of 
Pakistan is such….I would like to say the distortion in Pakistan‟s politics is directly linked 
with its geostrategic position. Because during the Cold War Pakistan had to be ally of the 
USA in order to condemn communism. And, the US thought Pakistan army is professional 
one – it was considered to be the elite of the country. They thought they should have contact 
with the elite. Because it is easy to deal with the elite rather than the common people. Once 
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they established their linkages with the army, she got confident that [now] she has political, 
economic and strategic support from the US. They should prolong their stay in politics of 
Pakistan in order to achieve their own interests as well as those of America. And that was 
(due to), I think, the corporate interests. This is the reason which impose them to be in 
politics  
 
Q: Do you think herein lies the reason for the break-up of the country …I mean the interests 
of the military in terms of its corporate interests kept them in politics and as a result the 
Eastern Wing didn‟t get proper rights. So, do you think that these interests of one particular 
group or institution led to the break-up of the country? [13:36] 
 
A: Exactly! I do agree with this. First of all, (there is) the attitude problem with Pakistan 
military, and that attitude was (caused by) the superiority complex. Because most of the 
Punjabis dominated the army who thought that these bully, black Bengalis are not competent 
enough to rule the country. And this attitude (of) superiority complex pushed them to 
suppress the Bengalis. Right. Secondly, with the passage of time their corporate interests got 
increased. Thirdly, the factor vis-à-vis India- they thought if India was their enemy, so 
Bengalis was thought to be more close to India [culturally and geographically]. That‟s why 
they thought them to be their internal enemy. They thought Bengalis were not sincere with 
the state of Pakistan, and this ideological misperception enforced the Pakistan army to think 
in different directions. Because once the country is ruled by the army, it is definitely under 
the dictatorship which doesn‟t have space for negotiations, for tolerance, and for political 
dialogue. The dictator says it should [must] be done, and it‟s all.  
 
Q: In the post-break up period we see that Bhutto became Chief Martial Law Administrator 
and the President of the country, so what do you think was the real reason behind his 
assumption of two offices? Was it that Pakistani military got discredited or demoralized in 
the war against India in „71? Or was it that Bhutto was powerful personality in that particular 
context? Or is there any third or fourth reason?  [15:42] 
 
A: Well, if we look at the personality of Mr. Bhutto, [we will see that] he himself belonged to 
a feudal family. He had some kind of feudal attitude. Though he got majority in the Western 
Wing, but mentally he was feudal: he didn‟t tolerate the opposition, he even killed his 
opponents; he suppressed his opponents, he started the military operation in Baluchistan. 
Some time he was at loggerheads with Mujib only because he [Bhutto] knew that had there 
been election for the National Assembly Mujib [-ur-Rahman] would get the premiership of 
the country. That‟s why he maneuvered in such a way- he compelled army through his 
maneuvering to undertake the military operation in the Eastern Wing. Because he (himself) 
belonged to the Western Wing and most of the military too came from this Wing. That‟s why 
Tikka Khan led the operation in East Pakistan. This is the reason that even after winning the 
majority and presenting himself as the first democratic leader of Pakistan after the Quaid, 
when he assumed the position of decision making he thought that the problems of the state 
could not be easily solved through a plain process of democracy or dialogue. That‟s why he 
reverted back to military-style dictatorship. This was the reason [of the break-up and Bhutto‟s 
rise]. There is no doubt that Pakistani problems of security were genuine; there were tribals 
who were challenging the writ of the state in Balochistan, and even in Sindh and tribal areas. 
That‟s why he didn‟t have any option. Because Western Pakistan didn‟t have broad political 
base. That‟s why he being the leader of a single democratic party, assumed himself to be a 
dictator. I think that was an attitudinal problem. 
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Q:  Do you think that it was his attitudinal problem which led to rig the 1977 elections, and 
his subsequent downfall?  [19:45] 
 
A: Y[es] exactly. In the 1977, there was rigging. Obviously! He even used his Federal 
Security Force [FSF]. He, basically, after assuming of powers as Prime Minster, wanted to 
subsidize the role of the military in Pakistan [„s politics]. [Therefore] he initiated the nuclear 
program, so that once he maintained the nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India, the role of the 
army [the military] would [get] automatically reduce[ed]. Because conventionally Pakistan 
could not challenge such a large [Indian] force[s]. With the achievement of nuclear parity 
with India, it would have been impossible for the two states to fight a war. And, this would 
automatically reduce the role of the military from politics. Right. When he initiated the 
nuclear program it gave him the presumption that now the role of the army would 
automatically reduce, he should go ahead with his despotic rule. And he wanted to be 
powerful at any cost.  That‟s why he rigged the elections of 1977. Because he was a power-
loving creature. 
 
Q: Do you think rigging was really an issue, a problem which made the military intervene 
again in 1977? [21:11] 
 
A: No. Rigging was just a pretext under which the military assumed power. Because even 
despite the humiliating defeat in Dhaka at the hands of General Arora Singh [Indian army], 
the Pakistani military was [such] a demoralized institution in 1971. No doubt Bhutto gave 
them space and [help them get] the 90 thousand prisoners [POW]. With the passage of time, 
Bhutto used the military to achieve his political objectives- to suppress his political 
opponents. And, it gave the military an indication that the prime minister is weak: the civilian 
set-up is weak, the political leadership is weak. They [politicians] are again using military to 
achieve their objectives. Right. This gave, I think, wrong signal to military that now there is 
again a space to intervene in politics. And, for seven years [1971-77] the military got itself 
established on some sold basis; they restored their position and again intervened.  
 
Q:   How do you look at Zia era (or decade) generally?  [22:47] 
 
A: Zia‟s eleven year rule was such a ruthless that what we are facing right now- the 
phenomenon of suicide bombing, religious extremism and Islamic militancy- have direct 
linkages with Zia‟s eleven-year rule. Because he led the extremists forces to gain ground in 
Pakistani society. Zia was a ruthless dictator without any vision, without any (pause) 
sympathy for political, democratic and cultural forces.  
 
Q: As you know that Zia did many things i.e. initiation of the Jihad and Kalashnikov culture. 
One thing that he also did was the induction of article 58 2(b) in the 1973 Constitution. So, 
how do you look at  that amendment and its fallouts or its consequences on Pakistan‟s 
political system in the 1990s?  [23:40]  
 
A: Y[es], exactly. We have experienced the downfall of four [civilian] governments under 58 
(2)(b). That‟s like a sword which is still hanging on the heads of politicians. Zia basically 
maneuvered…under some international pressure for democratization; the military wanted to 
have the juggler vein (of civilians) in her hand, and that was (through) 58 (2)(b).  
 
Q: Why did they want to have 58 (2)(b)? [24:49] 
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A: Because at that time they have developed such a massive corporate interests in the body of 
Pakistani state that they could not easily relinquish the charge of (politics). 
 
Q: What is your definition of corporate interests?   [25:13]   
 
A: Corporate interests are such (that) once you have some kind of businesses- heavy 
businesses and heavy investment- in any economic system that you need a political power to 
sustain that.     
                                                       
Q: You intend to say that it is something which also includes budgetary benefits or is it 
something beyond that?  [25: 34] 
 
A:  Pardon.  
 
Q: Do you think that corporate interests include budget[ary] money that they [the military] 
got from the national exchequer or something else?  [25:42] 
 
A: If you look at (this phenomenon), legally corporate interests are operating under the name 
of welfare institutions for the military personnel. But actually if we search through the very 
basis of these corporate interests, we will find that National Logistics Cell [NLC], that is the 
main transporting fleet in Pakistan, [is] head[ed] either by ruling Major General or Lieutenant 
General. And it is such a notorious organization- no doubt it is the main luggage forwarding 
body in Pakistan vis-à-vis Pakistan Railways [PR] - [that] it hindered the growth of the PR.  
 
Q: I got your point. My next question to you is: how do look at the relationship between civil 
bureaucracy, the military and politicians in the last six decades? Do you think civil 
bureaucracy had cooperative relationship with these actors or they had [has] conflictual one? 
Or is it a mixture?  [26.59] 
 
A: Well, if we look at the early ten years of Pakistan, we will find that it was solely ruled by 
the [civil] bureaucracy right from 1947 to 1958.  That was a pure rule of the bureaucracy 
because Pakistan didn‟t have too much seasoned politicians and, I think, well trained army 
[military]. It was only the bureaucrats who were running the affairs of the country. Because 
they considered themselves to be the most well educated and well exposured men who could 
serve the public. Right from 1958 to 1968, it was the civil bureaucracy which gave 
techniques- which gave ways to the military to get itself involved in politics. Right. Pause. 
Because for the civil bureaucracy it was just a change of masters after the British. Right from 
1958 to 1968 there was a very good symphony of bureaucracy and military. They well 
coordinated with each other.  And that‟s why we see that Bhutto thought that it was the 
bureaucracy which showed the ways of intervention to the military. That‟s why Bhutto 
clipped the wings of the bureaucracy in his early years of government. It was also easy for 
him to clip the wings of bureaucracy rather than the military. Zia again used [the civil] 
bureaucracy because at that time bureaucracy had assumed a junior partner‟s role. Between 
1948 and 1958 it was the senior partner in running the affairs of the country.  
 
Q: So, you think till now from 1958 it is a junior partner?  [30:06] 
 
A: Y[es], exactly! Still it is a junior partner.  
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Q: But still overall it has a conflictual or interest-based relationship? Or, if not conflictual 
one, it has cooperative relations with the military? [30:12]  
 
A: Look, Pakistani bureaucracy is very much resistant to change. But if we look at the 
cheequered history of Pakistan we will find that bureaucracy had been at more ease during 
the military rules rather than the civilian governments. 
 
Q: Why? [30:45] 
 
A: Because it is very easy to take decisions during the era of dictators and bureaucracy have 
just to execute the decisions. No doubt they [civil bureaucrats too] are policy makers; the give 
some policy guidelines to the dictators and they [dictators] take decisions, and get the 
bureaucrats involved in executing those decisions. 
 
Q:  How do you look at the 1999 military coup by Musharraf? Was it structural one? Or was 
there any other factor?  [31:13]  
 
A:  It was a structural one as I already told you Bhutto initiated the nuclear program to reduce 
the military role. And we should analyze Pakistani politics vis-à-vis its geostrategic 
environment. No doubt, Nawaz Sharif was hand-picked man by the establishment. But with 
the passage of time he started to get free from the clutches of military establishment. He 
wanted to gain a strategic breakthrough with India. He was a business-minded person who 
wanted good relations with India. But the army did not want that. Right. Because once you 
establish good relationship with India without the involvement of the army, it is (a) direct 
challenge to the military. 
 
Q: What you want to say is that his desire of normalizing with India became a kind of a 
difficult thing for military to digest? [32: 48] 
 
A: Exactly. I can give you one example. In 1999 Mr. Nawaz Sharif was successful in 
bringing Mr. Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India, under the shadow of the minaret of 
Pakistan in Lahore- that was a symbolic ideological statute of Pakistan. And the military 
chief [General Musharraf] refused to salute him [Prime Minister Vajpayee]. Even the military 
maneuvered Jamaat-e-Islami. And, they protested harshly against the visit of Mr. Vajpayee.  
 
Q: Do you think that Kargil was not that much important factor in this context? [33:53] 
 
A: Kargil was the culminating factor in the bringing down of Nawaz Sharif. Because that was 
just, I think, a shameless, misperceived [and] misconceived army adventure. Because they 
wanted Kargil to be a clue in overthrowing Nawaz Sharif  
 
Q:  How do you look at Musharraf years, briefly?  [34:27] 
 
A: Musharraf was welcomed in the very early years by different sections of society. But with 
the passage of time…Pause. Whatever kind of dictator he is, he is a dictator. He showed his 
(real) face with the passage of time. In the beginning, he presented himself as a very 
enlightened man – a man who genuinely presented himself as a democratic[ally-] minded 
dictator. Though it is ridicules to say a dictator a democrat. But he presented himself in such 
a way. And, immediately after his arrival [in politics] he maintained contacts with the [civil] 
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bureaucracy. The very loyal crony of Musharraf is a bureaucrat- Mr. Tariq Aziz, who is from 
the Income Tax Group [of the civil bureaucracy].  
 
Q: If he is allying with the chief of the bureaucracy, why did he [Musharraf] do damage to 
the DMG [District Management Group of the civil bureaucracy)]?  [35:37] 
 
A: That was again a personal vendetta against the DMG. Because it was the District 
Magistrate [from the DMG] who refused the landing of plane of Mr. Musharraf [on 12 
October 1999]. It was under the orders of the District Magistrate that the Civil Aviation 
Authority refused the captain of the plane to land at Karachi airport. Right. 
 
Q: So, you think it [the changes in the DMG] was his [Musharraf] personal [agenda]?  
[36:19]] 
 
A: Exactly. It was the brainchild of General Tauqeer Zia, and Musharraf implemented it.      
 
Q: Ok. How do you look at the role of judiciary in Pakistan‟s politics briefly, and then what 
you think was the real reason behind 9 March [2007] episode?  [36:29]   
 
A: Before I answer this question, let me add more comment on Musharraf. Actually, 
immediately after Nine Eleven – 9/11 was a turning point not only for the world but also for 
the Musharraf. Because 9/11 gave legitimacy to the Musharraf regime, it was easy for the 
Americans to deal with the dictator. It is astonishing to listen that…when he was phoned by 
President Bush that either you are with us or against us…. Musharraf categorically said that 
without any condition we are supporting you. And after 9/11 he didn‟t have any clear military 
stance. He even deceived Americans at many points. He deceived his nation [too]. He lied to 
the nation that he would doff his uniform by the end of 2004. But he didn‟t. In the same way, 
he killed many innocent people. He was considered to be the king of missing people. In the 
same way, he prolonged his rule to gain economic and military aid from the US (for himself 
and the top military brass). He is still loyal to his institution.  
 
Q:  Why the 9
th
 March occurred?  [39:38] 
 
A:  The reason was that the lawyers are representative of the lower middle class or the middle 
class of Pakistan. The very day [12 Oct. 1999] when Musharraf assumed powers, the lawyers 
protested. But that was not published in the press; they were not given (proper) coverage (by 
state media) to create consciousness in the people. But when Musharraf assumed powers he 
led private [TV] channels to play their role. And, with the passage of time there was growing 
frustration. Because the Musharraf and his cronies couldn‟t deliver to the Pakistani people.  
His hand-picked political party [ PML-Q] couldn‟t do anything. So, there was a great hatred 
against these people. Since 1999 to 2007 there was accumulation of anger, frustration and 
fear against the military dictatorship, and against the looming crisis of suicide bombing and 
other social problems – that created hatred [among] the people. And the media led the people 
think and judge freely. And, definitely the judges are from the society. They also thought. 
 
Q: Do you think it was for the first time in Pakistani history that the judges thought? Before 
this we had doctrine of necessity [from the judges]. [41:29]  
 
A:  No doubt. (But) we did have some judges in our history who refused the PCO; who didn‟t 
take oath under the PCO. But they were minor enough to [get] count[ed].  
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Q:  But I am talking about the institution of judiciary. Do you think that overall it was a first 
incident in Pakistani‟s history that they took a potential stance? [41:53] 
 
A: Y[es], exactly. It is (un)fortunately the first example in Pakistan‟s judicial chequered 
history that such an apex body of court took decision against Musharraf.  
 
Q:  Ok. So, you think the lawyers have now a movement? Do you think that they are going to 
be successful?  [42:30]   
 
A: Y[es], they do have potential to create problems for the [recently] elected government. 
Because they have experienced such a massive popular support during the last one year of 
their movement; and they are so resolute; and they show perseverance and patience in their 
political movement- they are appreciated throughout the world. The whole world watched 
them [when] the Chief Justice [of the Supreme Court] went from Islamabad to Lahore. It took 
[them] 25 to 26 hours to get to Lahore. Wherever he [the Chief Justice] visited, even a small 
town or a big town, he received such a rosy welcome whose example we don‟t have in our 
history.  
 
Q:  So, you are hopeful that the movement is going to get fruit[ful], maybe in two or three 
days?   [43:48] 
 
A: Exactly. I am hopeful. If the present coalition government could not restore the judges 
without any condition, they would go ahead and launch massive protest. 
 
Q: Ok. Thank you very much. I have asked all the questions. Anything else that you want to 
share with?  [44:08]  
 
A: I do like to share with you that now Pakistan is entirely a different state. We can say 
Pakistan is not a failed state. It is an unpredictable state. It could take a course of theocracy. It 
could take a course of protocracy. And, it could take a course of semi-democratic [system]. 
But if the middle class [including the lower middle class] along with other members [i.e. 
academia, media,] of the civil society are able to play their positive role, I think there are 
chances that the institutions in Pakistan would get strong. Because at this [particular] moment 
I feel [that] right from the lay man in the countryside to upper middle classes in the urban 
areas, there is a united hatred against the domination of a single institution. This is a positive 
thing. I think it would take some years [for] democracy [to get mature] in Pakistan.  
 
Q: Thank you very much…for your kind words. [45:34] 
 
A: You are always welcomed… 
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